Memorial Life of General Sherman



GENERAL WM. T. SHERMAN.

THE

MEMORIAL LIFE

OF

GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN

BY

PRIVATE EDWARD CHASE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

GENERAL C. H. HOWARD

Illustrated

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

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

Citizens who would realize the thrill of patriotic enthusiasm which stirred the national pulse during the war must seek on all sides for points of view which shall cover the scene and present the widest grasp of moving causes. It is not denied that patriotism was general; it may perhaps be said that all hearts were inspired with the same hope of a reunited country and more firmly established institutions. Still there remains the necessity of looking along the line which stretched from forsaken homes to the headquarters tent of the commanding general that the picture may be all-embracing. There was wide difference in the chances of advancement between the private in the ranks and the colonel at the head of his regiment. The outlook between these two points covers a large range and includes all that constitutes the test of army feeling.

There were few lives in which this field was covered. None in which it is touched at all points as in that of William Tecumseh Sherman. To the soldier in the ranks General Sherman appeared as the sum of all that was noble in a commander. He possessed none of those characteristics which kept constantly in view a life of preparation for military duty. His every act showed something of the preparation for present duties which made the performance of work in hand seem natural. Sherman was a soldier because of the emergency which called him from peaceful pursuits, and not because he had been educated at public expense to a knowledge of military tactics.

Of the grand work with which his name has been linked his intimate associates have borne faithful tribute. It is my object to present the view of General Sherman from the ranks, and to, in some manner, exhibit the causes which inspired the strong affection felt for their commander by all who had served under him and shared with him in his triumphs. It is not the story of one for whom the fortunes of war held prizes. With the gun on my shoulder I left the humble roof that had sheltered me during the whole of the eighteen years of my life. With that gun I returned in the ranks still, but filled with pride that my early ambition had been gratified, and that no misfortune had been placed to my discredit because of unfaithfulness.

They were four years of hardships and danger, but filled with an experience which has been valuable in subsequent life, and in no particular of greater personal comfort than in the opportunity of placing this tribute on the grave of a loved commander with the hope that it may give pleasure to comrades who remember the half-grown lad plodding with them during the war, bearing his share of the little annoyances of camp-life, and the name of

"TEDDY" CHASE.

INTRODUCTION.

It was to be expected that veterans of the Civil War would be interested in any full and accurate life of General Sherman. This would especially be true of those who were under his command, or in any way participated in the campaigns with which his world-wide fame was associated. But in reading the proof-pages of the present work, the writer has not only been deeply interested in the narratives of battles and campaigns, in which he was more or less closely associated with General Sherman, but has received new impressions of the General's character, and has found that other periods of his life, comparatively little known, possess an absorbing interest. There was never anything commonplace about Sherman. As a boy, a youth at West Point, or in his first Indian campaigning in Florida, a young officer in California, or afterward as a banker in San Francisco, not many years later at the head of the State Military School of Louisiana, as commander of a brigade at the first battle of Bull Run, or in his more responsible position, better known to the public during the remainder of the war, there is a picturesque and striking quality, that must always compel the attention, if not the admiration, of the reader.

It is not easy to satisfy his old companions in arms in any estimate of Sherman's military genius. Those who stood by his side in the battles of Shiloh, or Mission Ridge, or on the hotly contested fields about Atlanta, as the writer often has done, have no hesitation in giving General Sherman the first rank for coolness and clearness of mind, and readiness

of resource in action. Those who participated in the active campaign of ninety days in the pursuit of Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in which the three great armies cooperated under the one directing and controlling mind, will always remember with admiration the celerity of movements, the rapid and unexpected changes of front, the happy adaptation to the varying topography, the successful out-maneuvering of the astute Johnston on the Etowah River, at Kenesaw Mountain, on the Chattahoochee, and in the final capture of Atlanta. The quick sagacity, which first conceived and then successfully executed the plan of such a campaign, and the still bolder and more astonishing one of the "March to the Sea," and through the Carolinas to the expected consummation at Bentonville, resulting—together with the necessary part performed by Grant and his forces in the final collapse of the Rebellion—this genius for grand tactics, puts Sherman abreast of the Alexanders, the Fredericks, the Napoleons and the Washingtons of the World's history.

Among other impressions that have come to me afresh in reading this work is that of the moral basis of Sherman's character. As a boy of nine, when his honored father, Judge Charles R. Sherman, died, and the lad was adopted by the Hon. Thomas Ewing, his adopted father could say of the little orphan that he was "remarkable for accuracy of memory and straightforward truthfulness." The fact that, as a youthful officer in Florida, he formed friendships which lasted a life-time with such sterling men as Ord, Van Vliet, and George H. Thomas, is evidence of a sincerity and fidelity, indicating the same high moral quality. None of that personal jealousy or rivalry so common among army officers, could ever make Sherman swerve in his affection for General George H. Thomas.

When located in Charleston Harbor and in Georgia, a

young man, although fond of hunting and all active sports, he yet found time to study Blackstone, Kent, and other substantial works on law.

After he resigned his commission in the army and took charge of a branch bank in San Francisco, when, from no fault of his, reverses came, we find him now, in his early manhood, and with the responsibilities of a growing family, unwilling to save himself at the sacrifice of others, and insisting on paying dollar for dollar. Honesty was a cardinal trait in every position in life he was called to occupy. This phase of his character, and, at the same time, his capacity for patriotic devotion, were illustrated when the war-cloud actually broke upon the land. Sherman was then at the head of the Louisiana State Military College at Alexandria. On the 18th of January, 1861, Sherman wrote to the Governor:

"I accepted this position when the motto of the seminary, inserted in marble over the main door, was: 'By the Liberality of the General Government of the United States: The Union —Esto perpetua.' If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old constitution as long as a fragment of it survives.

"I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent, the moment the State determines to secede. For on no account will I do any act, or think any thought, hostile to, or in defiance of, the old Government of the United States."

No utterance in those trying days—days that developed the hero and disclosed the traitor—had a truer ring than that.

It is this fire of ardent patriotism, based on honorable purpose, and a love of truth and an earnestness of conviction which could brook no indirectness, no mere policy in con-

duct, which sometimes, and for a brief period, brought upon Sherman the aspersions of less faithful men and the distrustful insinuations of those who were timid and self-seeking. Sherman did not grow embittered and throw up his commission, even when unjustly treated under such circumstances. A true nobility of soul lay at the foundation of his character. Sherman was not only a great general—he was a great man.

C. H. HOWARD,
Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General; Inspector-General Army of Tennessee.

LIFE OF GENERAL SHERMAN.

CHAPTER I.

HIS ANCESTRY AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN EARLY LIFE.

In the wonderful story of Ben-Hur the author has presented a delightful picture of the road through which it is possible for some to be led up to great attainments. Every incident in the life of Wallace's hero forms an important factor in developing force of mind, heart and limb, essential to the great work that lay before him. Readers delighted with the vivid description of the chariot race with Ben-Hur the victor cannot prevent the mind recurring to his terrible life in the galleys and the discipline of his subsequent career.

This peculiar fitting of a life for unexpected duties, this preparation for work that seems distasteful in the distance and is met with perfect confidence, is as much a part of the life of General Sherman as was that life part and parcel of the war which sustained the government and forever determined the question of national authority. No one can trace his ancestry, his experiences as a youth on the frontier, longing for an education with a yearning that led him to endure the formalities and red-tapism of West Point, without understanding something of the laws of heredity and the force of early associations.

General William Tecumseh Sherman was born in Lancaster, Ohio, February 8th, 1820. He came of a family in which

culture and social position have been a birthright for many generations. In 1634 Samuel Sherman, of Essex County, England, came to the colony of Massachusetts with his brother, the Rev. John Sherman, and his cousin, Captain John Sherman. Roger Sherman, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, was a great-grandson of Captain John Sherman; while General Sherman traces his lineage to that of the Rev. John Sherman, whose family settled in Woodbury and Norwalk, Conn. The grandfather of General Sherman and the great-grandson of the Rev. John Sherman was a judge of one of the Connecticut courts. On his death in 1810 his widow removed to Lancaster, Ohio, in search of a cheaper living and better chances for her boys. One of her sons, Charles R. Sherman, rose in the practice of the law and became in 1823 a judge of the Ohio Supreme Court. He married in 1810, when twenty-two years old, Miss Mary Hoyt. She was an intelligent, exemplary woman, a member of the Presbyterian Church, and an affectionate wife and mother. They had eleven children, and the judge spent his income in their support. He died suddenly in 1829, of cholera. General Sherman was the sixth and Senator John Sherman the eighth of this family of eleven children. When General Sherman was born, the family names had been pretty well exhausted in furnishing forth the five children who preceded him, and there was great perplexity in seeking a name at once suitable and new for the infant. The father decided it. He wanted one son trained for the army; he had seen and admired Tecumseh, and among military names none was then held in such special esteem about Lancaster as that of this mourned Shawnee Indian chieftain (slain in the battle of the Thames, in Canada, in 1813) whose kindness had more than once, within the knowledge of the pioneers of that vicinity, saved the

shedding of innocent blood. Up to the death of his father General Sherman led the pleasant life of an active, bright-eyed, red-haired, play-loving, warm-tempered boy, surrounded by affectionate brothers and sisters and watched over by a good mother.

The members of the bar at Lancaster knew very well that Judge Sherman had left no adequate provision for his large family, and it was agreed among them that some of the children should be educated and supported by the legal brethren of the deceased parent. In accordance with this arrangement, Thomas Ewing, then in the prime of his reputation as a lawyer and statesman, decided to adopt one of the boys. "I must have the smartest of them," he is reported to have said to the widow, and, after some consultation between the mother and eldest sister, "Cump," who was at play in a neighboring sand-bank, was selected. Young Sherman soon made his way to the hearts of all the Ewings. He was sent to the English department of the village academy, where he stood well in his classes, and came to be called a promising boy. "There was nothing specially remarkable about him," Mr. Ewing wrote in later years, "excepting that I never knew so young a boy who would do an errand so correctly and promptly as he did. He was transparently honest, faithful and reliable. Studious and correct in his habits, his progress in education was steady and substantial."

The trait thus referred to was one which was apparent through his entire career. It led him to the proper courses when the breaking out of the rebellion found him at the head of a military school in Louisiana. It made him the successful subaltern in the military operations prior to the rebellion in which he gained a knowledge of the topography of Southern states which was never lost, but made for his constant suc-

cess. It was an indication that the young orphan was not to be thwarted by obstacles, from the attainment of his desires.

He saw the necessity for an education. In those days, schools were not found in the far west equipped as to-day, with all the appliances of modern science. Through the influence of his foster-father he was enabled to enter West Point; but his correspondence during the years he spent tends to prove that he looked forward to no career as a soldier. He hated the discipline and routine necessary in military affairs.

He had too firm a confidence in his own ability to look complacently on a life of idleness with scarce a possibility of preferment or accomplishment worthy his powers.

The story of his journey from his western home to West Point illustrates the wonderful progress made within the lifetime of men now in active business. Railroads were so new that the young man was warned against their dangers, and advised to stick to the safe old stage-coaches in which his father and grandfathers had ridden. But as he approached those sections of the country where the iron-horse had displaced the slower conveyances, young Sherman had his first experience with steam navigation by water and travel by land. He entered the Military Academy as a cadet July 1, 1836, and remained at West Point until his graduation in 1840, except a short time spent during one vacation at Lancaster, Ohio. Starting with a good preliminary education, he maintained a fair, though not first-class standing to the close. It was Mr. Ewing's wish that he should enter the Engineer Corps, but he was unable to do this. His rank, however, was such as to entitle him to enter the artillery service. He was sixth in his class of forty-two. Six forms below him stood George H. Thomas, followed by R. S. Ewell, and among others of the class who afterward made names for

themselves were Stewart Van Vliet, Bushrod R. Johnson, George W. Getty, William Hays and Thomas Jordan. Young Sherman had already formed a strong attachment for the daughter of his foster-father, and during his four years of cadet life he wrote to Miss Ellen Ewing a series of sprightly and vivacious letters, a trifle eccentric, and in style not at all unlike those graver epistles which, at a later period, were to draw from an uncomplimentary Secretary of War the compliment that "Sherman wrote as well as he fought."

During the four years of his stay at West Point the future commander of the armies of the United States remained a private. He seemed to abhor the service and to dislike its restraints. Nor was he a society man, which may possibly be accounted for by the fact that his mind was too preoccupied with thoughts of his future wife, and from his letters to this young lady may be gleaned his view as to the prospects before him. In one of these letters he wrote:

"We have two or three dancing parties each week, at which the gray bobtail is a sufficient recommendation for an introduction to any one. You can well conceive how the cadets have always had the reputation, and have still, here in the East, of being great gallants and ladies' men. God only knows how I will sustain that reputation." About a year before he was graduated, he wrote: "Bill is very much elated at the idea of getting free of West Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army more than a year, then to resign and study law, probably. No doubt you admire this choice; but to speak plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed, the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation day, the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer of the United States Army, and the more confirmed in the wish of spending my life in

the service of my country. Think of that!" Nurtured in the Presbyterian teachings of his mother until his tenth year, then kept under the influences of Mr. Ewing's Roman Catholic family, he had grown, after such changes, a little restive under protracted religious exercises. "The church bugle," he wrote in one of his letters, "has just blown, and in a moment I must put on my side-arms and march to church, to listen to a two-hours sermon, with its twenty divisions and twenty-one sub-divisions; . . . but I believe it is a general fact that what people are compelled to do they dislike."

Then, as later in life, practical matters and details were especially to his taste. "The last encampment," he wrote, "taken all in all, I think was the most pleasant one I have ever spent, even to me, who did not participate in the dances and balls given every week by the different classes; besides, the duties were of altogether a different nature from any previous ones, such as acting as officers upon guard and at artillery drills, practicing at target-firing with long twenty-fours and thirty-twos, mortars, howitzers, etc., as also cavalry exercise, which has been introduced this year." He was not slow in taking to the knack of command. "As to lording it over the plebs, to which you referred, I had only one, whom I made, of course, 'tend to a pleb's duty, such as bringing water, policing the tent, cleaning my gun and accouterments, and the like, and repaid in the usual and cheap coin—advice; and since we have commenced studying, I make him 'bone,' and explain to him the difficult parts of algebra and the French grammar, since he is a good one and a fine fellow; but should he not carry himself straight, I should have him 'found' in January and sent off, that being the usual way in such cases, and then take his bed, table and chair, to pay for the Christmas spree."

In another epistle he showed one of the traits that was destined to serve him well in after life. His foster-father was a prominent leader of the Whig party, and in a letter to his daughter the young cadet betrayed more liking for politics than in after years, but at the same time that independence of character which distinguished him through life. He wrote: "You, no doubt, are not only firmly impressed, but absolutely certain, that General Harrison will be our next President. For my part, though, of course, but a 'superficial observer,' I do not think there is the least hope of such a change, since his friends have thought proper to envelop his name with log-cabins, ginger-bread, hard-cider, and such humbugging, the sole object of which plainly is to deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens; whilst his qualifications, his honesty, his merits and services are merely alluded to!" Here are two more extracts from his last West Point letters to Miss Ewing: "I presume you have seen the register of cadets for the last year, and remarked that I still maintain a good standing in my class, and if it were not for that column of demerits it would be still better, for they are combined with proficiency in study to make out the standing in general merit. In fact, this year, as well as the last, in studies alone, I have been among the stars"— meaning among the first five in the class. "I fear I have a difficult part to act for the next three years," he wrote, as graduation day approached, "because I am almost confident that your father's wishes and intentions will clash with my inclinations. In the first place, I think he wishes me to strive and graduate in the Engineer Corps. This I can't do. Next to resign and become a civil engineer. . . . Whilst I propose and intend to join the infantry, be stationed in the Far West, out of the reach of what is termed civilization, and there remain as long as possible."

There are those who assert that Sherman's career at West Point gave little promise for achievements. These are critics who loudly proclaim that the brilliant mathematician, the parrot-like student of musty ancient history, the mere memorizer of the class, is to astound the world by his prominence in whatever calling he may choose. Let such prophets examine the lists of every institution of learning in the land and they will find proof of their lack of foresight. It is not the parrot who masters his fellows outside the recitation-room, however much he may gain the good-will of his teacher. William Tecumseh Sherman went to West Point for a purpose, and he gained it in the education which fitted him for the posts he was afterwards called upon to fill.

That his education had been of benefit, and that he possessed in his youth marked qualities, is seen from his career immediately after his graduation.

The orphan boy had gone to West Point with a well-defined object. He believed in the power of knowledge, and recognized the impossibility of acquiring a good education in the West or of entering eastern colleges in his poverty. The education he was determined to secure. It came as the free gift of his country, and most nobly has the obligation been honored.

Sherman graduated fifth in his class, and among his classmates was General Beauregard. The fifth at West Point became the first in gallant service to his country.

CHAPTER II.

IN THE SOUTH—EARLY TRAINING WHICH WAS OF SUBSEQUENT VALUE—THE LIEUTENANT LAYS FOUNDATION FOR THE GENERAL'S SUCCESS.

In 1840, Sherman was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Third regiment of artillery, and sent to Florida with a company of recruits. General *Z*achary Taylor was in command there. The worst of the Seminole war was over; but there were still many savages lurking in the Everglades, and the business of the troops was to hunt them out, capture them, and remove them to the Indian Territory. It was rough work for the young lieutenant; but he enjoyed the wild life of the forest, the bayous, and the swamps. The habit of independent judgment which characterized his opinions and operations during the civil war, showed itself thus early. He thought the policy of the Government toward the Seminoles a mistake. The Indian Territory he believed to be much better fitted for the abode of white people than Florida. The latter was an Indian paradise, abounding in game and fish, but of small account for white settlement. The Seminoles, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks should have been concentrated in Florida, where they would have been surrounded by the sea on all sides but one, and could have easily been protected against encroachment, and the vast agricultural plains west of Arkansas should have been left open to civilization. This was his idea then, and he has never changed it.

From Florida, after two winter campaigns, Lieutenant

Sherman was transferred to Fort Moultrie, near Charleston, South Carolina. There he remained four years, fretting, no doubt, at the uneventful life of the garrison, but finding diversion in hunting all through the lowland counties of the State, and in the aristocratic society of the then rich and proud little city close at hand across the bay from the fort, to which his uniform was a passport. Charleston then exercised an intellectual and political leadership throughout the South out of all proportion to her population, and Sherman was able to gain an insight into the Southern character which was of great service to him when he came to march armies through the Southern States. What was of even greater importance, he learned, and never afterward forgot, the topography of the country.

It is remarkable to what an extent Sherman's early career gave him special fitness for the great part he played during the rebellion. A single incident will illustrate in what manner he studied every step of his marches in line of duty, and treasured for future use even his sports and recreation. When he fought his way to Atlanta in 1864, driving the enemy mile by mile, he remembered all the features of the country, the course of the streams, the rocky gorges, and what positions would be favorable for defense. Ordering General McPherson to charge the Confederates on Kenesaw Mountain, he said: "About half-way up the mountain you will find a plateau where there is a peach orchard; it will be a good place to stop and let your men get breath for the assault." He had visited the orchard in 1834, and remembered, twenty-one years later, that the owner had told him that it was planted on the north side of the mountain so that the buds would not develop soon enough to be killed by the spring frosts. Of his life at Fort Pierce, in Florida, he wrote, April 10th, 1841:

"Now that we are at peace, and our minds withdrawn from those pleasant excursions and expeditions in which we have been engaged for the past four months, we are thrown upon our ingenuity to devise means of spending the time. Books we have few, but it is no use; you cannot read any but the lightest trash; and even the newspapers, which you would suppose we would devour, require a greater effort of mind to search than we possess. We attribute it to the climate, and bring up these native lazy Minorcans as examples, and are satisfied. Yet, of course, we must do something, however little. Well, in this, each pursues his own fancy. The major and I have a parcel of chickens, in which we have, by competition, taken enough interest to take up a few minutes of the day; besides, I have a little fawn to play with, and crows, a crane, etc.; and if you were to enter my room you would hesitate whether it was the abode of man or beasts. In one corner is a hen, sitting; in another, some crows, roosted on bushes; the other is a little bed of bushes for the little fawn; whilst in the fourth is my bucket, wash-basin, glass, etc. So you see it is three to one."

In a subsequent letter he touches the same vein:

"I've got more pets now than any bachelor in the country —innumerable chickens, tame pigeons, white rabbits, and a full-blooded Indian pony—rather small matters for a man to deal with, you doubtless think, but it is far better to spend time in trifles such as these than in drinking or gambling."

His desire for the freedom of frontier life is thus again shown:

"We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the western service. As you are at Washington, I presume you can learn whether it is so or not, for I should like to go in such a regiment, if stationed in the Far West; not that I am the least displeased with my present berth, but when the

regiment goes North, it will, in all likelihood, be stationed in the vicinity of some city, from which God spare me."

His indignation at anything not perfectly straightforward, shows itself in an energetic remonstrance to a friend:

"If you have any regard for my feelings, don't say the word 'insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you please, but I'd prefer, of the two, to be accused of telling a direct falsehood than stating anything evasively or underhand; and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing it was unintentionally."

Early in March, 1842, Sherman and his company were stationed at Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and about twenty miles from the city of Mobile. He was engaged in a monotonous round of garrison duty, mingled with hunting, occasional visits to the city, until, in the following June (1843), he was removed to Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor. Here he found a life entirely new, and made many friends among the citizens who had residences on Sullivan's Island, where they escaped the heat of a southern summer. In the fall of this year he secured a four months' leave of absence and visited his old home at Lancaster, Ohio, and while there plighted his troth with Miss Ellen Ewing, the daughter of his foster-father, and the love of his early days. At the expiration of his leave he returned to his post, making a winter journey down the Mississippi to New Orleans, and thence by Mobile and Savannah.

During February, March and April, 1844, he served with Colonel Sylvester Churchill on a board appointed to investigate a large number of claims for lost horses. The report gave satisfaction to the Government, and it is said to have saved large sums. After the adjournment of the board the young officer turned his attention to legal studies, not because he had any desire to practice the profession, but because he

deemed it fitting that every officer should be so well versed in law as to be of proper service to the Government under such occasions as his first experience on a board of examination. Writing under date of June 12th, 1844, from Fort Moultrie, he says:

"Since my return, I have not been running about in the city or the island, as heretofore, but have endeavored to interest myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance of Bouvier's Dictionary, I find no difficulty in understanding. I have read all four volumes, Starkie on Evidence, and other books, semi-legal and semi-historical, and would be obliged to you if you would give me a list of such books as you were required to read, not including your local or State law. I intend to read the second and third volumes of Blackstone again, also Kent's Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am capable of judging, to be the basis of the common-law practice. This course of study I have adopted, from feeling the want of it in the duties to which I was lately assigned."

And again, on the 20th of October:

"I have no idea of making the law a profession—by no means; but, as an officer of the army, it is my duty and interest to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for professional practice."

Early in 1845, he visited his home, to recover from the effects of illness. After his return South, he was stationed on detached service at the arsenal at Augusta, Georgia, and was detailed as a member of a general court-martial sitting at Wilmington, North Carolina, where he had the pleasure of meeting his old comrades of Company A, Third Artillery.

CHAPTER III.

SERVICES IN THE MEXICAN WAR—MARRIAGE AT WASHINGTON, AND HONORABLE ACTION AT NEW ORLEANS.

When dispute arose regarding the boundaries of Mexico the Government saw the necessity of having troops in California. No railroad spanned the continent, and the way across the plains was fraught with great hardships and danger. The gallant Kearny went overland, and to join him Lieutenant Sherman was ordered to set sail with his company. He had been assigned to duty at Pittsburgh, but constantly urged the authorities to give him opportunity for active service. He received his first intimation of the order under which he was to sail on the 28th of June, and on the 30th set sail, without having opportunity of bidding his family good-bye. The company sailed from New York in July, in the ship Lexington, and, after a tedious voyage, touching at Rio de Janiero and Valparaiso, landed at San Francisco. Contrary to the anticipations of actual service entertained at the outset, the career of the company in California proved uneventful. During his service there, Lieutenant Sherman was detailed as acting assistant adjutant-general of the forces in the Tenth Military Department, under the command of Brigadier-General Stephen W. Kearny, afterwards under that of Colonel Richard B. Mason, First Dragoons; and in this capacity attracted the notice of his brother officers by the efficiency, clearness, and administrative ability he showed in the discharge of the responsible duties confided to him. In 1850 he returned to the Atlantic States, and on the 1st of

May, in the same year, was married to Miss Ellen Ewing, at the residence, in Washington City, of her father, then Secretary of the Interior under President Taylor. The house in which the wedding took place is still standing on Pennsylvania avenue—a very plain building now, but a fine mansion in those days. There were famous guests at the wedding—Clay, Webster, and Benton, and President Zachary Taylor with all his cabinet—and it was a brilliant affair, with music, dancing, and feasting, and was followed by a bridal tour to Niagara Falls. In the following September he received what was, in those days, considered one of the highest prizes the military profession had in store for the subaltern, being appointed a commissary of subsistence with the rank of captain. He was assigned to duty upon the staff of the commanding officer of the military department of the West, at St. Louis. In March, 1852, he received from the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, a commission as captain, by brevet, to date from May 30, 1848, "for meritorious services in California during the war in Mexico."

In his memoirs General Sherman writes amusingly of his successful attempt to enter the United States Senate on the occasion of Webster's last speech. He had jokingly told friends who sought his acceptance of political favors that he never tried to enter a legislative body but once, and that, though successful, he was then so disappointed that he would never try it again. The General writes:

"I heard Mr. Webster's speech on the floor of the Senate, under circumstances that warrant a description. It was publicly known that he was to leave the Senate, and enter the new cabinet of Mr. Fillmore, as his Secretary of State, and that prior to leaving he was to make a great speech on the 'Omnibus Bill.' Resolved to hear it, I went up to the Capitol on the day named, an hour or so earlier than usual.

The speech was to be delivered in the old Senate-chamber, now used by the Supreme Court. The galleries were much smaller than at present, and I found them full to overflowing, with a dense crowd about the door, struggling to reach the stairs. I could not get near, and then tried the reporter's gallery, but found it equally crowded; so I feared I should lose the only possible opportunity to hear Mr. Webster.

"I had only a limited personal acquaintance with any of the Senators, but had met Mr. Corwin quite often at Mr. Ewing's house, and I also knew that he had been extremely friendly to my father in his life-time; so I ventured to send in to him my card, 'W. T. S., First-Lieutenant, Third Artillery.' He came to the door promptly, when I said, 'Mr. Corwin, I believe Mr. Webster is to speak to-day.' His answer was, 'Yes, he has the floor at one o'clock.' I then added that I was extremely anxious to hear him. 'Well,' said he, 'why don't you go into the gallery?' I explained that it was full, and I had tried every access, but found all jammed with people. 'Well,' said he, 'what do you want of me?' I explained that I would like him to take me on the floor of the Senate; that I had often seen from the gallery persons on the floor, no better entitled to it than I. He then asked in his quizzical way, 'Are you a foreign embassador?' 'No.' 'Are you the Governor of a State?' 'No.' 'Are you a member of the other House?' 'Certainly not.' 'Have you ever had a vote of thanks by name?' 'No.' 'Well, these are the only privileged members.' I then told him that he knew well enough who I was, and that if he chose he could take me in. He then said, 'Have you any impudence?' I told him, 'A reasonable amount if occasion called for it.' 'Do you think you could become so interested in my conversation as not to notice the door-keeper?' (pointing to him). I told him that there was not the least doubt of it, if he would

tell me one of his funny stories. He then took my arm and led me a turn in the vestibule, talking about some indifferent matter, but all the time directing my looks to his left hand, toward which he was gesticulating with his right; and thus we approached the door-keeper, who began asking me, 'Foreign embassador? Governor of a State? Member of Congress?' etc.; but I caught Corwin's eye, which said plainly, 'Don't mind him, pay attention to me,' and in this way we entered the Senate-chamber by a side-door. Once in, Corwin said, 'Now you can take care of yourself,' and I thanked him cordially. I found a seat close behind Mr. Webster, and near General Scott, and heard the whole of the speech. It was heavy in the extreme, and I confess that I was disappointed and tired long before it was finished. No doubt the speech was full of fact and argument, but it had none of the fire of oratory, or intensity of feeling, that marked all of Mr. Clay's efforts."

Until the 6th of September, 1853, Captain Sherman remained in the Government service. During these years he was sent to New Orleans to take charge of the commissary department, it having been asserted, and probably proved, that certain merchants of that city were making undue profits by means of collusion with army officers. That speculators in Government contracts found small favor with Captain Sherman may well be surmised. His own account of the affair is brief, but displays a disposition to avoid even an appearance of evil that would become every official so placed. In his memoirs the General writes of this:

"One day, as General Twiggs was coming across Lake Pontchartrain, he fell in with one of his old cronies, who was an extensive grocer. This gentleman gradually led the conversation to the downward tendency of the times since he and Twiggs were young, saying that, in former years, all the

merchants of New Orleans had a chance at government patronage; but now, in order to sell to the army commissary, one had to take a brother in as a partner. General Twiggs resented this, but the merchant again affirmed it, and gave names. As soon as General Twiggs reached his office, he instructed his adjutant-general, Colonel Bliss—who told me this—to address a categorical note of inquiry to Major Waggaman. The major very frankly stated the facts as they had arisen, and insisted that the firm of Perry Seawell & Co. had enjoyed a large patronage, but deserved it richly by reason of their promptness, fairness, and fidelity. The correspondence was sent to Washington, and the result was, that Major Waggaman was ordered to St. Louis, and I was ordered to New Orleans.

"I went down to New Orleans in a steamboat in the month of September, 1852, taking with me a clerk, and, on arrival, assumed the office, in a bank-building facing Lafayette Square, in which were the offices of all the army departments. General D. Twiggs was in command of the department, with Colonel W. W. S. Bliss (son-in-law of General Taylor) as his adjutant-general. Colonel A. C. Myers was quartermaster, Captain John F. Reynolds aide-de-camp, and Colonel A. J. Coffee paymaster. I took rooms at the St. Louis Hotel, kept by a most excellent gentleman, Colonel Mudge.

"Mr. Perry Seawell came to me in person, soliciting a continuance of the custom which he had theretofore enjoyed; but I told him frankly that a change was necessary, and I never saw or heard of him afterward. I simply purchased in open market, arranged for the proper packing of the stores, and had not the least difficulty in supplying the troops and satisfying the head of the department in Washington."

This happened in 1852, and in December of that year the

young captain was informed that his family consisting of his wife, two children and nurse, and his sister Fanny, were en route for New Orleans, and he accordingly secured a house and furnished it. But very soon after their arrival he received a parcel of documents which proved to be articles of copartnership for the firm of "Lucas, Turner & Co.," for the establishment of a bank in California, with his own name as a partner. This was done at the instance of Major Turner, then a wealthy citizen of St. Louis, who had conceived a strong liking for Sherman. There were strong reasons why the offer should be accepted. In the first place, it had never been the desire of Sherman to continue in the army, and he would doubtless have resigned earlier if other occupation had opened to him. But it was not a step to be decided without a full understanding of the situation, and when that decision was made, action was prompt. Late in February, after less than two months in New Orleans, the family were sent up the Ohio in a steamboat; the New Orleans household effects disposed of; the property and records of the office turned over to his successor, and Sherman started on his way to California on a six months' leave of absence to look over the ground, and, as it happened, to enter upon his first commercial venture.

The result of his journey was to fix his determination to leave the army, and he returned to Ohio for consultation with his wife and her father. Matters were soon arranged and Captain Sherman's resignation was tendered to the Government, to take effect at the end of his six month's leave. It was accepted September 6th, 1853, and Sherman was a private citizen.

CHAPTER IV.

EXPERIENCES IN CIVIL LIFE—PARTNER IN A BANKING-HOUSE AT SAN FRANCISCO, HE WEATHERS A FINANCIAL STORM WITH THE SKILL OF A VETERAN—RETURNS TO NEW YORK AND SOON BECOMES HEAD OF A MILITARY SCHOOL—PROMPT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF SECESSION—RESIGNS HIS POSITION AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION.

It seemed a hazardous undertaking for one so young, and the difficulty would have deterred older heads. But Sherman had confidence in himself, and felt that business affairs, if conducted with honor and prudence, must reward earnest efforts with success. During his career at San Francisco Mr. Sherman was forced to cope with some of the oldest and best equipped bankers and merchants. In every emergency he extorted the admiration even of those with whom he was forced to disagree, and to whom he refused bank favors at times too critical to allow sober judgment by men who thought they saw their fortunes threatened by one so much their junior.

His partners reposed full confidence in him, and he alone carried his bank through the financial panic that ensued upon the failure and flight of Meigs, the great contractor and afterwards wealthy resident of Chili. The bank was more than usually prosperous until changed conditions and the fear that his asthma, which was now depriving him of sleep, would become chronic, induced Sherman to inform his partner, Mr.

Lucas, that he could use their money to greater profit in St. Louis, and the affairs of the bank were closed on the 1st of May, 1857, and Mr. Sherman returned to St. Louis.

On his return east Mr. Lucas arranged for opening a branch of his St. Louis bank in New York, and installed Mr. Sherman as its resident manager. But shortly after its opening for business the panic of 1857 burst upon the country, and Lucas & Co., of St. Louis, failed, carrying with it all its branches. Of this fact Sherman writes in his memoirs:

"I was of course surprised, but not sorry, for I had always contended that a man of so much visible wealth as Mr. Lucas should not be engaged in a business subject to such vicissitudes."

Mr. Sherman returned to St. Louis October 17th, and remained there till the 7th of the following December, assisting in settling the affairs of the suspended bank of Lucas & Co. He then was sent to San Francisco to settle finally the business of the house in that city, and within six months had completed his task, paying every cent owed by the firm, and collecting a large portion of debts due.

Returning to Ohio in the summer of 1858, he was for a time out of employment and undetermined as to his future. For some time he practiced law, tried his hand at farming, and finally wrote to the assistant adjutant-general on duty at the War Department, asking if there was a vacancy among the army paymasters, receiving in reply a printed programme for a military college about to be established, organized in Louisiana, and advice to apply for the position of superintendent. The reasons for establishing this school were probably not understood at the time by the applicant for the position of superintendent. That they had reference to the coming trouble is generally understood.

The pro-slavery leaders were well aware that the attempted

overthrow of the National Government would be likely to be resisted by force. They made ready to carry out their plans by force. The wiser heads among them hoped to be allowed to secede in peace, but they were as determined as the rest to appeal to war in the last resort. Accordingly, during Mr. Buchanan's administration, there was set on foot throughout the slave-holding States a movement embodying the reorganization of the militia, the establishment of State military academies, and the collection of warlike materials of all kinds. The Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, in the interests of the conspirators, aided them by sending to the arsenals in the slave States quantities of arms and military supplies; the quotas of the Southern States under the militia laws were anticipated, in some cases, by several years; and he caused sales of arms to be secretly made, at low prices, to the agents of those States. The pro-slavery leaders then began to select and gather round them men whom they needed, and upon whom they thought they could rely. Unable always to explain to these men their purposes, they were often compelled to trust to circumstances and the force of association to complete the work; and in doing so, they occasionally made mistakes.

Among the men they fixed upon was Captain Sherman. Recognizing his aptitude in military art and science, the leaders in Louisiana determined to place him at the head of the new State Military Academy at Alexandria. It was explained to him that the object of establishing the school was to aid in suppressing negro insurrections, to enable the State to protect her borders from the Indian incursions, then giving trouble in Arkansas and Texas, and to form a nucleus for defense, in case of an attack by a foreign enemy.

It is rare that a man whose youth has been spent in the army does not, in his maturer years, retain a strong desire

for the old life and the old companions. Let the temptation be offered in a moment when the cares and details of civil life look more than ordinarily dull, and the memories of former days may present a contrast too vivid for most men to resist.

So it was with Captain Sherman. The offer was in line with his associations, his tastes, and his ambition. He accordingly accepted the office, and entered upon his duties as superintendent of the Louisiana State Military Academy, early in the year 1860. The liberal salary of five thousand dollars a year was attached to the office.

The efficiency which Captain Sherman here displayed confirmed the leaders in that State in the correctness of their choice, and satisfied them that he was a man to be kept at any price. They were met at the outset by a deep-seated loyalty, by a deep-rooted fidelity to the Union, upon which they had by no means calculated. Every effort was expended to convert him to their way of thinking, but in vain. Surface opinions change with the wind, but it is useless to argue against fundamental beliefs. And such was the character of Sherman's attachment to the Union.

As events ripened, he saw clearly that the election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency would be followed by the general secession of the Southern States, and that secession meant war. When, at length, he perceived that the result could no longer be avoided, he decided upon his own course, and sent to the Governor of the State this clear and straightforward letter, dated January 18, 1861:

"SIR:—As I occupy a *quasi*-military position under this State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of the seminary, inserted in marble over the

main door, was: '*By the liberality of the General Government of the United States:* The Union—*Esto Perpetua.*'

"Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belonging to the State, or direct me what disposition should be made of them.

"And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the State determines to secede; for on no earthly account will I do any act, or think any thought, hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States. W. T. SHERMAN, *Supt.*"

He also forwarded the following private letter to the Governor:

[PRIVATE.]

"*January* 18, 1861.

"*To Governor* MOORE:

"MY DEAR SIR: I take it for granted that you have been expecting for some days the accompanying paper from me (the above official letter). I have repeatedly and again made known to General Graham and Dr. Smith that, in the event of a severance of the relations hitherto existing between the Confederate States of this Union, I would be forced to choose the old Union. It is barely possible all the states may secede, South and North, that new combinations may result, but this process will be one of time and uncertainty, and I cannot with my opinions await the subsequent development.

"I have never been a politician, and therefore undervalue the excited feelings and opinions of present rulers, but I do think, if this people cannot execute a form of government like the present, that a worse one will result.

"I will keep the cadets as quiet as possible. They are nervous, but I think the interest of the State requires them here, guarding this property, and acquiring a knowledge which will be useful to your State in aftertimes.

"When I leave, which I now regard as certain, the present professors can manage well enough, to afford you leisure time to find a suitable successor to me. You might order Major Smith to receipt for the arms, and to exercise military command, while the academic exercises could go on under the board. In time, some gentleman will turn up, better qualified than I am, to carry on the seminary to its ultimate point of success. I entertain the kindest feeling toward all, and would leave the State with much regret; only in great events we must choose, one way or the other.

"Truly, your friend,

"W. T. SHERMAN."

The following from the memoirs of General Sherman will give a clear understanding of the state of feeling at the time through the Southern States:

One evening, at a large dinner-party at Governor Moore's at which were present several members of the Louisiana Legislature, Taylor, Bragg, and the Attorney-General Hyams, after the ladies had left the table, I noticed at Governor Moore's end quite a lively discussion going on, in which my name was frequently used; at length the Governor called to me saying: "Colonel Sherman, you can readily understand that, with your brother the abolitionist candidate for Speaker, some of our people wonder that you should be here at the

head of an important State institution. Now, you are at my table, and I assure you of my confidence. Won't you speak your mind freely on this question of slavery, that so agitates the land? You are under my roof, and, whatever you say, you have my protection."

I answered: "Governor Moore, you mistake in calling my brother, John Sherman, an abolitionist. We have been separated since childhood—I in the army, and he pursuing his profession of law in Northern Ohio; and it is possible we may differ in general sentiment, but I deny that he is considered at home an abolitionist; and, although he prefers the free institutions under which he lives to those of slavery which prevail here, he would not of himself take from you by law or force any property whatever, even your slaves."

Then said Moore: "Give us your own views of slavery as you see it throughout the South."

I answered in effect that "the people of Louisiana were hardly responsible for slavery, as they had inherited it; that I found two distinct conditions of slavery, domestic and field hands. The domestic slaves, employed by the families were probably better treated than any slaves on earth; but the condition of the field-hands was different, depending more on the temper and disposition of their masters and overseers than were those employed about the house;" and I went on to say that, "were I a citizen of Louisiana, and a member of the Legislature, I would deem it wise to bring the legal condition of the slaves more near the status of human beings under all Christian and civilized governments. In the first place, I argue that, in sales of slaves made by the State, I would forbid the separation of families, letting the father, mother, and children, be sold together to one person, instead of each to the highest bidder. And, again, I would advise the repeal of the statute which enacted a severe penalty for

even the owner to teach his slave to read and write, because that actually qualified property and took away a part of its value—illustrating the assertion by the case of Henry Sampson, who had been the slave of Colonel Chambers, of Rapides Parish, who had gone to California as the servant of an officer of the army, and who was afterwards employed by me in the bank at San Francisco. At first he could not write or read, and I could only afford to pay him one hundred dollars a month; but he was taught to read and write by Reilley, our bank-teller, when his services became worth two hundred and fifty dollars a month, which enabled him to buy his own freedom and that of his brother and his family."

What I said was listened to by all with the most profound attention; and, when I was through, some one (I think it was Mr. Hyams) struck the table with his fist, making the glasses jingle, and said, "By God, he is right!" and at once he took up the debate, which went on for an hour or more, on both sides with ability and fairness. Of course, I was glad to be thus relieved, because at the time all men in Louisiana were dreadfully excited on questions affecting their slaves, who constituted the bulk of their wealth, and without whom they honestly believed that sugar, cotton, and rice could not possibly be cultivated."

That the retiring superintendent had possessed the confidence and regard of the state officials is abundantly demonstrated by the following letter, in which his resignation was accepted:

"EXECUTIVE OFFICE }
BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA *January* 23, 1861. }

"MY DEAR SIR: It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 18th inst. In the pressure of official business, I can now only request you to transfer to Professor Smith the arms, munitions, and funds in your

hands, whenever you conclude to withdraw from the position you have filled with so much distinction. You cannot regret more than I do the necessity which deprives us of your services, and you will bear with you the respect, confidence, and admiration of all who have been associated with you.

"Very truly, your friend,

"THOMAS O. MOORE."

Colonel W. T. SHERMAN, *Superintendent Military Academy, Alexandria.*"

There has been absurd accusation laid against General Sherman that he was practically enjoying southern hospitality when the war broke out, and that he should therefore have taken no part in the contest against those he was serving. He had at all times made known his sentiments as a Northern man and a patriot. That he did not deceive his associates is well proved by the correspondence that followed his surrender of his position as superintendent of the military school. No reader of these communications and official records will listen to the silly aspersion sought to be cast on the name of an honorable soldier. Let them stand here as Sherman's own answer to the charge.

"BATON ROUGE, JANUARY 28, 1861.

"*To Major* SHERMAN, *Superintendent, Alexandria.*

"MY DEAR SIR: Your letter was duly received, and would have been answered ere this time, could I have arranged sooner the matter of the five hundred dollars. I shall go from here to New Orleans to-day or to-morrow, and will remain there till Saturday after next, perhaps. I shall expect to meet you there, as indicated in your note to me.

"I need not tell you that it is with no ordinary regret that I view your determination to leave us, for really I believe that the success of our institution, now almost assured, is

jeopardized thereby. I am sure that we will never have a superintendent with whom I shall have more pleasant relations than those which have existed between yourself and me.

"I fully appreciate the motives which have induced you to give up a position presenting so many advantages to yourself, and sincerely hope that you may in any future enterprise, enjoy the success which your character and ability merit and deserve.

"Should you come down on the Rapides (steamer), please look after my wife, who will, I hope, accompany you on said boat, or some other good one.

"Colonel Bragg informs me that the necessary orders have been given for the transfer and receipt by Major Smith of the public property.

"I herewith transmit a request to the secretary to convene the Board of Supervisors, that they may act as seems best to them in the premises.

"In the meantime, Major Smith will command by seniority the cadets, and the Academic Board will be able to conduct the scientific exercises of the institution until the Board of Supervisors can have time to act. Hoping to meet you soon at the St. Charles, I am, most truly, your friend and servant,

"S. A. SMITH."

"P. S.—Governor Moore desires me to express his profound regret that the State is about to lose one who we all fondly hoped had cast his destinies for weal or woe among us; and that he is sensible that we lose thereby an officer whom it will be difficult, if not impossible to replace.

"S. A. S."

"BATON ROUGE, *February* 11, 1861.

"*To Major* SHERMAN, *Alexandria.*

"DEAR SIR: I have been in New Orleans for ten days, and

on returning here find two letters from you, also your prompt answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives, for which I am much obliged.

"The resolution passed the last day before adjournment. I was purposing to respond, when your welcome reports came to hand. I have arranged to pay you five hundred dollars.

"I will say nothing of general politics, except to give my opinion that there is not to be any war.

"In the event, would it not be possible for you to become a citizen of our state? Every one deplores your determination to leave us. At the same time your friends feel that you are abandoning a position that might become an object of desire to any one.

"I will try to meet you in New Orleans at any time you may indicate; but it would be best for you to stop here, when, if possible, I will accompany you. Should you do so, you will find me just above the State House, and facing it.

"Bring with you a few copies of the 'Rules of the Seminary.'

"Yours truly, S. A. SMITH."

"LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING AND MILITARY ACADEMY, *February* 14, 1861.

"*Colonel* W. T. SHERMAN:

"SIR: I am instructed by the Board of Supervisors of this institution to present a copy of the resolutions adopted by them at their last meeting:

"*Resolved*, That the thanks of the Board of Supervisors are due, and are hereby tendered, to Colonel William T. Sherman for the able and efficient manner in which he has conducted the affairs of the seminary during the time the institution has been under his control—a period attended with unusual difficulties, requiring on the part of the superintendent, to successfully overcome them, a high order of adminis-

trative talent. And the board further bear willing testimony to the valuable services that Colonel Sherman has rendered them in their efforts to establish an institution of learning in accordance with the beneficent design of the State and Federal Governments; evincing at all times a readiness to adapt himself to the ever-varying requirements of an institution of learning in its infancy, struggling to attain a position of honor and usefulness.

"*Resolved further*, That in accepting the resignation of Colonel Sherman as Superintendent of the State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, we tender to him assurances of our high personal regard, and our sincere regret at the occurrence of causes that render it necessary to part with so esteemed and valued a friend, as well as co-laborer in the cause of education.

POWHATAN CLARKE, *Secretary to the Board.*"

A copy of the resolution of the Academic Board, passed at their session of April 1, 1861:

"*Resolved*, That in the resignation of the late superintendent, Colonel W. T. Sherman, the Academic Board deem it not improper to express their deep conviction of the loss the institution has sustained in being thus deprived of an able head. They cannot fail to appreciate the manliness of character which has always marked the actions of Colonel Sherman. While he is personally endeared to many of them as a friend, they consider it their high pleasure to tender to him in this resolution their regret on his separation, and their sincere wish for his future welfare."

At this point closes that period of Sherman's career which antedated the war in which his services to his country placed him in the front ranks of heroes. In every position he had earned the rewards of honesty and capacity. At every step

in his upward march he had redeemed the promise of his youth. He had extorted praise as a child for his fidelity as a messenger boy. He was now approaching a time when Sherman's messages were to be hailed with joy in every hamlet between the two oceans.

CHAPTER V.

THE REBELLION—SHERMAN IS AT THE HEAD OF A HORSE RAILROAD IN ST. LOUIS WHEN SUMTER FALLS—READY FOR ACTIVE SERVICE AS WHEN THE MEXICAN TROUBLES OCCURRED.

His resignation having been accepted, he returned to St. Louis. In consequence of the uncertain aspect of political affairs, he had deemed it best that his family should not accompany him to the South.

He was not to remain long inactive. The crisis for which the pro-slavery leaders had been preparing was precipitated by the rashness of the more incautious, and hurried forward by the frenzy of the people. The conspirators had proposed to themselves to capture Washington before the North should be able to organize resistance, and to proclaim themselves the true and lawful Govermnent of the United States. They would have declared Mr. Lincoln's election as unconstitutional, and therefore null, and would have based their assumption of power on the right of self-preservation. From their knowledge of the disposition of most of the foreign ministers resident at the Federal capital, they expected their recognition by the leading European powers to follow closely upon the act. They counted upon the trade-loving and peaceful instincts of the people of the Free States to keep the North inert. The great Central and Western States would probably be with them, and New England they would gladly leave "out in the cold." But while the cool-headed conspirators plotted thus, one element of their calculation failed.

It had been necessary to fire the Southern heart to the point of rebellion—the Southern brain took fire as well. On the 12th of April, 1861, Mr. Davis gave the order to open upon Fort Sumter. At noon the first gun was fired, and the war was begun.

Sherman had gone to Washington about the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and had talked of the state of affairs with characteristic freedom. He believed that war was inevitable—that it would be no pantomime of wooden swords, but a long and bitter struggle. He endeavored in vain, in earnest language, to impress his convictions upon the Administration. Nobody listened to him except the President. Sherman went to him to offer his services in any capacity.

His strong words elicited a smile from Mr. Lincoln. "We shall not need many men like you," he said; "the affair will soon blow over." Some of Sherman's friends in the army who believed there would be a war, urged his appointment to the chief clerkship of the War Department—a position which at that time was always held by a confidential adviser of the Secretary of War and somewhat later he was strongly recommended for the position of quartermaster-general of the army, made vacant by the resignation of Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston. Neither application was successful.

Sherman knew the Southern people; the Administration did not. He knew we were sleeping upon a volcano.

On the 15th of April, 1861, the President called for seventy-five thousand men to serve for three months, to be employed in enforcing the laws of the United States, and to hold and occupy the forts, and other public places belonging to the National Government, which had been seized. Sherman was urged by his friends to go to Ohio, and raise one of the three-

months regiments. He declined to consider such a trifling expedient, as he considered it. He did not believe that the three-months men would do any good. This affair was no riot, but a revolution. It was not a mob, to be put down by the *posse comitatus*, but a war, to be fought by an army. "Why," he said, "you might as well attempt to put out the flames of a burning house with a squirt-gun."

He used all the influence at his command to induce the authorities to recognize his view of the case, and, by at once oragnizing the whole military force of the country, to crush the rebellion in its infancy. But the authorities still believed there would be no fight—that the rebellion would succumb at the sight of the power of the Union.

Of his interview with president Lincoln regarding the probability of war, the following from his own pen places in strong light the persistence with which the people of the North held on to the belief that there would be no war.

"John then turned to me, and said, 'Mr. President, this is my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up from Louisiana; he may give you some information you want.' 'Ah!' said Mr. Lincoln, 'how are they getting along down there?' I said, 'They think they are getting along swimmingly—they are preparing for war.' 'Oh, well!' said he, 'I guess we'll manage to keep house.' I was silenced, said no more to him, and we soon left. I was sadly disappointed, and remember that I broke out on John, d—ning the politicians generally, saying, 'You have got things in a hell of a fix, and you may get them out as best you can,' adding that the country was sleeping on a volcano that might burst forth at any minute, but that I was going to St. Louis to take care of my family, and would have no more to do with it. John begged me to be more patient, but I said I would not; that I had no time to wait, that I was off for St. Louis; and off I went.

At Lancaster I found letters from Major Turner, inviting me to St. Louis, as the place in the Fifth Street Railroad was a sure thing, and that Mr. Lucas would rent me a good house on Locust Street, suitable for my family, for six hundred dollars a year."

But there was no possibility of this soldier spending his life in peaceful pursuits. As if in mockery of his constant desire to be rid of militarism and its forms, fate was leading the great hero to the performance of services that would link his name with his country's history. There were camps around St. Louis. The war-cloud did not blow over. Missouri was almost debatable ground. During the excitement the superintendent of the horse-railroad was at the post of duty, caring for interests placed in his hands. But he was not careless of the situation. He was oppressed with fear of the future, for he understood the Southern people better than those who had not lived among them.

The bombardment of Fort Sumter, which was announced by telegraph, began April 12th, and ended on the 14th. All knew that the war was actually begun, and though the South was openly, manifestly the aggressor, yet her friends and apologists insisted that she was simply acting on a justifiable defensive, and that in the forcible seizure of the public forts within her limits the people were acting with reasonable prudence and foresight. Yet neither party seemed willing to invade, or cross the border. Davis, who ordered the bombardment of Sumter, knew the temper of his people well, and foresaw that it would precipitate the action of the border States; for almost immediately four commonwealths followed the lead of the Cotton States, and conventions were deliberating in two others.

On the night of Saturday, April 6th, Sherman received the following dispatch:

"WASHINGTON, *April* 6, 1861.

"*Major* W. T. SHERMAN:

"Will you accept the chief clerkship of the War Department? We will make you Assistant Secretary of War when Congress meets. M. BLAIR, *Postmaster-General.*"

To which he replied by telegraph: "I cannot accept;" and by mail as follows:

"OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY,
Monday, April 8, 1861.

"*Hon.* M. BLAIR, *Washington, D. C.*

"I received about nine o'clock Saturday night, your telegraphic dispatch, which I have this moment answered, 'I cannot accept.'

"I have quite a large family, and when I resigned my place in Louisiana, on account of secession, I had no time to lose; and, therefore, after my hasty visit to Washington, where I saw no chance of employment, I came to St. Louis; have accepted a place in this company, have rented a house, and incurred other obligations, so that I am not at liberty to change.

"I thank you for the compliment contained in your offer, and assure you that I wish the administration all success in its almost impossible task of governing this distracted and anarchied people.

"Yours truly,

"W. T. SHERMAN."

There were those ready to accuse Sherman of disloyalty. They remembered that he had been in the South, and in the disturbed state of the public mind every criticism offered was accepted as evidence of treachery. But it was the act of a man who knew what was his duty and what was to be that of the Government. He was a soldier and trained in the

arts of war. He had sufficiently studied the condition in the South to form his conclusions. That he formed them wisely, the result demonstrated. That he was never disloyal to the Government was proved when he so promptly accepted a position in which he felt he could render service.

General Frank Blair urged him to accept a command in the three-months service. Sherman refused, and stated his reasons so clearly as to impress his hearer. Later, when Lincoln had called for three-years volunteers, Sherman sent the following letter to the Secretary of War.

"OFFICE OF ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY,
May, 8, 1861.

"*Hon.* S. CAMERON, *Secretary of War.*

"DEAR SIR: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for *three months*, because I cannot throw my family on the cold charity of the world. But for the *three-years* call, made by the President, an officer can prepare his command and do good service.

"I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightfully or wrongfully I feel unwilling to take a mere private's place, and, having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.

"Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most service.

"Yours truly,

"W. T. SHERMAN."

He received no direct answer, but the next week was notified of his appointment as colonel of the Thirteenth Regular Infantry. Speaking of his first experiences Sherman writes:

"I remember going to the arsenal on the 9th of May, taking my children with me in the street-cars. Within the arsenal wall were drawn up in parallel lines four regiments of the 'Home Guards,' and I saw men distributing cartridges to the boxes. I also saw General Lyon running about with his hair in the wind, his pockets full of papers, wild and irregular, but I knew him to be a man of vehement purpose and of determined action. I saw of course that it meant business, but whether for defense or offense I did not know. The next morning I went up to the railroad office in Bremen, as usual, and heard at every corner of the streets that the 'Dutch' were moving on Camp Jackson. People were barricading their houses, and men were running in that direction. I hurried through my business as quickly as I could and got back to my house on Locust Street by twelve o'clock. Charles Ewing and Hunter were there, and insisted on going out to camp to see 'the fun.' I tried to dissuade them, saying that in case of conflict the by-standers were more likely to be killed than the men engaged, but they would go. I felt as much interested as anybody else, but staid at home, took my little son Willie, who was about seven years old, and walked up and down the pavement in front of our house, listening for the sound of musketry or cannon in the direction of Camp Jackson. While so engaged Miss Eliza Dean, who lived opposite us, called me across the street, told me that her brother-in-law, Dr. Scott, was a surgeon in Frost's camp, and she was dreadfully afraid he would be killed. I reasoned with her that General Lyon was a regular officer; that if he had gone out, as reported, to Camp Jackson, he would take with him such a force as would make resistance impossible. But she would not be comforted, saying that the camp was made up of young men from the first and best families of St. Louis, and that they were proud,

and would fight. I explained that young men of the best families did not like to be killed better than ordinary people. Edging gradually up the street, I was in Olive Street just about Twelfth, when I saw a man running from the direction of Camp Jackson at full speed, calling, as he went, 'They've surrendered, they've surrendered!' So I turned back and rang the bell at Mrs. Dean's. Eliza came to the door, and I explained what I had heard; but she angrily slammed the door in my face! Evidently she was disappointed to find she was mistaken in her estimate of the rash courage of the best families.

"I again turned in the direction of Camp Jackson, my boy Willie with me still. At the head of Olive Street, abreast of Lindell's Grove, I found Frank Blair's regiment in the street, with ranks opened, and the Camp Jackson prisoners inside. A crowd of people was gathered around, calling to the prisoners by name some, hurrahing for Jeff Davis, and others encouraging the troops. Men, women, and children were in the crowd. I passed along till I found myself inside the grove, where I met Charles Ewing and John Hunter, and we stood looking at the troops on the road, heading toward the city. A band of music was playing at the head, and the column made one or two ineffectual starts, but for some reason was halted. The battalion of regulars was abreast of me, of which Major Rufus Saxton was in command, and I gave him an evening paper, which I had bought of the newsboy on my way out. He was reading from it some piece of news, sitting on his horse, when the column again began to move forward, and he resumed his place at the head of his command. At that part of the road, or street, was an embankment about eight feet high, and a drunken fellow tried to pass over it to the people opposite. One of the regular sergeant file-closers ordered him back, but he at-

tempted to pass through the ranks, when the sergeant barred his progress with his musket 'a-port.' The drunken man seized his musket, when the sergeant threw him off with violence, and he rolled over and over down the bank. By the time the man had picked himself up and got his hat, which had fallen off, and had again mounted the embankment, the regulars had passed, and the head of Osterhaus' regiment of Home Guards had come up. The man had in his hand a small pistol, which he fired off, and I heard that the ball had struck the leg of one of Osterhaus' staff; the regiment stopped; there was a moment of confusion, when the soldiers of that regiment began to fire over our heads in the grove. I heard the balls cutting the leaves above our heads, and saw several men and women running in all directions, some of whom were wounded. Of course there was a general stampede. Charles Ewing threw Willie on the ground and covered him with his body. Hunter ran behind the hill, and I also threw myself on the ground. The fire ran back from the head of the regiment toward its rear, and as I saw them reloading their pieces, I jerked Willie up, ran back with him into a gully which covered us, lay there until I saw that the fire had ceased, and that the column was again moving on, when I took up Willie and started back for home round by way of Market Street. A woman and child were killed outright; two or three men were also killed, and several others were wounded. The great mass of the people on that occasion were simply curious spectators, though men were sprinkled through the crowd calling out, 'Hurrah for Jeff Davis!' and others were particularly abusive of the 'damned Dutch.' Lyons posted a guard in charge of the vacant camp, and marched his prisoners down to the arsenal; some were paroled, and others held, till afterward they were regularly exchanged."

Shortly after this event Sherman proceeded to Washington to report under his commission as colonel. He says:

"Of course I could no longer defer action. I saw Mr. Lucas, Major Turner, and other friends and parties connected with the road, who agreed that I should go on. I left my family, because I was under the impression that I would be allowed to enlist my own regiment, which would take some time, and I expected to raise the regiment and organize it at Jefferson Barracks. I repaired to Washington, and there found that the Government was trying to rise to a level with the occasion. Mr. Lincoln had, without the sanction of law, authorized the raising of ten new regiments of regulars, each infantry regiment to be composed of three battalions of eight companies each; and had called for seventy-five thousand State volunteers. Even this call seemed to me utterly inadequate; still it was none of my business. I took the oath of office, and was furnished with a list of officers, appointed to my regiment, which was still incomplete. I reported in person to General Scott, at his office on Seventeenth Street, opposite the War Department, and applied for authority to return West, and raise my regiment at Jefferson Barracks; but the general said my lieutenant-colonel, Burbank, was fully qualified to superintend the enlistment, and that he wanted me there; and he at once dictated an order for me to report to him in person for inspection duty.

"Satisfied that I would not be permitted to return to St. Louis, I instructed Mrs. Sherman to pack up, return to Lancaster, and trust to the fate of war.

"I also resigned my place as president of the Fifth Street Railroad, to take effect at the end of May, so that in fact I received pay from that road for only two months service, and then began my new army career."

These were days when events crowded each other with

confusing rapidity. General Sherman hesitates to recall those on which have been based unjust criticism of able and courageous commanders, but does due justice to the General who planned the battle of Bull Run, the event which cast such a gloom over the North.

"Patterson's army crossed the Potomac River on the 1st or 2nd of July, and, as John Sherman was to take his seat as a Senator in the called session of Congress, to meet July 4th, he resigned his place as aid-de-camp, presented me his two horses and equipment, and we returned to Washington together."

"The Congress assembled punctually on the 4th of July, and the message of Mr. Lincoln was strong and good: it recognized the fact that civil war was upon us, that compromise of any kind was at an end; and he asked for four hundred thousand men, and four hunndred million dollars, wherewith to vindicate the national authority, and to regain possession of the captured forts and other property of the United States.

"It was also immediately demonstrated that the tone and temper of Congress had changed since the Southern Senators and members had withdrawn, and that we, the military, could now go to work with some definite plans and ideas.

"The appearance of the troops about Washington was good, but it was manifest they were far from being soldiers. Their uniforms were as various as the States and cities from which they came; their arms were also of every pattern and caliber; and they were so loaded down with overcoats, haversacks, knapsacks, tents, and baggage, that it took from twenty-five to fifty wagons to move the camp of a regiment from one place to another, and some of the camps had bakeries and cooking establishments that would have done credit to Delmonico.

"While I was on duty with General Scott, viz., from June

20th to about June 30th, the general frequently communicated to those about him his opinions and proposed plans. He seemed vexed with the clamors of the press for immediate action, and the continued interference in details by the President, Secretary of War, and Congress. He spoke of organizing a grand army of invasion, of which the regulars were to constitute the 'iron column,' and seemed to intimate that he himself would take the field in person, though he was at the time very old, very heavy, and very unwieldy. His age must have been about seventy-five years.

"At that date, July 4, 1861, the rebels had two armies in front of Washington; the one at Manassas Junction, commanded by General Beauregard, with his advance guard at Fairfax Court-House, and indeed almost in sight of Washington. The other commanded by General Joe Johnston, was at Winchester, with its advance at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry; but the advance had fallen back before Patterson, who then occupied Martinsburg and the line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

"The temper of Congress and the people would not permit the slow and methodical preparation desired by General Scott; and the cry of 'On to Richmond!' which was shared by the volunteers, most of whom had only engaged for ninety days, forced General Scott to hasten his preparations, and to order a general advance about the middle of July. McDowell was to move from the defenses of Washington, and Patterson from Martinsburg. In the organization of McDowell's army into divisions and brigades, Colonel David Hunter was assigned to command the Second Division, and I was ordered to take command of his former brigade, which was composed of five regiments in position in and about Fort Corcoran, and on the ground opposite Georgetown. I assumed command on the 30th of June, and proceeded at once to prepare

it for the general advance. My command constituted the Third Brigade of the First Division, which division was commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, a graduate of West Point, but who had seen little or no actual service. I applied to General McDowell for some staff-officers, and he gave me, as adjutant-general, Lieutenant Piper, of the Third Artillery, and, as aide-de-camp, Lieutenant McQuesten, a fine young cavalry officer, fresh from West Point.

"I selected for the field the Thirteenth New York, Colonel Quimby; the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; the Seventy-ninth New York, Colonel Cameron, and the Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck. These were all good, strong, volunteer regiments, pretty well commanded; and I had reason to believe that I had one of the best brigades in the whole army. Captain Ayres's battery of the Third Regular Artillery was also attached to my brigade. The other regiment, the Twenty-ninth New York, Colonel Bennett, was destined to be left behind in charge of the forts and camps during our absence, which was expected to be short. Soon after I had assumed the command, a difficulty arose in the Sixty-ninth, an Irish regiment. This regiment had volunteered in New York, early in April, for ninety days; but, by reason of the difficulty of passing through Baltimore, they had come *via* Annapolis, had been held for duty on the railroad as a guard for nearly a month before they actually reached Washington, and were then mustered in about a month after enrollment. Some of the men claimed that they were entitled to their discharge in ninety days from the time of enrollment, whereas the muster-roll read ninety days from the date of muster-in. One day, Colonel Corcoran explained this matter to me. I advised him to reduce the facts to writing, and that I would submit it to the War Department for an authoritative decision. He did so, and the War Depart-

ment decided that the muster-roll was the only contract of service, that it would be construed literally; and that the regiment would be held till the expiration of three months from the date of muster-in, viz., to about August 1, 1861. General Scott at the same time wrote one of his characteristic letters to Corcoran, telling him that we were about to engage in battle, and he knew his Irish friends would not leave him in such a crisis. Corcoran and the officers generally wanted to go to the expected battle, but a good many of the men were not so anxious. In the Second Wisconsin, also, was developed a personal difficulty. The actual colonel was Dr. Coon, a good-hearted gentleman, who knew no more of the military art than a child; whereas his lieutenant-colonel, Peck, had been to West Point, and knew the drill. Preferring that the latter should remain in command of the regiment, I put Colonel Coon on my personal staff, which reconciled the difficulty."

"In due season, about July 15th, our division moved forward, leaving our camps standing; Keyes's brigade in the lead then Schenck's, then mine, and Richardson's last. We marched via Vienna, Germantown, and Centreville, where all the army, composed of five divisions, seemed to converge. The march demonstrated little save the general laxity of discipline; for with all my personal efforts I could not prevent the men from straggling for water, blackberries, or anything on the way they fancied.

General Sherman's report gives his own statement of his part in the first great battle of the war.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
FORT CORCORAN, *July* 25, 1861.

"*To Captain* A. BAIRD, *Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division (General Tyler's).*

"SIR: I have the honor to submit this my report of the

operations of my brigade during the action of the 21st instant. The brigade is composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Quimby; Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York, Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; and Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Captain R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery. We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at half-past 2 A. M., taking place in your column, next to the brigade of General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt, before the enemy's position, near the stone bridge across Bull Run. Here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber to the right of the Warrenton road, and remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we saw a rebel regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed in double-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we knew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman were approaching. About the same time we observed in motion a large mass of the enemy, below and on the other side of the stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near our right, and to open fire on this mass; but you had previously detached the two rifle-guns belonging to this battery, and, finding that the smooth-bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you would send to me the thirty-pounder rifle-gun attached to Captain Carlisle's battery. At the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme right of the brigade. Thus we remained till we heard the musketry-fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter's column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon, when it became certain the enemy had come to a stand, and that our forces on the other

side of Bull Run were all engaged, artillery, and infantry.

"Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade, to the assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitering the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show himself in the open field on this side; and, inferring that we could cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading.

"We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met with no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was impassable to the artillery, and I sent word back to Captain Ayres to follow if possible, otherwise to use his discretion. Captain Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained on that side with the rest of your division. His report herewith describes his operations during the remainder of the day. Advancing slowly and cautiously with the head of the column, to give time for the regiments in succession to close up their ranks, we first encountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster of pines; Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, of the Sixty-ninth, without orders, rode out alone, and endeavored to intercept their retreat. One of the enemy, in full view, at short range, shot Haggerty, and he fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire on this party, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junction with Hunter's division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we proceeded with caution toward the field where we then plainly saw our forces engaged. Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter's. Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out, and

received his orders to join in pursuit of the enemy, who was falling back to the left of the road by which the army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel Quimby's regiment of rifles in front, in column, by division, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth. Quimby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonade; and, the ground affording comparative shelter from the enemy's artillery, they changed direction, by the right flank, and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crosses the ridge to our left front, the ground was swept by a most severe fire of artillery, rifles, and musketry, and we saw, in succession, several regiments driven from it; among them the Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching the crest of this hill, the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway, by the left flank, and to attack the enemy.

"This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army; and, when the regiment fell into confusion and retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that

they were being fired on by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, but was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill, and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of this ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was very irregular with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel, Cameron, charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe; they rallied several times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill.

This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest and had in full open view the ground so severely contested; the fire was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles incessant; it was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

"All this time Quimby's regiment occupied another ridge, to our left, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here, about half-past three P. M., began the scene of confusion and disorder that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time, all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool, and used to the shell and shot that fell comparatively harmless, all around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all of the battalions that had attempted to encounter it. Men fell away from their ranks, talking, and in great confusion. Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, was

carried to an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings used as hospitals, on the ridge to the west. We succeeded in partially reforming the regiments, but it was manifest that they would not stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and used all possible efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran, we formed an irregular square against the cavalry which were then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and we began our retreat toward the same ford of Bull Run, by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no positive order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operation of the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream of people strung from the hospital across Bull Run, and far toward Centreville. After putting in motion the irregular square in person, I pushed forward to find Captain Ayres's battery at the crossing of Bull Run. I sought it at its last position, before the brigade had crossed over, but it was not there; then, passing through the woods, where, in the morning, we had first formed line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found a detachment of the secession cavalry and thence made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run Bridge, into Centreville, where I found General McDowell, and from him understood that it was his purpose to rally the forces, and make a stand at Centreville.

"But, about nine o'clock at night, I received from General Tyler, in person, the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together,

and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camp, at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon the next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect; men sought their proper companies and regiments. Comparative order was restored, and all were posted to the best advantage.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Colonel Commanding Brigade.*"

No veteran can read these lines and fail to understand what Sherman meant when he said that they brought back to him every scene and incident of that terrible fight. That the report does justice to those engaged is sustained by the account given by a near friend of General Sherman, and who would if possible claim more for his friend. Colonel Bowman has given a calm statement of the Bull Run battle, which was singularly accepted as a rout by both armies, and might have been an unfortunate end of the war if the soldiers had been as well prepared for service as in later campaigns. That the closing of the war at this point might have left greater suffering for the nation can only be appreciated by those who carry as memories the prevalent feeling of the day.

"It may be said, in defense of the delusions of the hour, that our army was numerically stronger, as well officered, better equipped, and as well instructed as the rebel forces; and so indeed it was. But the rebel army was to act upon the defensive, ours upon the offensive. The advantage of ground would be with the enemy, the advantage of surprise, and the great advantage of cohesion at the moment of attack. On the other hand, our troops would have to move, to find

the enemy, and to attack him in his chosen position, or sustain his fire delivered from behind cover or behind earthworks. But the salient point of this question is, that the result of any movement, by either side, was left to chance; no man could have indicated the causes which would determine the result. It was purely chance whether any movement ordered from headquarters would be made at all; a rare chance whether it would be made at the time designated in orders; a miraculous chance if it were made exactly as ordered. By waiting a very little while, the result might have been reasonably assured. We could not wait. In the American character, Hope crowds Patience to the wall.

"After much public discussion and excitement, the order was given to General McDowell to move forward.

"The enemy had a force of about twenty-two thousand men, organized in eight brigades, with twenty-nine guns, encamped and intrenched at Manassas Junction, and commanded by General Gustave T. Beauregard. They had outposts at Fairfax Court-house, and at Centreville, seven miles from the Junction. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals Ewell, Holmes, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, and Colonels Cocke, Evans, and Early.

"General Joseph E. Johnston was at Winchester, with about twelve thousand men, watching our forces, under Major-General Robert Patterson, one of the Pennsylvania three-months militia. Generals Bee and Bartow and Colonel Jackson commanded the brigades of General Johnston's army. General Patterson's force amounted to twenty-three thousand men of all arms, chiefly three-months militia.

"General McDowell was to move directly upon Manassas on the 9th of July, and, turning the enemy's right flank, cut off his forces from Richmond. The movement began on the 16th. The men, unaccustomed to marching, moved very slowly.

Long years of peace had nourished in the minds of our citizens a reluctance to endure pain and privation, and the citizens had not become soldiers by a mere change of clothing. The men stopped every few moments to pick blackberries, stepped aside to avoid mud-puddles, crossed fords gingerly, emptied their canteens and filled them with fresh water whenever they came to a stream. Thus the army did not reach Centreville until the night of the 18th. Two days were spent here in reconnoissances, and on the 21st the final movement began. All this time the enemy, fully advised of our movements by the daily papers, was busily engaged in concentrating his available forces to meet our attack. That he would do so was obvious. General Scott had undertaken to guard against this, so far as the army under Johnston was concerned, by instructing General Patterson to observe him. Accordingly, after many delays, General Patterson moved from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, nine miles from Winchester, and then turned aside and marched to Charlestown. At the very moment when Johnston was withdrawing with all speed from Winchester, and hurrying to Beauregard's aid, Patterson was retreating to the Potomac.

"Tyler's division, which had marched from its camp near the Chain Bridge, on the extreme right of our lines, by the Vienna Road, was the first to reach Centreville. General Tyler's orders were to seize and hold this position, but not to bring on an engagement. He had no sooner arrived there than, elated at finding our progress undisputed by the enemy, he took the road to the left and pushed on, with Richardson's brigade, Ayres' battery, and a few cavalry, to Blackburn's Ford, where the Manassas and Centreville road crosses Bull Run. The ground on the left bank of that stream is just here open and gently undulating; on the other side it becomes at once heavily wooded, and ascends rather abruptly to the elevated

plateau on which Manassas Junction is situated. General Tyler was surprised to find that the enemy had not occupied the left bank at the ford; and still more, that they permitted our men to approach it unmolested. Nor was the enemy to be seen on the opposite bank. He deployed the infantry, and caused Captain Ayres to open fire from his battery on the woods opposite. Instantly a hot fire, as if from four thousand muskets at once, says the general, was opened from the woods. Our troops replied for a short while, and then retired. This movement was contrary to orders; had no object worth mentioning; and its result had a most dispiriting effect upon the whole army of General McDowell. Before it, the men had been all enthusiasm. They either would not meet the enemy at all, they dreamed, or they would whip him and chase him to Richmond. The enemy had been met, had not fled at the sight of us, and had not been whipped. The enthusiasm, which had been at the boiling point, was chilled by a doubt. The delay of the 19th and 20th, while waiting for the subsistence to come up, spread and increased the flatness.

"The original plan was to turn the enemy's right, and so cut off his communication with Richmond. General McDowell had objected to moving by his right to turn the enemy's left, because the movement would be indecisive. At the eleventh hour, this indecisive course was adopted, for the reasons that the roads on the left appeared impracticable, that the enemy's attention had been attracted to Blackburn's Ford by the blunder of the 18th, and that it had now become an object to guard against the expected arrival of Johnston, by occupying his line of railway communication.

"On the night of Saturday, the 20th of July, General McDowell issued his orders for the attack. Runyon's Fourth division was left in the rear near Fairfax Court-house.

Tyler's division—except Richardson's brigade, which was to remain at Blackburn's Ford and report to Colonel Miles—was to march at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning down the Warrenton road, and threaten the Stone Bridge. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades were encamped on the Warrenton road, about a mile beyond Centreville; Keyes's brigade, which had become separated from the rest of the division, had gone into camp half a mile east of Centreville. Hunter's division, which was about a mile and a half beyond Keyes's was to move at two o'clock, and close up on Tyler. Heintzelman's division, which was encamped on the Braddock road, two miles east of Centreville, was to march at half-past two, and fall in the rear of Hunter. Under cover of Tyler's attack, Hunter and Heintzelman were to move to the right, cross Bull Run at Sudley's Springs, and turn the enemy's left. Mile's division was held in reserve at Centreville, to guard against a movement of the enemy by Blackburn's Ford, to cut off our rear.

"These dispositions, except as to Runyon's division, were well made. Had they been executed, the result of the day must have been very different.

"At a blacksmith's shop, about a mile in advance of Tyler's position, a branch road leads from the Warrenton pike toward Sudley's Springs. If Tyler had marched boldly forward, the rear of his division should have cleared that point, in an hour, or, at the very latest, in an hour and a half. This would have enabled Hunter to file to the right, certainly by four o'clock. In fact, the rear of Tyler's division did not pass the junction of the roads until half-past five, or fully an hour and a half later than it should have done. Schenck's brigade, which led the advance, started punctually at the time fixed in orders, but, as General Tyler himself explains, he felt called upon to move slowly and with caution, feeling

his way down to the Stone Bridge. Thus occurred a fatal delay.

"The head of Schenck's brigade reached the Stone Bridge about six o'clock, and the artillery of his and Sherman's brigades opened fire about half an hour later. Hunter's division could not find the road by which it was to march, and having been led by its guide by a wide detour through the woods, did not reach the ford until between half-past nine and ten o'clock, and occupied more than an hour in passing, so that it was after eleven o'clock before Heintzelman began to cross. The head of Hunter's column became engaged almost immediately after crossing Bull Run, and drove the enemy steadily until about noon. While Hunter was crossing, orders were sent to Tyler to press his attack. Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, accordingly crossed Bull Run at a ford just above the Stone Bridge, and pushed forward down the Warrenton road until he joined the left of Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, then hotly engaged; Ayres's battery, being unable to cross the ford, was left behind. Sherman came into action about half-past twelve, and was at once ordered by General McDowell to join in the pursuit of the enemy, then falling back on the left of the Groveton road. Placing Colonel Quimby's Thirteenth New York regiment in front, in column by division, Colonel Sherman ordered the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Second Wisconsin, Seventy-ninth New York and Sixty-ninth New York.

"Thus far the tide of success had been unbroken. Our troops had effected the passage of Bull Run, had driven the enemy before them in confusion a mile and a half, and we had succeeded in uniting three divisions under the crest of the hill which was to be the decisive point of the battle. On the left, Keyes was driving back the enemy, enabling Schenck

to cross and remove the obstructions in his front, and to turn the enemy's right. The crisis was at hand."

"In his official report, Colonel Sherman thus graphically describes the operations of his brigade at this time: 'Quimby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him; and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way till the head of the column reached the point near which Ricketts' battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading; and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left, the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of Marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion, and retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had

closed up, and, in like manner, it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and, for a short time, the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had a full, open view of the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

"It was now half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two in the morning, had been on their legs ever since, had been engaged for four hours, and had eaten nothing. The day was intensely hot. The troops unused to any of these things, were fagged.

"There was a slight lull on the extreme right. Porter's brigade of Hunter's division, and Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries, were sent forward to occupy the crest of the hill, from which the enemy had been pushed. Hardly had they reached the position, when a murderous volley was poured into them, at pistol range, from the clump of pines that skirted the hill. Early's brigade, of Johnston's army, had arrived, and thrown itself on our right flank. Our line began to melt. The movement was taken up reluctantly by some regiments, but soon became general. The retreat became confused, and,

beyond Bull Run, the confusion became a rout. The enemy did not pursue. That night, while a council of war was discussing the expediency of holding Centreville, the sea of panic-stricken fugitives was making for Washington. Orders were issued for the coherent remains of the army to follow.

"Colonel Sherman says, of his own command: 'This retreat, was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their proper companies, comparative order was restored, and all are now (July 25,) posted to the best advantage.'

"The loss in Sherman's brigade was one hundred and eleven killed, two hundred and five wounded, two hundred and ninety-three missing; total, six hundred and nine. Our total loss in this engagement, exclusive of missing, was four hundred and eighty-one killed, one thousand and eleven wounded. The loss in killed and wounded in Sherman's brigade was nearly a fourth of that of the entire army. The enemy lost, in all, three hundred and seventy-eight killed, fourteen hundred and eighty-nine wounded, and thirty missing. His loss in killed and wounded was considerably greater than ours, but he picked up many prisoners from among the wounded and the lagging stragglers.

"The prime causes which led to this disgraceful defeat are to be sought in the many delays attending the commencement and execution of the movement, in consequence of which

our forces had to contend with the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston.

"The panic which followed the defeat must be traced to internal defects; to the utter absence of coherence or cohesion in the masses of militia; to the want of confidence of men in their officers, of officers in themselves and in their men; to the sudden apparition of a new and undefined terror in place of the confidently expected triumph. The mass easily became a jumbled crowd of individuals, because it had never been an army.

"As to the general plan of campaign, it was certainly a fatal mistake that our army clung to the banks of the Potomac a long month after it should boldly have seized upon Centreville and Manassas; and equally so, that a force of nearly eighty thousand should have been wasted by breaking it up into three fractions, destined to stand still on exterior lines, watching the enemy concentrate on the key-point.

"But the mortifying and humiliating disaster was necessary, by crushing the shell at once, to show us in a moment our weakness and utter want of solidity. Disguised until the rebellion had developed and established its strength, the disease would have been incurable. Laid bare at a stroke, the reaction set in at once, and the life of the nation was saved.

"Trust in everything and everybody around the Capital was for the moment destroyed. Major-General George B. McClellan, who had been successful in his operations in Western Virginia, an accomplished officer, well-known in the army, and possessing the confidence of the Lieutenant-General, was at once summoned to Washington, and assigned to the command of all the troops for its defense. At the end of July, he found a few scattered regiments cowering upon

the banks of the Potomac. The militia went home. The North rose. Four months later, the Army of the Potomac counted two hundred thousand soldiers ready for their work.

"The sharpness with which Colonel Sherman criticised the conduct of some of the officers and men of his brigade at Bull Run, both in his official report and in his free conversations, made him many enemies; but the vigor he had displayed on the field, added to the influence of his brother, the Honorable John Sherman, led the Ohio delegation in Congress to recommend his promotion. He was commissioned as a Brigadier-General of Volunteers on the 3d of August, 1861, to date back to the 17th of May, as was the custom at that time. For a short time after this he had command of a brigade in the Army of the Potomac, but early in September, upon the organization of the Department of Kentucky, he was transferred to that theater of operations, and ordered to report, as second in command, to Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, who was placed at the head of the department."

CHAPTER VI.

FIGHTING BY DIPLOMACY—THE TRICKS OF SECESSIONISTS FOR CONTROLLING BORDER STATES—SHERMAN'S PROMPTNESS SAVES KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI FROM THE CONSPIRATORS—HIS SUPERIORS COULD NOT COMPREHEND THE SITUATION.

The advice given by Sherman to Lincoln at his first interview, and the prophecy he made in regard to the struggle that was sure to ensue, had been fully justified by events. Even in Missouri it was evident that the Union feeling was not strong enough to prevent the active operations of the Secessionists without the support of the Federal arms. The tricks by which the extreme Southern states had been taken out of the Union, because of the ambition of their leaders, had been very successful. A new Confederate dictionary had been made; slavery was called "The South;" rebellion was denominated "Secession;" the execution of the Federal laws, "Coercion," and the desires of these conspirators, "The Constitution." They proposed to overthrow entirely the Federal Union and establish a separate government. They had prepared a new system of logic, which was a conglomeration of postulates substituted for the old-fashioned syllogism, and everything taken for granted which it was impossible for them to prove. Only let it be admitted that where thirteen or more parties have entered into an agreement any one of them can withdraw whenever he chooses without the consent of the others, and you can prove anything. To one whose mind is so organized that he can believe that statement, every-

thing will appear logical, and the Southern people were taught in this logic. It followed that while those states which chose to secede could not be rightfully coerced to remain in the Union, other states which chose to stay must be compelled to secede. This was the logic of the South. Unexpectedly Kentucky chose to stay in the Union. The inventors of the Confederate dictionary and the Confederate logic hatched a new scheme, formulated a new lie; they called it "Neutrality," and proposed to hold Kentucky neutral. Kentucky was to be neutral ground until the Confederacy had become strong enough to swallow the State at one bite. It was to be armed to resist invasion from the South and from the North alike. Beriah Magoffin, a Secessionist, was Governor. He organized the State militia in the interests of Secession, issuing a proclamation in which he declared the neutrality of Kentucky. A few gentlemen who had not yet accepted the Confederate logic and retained their love for the Union, suffered themselves to be gulled by this pretense, and hoped for peace because of that word, "neutrality." The names had great influence at the Capitol. They were believed at Washington to be Union men, but there were very few unconditional Union men in Kentucky, and their influence was proportionately weak. The Government was at a loss what course to pursue, but the Secessionists prepared for war. Governor Magoffin called a meeting of the Legislature, and urged that body to order a State convention of all the people to consider the crisis, and what should be the policy of the State under the circumstances. The State Legislature met April 28th. Two days after, the Governor issued a proclamation, practically declaring that Kentucky would remain neutral and prevent invasion from any quarter.

Nearly one month later the Legislature resolved that the Governor's proclamation was not in accordance with the

views of the people. The State Militia law was so amended as to require the State Guard to take the oath of allegiance to the Federal Government. On the 24th of May, the last day of the session, the Senate passed resolutions declaring:

"Kentucky will not sever connection from the National Government, nor take up arms for either belligerent party, but arm herself for the preservation of peace within her borders, and tender their services as mediators to effect a just and honorable peace." The resolutions were defeated in the House by a vote of forty-nine to forty-three. The Secessionists began to be alarmed. Their fears were not allayed when the election for members of Congress, held in July, showed a majority for the loyal Unionist candidates of more than fifty-five thousand.

The Legislature convened again on the 3rd of September. The Federal Government had authorized Lovell H. Rousseau to raise a brigade of troops in the State for the Federal service, and the Confederate troops under Pollock had just invaded the Commonwealth, occupying Hickman, and Chalk Bluffs. General Grant, who had been watching these steps, assumed the responsibility of occupying Paducah, but the Secessionists alarmed at this supported their government in a demand that both belligerents should withdraw. They desired to frighten the Government of the United States, while the rebel authorities, not being compelled to listen to them, should maintain their control of the State. On the 11th the Legislature by a vote of seventy-one to twenty-six requested the Governor to order the Confederates troops to leave the State. A long contest ensued; many test resolutions being introduced, avowing that the neutrality of Kentucky and the rights of her people had been invaded by the so-called Confederate forces, urging the Governor to call out the military forces of the State to repel them, and invoking the assist-

ance of the Federal Government for that purpose. On the test vote the Unionists outnumbered their opponents by sixty-eight to twenty-six; but the Governor promptly vetoed the resolutions and the Legislature, as promptly repassed them over his veto by more than a two-thirds vote.

At once the Confederates changed their tactics. Those who had declared they must go with their State, found that this obligation rested heavily upon them as they were Secessionists at heart. Those who had protested that it was a crime to coerce a state had discovered that it was their sacred duty to coerce Kentucky to leave the Union. Confederate logic was doing its work. Buckner and Breckenridge assumed commands as general officers in the Confederate service and many of their fellow-conspirators followed.

On the 17th of September, Buckner seized a railway train and moved upon Louisville from Bowling Green. By an accident he was detained within forty miles of the city, and by the time he was ready to start, Rousseau's brigade and a battalion of home-guards were ready to oppose it. He then abandoned the attempt.

In obedience to the call of the Legislature and by order of President Lincoln, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson assumed command of the military department of Kentucky, September 21, 1861, and began preparations for organizing the full quota of State troops that had been called for the National defense. The invasion of the State had stripped the mask from the designs of the Secessionists and citizens could no longer favor them openly. Recruiting however went on slowly and meanwhile at Bowling Green and Nashville, Pollock and Zollicoffer were gathering large bodies of rebels to invade and hold Kentucky.

Brigadier-General Anderson because of ill-health, found that the demands upon his strength by the cares and respon-

sibilities of his position was dragging him down, and asked the War Department to relieve him from the command. He was promptly relieved by Brigadier-General Sherman, then in command of a brigade at Lexington. The new commander evinced his usual tact, and energy in organizing his department. He understood the temper of the Southern people and prepared his troops for the bitter contest that was to ensue.

General McClellan had succeeded to the chief command of the army on the first of November, and immediately adopted a general plan of campaign, in which the operations in the department of the Cumberland formed a co-operative part of those of the principal army on the Potomac, but the people and the press forced the Administration; they had become impatient of the general inactivity of the Federal forces, and were demanding their advance. On the 16th of October, the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, accompanied by Brigadier-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the army, visited Sherman at Louisville for the purpose of ascertaining by a personal interview the exact condition of affairs in that quarter.

Sherman agreed with Lieutenant-General Scott and General McClellan that there was to be no "little war," and believed with them, too, in the necessity of immediate, decisive movements by armies large enough not merely to advance, but to end the war at once. But he did not agree with General McClellan that it was unnecessary to school the soldiers and prepare them for the service. He had had experience with new troops and understood that they would be of little use, as indeed they had proved at Bull Run. In an interview with the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron asked Sherman how many troops he would require in his department. Sherman replied: "Sixty thousand to drive the enemy out of Kentucky;

two hundred thousand to finish the war in this section." Convinced of the inutility of advancing against the enemy until our strength would render success decisive, as well as reasonably certain, while defeat would not be fatal, and aware of the ease with which the enemy, driven out of the State could concentrate and recuperate in Tennessee, and calling to his aid the reserves then at his command, would compel us to summon to the field at the eleventh hour, and concentrate upon an advanced and exposed position, a much larger force than would have been required in the first instance; perceiving these things, he could not sympathize with, or even comprehend the spirit of, his superiors, who were for present success, and for trusting to-morrow to the future. On the other hand, the Secretary of War and Adjutant-General could not understand Sherman, nor see the utility of a delay which they regarded as temporizing. Looking at the force of the enemy then in arms in Sherman's immediate front, they considered that he greatly overestimated the obtacles with which he would have to contend. Calculations of difficulties seem to earnest men, to spring from timidity or want of zeal. In a few days the report of the Adjutant-General, embracing full particulars of the condition of all the Western armies, was given to the public. In referring to General Sherman, General Thomas simply stated that he had said he would require two hundred thousand men. Great excitement was occasioned in the popular mind. A writer for one of the newspapers declared that Sherman was crazy. Insanity is hard to prove; harder still to disprove, when the suspicion rests upon a difference of opinion; the infirmities of great minds are always fascinating to the masses. The public seized upon the anonymous insinuation, and accepted it as a conclusion.

On the 12th of November Brigadier-General Buell was

ordered by Major-General McClellan to relieve Brigadier-General Sherman from the command of the department of the Cumberland, and Sherman was ordered to report to Major-General Halleck in command of the Department of the West. General Buell was granted strong reinforcements, enabling him to take the offensive during the latter part of the winter. In these events will be seen the same lesson of tolerance for the opinions of others that was taught so continuously during and after the war. Looking back on that time in the light of to-day, Sherman's views seem to be those which should have been held by every citizen, yet, at that time it was difficult to believe that the seventy-five thousand men called for by Lincoln would not be able to subdue the Rebellion and restore peace. But, having these views at the time, General Sherman was not held in high esteem at the War Department, though he maintained the confidence and respect of his brother officers. The General-in-Chief deemed that he might be useful in a subordinate capacity, and therefore ordered him to report to Halleck. Events proved that, instead of being allowed to continue at Benton Barracks where he had been assigned for duty, he would outrank those who had failed to recognize his great ability.

It is difficult for readers of history to comprehend the actions of men in high position during the struggle which was to decide the life of the nation. It is due to the great hero, who suffered so much and bore the contumely of ambitious and dishonest men, to keep in every record of the early days of the war the fullest statement of actual facts, substantiated by such documentary evidence as will forever close the mouths of maligners. No historian can fail to understand with what indignation the honest soldier listened to reports of his insanity, based upon ignorance and hate. He knew what

effects they must have on his young wife from whom he was separated.

The Secretary of War had determined upon a visit to the Department of the Cumberland, and notified Sherman of his coming. Preparations were promptly made to receive the Secretary, and hopes of good results were natural to those who had no other thought in the matter than faithful service to the country. Of the interview and its results General Sherman has placed the best record on file:

"After some general conversation, Mr. Cameron called to me, 'Now, General Sherman, tell us of your troubles.' I said 'I preferred not to discuss business with so many strangers present.' He said, 'They are all friends, all members of my family, and you may speak your mind freely and without restraint.' I am sure I stepped to the door, locked it to prevent intrusion, and then fully and fairly represented the state of affairs in Kentucky, especially the situation and numbers of my troops. I complained that the new levies of Ohio and Indiana were diverted east and west, and we got scarcely anything; that our forces at Nolin and Dick Robinson were powerless for invasion, and only tempting to a general such as we believed Sidney Johnston to be; that, if Johnston chose, he could march to Louisville any day. Cameron exclaimed: 'You astonish me! Our informants, the Kentucky Senators and members of Congress, claim that they have in Kentucky plenty of men, and all they want are arms and money.' I then said it was not true; for the young men were arming and going out openly in broad daylight to the rebel camps, provided with good horses and guns by their fathers, who were at best 'neutral;' and as to arms, he had, in Washington, promised General Anderson forty thousand of the best Springfield muskets, instead of which we had received only about twelve thousand Belgian muskets, which

the Governor of Pennsylvania had refused, as had also the Governor of Ohio, but which had been adjudged good enough for Kenutcky. I asserted that volunteer colonels raising regiments in various parts of the State had come to Louisville for arms, and when they saw what I had to offer had scorned to receive them—to confirm the truth of which I appealed to Mr. Guthrie, who said that every word I had spoken was true, and he repeated what I had often heard him say, that no man who owned a slave or a mule in Kentucky could be trusted.

"Mr. Cameron appeared alarmed at what was said, and turned to Adjutant-General L. Thomas, to inquire if he knew of any troops available, that had not been already assigned. He mentioned Negley's Pennsylvania Brigade at Pittsburgh, and a couple of other regiments that were then *en route* for St. Louis. Mr. Cameron ordered him to divert these to Louisville, and Thomas made the telegraphic orders on the spot. He further promised, on reaching Washington, to give us more of his time and assistance.

"In the general conversation which followed, I remember taking a large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them, showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less than a hundred miles, and Fremont the right, about the same; whereas I, the center, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over three hundred miles of frontier; that McClellan had a hundred thousand men, Fremont sixty thousand, whereas to me had only been allotted about eighteen thousand. I argued that, for the purpose of defense, we should have sixty thousand men at once, and for offense, would need two hundred thousand, before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands and exclaimed, 'Great God! where are they to come

from?' I asserted that there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing to come, if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious that regiments had been formed in all the Northwestern States, whose services had been refused by the War Department, on the ground that they would not be needed. We discussed all these matters fully, in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was before us and was in fact upon us. I heard him tell General Thomas to make a note of our conversation, that he might attend to my requests on reaching Washington. We all spent the evening together agreeably in conversation, many Union citizens calling to pay their respects, and the next morning early we took the train for Frankfort; Mr. Cameron and party going on to Cincinnati and Washington, and I to Camp Dick Robinson to see General Thomas and the troops there.

"I found General Thomas in a tavern, with most of his regiment camped about him. He had sent a small force some miles in advance toward Cumberland Gap, under Brigadier-General Schoepf. Remaining there a couple of days I returned to Louisville; on the 22nd of October, General Negley's brigade arrived in boat from Pittsburgh, was sent out to Camp Nolin; and the Thirty-seventh Indiana, Colonel Hazzard, and Second Minnesota, Colonel Van Cleve, also reached Louisville by rail, and were posted at Elizabethtown and Lebanon Junction. These were the same troops which had been ordered by Mr. Cameron when at Louisville, and they were all that I received thereafter, prior to my leaving Kentucky. On reaching Washington, Mr. Cameron called on General Thomas, as he himself afterward told me, to submit his memorandum of events during his absence, and in that memorandum was mentioned my *insane* request for two hun-

dred thousand men. By some newspaper man this was seen and published, and, before I had the least conception of it, I was universally published throughout the country as 'insane, crazy,' etc. Without any knowledge, however, of this fact, I had previously addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army at Washington this letter:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, *October* 22, 1861.

"*To General* L. THOMAS *Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.*

"SIR: On my arrival at Camp Dick Robinson, I found General Thomas had stationed a Kentucky regiment at Rock Castle Hill, beyond a river of the same name, and had sent an Ohio and an Indiana regiment forward in support. He was embarrassed for transportation, and I authorized him to hire teams, and to move his whole force nearer to his advance-guard, so as to support it, as he had information of the approach of Zollicoffer toward London. I have just heard from him, that he had sent forward General Schoepf with Colonel Wolford's cavalry, Colonel Steadman's Ohio regiment, and a battery of artillery, followed on a succeeding day by a Tennessee brigade. He had still two Kentucky regiments, the Thirty-eighth Ohio and another battery of artillery, with which he was to follow yesterday. This force, if concentrated, should be strong enough for the purpose; at all events, it is all he had or I could give him.

"I explained to you fully, when here, the supposed position of our adversaries, among which was a force in the valley of Big Sandy, supposed to be advancing on Paris, Kentucky. General Nelson at Maysville was instructed to collect all the men he could, and Colonel Gill's regiments of Ohio Volunteers. Colonel Harris was already in position at Olympian

Springs, and a regiment lay at Lexington, which I ordered to his support. This leaves the line of Thomas' operations exposed, but I cannot help it. I explained so fully to yourself and the Secretary of War the condition of things, that I can add nothing new until further developments. You know my views that this great center of our field is too weak, far too weak, and I have begged and implored till I dare not say more.

"Buckner still is beyond Green River. He sent a detachment of his men, variously estimated at from two to four thousand toward Greensburg. General Ward with about one thousand men, retreated to Campbellsburg, where he called to his assistance some partially-formed regiments to the number of about two thousand. The enemy did not advance, and General Ward was at last dates at Campbellsburg. The officers charged with raising regiments must of necessity be near their homes to collect men, and for this reason are out of position; but at or near Greensburg and Lebanon, I desire to assemble as large a force of the Kentucky Volunteers as possible. This organization is necessarily irregular, but the necessity is so great that I must have them, and therefore have issued to them arms and clothing during the process of formation. This has facilitated their enlistment; but inasmuch as the Legislature has provided money for organizing the Kentucky Volunteers, and intrusted its disbursment to a board of loyal gentlemen, I have endeavored to co-operate with them to hasten the formation of these corps.

"The great difficulty is, and has been, that as volunteers offer, we have not arms and clothing to give them. The arms sent us are, as you already know, European muskets of uncouth pattern, which the volunteers will not touch.

"General McCook has now three brigades—Johnson's,

Wood's and Rousseau's. Negley's brigade arrived to-day and will be sent out at once. The Minnesota regiment has also arrived, and will be sent forward. Hazzard's regiment of Indiana troops I have ordered to the mouth of Salt Creek, an important point on the turnpike road leading to Elizabethtown.

"I again repeat that our force here is out of all proportion to the importance of the position. Our defeat would be disastrous to the nation and to expect of new men, who have never bore arms, to do miracles, is not right.

"I am, with much respect, yours truly,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Brigadier-General Commanding.*"

"About this time my attention was drawn to the publication in all the Eastern papers, which of course was copied at the West, of the report that I was 'crazy, insane, and mad,' that 'I had demanded two hundred thousand men for the defense of Kentucky;' and the authority given for the report was stated to be the Secretary of War himself, Mr. Cameron, who never, to my knowledge, took pains to affirm or deny it. My position was therefore simply unbearable, and it is probable I resented the cruel insult with language of intense feeling. Still I received no orders, no reenforcements, not a word of encouragement or relief. About November 1, General McClellan was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies in the field, and by telegraph called for a report from me. It is herewith given:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, *November* 4, 1861.

"*General* L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.*

"SIR: In compliance with the telegraphic orders of General McClellan, received late last night, I submit this report of the forces in Kentucky, and of their condition.

"The tabular statement shows the position of the several regiments. The camp at Nolin is at the present extremity of the Nashville Railroad. This force was thrown forward to meet the advance of Buckner's army, which then fell back to Green River, twenty-three miles beyond. These regiments were substantially without means of transportation, other than the railroad, which is guarded at all dangerous points, yet is liable to interruption at any moment, by the tearing up of a rail by the disaffected inhabitants or a hired enemy. These regiments are composed of good materials, but devoid of company officers of experience, and have been put under thorough drill since being in camp. They are generally well-clad, and provided for. Beyond Green River, the enemy has masked his forces, and it is very difficult to ascertain even the approximate numbers. No pains have been spared to ascertain them, but without success, and it is well known that they far outnumber us. Depending, however, on the railroads to their rear for transportation, they have not thus far advanced this side of Green River, except in marauding parties. This is the proper line of advance, but will require a very large force, certainly fifty thousand men, as their railroad facilities south enable them to concentrate at Munfordsville the entire strength of the South. General McCook's command is divided into four brigades, under Generals Wood, R. W. Johnson, Rousseau and Negley.

"General Thomas's line of operations is from Lexington, toward Cumberland Gap and Ford, which are occupied by a force of rebel Tennesseeans, under the command of Zollicoffer. Thomas occupies the position at London, in front of two roads which lead to the fertile part of Kentucky, the one by Richmond, and the other by Crab Orchard, with his reserve at Camp Dick Robinson, eight miles

south of the Kentucky River. His provisions and stores go by railroad from Cincinnati to Nicholasville, and thence in wagons to his several regiments. He is forced to hire transportation.

"Brigadier-General Nelson is operating by the line from Olympian Springs, east of Paris, on the Covintgon & Lexington Railroad, toward Prestonburg, in the valley of the Big Sandy, where is assembled a force of from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred rebel Kentuckians waiting re-enforcements from Virginia. My last report from him was to October 28, at which time he had Colonel Harris' Ohio Second, nine hundred strong; Colonel Norton's Twenty-first Ohio, one thousand; and Colonel Sill's Thirty-third Ohio, seven hundred and fifty strong; with two irregular Kentucky regiments, Colonels Marshall and Metcalf. These troops were on the road near Hazel Green and West Liberty, advancing toward Prestonburg.

"Upon an inspection of the map, you will observe these are all vergent lines, but rendered necessary, from the fact that our enemies choose them as places of refuge from pursuit, where they can receive assistance from neighboring States. Our lines are all too weak, probably with the exception of that to Prestonburg. To strengthen these, I am thrown on the raw levies of Ohio and Indiana, who arrive in detachments, perfectly fresh from the country, and loaded down with baggage; also upon the Kentuckians, who are slowly forming regiments all over the State, at points remote from danger, and whom it will be almost impossible to assemble together. The organization of this latter force, is, by the laws of Kentucky, under the control of a military board of citizens, at the capital, Frankfort, and they think they will be enabled to have fifteen regiments toward the middle of this month, but I doubt it, and deem it unsafe

to rely on them. There are four regiments forming in the neighborhood of Owensboro', near the mouth of Green River, who are doing good service, also in the neighborhood of Campbellsville, but it is unsafe to rely on troops so suddenly armed and equipped. They are not yet clothed or uniformed.

"I know well you will think our force too widely distributed, but we are forced to it by the attitude of our enemies, whose force and numbers the country never has, and probably never will, comprehend.

"I am told that my estimate of troops needed for this line, viz., two hundred thousand, has been construed to my prejudice, and therefore leave it for the future. This is the great center on which our enemies can concentrate whatever force is not employed elsewhere. Detailed statement of present force inclosed with this.

"With great respect, your obedient servant.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Brigadier-General commanding.*"

"And, in order to conclude this subject, I also add copies of two telegraphic dispatches, sent for General McClellan's use about the same time, which are all the official letters received at his headquarters, as certified by the Adjutant-General, L. Thomas, in a letter of February 1, 1862, in answer to an application of my brother, Senator John Sherman, and on which I was adjudged insane:

"LOUISVILLE, *November* 3, 10 P. M.

"*To General* MCCLELLAN, *Washington, D. C.*

"Dispatch just received. We are forced to operate on three lines, all dependent on railroads of doubtful safety, requiring strong guards. From Paris to Prestonburg, three Ohio regiments and some militia—enemy variously reported from thirty-five hundred to seven thousand. From Lexington

toward Cumberland Gap, Brigadier-General Thomas, one Indiana and five Ohio regiments, two Kentucky and one Tennessee; hired wagons and badly clad. Zollicoffer, at Cumberland Ford, about seven thousand. Lee reported on the way with Virginia re-enforcements. In front of Louisville, fifty-two miles, McCook, with four brigades of about thirteen thousand, with four regiments to guard the railroad, at all times in danger. Enemy along the railroad from Green River, to Bowling Green, Nashville, and Clarksville, Buckner, Hardee, Sidney Johnston, Polk, and Pillow, the two former in immediate command, the force as large as they want or can subsist, from twenty-five to thirty thousand. Bowling Green strongly fortified. Our forces too small to do good, and too large to sacrifice. W. T. SHERMAN, *Brigadier-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND.
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, *November*, 6. 1861,

"*General* L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*

"SIR: General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the situation of affairs here. The country is so large that it is impossible to give clear and definite views. Our enemies have terrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, and along our avenues of travel, they have active partisans, farmers and business-men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but are in fact spies. They report all our movements and strength, while we can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means. I enclose you the copy of an intercepted letter, which is but the type of others. Many men from every part of the State are now enrolled under Buckner—have gone to him—while ours have to be raised in a neighborhood, and cannot be called together except at long notice. These volunteers are being organized under the laws of the State, and the 10th of November is

fixed for the time of consolidating them into companies and regiments. Many of them are armed by the United States as home guards, and many by General Anderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed to guard their camps against internal enemies. Should we be overwhelmed, they would scatter, and their arms and clothing will go to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need. We should have here a very large force, sufficient to give confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should be done—possess ourselves of all the State. But all see and feel we are brought to a stand-still, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our present force it would be simple madness to cross Green River, and yet hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner the other columns are in peril, not so much in front as rear, the railroads over which our stores must pass being much exposed. I have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is far from being safe; and, the moment actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma. To meet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth of Salt River, guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weaken the main force, and endanger the whole. Do not conclude as before, that, I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some man of sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according to my convictions.

"Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Brigadier-General Commanding.*"

"After the war was over, General Thomas J. Wood, then in command of the district of Vicksburg, prepared a statement, addressed to the public, describing the interview with the Secretary of War, which he calls a 'Council of War.'

I did not then deem it necessary to renew a matter which had been swept to oblivion by the war itself; but, as it is evidence by an eye-witness, it is worthy of insertion here.

On the 11th of October, 1861, the writer who had been personally on mustering duty in Indiana, was appointed a Brigadier-General of volunteers, and ordered to report to General Sherman, then in command of the Department of the Cumberland, with his headquarters at Louisville, having succeeded General Robert Anderson. When the writer was about leaving Indianapolis to proceed to Louisville, Mr. Cameron, returning from his famous visit of inspection to General Fremont's department, at St. Louis, Missouri, arrived at Indianapolis, and announced his intention to visit General Sherman.

"The writer was invited to accompany the party to Louisville. Taking the early morning train from Indianapolis to Louisville on the 16th of October, 1861, the party arrived in Jeffersonville shortly after mid-day, General Sherman met the party in Jeffersonville, and accompanied it to the Galt House, in Louisville, the hotel at which he was stopping.

"'During the afternoon General Sherman informed the writer that a council of war was to be held immediately in his private room in the hotel, and desired him to be present at the council. General Sherman and the writer proceeded directly to the room. The writer entered the room first, and observed in it Mr. Cameron, Adjutant-General L. Thomas, and some other persons, all of whose names he did not know but whom he recognized as being of Mr. Cameron's party. The name of one of the party the writer had learned, which he remembers as Wilkinson, or Wilkerson, and who he understood was a writer for the *New York Tribune* newspaper. Hon. James Guthrie was also in the room, having been invited, on account of his eminent position as a citizen of Ken-

tucky, his high civic reputation, and his well-known devotion to the Union, to meet the Secretary of War in the council. When General Sherman entered the room he closed the door, and turned the key in the lock.

"'Before entering on the business of the meeting, General Sherman remarked substantially: "Mr. Cameron, we have met here to discuss matters and interchange views which should be known only by persons high in the confidence of the Government. There are persons present whom I do not know; and I desire to know, before opening the business of the council, whether they are persons who may be properly allowed to hear the views which I have to submit to you." Mr. Cameron replied, with some little testiness of manner, that the person referred to belonged to his party, and there was no objection to their knowing whatever might be communicated to him.

"'Certainly the legitimate and natural conclusion from this remark of Mr. Cameron's was that whatever views might be submitted by General Sherman would be considered under the protection of the seal of secrecy, and would not be divulged to the public till all apprehension of injurious consequences from such disclosure had passed. And it may be remarked, further, that justice to General Sherman required that if, at any future time, his conclusions as to the amount of force necessary to conduct the operations committed to his charge should be made public, the grounds on which his conclusions were based should be made public at the same time.

"'Mr. Cameron then asked General Sherman, what his plans were. To this General Sherman replied that he had no plans; that no sufficient force had been placed at his disposition with which to devise any plan of operations; that before a commanding general could project a plan of campaign, he must know what amount of force he would have to operate with.

"'The general added that he had views which he would be happy to submit for the consideration of the Secretary. Mr. Cameron desired to hear General Sherman's views.

"'General Sherman began by giving his opinion of the people of Kentucky, and the condition of the State. He remarked that he believed a very large majority of the people of Kentucky were thoroughly devoted to the Union, and loyal to the Government, and that the Unionists embraced almost all the older and more substantial men in the State; but, unfortunately, there was no organization nor arms among the Union men; that the Rebel minority, thoroughly vindictive in its sentiments, was organized and armed (this having been done in advance by their leaders), and, beyond the reach of the Federal forces, overawed and prevented the Union men from organizing; that, in his opinion, if Federal protection were extended throughout the State to the Union men, a large force could be raised for the service of the Government.

"'General Sherman next presented a *resume* of the information in his possession as to the number of the Rebel troops in Kentucky. Commencing with the force at Columbus, Kentucky, the reports varied, giving the strength from ten to twenty thousand. It was commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk. General Sherman fixed it at the lowest estimate; say, ten thousand. The force at Bowling Green, commanded by General A. S. Johnston, supported by Hardee, Buckner, and others, was variously estimated at from eighteen to thirty thousand. General Sherman estimated this force at the lowest figures, given to it by his information—eighteen thousand.

"'He explained that, for purposes of defense, these two forces ought, owing to the facility with which troops might be transported from one to the other, by the net-work of railroads in Middle and West Tennessee, to be considered almost as one.

General Sherman remarked, also, on the facility with which re-enforcements would be transported by railroad to Bowling Green, from the other rebellious states.

"'The third organized body of Rebel troops was in Eastern Kentucky, under General Zollicoffer, estimated, according to the most reliable information, at six thousand men. This force threatened a descent, if unrestrained, on the blue-grass region of Kentucky, including the cities of Lexington, and Frankfort, the capital of the State; and if successful in its primary movements, as it would gather head as it advanced, might endanger the safety of Cincinnati.

"'General Sherman said that the information in his possession indicated an intention, on the part of the Rebels, of a general and grand advance toward the Ohio River. He further expressed the opinion that, if such advance should be made, and not checked, the Rebel force would be swollen by at least twenty thousand recruits from the disloyalists in Kentucky. His low computation of the organized Rebel soldiers then in Kentucky fixed the strength at about thirty-five thousand. Add twenty thousand for re-enforcements gained in Kentucky, to say nothing of troops drawn from other Rebel States, and the effective Rebel force in the State, at a low estimate, would be fifty-five thousand men.

"'General Sherman explained forcibly how largely the difficulties of suppressing the Rebellion would be enhanced, if the Rebels should be allowed to plant themselves firmly, with strong fortifications, at commanding points on the Ohio River. It would be facile for them to carry the war thence into the loyal states north of the river.

"'To resist an advance of the Rebels, General Sherman stated that he did not have at that time in Kentucky more than some twelve to fourteen thousand effective men The bulk of this force was posted at Camp Nolin, on the Louis-

ville & Nashville Railway, fifty miles south of Louisville. A part of it was in Eastern Kentucky, under General George H. Thomas, and a very small force was in the lower valley of Green River.

"'This disposition of the force had been made for the double purpose of watching and checking the Rebels, and protecting the raising and organization of troops among the Union men of Kentucky.

"'Having explained the situation from the defensive point of view, General Sherman proceeded to consider it from the offensive stand-point. The Government had undertaken to suppress the Rebellion; the *onus faciendi*, therefore, rested on the Government. The Rebellion could never be put down, the authority of the paramount Government asserted, and the union of the states declared perpetual, by force of arms, by maintaining the defensive; to accomplish these grand desiderata, it was absolutely necessary the Government should adopt, and maintain until the Rebellion was crushed, the *offensive*.

"'For the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, General Sherman said that at least sixty thousand soldiers were necessary. Considering that the means of accomplishment must always be proportioned to the end to be achieved, and bearing in mind the array of rebel force then in Kentucky, every sensible man must admit that the estimate of the force given by General Sherman, for driving the rebels out of the State, and re-establishing and maintaining the authority of the Government, was a very low one. The truth is that, before the Rebels were driven from Kentucky, many more than sixty thousand soldiers were sent into the State.

"'Ascending from the consideration of the narrow question of the political and military situation in Kentucky, and the extent of force necessary to redeem the State from Rebel

thraldom, forcasting in his sagacious intellect the grand and daring operations which, three years afterward, he realized in a campaign, taken in its entirety, without a parallel in modern times, General Sherman expressed the opinion that, to carry the war to the Gulf of Mexico, and destroy all armed opposition to the Government, in the entire Mississippi Valley, at least two hundred thousand troops were absolutely requisite.

"'So soon as General Sherman had concluded the expression of his views, Mr. Cameron asked, with much warmth and apparent irritation, "Where do you suppose, General Sherman, all this force is to come from?" General Sherman replied that he did not know; that it was not his duty to raise, organize, and put the necessary military force into the field; that duty pertained to the War Department. His duty was to organize campaigns and command the troops after they had been put into the field.

"'At this point of the proceedings, General Sherman suggested that it might be agreeable to the Secretary to hear the views of Mr. Guthrie. Thus appealed to, Mr. Guthrie said he did not consider himself, being a civilian, competent to give an opinion as to the extent of force necessary to carry the war to the Gulf of Mexico; but, being well-informed of the condition of things in Kentucky, he indorsed fully General Sherman's opinion of the force required to drive the Rebels out of the State.

"'The foregoing is a circumstantial account of the deliberations of the council that were of any importance.

"'A good deal of desultory conversation followed, on immaterial matters; and some orders were issued by telegraph, by the Secretary of War, for some re-enforcements to be sent to Kentucky immediately, from Pennsylvania and Indiana.

"'A short time after the council was held—the exact time is not now remembered by the writer—an imperfect narrative of it appeared in the *New York Tribune*. This account announced to the public the conclusions uttered by General Sherman in the council, without giving the reasons on which his conclusions were based. The unfairness of this course to General Sherman needs no comment. All military men were shocked by the gross breach of faith which had been committed.

"'TH. J. WOOD, *Major-General Volunteers*.

"'VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI, *August* 24, 1866.'"

It is difficult to understand the causes which so warped men's judgment and, indeed, seemed to have prejudiced their hearts against a soldier who had in every position revealed traits so extraordinary as to have been full warrant for his future success. There can be no greater calamity to a human being than to be forced to walk the earth with a partial consciousness that the mental faculties have become so impaired as to render a further work impossible. But for a man as sensitive as was General Sherman, as conscious of the correctness of his opinions regarding matters entirely beyond the comprehension of his judges, to be sent out into the world branded with the taint of insanity was enough to have crushed in most men all wish to render service where such, as was at his disposal, was so greatly needed.

Reaching St. Louis, he was kindly received by General Halleck, but the very manifestation of kindness carried proof of a sort of belief in the rumors. He was sent down to "inspect" a camp at Sedalia, well knowing that it was looked upon as a vacation devised for his personal benefit. Every newspaper harped on the terrible fate of General Sherman. The correspondents must have something to write about,

and it was much safer writing this than risking being caught near a battle. Battles could be written up from the rear best. There was no danger of bullets, and the stragglers brought plenty of food for histories. What wonder some imprudent words were called forth by such tortures. Rather what wonder the victim of such cruelty did not lessen the ranks of great journalistic critics.

General Halleck telegraphed Sherman, November 26th, "Unless telegraph lines are interrupted, make no movement of troops without orders." And three days later; "No forward movement of troops will be made; only strong reconnoitering parties will be sent out in the supposed direction of the enemy, the bulk of the troops being held in position till more reliable information is obtained." Shortly afterward General Sherman received the following dispatch:

"HEADQUARTERS, ST. LOUIS MISSOURI,
November, 28, 1861.

"*Brigadier-General*, SHERMAN, *Sedalia:*

"Mrs. Sherman is here. General Halleck is satisfied, from reports of scouts received here, that no attack on Sedalia is intended. You will, therefore, return to this city, and report your observations on the conditions of the troops you have examined. Please telegraph when you will leave.

"SCHUYLER HAMILTON,
"*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*"

On his return to St. Louis he found his wife much alarmed at the newspaper stories regarding her husband. His return gave new material for the manufacture of "stuff," at so much a line. Disgusted at the persistence with which he had been followed, General Sherman went to his old home and remained for a time during the winter of 1861 and 1862, there being no active military operations. Early in November he wrote

General Halleck complaining of the injustice and received the following reply:

"ST. LOUIS, *December* 18, 1861.

"*Brigadier-General* W. T. SHERMAN, *Lancaster, Ohio.*

"MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 12th was received a day or two ago, but was mislaid for the moment among private papers, or I should have answered it sooner. The newspaper attacks are certainly shameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you, that they have us in their power 'to destroy us as they please.' I certainly get my share of abuse, but it will not disturb me.

"Your movement of the troops was not countermanded by me because I thought it an unwise one in itself, but because I was not then ready for it. I had better information of Price's movements than you had, and I had no apprehension of an attack. I intended to concentrate the forces on that line, but I wished the movement delayed until I could determine on a better position.

"After receiving Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson's report, I made precisely the location you had ordered. I was desirous at the time not to prevent the advance of Price by any movement on our part, hoping that he would move on Lexington; but finding that he had determined to remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made the movement you proposed. As you could not know my plans, you and others may have misconstrued the reason on my countermanding your orders.

* * *

"I hope to see you well enough for duty soon. Our organization goes on slowly, but we will effect it in time.

"Yours truly, W. H. HALLECK."

Afterward in a letter to the Hon. Thomas Ewing, General Halleck wrote as follows:

"ST. LOUIS, *February* 15, 1862.

"*Hon.* THOMAS EWING, *Lancaster, Ohio.*

"DEAR SIR: Your note of the 13th, and one of this date, from Mr. Sherman, in relation to Brigadier-General Sherman's having been relieved from command in Sedalia, in November last, are just received. General Sherman was not put in command at Sedalia; he was authorized to assume it, and did so for a day or two. He did not know my plans, and his movement of troops did not accord with them. I therefore directed him to leave them as they were, and report here the result of his inspection, for which purpose he had been ordered there.

"No telegram or dispatch of any kind was sent by me, or by any one with my knowledge or authority, in relation to it. After his return, I gave him a leave of absence of twenty days, for the benefit of his health. As I was then pressing General McClellan for more officers, I deemed it necessary to explain why I did so. I used these words: 'I am satisfied that General Sherman's physical and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to render him, for the present, unfit for duty; perhaps a few week's rest may restore him.' This was the only communication I made on the subject. On no occasion have I ever expressed an opinion that his mind was affected otherwise than by over-exertion; to have said so would have done him the greatest injustice.

"After General Sherman returned from his short leave, I found that his health was nearly restored, and I placed him temporarily in command of the camp of instruction, numbering over fifteen thousand men. I then wrote to General McClellan that he would soon be able to again take the field. I gave General Sherman a copy of my letter. This is the total of my correspondence on the subject. As evidence that I have every confidence in General Sherman, I have placed

him in command of Western Kentucky—a command only second in importance in this department. As soon as divisions and columns and be organized, I proposed to send him into the field where he can render most efficient service. I have seen newspaper squibs charging him with being 'crazy,' etc. This is the grossest injustice; I do not, however, consider such attacks worthy of notice. The best answer is General Sherman's present position, and the valuable services he is rendering to the country. I have the fullest confidence in him.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

On returning to St. Louis, on the expiration of his leave, he found that General Halleck was beginning to move his troops: one part, under General U. S. Grant, up the Tennessee River; and another part, under General S. R. Curtis, in the direction of Springfield, Missouri. General Grant was then at Paducah, and General Curtis was under orders for Rolla. He was ordered to take Curtis' place in command of the camp of instruction, at Benton Barracks, on the ground back of North St. Louis, now used as the Fair Grounds, by the following order:

[SPECIAL ORDER NO. 87.]

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.
ST. LOUIS, *December* 23, 1861.

[EXTRACT.]

"Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, United States Volunteers, is hereby assigned to the command camp of instruction and post of Benton Barracks. He will have every armed regiment and company in his command ready for service at a moment's warning, and will notify all concerned that, when marching orders are received, it is expected that they will be

instantly obeyed; no excuses for delay will be admitted. General Sherman will immediately report to these headquarters what regiments and companies, at Benton Barracks, are ready for the field. By order of Major-General Halleck,

"J. C. KELTEN, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

On assuming command, he found, in the building constructed for the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Strong, and the family of a captain of Iowa cavalry, with whom he boarded. Major Curtis, son of General Curtis, was the Adjutant-General, but was soon relieved by Captain J. H. Hammond, who was appointed Assistant Adjutant-General, and assigned to duty with General Sherman. By his activity in this position General Sherman convinced all except the war correspondents not merely of his sanity but also of his great capacity. It was, perhaps not strange that the active young men who had their positions to gain should fail to grasp every military movement. They did not enjoy the kind of activity liable to be found near the front of an army commanded by a soldier who had seen service and disliked indolence. Though in mid-winter, Halleck was making preparations for a vigorous forward movement. The correspondents had demonstrated with pen and ink the necessity of an immediate "Advance", and the red-tapists accepted their statements, issuing daily bulletins to the commanders less trusted urging that degree of activity which had been shown possible in the newspapers. General Sherman details the operations leading up to the battle of Shiloh. He saw no more at the time of lack of confidence in his mental powers, and before the newsmongers could start another story he had so outstripped them as to force their acceptance of him as authority it were well to quote:

"Most people urged the movement down the Mississippi

River; but Generals Polk and Pillow had a large Rebel force, with heavy guns in a very strong position, at Columbus, Kentucky, about eighteen miles below Cairo. Commodore Foote had his gunboat fleet at Cairo; and General U. S. Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting a large force at Paducah, Cairo, and Bird's Point. General Halleck had a map on his table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, 'Where is the rebel line?" Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, Kentucky. 'That is their line,' said Halleck. 'Now where is the proper place to break it?' And either Cullum or I said, '*Naturally* the center.' Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other, near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River; and he said, 'That's the true line of operations.' This occurred more than a month before General Grant began the movement, and, as he was subject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given Halleck the full credit for that movement, which was skillful, successful, and extremely rich in military results; indeed, it was the first real success on our side in the civil war. The movement up the Tennessee began about the 1st of February, and Fort Henry was captured by the joint action of the navy under Commodore Foote and the land-forces under General Grant, on the 6th of February, 1862. About the same time, General S. R. Curtis had moved forward from Rolla, and, on the 8th of March, defeated the rebels under McCulloch, Van Dorn, and Price, at Pea Ridge.

"As soon as Fort Henry fell, General Grant marched straight across to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, invested the place, and, as soon as the gunboats had come round from the Tennessee, and had bombarded the water-front, he assaulted; whereupon Buckner surrendered the gar-

rison of twelve thousand men; Pillow and ex-Secretary of War General Floyd having personally escaped across the river at night, occasioning a good deal of fun and criticism at their expense.

"Before the fall of Donelson, but after that of Henry, I received, at Benton Barracks the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
ST. LOUIS, *February* 13, 1862.

"*Brigadier-General* SHERMAN, *Benton Barracks:*

"You will immediately repair to Paducah, Kentucky, and assume command of that post. Brigadier-General Hurlbut will accompany you. The command of Benton Barracks will be turned over to General Strong.

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

"I started for Paducah the same day, and think that General Cullum went with me to Cairo, General Halleck's purpose being to push forward the operations up the Tennessee River with unusual vigor. On reaching Paducah, I found this dispatch:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
ST. LOUIS, *February* 15, 1862.

"*Brigadier-General* SHERMAN, *Paducah, Kentucky:*

"Send General Grant everything you can spare from Paducah and Smithland; also General Hurlbut.

"Bowling Green has been evacuated entirely.

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

"The next day brought us news of the surrender of Buckner, and probably at no time during the war did we all feel so heavy a weight raised from our breasts, or so thankful for a most fruitful series of victories. They at once gave Gen-

erals Halleck, Grant, and C. E. Smith great fame. Of course, the Rebels let go their whole line, and fell back on Nashville and Island Number Ten, and to the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Everybody was anxious to help. Boats passed up and down constantly, and very soon arrived the Rebel prisoners from Donelson. I saw General Buckner on the boat; he seemed self-sufficient, and thought their loss was not really so serious to their cause as we did.

"From the time I had left Kentucky, General Buell had really made no substantial progress, though strongly reenforced beyond even what I had asked for. General Albert Sidney Johnston had remained at Bowling Green until his line was broken at Henry and Donelson, when he let go Bowling Green and fell back hastily to Nashville; and on Buell's approach did not even tarry there, but continued his retreat southward."

CHAPTER VII.

FROM SHILOH TO MEMPHIS—DOING THE WORK AND THANKED CORDIALLY FOR IT BY GENERAL GRANT.

The early spring of 1862 saw great activity along the Union lines. In February Major-General Halleck was in command of all the armies in the Mississippi valley, having headquarters at St. Louis. On the 16th, Fort Donelson fell before Grant's assault. General Sherman was at Paducah to push forward the work then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. General Buel was pressing the enemy, which had retreated from Bowling Green through Nashville. The Generals in command of active operations were getting further away from their superior's headquarters than was pleasant to Halleck, and the army operations were practically conducted at arms-length. On the first day of March, General Sherman received the following dispatch which was at once forwarded to Grant, the condition of the telegraph lines being such as to make communication very uncertain.

"ST. LOUIS, *March* 1, 1862.

"*To General* GRANT, *Fort Henry:*

"Transports will be sent you as soon as possible, to move your column up the Tennessee River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad-bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi; and also the railroad connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light ar-

tillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river, without any serious opposition.

"Avoid any general engagements with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be strongly impressed on the officers sent with expeditions from the river. General C. F. Smith or some very discreet officer should be selected for such commands. Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville, and move on Paris.

"Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humboldt can reach Paris by land as easily as to return to the transports. This must depend upon the character of the roads and the position of the enemy. All telegraphic lines which can be reached must be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their protection. Any loyal Tennesseeans who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms. Competent officers should be left to command Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. I have indicated in general terms the object of this.

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

In quick succession came the two following dispatches, indicating that distance from his armies was not adding to the comfort of General Halleck.

"CAIRO, *March* 2, 1862.

"*To General* GRANT:

"General Halleck, February 25th, telegraphs me: 'General Grant will send no more forces to Clarskville. General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry, or a point higher up on the Tennessee River; transports will also be collected at Paducah. Two gunboats in Tennessee River with Grant. General Grant will immediately have small garrisons de-

tailed for Forts Henry and Donelson, and all other forces made ready for the field.'

"From your letter of the 28th, I learn you were at Fort Donelson, and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you could not have received orders. Halleck's telegram of last night says: 'Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered it across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant.' Evidently the general supposes you to be on the Tennessee. I am sending all the transports I can find for you, reporting to General Sherman for orders to go up the Cumberland for you, or, if you march across to Fort Henry, then to send them up the Tennessee. G. W. CULLUM, *Brigadier-General.*"

"On the 4th came this dispatch:

"ST. LOUIS, *March* 4, 1862.

"*To Major-General* U. S. GRANT:

"You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

The closing sentence of the last dispatch reveals some of the discouraging features of the contest. The penny-a-liners were active in all directions. The same ignorant zeal which led them to manufacture and keep alive the belief that Sherman was crazy also induced their sending out whatever story they could manufacture from rumors at headquarters. Hence the tenor of these dispatches to Generals, whom the army were learning to love for their bravery and skill, caused not a little ill-feeling among the officers and enlisted men.

Sherman had been engaged in forwarding steamboats and men to other Generals under orders from General Halleck and also in preparing a force for himself out of the new recruits sent him. On March 10, he embarked his division at Paducah, and four days later sailed up the Tennessee, making a feint of landing at Eastport and finally disembarking at Pittsburg Landing. General Sherman intended to march from Pittsburg Landing toward Iuka, and, resting his infantry there, to send his cavalry to the Memphis and Charleston railway. But the enemy was met in greater force than expected. In the meanwhile, Major-General Charles F. Smith, in command of the advance, having landed his own second division at Savannah, had selected Pittsburg Landing as the favorable position for the encampment of the main body of the army, and under his instructions Sherman and Hurlbut, who had closely followed him, went into camp there. In a few days they were joined by the first and sixth divisions of McClernand and Prentiss, and by Smith's own division from Savannah; and Major-General Grant arrived and took command in person. During the last week of March, the Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio. General Buell had informed General Grant that he would join him before that time; but he had encountered great delays, and on the morning of the sixth of April the Army of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected. Instructions had been sent by General Grant to expedite its advance, and to push on to Pittsburg. The importance of the crisis was apparent, for Johnston would naturally seek to strike Grant before Buell's arrival; but Buell marched his troops with the same deliberation as if no other army depended upon his promptness. By orders he caused intervals of six miles to be observed between his divisions, thus lengthening out his column to a distance of over thirty miles.

Pittsburg is not a village, but only a landing, and is situated in a deep ravine, down which the Corinth road leads to the Tennessee River. The ground in front of Pittsburg is an undulating table-land, about a hundred feet above the road bottom, between two tributaries of the Tennessee, Lick Creek on the south, and Snake Creek on the north, and having a front of about three miles between the two streams. The country is covered with a heavy forest, passable for troops, except where the undergrowth constitutes an obstruction, and is broken by small cleared farms. The soil is a heavy clay. About two miles from the landing, the road to Corinth forks into two branches, forming the Lower Corinth road and the Ridge Corinth road; and another road leads off, still further to the left, across Lick Creek to Hamburgh, a few miles up the Tennessee River. On the right, two roads lead almost due west to Purdy, and another in a northerly direction across Snake Creek, down the river to Crump's Landing, six miles below.

"On the front of this position, facing to the south and southwest, five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped on the morning of the 6th of April. On the extreme left lay Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, on the Hamburgh road, behind the abrupt bank of Lick Creek. Prentiss' small division, facing to the south, carried the line across a branch of the main Corinth road, nearly to Sherman's left. Sherman facing to the south, with his right thrown back toward the landing, extended the front to the Purdy road, near Owl Creek. This advanced line was about two miles from the landing. Near the river, about a mile in rear of Prentiss and Stuart, Hurlbut's division was encamped; McClernand's was posted to the left and rear of Sherman, covering the interval between him and Prentiss; and C. F. Smith's division, commanded during his severe

illness at Savannah by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, was on the right of Hurlbut. Lewis Wallace's division was six miles distant, at Crump's Landing. The whole force in front of Pittsburg was about thirty thousand men.

On Friday, the 4th of April, the enemy's cavalry had made a demonstration upon the picket line, drove it in on Sherman's center, and captured a lieutenant and seven men. They were repulsed by Sherman's cavalry, and pursued with considerable loss. The next day the enemy's cavalry had again showed itself in our front, but there was nothing to indicate a general attack until seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance guard on Sherman's front was forced in upon his main line. Sherman at once got his men under arms, sent a request to General McClernand to support his left, and informed Generals Prentiss and Hurlbut that the enemy was before him in force. Sherman's division was posted as follows: The first brigade, under Colonel J. A. McDowell, consisting of the 6th Iowa; 40th Illinois, Colonel Hicks; 46th Ohio, Colonel Worthington, and Captain Behr's "Morton" Battery held the right, guarding the bridge over Owl Creek. The fourth brigade, commanded by Colonel Buckland of the 72nd Ohio, with his own regiment; the 48th Ohio, Colonel Sullivan, and the 70th Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, continued the line, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house. The third brigade, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand of the 77th Ohio, was composed of that regiment, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appler, and the 57th Ohio, Colonel Mungen, and was posted to the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house. Taylor's battery of light artillery was in position at the meeting-house, and Waterhouse's on a ridge to the left commanding the open ground between Appler's and Mungen's regiments. Eight companies of the 4th Illinois cavalry, Colonel Dickey, were placed in a large open

field in rear of the center of the division. Stuart's second brigade was, as we have seen, detached, and on the extreme left of the army.

The enemy formed under cover of the brush that lines Owl Creek, and at eight o'clock opened fire from his artillery, and moved forward his infantry across the open ground and up the slope that separated him from our lines. It now became evident that a general and determined attack was intended. Under cover of the advance on Sherman's front, the enemy was seen moving heavy masses to the left to attack Prentiss. About nine, Prentiss was giving ground, and presently Colonel Appler's Fifty-third Ohio and Colonel Mungen's Fifty-seventh Ohio regiments broke in disorder, exposing Waterhouse's battery. A brigade of McClernand's division, which had been promptly moved forward by General McClernand to the support of Sherman's left, formed the immediate supports of this battery; but the enemy advanced with such vigor, and kept up so severe a fire, that the three regiments were soon also in disorder, and the battery was lost. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades, and the rest of Hildebrand's brigade maintained the position at Shiloh for an hour longer; but ten o'clock found the enemy pressing heavily upon Sherman's front, their artillery supported by infantry in rear of the left flank of the division, and Hildebrand's own regiment broken up also; it was found necessary to change position at once, and Sherman accordingly gave orders to retire his line to the Purdy and Hamburgh road. Taylor's battery was sent to the rear to take up the new position, and hold the enemy while the movement progressed. Riding across the angle, General Sherman met Captain Behr's battery attached to Colonel McDowell's brigade, and ordered it to come into battery. The captain had hardly given the order to his men, when he was struck by a musket-

BATTLE OF SHILOH.

ball and fell. The drivers and gunners incontinently fled without firing a single shot, carrying with them the caissons and one gun and abandoning the other six to the enemy. General Sherman being thus reduced to the necessity of again choosing a new line, and of abandoning the attempt to maintain his old one, promptly moved the coherent remainder of his division, consisting of Colonel McDowell's and Colonel Buckland's brigades, Captain Taylor's battery, and three guns of Captain Waterhouse's battery, to the support of General McClernand's right, which was just then menaced. At half-past ten the enemy made a furious attack on the whole front of McClernand's division, and for some time pressed it hard; but the movement of Colonel McDowell's brigade against his left flank, forced him back and relieved the pressure. Taking advantage of the cover of trees and felled timber, and of a wooded ravine on the right, Sherman held this position for four hours, contesting it with the enemy, who continued to make determined efforts to drive us back upon the river. General Grant visited this part of the lines about three in the afternoon, conversed with McClernand and Sherman, and informed them of the condition of affairs on the other parts of the field, where our resistance had been less successful.

An hour later it became evident to both the division commanders, from the sounds heard in that direction, that Hurlbut had fallen back toward the river; and having been informed by General Grant that General Lewis Wallace was on his way from Crump's Landing with his entire division, they agreed upon a new line of defense, covering the bridge over Snake Creek, by which these re-enforcements were expected to approach. The retirement to the position so selected was made deliberately, and in as good order as could have been expected. Many stragglers and fragments of

troops were encountered during the movement, and united with the two divisions. The enemy's cavalry attempting a charge was handsomely repulsed. The Fifth Ohio cavalry, arriving upon the ground, held the enemy in check for some time, until Major Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery of Sherman's division, came up with Schwartz's battery of McClernand's division, and opened an effective fire upon the enemy's flank as he pressed forward against McClernand's right. McClernand having now deployed his division on its new line, ordered a charge, which was handsomely executed, driving the enemy from his front, and forcing them to seek cover in the ravines in advance of our right. It was now five o'clock. The new line had been well selected, and afforded us a decided advantage, the ground along its front being open for a distance of about two hundred yards. The enemy's momentum was spent, and he did not afterwards attempt to cross this open space.

"On the left, the day had scarcely gone so well. The weight of the enemy's attack was chiefly directed against this wing. The two brigades of Prentiss gave way early in the morning, and drifted to the rear as Hurlbut advanced to their support, and by ten o'clock the division had melted away. Hurlbut made a gallant fight, obstinately contesting the ground with varying success, until four o'clock in the afternoon, when his division also was pressed to the rear, and the whole line compelled to retire. Smith's division, under the command of Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, had been moved upon Hurlbut's right, and had materially aided in holding our ground, there, but had in its turn been forced back. Colonel Stuart's brigade held the extreme left until the pressure of the enemy on its front, and the exposure of its flank by the disaster to Prentiss, forced it successively to take up new lines of defense on the ridges which broke the ground toward the river.

Our troops held this last firmly. It was now after six o'clock in the afternoon. The battle had lasted nearly twelve hours. Our troops had been driven from all their camps of the morning, except Wallace's, to the line of woods in the rear, had been dislodged from that position, and again pressed back, and now held a line perpendicular to the river, with its left resting on the bluff behind which the landing was situated, and only half a mile from it. The enemy gathered up his forces, and made a last desperate effort to gain this position. But his losses had been very heavy, his troops were much shaken by the hard fighting they had encountered, and the spirit which characterized their first onset in the morning had burned out. Cheatham's division and Gladden's brigade, which now held the extreme right of the confederate line on the river, lay directly under the fire of our artillery. They attempted to take it, but were repulsed in great disorder.

"A galling fire of artillery and musketry was poured into them; and the gunboats "Lexington" and "Tyler" swept the flanks with their nine-inch shell. Their troops were reformed with difficulty. Night was closing in. General Beauregard gave the orders to retire out of range, and the battle was over.

"Darkness fell upon the disordered and confused remnants of two large armies. In each the losses had been very heavy, the straggling fearful, and the confusion almost inextricable. But the enemy had failed. He had attempted to force us back upon the river and compel our surrender, and had not done so. In the morning we would attack him and seek to drive him from the field. General Grant had given verbal orders to that effect to General Sherman about 3 P. M., before the last repulse of the enemy.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate commander-in-chief, was mortally wounded in front of Sherman's

division, and died shortly afterward at half-past two o'clock. Two regiments of Nelson's division, of the Army of the Ohio, crossed the river, and arrived upon the extreme left of the field about six o'clock, in time to fire a few shots just before the final repulse. As Nelson's troops came up, they met an appalling sight. A crowd of from seven to ten thousand panic-stricken wretches thronged the landing, crouching behind trees and under the bluff to avoid the enemy's shell, which had begun to drop in among them, and giving vent to the most sickening cries that we were whipped, and cut to pieces, and imploring their newly-arrived comrades to share their shame. But the gallant men of Nelson's division were unmoved by the scene, and greeted the loathsome pack with jeers and sarcasm. It is perhaps natural enough that those who saw only the stragglers should have found it hard to believe that anyone had fought. Yet the greater portion of the Army of the Tennessee had stood to their arms, and had repulsed the enemy.

"The troops slept that night in good spirits, although about midnight they were drenched by the heavy rain which began to fall. They knew that the enemy had failed, that Lewis Wallace would be up during the night, that Buell was arriving, and that in the morning these fresh battalions would be hurled against the shaken and broken foe. The "Lexington" dropped a shell into the enemy's lines every ten minutes, until 1 A. M., when the "Tyler" took her turn at the same task, firing every quarter of an hour till daylight. The demoralizing shriek of the navy shells, while it robbed the enemy of rest, was inspiring music to the ears of our wearied troops. During the night the remainder of Nelson's division crossed the river, and took position in the left front; and later came Crittenden's division, followed by McCook's, successively extending the line to the right and connecting with

Hurlbut's left. Lewis Wallace arrived about 1 A. M., and came into position on Sherman's right.

"Daybreak of the 7th found the enemy out of sight in our front. He showed no signs of advancing. Beauregard did not know that Buell had come, and yet he did not attack. As soon as it was fairly light, the division commanders received the orders promised by General Grant at the close of the previous day's battle, to move upon the enemy and drive him from our front. By six o'clock our artillery opened fire on the left. About seven, Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook pushed forward, and by ten were warmly engaged with the enemy in a contest for the possession of the old camps. Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and Wallace now moved steadily forward. The open fields in front of the log church of Shiloh were reached. The enemy's position here was a strong one, and he contested it obstinately. For more than three hours he held his ground in the scrub-oak thicket. But by one o'clock his weakness had become apparent. He was yielding everywhere, and giving palpable signs of exhaustion. General Beauregard gave orders to withdraw from the contest. About 2 P. M., his right retired, and two hours later his left followed. The movement was made in tolerable order. Near the junction of the Hamburgh and Pittsburg road with the Hamburgh and Corinth road, his rear-guard under Breckinridge made a stand; and the next day his retreat was continued to Corinth. On the 8th, Sherman, with two brigades, followed Breckinridge to the point where he made his first stand. But our troops were worn out, disorganized, out of supplies, and in no condition to enter upon a campaign. They returned to Pittsburg to refit and reorganize. Sherman lost three hundred and eighteen killed, one thousand two hundred and seventy-five wounded, and four hundred and forty-one missing; total two

thousand and thirty-four. Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace was killed during the first day, and Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss taken prisoner, and their divisions broken up and distributed.

"The enemy went into battle on the 6th with forty thousand three hundred and fifty-five effective men. His losses, as stated by General Beauregard in his official report, were, in killed, one thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight; wounded, eight thousand and twelve; missing, nine hundred and fifty-nine; total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. General Beauregard says: 'On Monday, from exhaustion and other causes, not twenty thousand men could be brought into action on our side.' If we suppose two thirds of the casualties to have occurred on Sunday, there should still have been over thirty-eight thousand men with the Rebel colors on Monday; and even imagining, for the sake of illustration, that all the losses took place on the first day, the enemy should have had nearly thirty-five thousand fighting men on the second. Yet that number was less than twenty thousand. Here are from fifteen to eighteen thousand men to be accounted for, or about half of his remaining force. These are the stragglers.

"General Beauregard, in his official report, estimates the Union forces engaged on Sunday at forty-five thousand, the remnant of General Grant's forces on Monday morning at twenty thousand, and the reinforcements received during the preceding night at thirty-three thousand, making fifty-three thousand arrayed against him on that day, or seventy-eight thousand on both days; and he sets down our aggregate losses at twenty thousand.

"The enemy's troops were comparatively old. Bragg's corps had been under fire at Pensacola; Polk's, at Columbus, and Hardee's at Mill Spring, in Kentucky. A considerable

portion of them had been organized and drilled since the summer of 1861, but there was also a large infusion of new regiments and new men, troops which had never been under fire, and militia just from the States. The commander-in-chief, General Albert Sidney Johnston, was one of the ablest officers of the old regular army of the United States. General Beauregard, his second in command, had been known as a skillful officer of engineers, and by the exercise of his popular talents had suddenly achieved a reputation which his subsequent history failed to sustain. Of Grant's army only two divisions had been under fire. Sherman's, Prentiss', Hurlbut's and Lewis Wallace's were all new and raw."

It is by the record of this battle that envy and ignorance have sought to tarnish the names and fame of the two greatest soldiers of their age. In the attempt no regard has been shown to officers or men; no credit given to raw troops smelling powder for the first time, and yet repulsing troops of veterans fighting on their own chosen ground. As to the credit due the troops I feel sure posterity will do full justice. As to the ability of the commanders I have known no true soldier who would willingly increase his own deserts by casting slurs on the generals who made that victory possible. Two incidents occurring during the fight made a deep impression on me, and gave me an insight to the animus of the attacks made on prominent Union officers by irresponsible scribblers. Into the hands of these journalists had been placed a power for good or evil under the then state of public feeling that should always have been turned to the right.

During the hottest part of the Sunday morning fight on the 6th of April, 1862, I was sent with messages from my Colonel to General Sherman. Riding along the Purdy road I came upon General Sherman and his staff on a little knoll overlooking Owl Creek. As I approached the group I could hear

the whiz of the enemy's bullets, and the air seemed full of the deadly missiles. It was not my first experience, but even now I can feel the tingle of the blood at my finger-tips as I thought it might be my last. It seemed impossible to escape such a hail. Saluting the General, I approached and handed him my dispatches. They contained a brief report of a reconnoissance. Sitting on his horse, General Sherman read the lines as calmly as if he had been sitting in his bank parlor at San Francisco, then turning to me asked when I was to return. My regiment was about five miles to the rear. I remember how far it seemed as I sat there looking at my superior officer, and wondering when he would signify that I might depart. Looking up quickly at his question, I replied, "If you have no orders for me I think I will return as quickly as possible, as there may be changes there; and besides, General, I don't like this standing here as a target and no chance to fire back." I shall never forget his calm reply; "You can go, but my lad, never have that feeling again. You are 'firing back' just as truly as if you had your gun. These may be the hardest duties of a soldier, but they must be performed."

I made my way back to the rear without loss of time. Indeed, I remember thinking how much better it would be if my messages could always be directed to the rear. And then I fell to thinking of the close call I had had, and just before reaching camp saw a shell burst nearly overhead but just above a clump of trees, and as the limbs flew before the broken iron, I registered a vow that if I ever got out of that difficulty I would let other fellows fight the next war. And yet, I don't believe I was more of a coward or less a fighter than those who were at the front in active engagement. It is an easier matter to stand up and shoot than to stand up quietly as a mark without opportunity of shooting back.

Shortly after supper all was comparatively quiet, and just outside my tent I heard voices of men engaged in earnest conversation:

"Say, Bill, where have you been all day. There has been a lively scrimmage going on."

"Yes, I judged so," answered a man with a deep voice, "but I kept well out of way of those bullets and shells till late in the afternoon when the stragglers came along, and I've got enough for more stuff than I can send in two days."

"By George," said the first voice, "you're mighty lucky. I haven't a line, and yet I must send something. I'll tell you what I'll do. If you will talk it off I'll take it down short-hand, and we'll make two stories from different points of view."

The offer was accepted, and history was made for the benefit of envious upstarts who saw as little of the battles of Shiloh and Corinth as did the correspondents. The people knew more of the details of the battles than was possible for any person engaged, and they derived their information from sources that seemed perfectly reliable because confirmed by "loyal" journals whose owners would never have countenanced such work, perhaps, but who always insisted upon "full dispatches."

The reports of the battle of Shiloh are made up of those of the division commanders. The dispatches of General Sherman give emphasis to his remark regarding the late attempt of certain Generals to criticise the conduct of the Shiloh fight: "Oh, well, they were farther away than we were, and could probably see more of the field." I have noted that this was usually the way with army correspondents, and during the fight at Shiloh the correspondents had plenty of company. Let any reader look over the dispatches sent by Sherman bearing on the movements and the conclusion will be irresistible that, he at least, was guilty of no carelessness.

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
CAMP SHILOH, *April* 5, 1862.

"*Captain* J. A. RAWLINS, *Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Western Tennessee.*

"SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, about 3 P. M., the lieutenant commanding and seven men of the advance pickets imprudently advanced from their post, and were captured. I ordered Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed rapidly to the picket-station, ascertain the truth, and act according to circumstances. He reached the station, found the pickets had been captured as reported, and that a company of infantry sent by the brigade commander had gone forward in pursuit of some cavalry. He rapidly advanced some two miles, and found them engaged, charged the enemy, and drove them along the Ridge road, till he met and received three discharges of artillery, when he very properly wheeled under cover, and returned till he met me.

"As soon as I heard artillery, I advanced with two regiments of infantry, and took position, and remained until the scattered companies of infantry and cavalry had returned. This was after night.

"I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge, that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field-artillery, to the ridge on which, the Corinth road lies. They halted the infantry and artillery at a point about five miles in my front, sent a detachment to the lane of General Meaks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward our camp. This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets, and afterward engaged the two companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by him in his report herewith inclosed. Our cavalry drove them back upon their artillery and infantry, killing many, and bringing off ten

prisoners, all of the First Alabama Cavalry, whom I send to you.

"We lost of the pickets one first-lieutenant and seven men of the Ohio Seventieth Infantry (list inclosed); one major, one lieutenant, and one private of the Seventy-second Ohio, taken prisoners; eight privates wounded (names in full, embraced in report of Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith).

"We took ten prisoners, and left two Rebels wounded and many killed on the field."

"I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
CAMP SHILOH, *April* 10, 1862.

"*Captain* J. A. RAWLINS, *Assistant Adjutant-General to General* GRANT.

"SIR: I had the honor to report that, on Friday the 4th inst., the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a half in advance of my center, on the main Corinth road, capturing one first-lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, and killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning early, the 6th inst., the enemy drove our advance-guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General McClernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At that time—7 A. M.—my division was arranged as follows:

"First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A. McDowell, Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Worthington; and the Morton battery, Captain Behr, on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek.

Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel D. Stuart; the Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kirby Smith; and the Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick Creek.

"Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Colonel Hildebrand; the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler; and the Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house.

"Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Colonel Buckland; the Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan; and the Seventieth Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, on the right of the Corinth road, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house.

"Two batteries of artillery—Taylor's and Waterhouse's—were posted, the former at Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front-fire over open ground between Mungen's and Appler's regiments. The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I regarded as the center of my position.

"Shortly after 7 A. M., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's regiment, the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire upon my party, killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of Company H, Second Illinois Cavalry. The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of Appler's camp, and flows to the north along my whole front.

"This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men

were so posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side.

"About 8 A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp.

"All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler, and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazard, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good battery on his right, and strong support to his rear. General McClernand had promptly and energetically responded to my request, and had sent me three regiments which were posted to protect Waterhouse's battery, and the left flank of my line.

"The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to our front, throwing shells into our camp. Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry passing obliquely to the left, across the open field in Appler's front; also, other columns advancing directly upon my division. Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle became general. Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to our left, and directing their course on General Prentiss. I saw at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it. Very soon the sound of artillery and musketry announced that General Prentiss was engaged; and about 9 A. M. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder, followed by Mungen's regi-

ment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery, thereby exposed.

"The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery stood for some time; but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, and the fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois received a severe wound and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery. Although our left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole line, I deemed Shiloh so important, that I remained by it and renewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground; and we did hold these positions until about 10 A. M., when the enemy got his artillery to the rear of our left flank and some change became absolutely necessary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade—Appler's and Mungen's—had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in disorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery—still at Shiloh—to fall back as far as the Purdy and Hamburgh road, and for McDowell and Buckland to adopt that road as their new line. I rode across the angle and met Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to come into battery, action right. Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons, and abandoning five out of six guns, without firing a shot. The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were again forced to choose a new line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades maintained their organizations, and were conducted by my aids, so as to join on General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original camps and line. This

was about 10:30 A. M, at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. He struggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover—trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right. We held this position for four long hours, sometimes gaining and at others losing ground, General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert, and struggling to maintain this line. While we were so hard pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 3 P. M.; but about 4 P. M. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river; and knowing that General Lew Wallace was coming with re-enforcements from Crump's Landing, General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. We fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line.

"During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment. The Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in check for some time, and Major Taylor also came up with another battery and got into position just in time to get a good flank-fire upon the enemy's column as he pressed on General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when General McClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right. I had a

clear field, about two hundred yards wide, in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day. In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's brigade was the only one that retained its organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall off his horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not in line. The Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization; and it formed a part of my line during Sunday night and all Monday. Other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle. Generals Grant and Buell visited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned the situation of affairs on other parts of the field. General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark and formed his line to my right rear. It rained hard during the night, but our men were in good spirits, lay on their arms, being satisfied with such bread and meat as could be gathered at the neighboring camps, and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday.

"At daylight of Monday, I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps. I dispatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before; and, at the appointed time the division, or rather what remained of it, with the Thirteenth Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and re-occupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former

headquarters. Here I remained, patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 A. M. the heavy firing in that direction, and its steady approach satisfied me; and General Wallace being on our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's brigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily and slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into position, to advance by hand firing. These guns belonged to Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant P. P. Wood, and did most excellent service. Under cover of their fire, we advanced till we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McClernand's camp, and here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined men. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of timber is about five hundred yards east of Shiloh meeting-house, and it was evident here was to be the struggle. The enemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south. General McClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three guns of Wood's battery, with which he speedily drove them back, and, seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to bring them forward, when, by almost providential decree, they proved

to be two twenty-four-pound howitzers belonging to McAlister's battery, and served as well as guns ever could be.

"This was about 2 P. M. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near the Hamburgh road, both pouring grape and canister upon any column of troops that advanced upon the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second brigade (then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Colonel Stuart being wounded) to form on its right, and my fourth brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right—all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterward found to be Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division. I gave personal direction to the twenty-four-pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh meeting-house.

"Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it, and at 4 P. M. we stood upon the ground of our original front line; and the enemy was in full retreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once their original camps.

"Several times during the battle, cartridges gave out; but General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges, I did so because, to retire a regiment for any cause, has a bad effect on others. I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although their cartridge-boxes were empty."

"I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I think it is due, and censure where I think it merited. I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Ken-

tucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great center of this field of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's divisions. I think Johnston was killed by exposing himself in front of his troops, at the time of their attack on Buckland's brigade on Sunday morning; although in this I may be mistaken.

"My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday.

"To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organization. When individual fears seized them, the first impulse was to get away. My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment, with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action. Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry; the former receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, until his right arm was broken by a shot. Colonel Cockerill held a larger proportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from first to last.

"Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his ground on Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle; and when ordered, he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next position, he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates, Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound, which it is feared may prove mortal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. My second brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached nearly two miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday, against superior numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely.

"I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the operations of his brigade during the time he was detached, and must therefore forbear to mention names. Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regiment itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with the brigade when it joined the division on Monday morning. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments who kept in the advance. I observed and noticed them, but until the brigadiers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our

front line, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the steam-boat landing. I will also send a full list of the killed, wounded and missing, by name, rank, company, and regiment. * * * * * * * *

"The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we recovered seven—not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in number to balance the account. At the time of recovering our camps, our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy; but on the following day I followed up with Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigade for six miles, the result of which, I have already reported.

"Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks. I think they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls and bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain Hammond, my chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active in rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and aiding to form the lines of defense and attack. I recommend him to your notice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapid execution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringing into line the batteries that co-operated so efficiently in our movements. Captains McCoy and Dayton, aides-decamp, were with me all the time, carrying orders, and acting with coolness, spirit, and courage. To Surgeon Hartshorne and Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds of wounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatment received on the field of battle and in the various temporary hospitals created along the line of our operations. They worked day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own troops as well as of the enemy were in safe and comfortable shelter. To Major Taylor, chief of artillery, I feel under deep obligations, for his good sense and judgment in managing the batteries, on which so much de-

pended. I inclose his report and indorse his recommendations. The cavalry of my command kept to the rear, and took little part in the action; but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which we were compelled to remain, from Sunday at 8 A. M. till Monday at 4 P. M.

"Captain Kossack, of the engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great assistance. I inclose his sketch of the battle-field, which is the best I have seen, and which will enable you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as of the others that participated in the battle. I will also send in, during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels, and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper.

"I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Brigadier-General Commanding Fifth Division.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
Tuesday, April 8, 1862.

"SIR: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades of my fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth road. One after another of the abandoned camps of the enemy lined the roads, with hospital-flags for their protection; at all we found more or less wounded and dead men. At the forks of the road I found the head of General T. J. Wood's division of Buell's Army. I ordered cavalry to examine both roads leading toward Corinth, and found the enemy on both. Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, asking for re-enforcements, I ordered General Wood to advance the head of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while I conducted the head of the third brigade of my division up the right-hand road. About half a mile from the

forks was a clear field, through which the road passed, and, immediately beyond, a space of some two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that an extensive Rebel camp. The enemy's cavalry could be seen in this camp; after reconnoissance, I ordered the two advance companies of the Ohio Seventy-seventh, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward as skirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with an interval of one hundred yards. In this order we advanced cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged. Taking it for granted this disposition would clear the camp, I held Colonel Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge. The enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest in person, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment of infantry, without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and fled. The ground was admirably adapted for a defense of infantry against cavalry being miry and covered with fallen timber.

"As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's Cavalry began to discharge their carbines, and fell into disorder. I instantly sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle, which was promptly executed. The broken infantry and cavalry rallied on this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it, our cavalry in turn charged and drove them from the field. I advanced the entire brigade over the same ground and sent Colonel Dickey's cavalry a mile farther on the road. On examining the ground which had been occupied by the Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our men dead and about twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons and had all the wounded carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried—also the whole Rebel camp to be destroyed.

"Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about two hundred and eighty Confederates wounded,

and about fifty of our own wounded men. Not having the means of bringing them off, Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by the medical director (Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and a pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also a pledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, and surrendered to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out. I inclose this written document, and request that you cause wagons or ambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and that wagons be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us which are pitched along the road for four miles out. I did not destroy them, because I knew the enemy could not move them. The roads are very bad, and are strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and limber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes of at least twenty caissons. I am satisfied the enemy's infantry and artillery passed Lick Creek this morning, traveling all of last night, and that he left to his rear all his cavalry, which has protected his retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark the whole road. The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I ordered them back to their camps, where they now are.

"I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Brigadier-General Commanding Division.*"

Notwithstanding the extravagant reports prevalent at the North, and due entirely in the first instance to the versions of the battle forwarded by correspondents under circum-

stances I have described, General Grant maintained a discreet and manly silence, and General Sherman always shielded as far as possible every soldier and commander who had tried to do his duty. Writing in the quiet of his study long after the war, General Sherman modestly speaks of his own share in the work, and gives due credit to others. Where he might have gained personal advantage by joining in the cry against General Grant, and especially in this case after the war had closed, General Sherman was always faithful to that friendship formed early in the war and testified to so often by both these heroes. Referring to these cruel reports, General Sherman writes:

"Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the sixth, when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well over on the left. He also told me that on his way up from Savannah that morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered Lew Wallace's division to cross over Lick Creek, so as to come up on my right, telling me to look out for him. He again came to me just before dark, and described the last assault made by the Rebels at the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webtser and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win. General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.

"About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his staff. I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me a good many significant inquiries about matters and things generally. By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained to him that my right then covered the bridge over Lick Creek by which we had all day been expecting Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left, and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the landing, and had not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt. I insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and thought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what was left of Hurlbut's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions, we ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle. I reckoned that ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and that the enemy's loss could not be much less. Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued that with these re-enforcements we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster. He did not, of course, understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my map, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. He handed it to Major Michler to have it copied, and the original returned to me, which Michler did two or three days after the battle. Buell did cross over that night, and the

next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence.

"After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and Sanitary Commission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee to bring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for whom we had imperfect means of shelter and care. These people caught up the camp-stories, which on their return home they retailed through their local papers, usually elevating their own neighbors into heroes, but decrying all others. Among them was Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, who published in Bellefontaine, Ohio, a most abusive article about General Grant and his subordinate generals. As General Grant did not and would not take up the cudgels, I did so. My letter in reply to Stanton, dated June 10, 1862, was published in the *Cincinnati Commercial* soon after its date. To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied and I further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862. These letters are too personal to be revived. By this time the good people of the North had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in the field more faith and support. Stanton was never again elected to any public office, and was commonly spoken of as "the late Mr. Stanton." He is now dead, and I doubt not in life he often regretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame by abusing the army-leaders, then as now an easy and favorite mode of gaining notoriety, if not popularity. Of course subsequent events gave General Grant and most of the other actors in that battle their appropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden popular clamors is well illustrated by this case.

"The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the

most fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The Rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousand strong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question fought skillfully from early morning till about 2 P. M., when their commander-in-chief was killed by a minie-ball in the calf of his leg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery. There was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to dark. Early at night the division of Lew Wallace arrived from the other side of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot. A very small part of General Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee River that evening, and their loss was trivial.

"During that night, the three divisions, of McCook, Nelson, and Crittenden, were ferried across the Tennessee, and fought with us the next day (7th). During that night, also, the two wooden gunboats, Tyler, commanded by Lieutenant Gwin, and Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to be thrown toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupied by the enemy. Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. Our aggregate loss, made up from official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven thousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand and twenty-two prisoners; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen, of which twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant ten thousand and fifty. This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by each army."

CHAPTER VIII.

OPENING THE MISSISSIPPI—TENTATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND STRANGE INTERFERENCE WITH FIELD COMMANDERS FROM WASHINGTON.

Although the military operations which had resulted thus successfully had been directed from the headquarters of the army by General Halleck, it was a long distance from St. Louis to the points at which active and effective movements were being made. General Sherman speaks of his confidence in General Halleck, and yet it is easy to see that he shared the general disappointment when the reorganization of the entire army, Halleck taking the field in person, resulted in the practical retirement of General Grant. While the operations already described were going on, the enemy was being harassed at other points, and for once the war was being conducted in accordance with the expressed wishes "of the country"—by which is meant, of course, in accordance with the plans of newspaper correspondents. These very astute gentlemen had discovered that somebody might—to use their own slang—"get very badly left" if they did not watch carefully what was being done and be prepared to "write up" the proper officer to a greatness only possible as the result of favorable criticism. They had seen the force of their blows against General Sherman, and now were filling the mind of General Halleck with false statements regarding General Grant's part in the battle of Shiloh.

That this influence was the direct cause of Grant's practical retirement cannot be questioned. At the mouth of the Mis-

sissippi Admiral Farragut was co-operating with General Butler; General Pope and Admiral Foote were bombarding Island Number 10, and the conquest of the Mississippi seemed almost assured, if the successes should be followed by continuous advance. But a few days after the battle of Shiloh General Halleck came down from St. Louis and was attended by his staff, composed of General G. W. Cullum, U. S. Engineers, as chief; Colonel George Thom, U. S. Engineers; and Colonels Kelton and Kemper, adjutant-generals. It was clear his mind had been prejudiced by rumors to the detriment of General Grant, for he issued an order, reorganizing the whole army. General Buell's Army of the Ohio constituted the center; General Pope's army, was the left; the right was made up of Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions, belonging to the old Army of the Tennessee, and two new ones, made up from the fragments of the divisions of Prentiss and C. F. Smith, and of troops commanded by Generals T. W. Sherman and Davies. General George H. Thomas was taken from Buell, to command the right. McClernand's and Lew Wallace's divisions were styled the reserve, to be commanded by McClernand. General Grant was substantially left out, and was named "second in command," with no well-defined authority. He still retained his old staff, composed of Rawlins, Adjutant-General; Riggin, Lagow, and Hilyer, aides; and a small company of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry as an escort. For more than a month he thus remained, frequently visiting friends, but rarely complaining; though all could see that he felt deeply the indignity heaped upon him.

General Thomas at once assumed command of the right wing.

Corinth was about thirty miles distant, and we all knew that we should find there the same army with which we had so fiercely grappled at Shiloh, re-enforced, and com-

manded by general Beauregard in place of Johnston, who had fallen at Shiloh. But we were re-enforced by Buell's and Pope's armies, and, before the end of April our army extended from Snake River to the Tennessee at Hamburgh, and numbered about one hundred thousand men. Supplies reached us by the Tennessee river. By the last of April the troops were ready to march and the general movement toward Corinth began. There was little or no fighting, as the enemy seemed so demoralized that he evacuated that town under cover of night, and when General Sherman was ordered to feel the enemy after having reported strange sounds of moving railway trains, it was found that the troops had fled towards the south. At this point it was apparent to the entire army that the question of the opening of the Mississippi could be solved in a very short time. The boys in the ranks were calculating the number of days it would take to finish up the whole business, and among the officers there was strong remonstrance when it seemed as if the advantage gained must be lost through inaction. But "public opinion" at Washington, and the wishes of those in command seated in easy-chairs must be consulted. General Halleck was overruled in his plans. General Grant was practically in disgrace, and asked for and obtained a leave of absence when smarting under the injustice. General Sherman sought out Grant and asked him the reason for his going away, and was told the plain truth. It was evident that he was not wanted, and he was going to St. Louis. Sherman promptly quoted his own case to him. Just before the battle of Shiloh he had been in the same condition with the added weight of charges of insanity. General Grant yielded to the wishes of his friend and after a short time General Grant was given a small command and the duty of taking command of Memphis and of the District of West Tennessee.

This was about the time when General Sherman became directly under the command of Grant. Halleck was ordered to Washington to succeed General McClellan as Commander-in-Chief. For the remaining months of the year there was practically no energetic movements, though the army was at that time in the best possible condition. But there was much for soldiers to do. Nothing had yet been settled as to the status of the negroes. They were still considered slaves and to owe service to their masters, if the latter were loyal. Then there was another question, as to the cotton stored in the South. General Grant had assumed command in place of Halleck, and Sherman had been ordered to Memphis to command the district of West Tennessee vacated by General Grant. The battle of Corinth resulted in the complete rout of the enemy, but Rosencrans neglected to follow up his advantage till too late and another opportunity was lost to the Union cause. But the effect of the battle was felt throughout the South, and when General Sherman arrived at Memphis in the latter part of July it was apparent that the people realized that the Confederacy was doomed. Their feelings justified the hopes felt by the Union soldiers, but both were destined to long-deferred hopes. Possibly in some manner history may clear up the causes which led to the repeated failure of the real authority to allow too prompt an ending to a war fought so heroically by the soldiers in the ranks, and so skillfully by their commanders.

At Memphis business was practically at a stand-still, the river being in our possession. But there was activity of another sort. To the soldiers it was soon a matter of surprise that the trade in cotton was so brisk, and it seemed as if, from the number of speculators coming down from the North, there would be no difficulty in obtaining whatever recruits the Government might need. But the military were relieved





SCENES FROM ARMY LIFE.

of this, as it was given to the agents of the treasury department under Mr. Chase. The following correspondence of General Sherman will throw some light on this matter, and possibly form some part of that history which must in time do justice to all.

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, *August* 11, 1862.

"*Hon.* S. P. CHASE, *Secretary of the Treasury.*

"SIR: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion of the cotton question.

"I write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles. This is no trifle; when one nation is at war with another all the people of the one are enemies of the other—then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has been complicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other are *not* enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, this mistake had not been made; and it is wrong longer to be misled by it. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procure arms now bear them as organized regiments, or as guerrillas. There is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight of the flag-staff without being shot or captured. It so happened that these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended our large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief that, of course, we would seize it, and convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged government, and was therefore lost to their people; and

could have been, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either as absolute prize of war, or for future compensation. But the commercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents would buy a pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps, etc., etc., were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted but encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it, hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of salt and millions of dollars had been disbursed; and I have no doubt that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved their armies in mass; and that from ten to twenty thousand fresh arms, and a due supply of cartridges, have also been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as to my own command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband of war, and should not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It is idle to talk about the Union men here. Many want peace, and fear war and its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent, government, and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged for bank-notes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, and are taken in ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton to be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee, viz., the United States Quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet the enemy receives no 'aid or

comfort.' Under the 'gold,' rule, the country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that the trade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use of gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton.

"I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war, because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't employ and feed her own people, to send them here, where they can not only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton, than us for not shipping it. To aid the South on this ground would be hypocrisy which the world would soon detect at once. Let her make her ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will counteract her in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures, that threatens even to usurp her history. In twenty more years of prosperity, it will require a close calculation to determine whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the Continent of America or the Isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us in a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy both parts in detail.

"Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept no other mediation, because she knows full well that in *Old* England her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement that in *New* England.

"France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respectful consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession anywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German states must be our ardent friends; and, in case of European intervention, they could not be kept down.

"With respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MEMPHIS, *July* 23, 1862.

"*Dr.* E. S. PLUMMER *and others, Physicians in Memphis, Signers to a Petition.*

"GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, and assure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument of adding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war.

"On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) had issued an order permitting the departure south of all persons subject to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy. Many applications have been made to me to modify this order, but I regarded it as a condition precedent by which I was bound in honor, and therefore I have made no changes or modifications; nor shall I determine what action I shall adopt in relation to persons unfriendly to our cause who remain after the time limited by General Hovey's order has expired. It is now sunset, and all who have not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority, and who remain in Memphis, are supposed to be loyal and true men.

"I will only say that I cannot allow the personal conven-

ience of even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to make Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all people who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such direction as I may hereafter indicate.

"Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but they should not reside within the lines of an army which they regard as hostile. The situation would be too delicate.

"I am with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-Generla.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MEMPHIS, *July* 24, 1862.

"SAMUEL SAWYER, *Esq., Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.*

"DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at once with the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered to command—which means, to control for the interest, welfare, and glory of the whole Government of the United States."

"Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, though you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make more than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as I don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It is enough for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound to obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to venerate its Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, I shall exercise it wisely and account to my superiors.

"I regard your article headed 'City Council—General Sherman and Colonel Slack,' as highly indiscreet. Of course, no person who can jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less exercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfied that injustice be not done.

"If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact

should not be published, to put them on their guard and thus to encourage their escape. The evidence should be carefully collected, authenticated, and then placed in my hands. But your statement of facts is entirely qualified, in my mind, and loses its force by your negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as to myself; I had been in the army six years in 1846; am not related by blood to any member of Lucas, Turner & Co.; was associated with them in business six years (instead of two); am not colonel of the Fifteenth Infantry, but of the Thirteenth. Your correction, this morning, of the acknowledged error as to General Denver and others, is still erroneous. General Morgan L. Smith did not belong to my command at the battle of Shiloh at all, but he was transferred to my division just before reaching Corinth. I mention these facts in kindness, to show you how wrong it is to speak of persons."

"I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Alderman, and policemen, all in good time.

"Use your influence to re-establish system, order, government. You may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect internal safety, or to guard against external danger; but to do right requires time, and more patience than I usually possess. If I find the press of Memphis actuated by high priniciple and a sole devotion to their country, I will be their best friend; but if I find them personal, abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at a blind venture, and looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and fame, then they had better look out; for I regard such persons as greater enemies to their country and to mankind than the men who, from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets, and fight us about as hard as we care about.

"In haste, but in kindness, yours, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, *July* 27, 1862.

"JOHN PARK, *Mayor of Memphis, present.*

"SIR: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to restore them to their proper use, viz., the protection of life, liberty and property.

"Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the d, and necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to the civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civil courts and executive officers should still exist and perform duties, without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass into disrespect—an end to be avoided. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither time nor inclination to interfere with. Among these, first in importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet, within the jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding public property held or claimed by the United States, and for the arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This should be done by the city police. I understand that the city police is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your

ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; so that any change in our military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost-guard to assist the police force when any combination is made too strong for them to overcome; but the city police should be strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost of maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all citizens equitably.

"I am not willing, nor do I think it good policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to the State and County, as you recommend; for these would have to be refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your police force, and for raising the necessary means for their support and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of the tax. Of course I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real estate, and personal property, including money and merchandise.

"All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion to the interests involved.

"I am with respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, *August* 26, 1862.

"*Major-General* GRANT, *Corinth, Mississippi.*

"SIR: In pursuance of your request that I should keep you advised of matters of interest here, in addition to the purely official matters, I now write.

"I dispatched promptly the thirteen companies of cavalry, nine of Fourth Illinois, and four of Eleventh Illinois, to their

respective destinations, punctually on the 23d instant, although the order was only received on the 22d. I received at the same time, from Colonel Dickey, the notice that the bridge over Hatchie was burned, and therefore I prescribed their order of march *via* Bolivar. They started at 12 M. of the 23d, and I have no news of them since. None of the cavalry ordered to me is yet heard from.

"The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel to and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph road for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is no large force of Rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navy gunboats are below except the St. Louis, which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat not iron-clad—one that can move up and down the river, to break up ferry-boats and canoes, and to prevent all passing across the river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace, buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on this point, which will enable us to control it better.

"You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here. There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New York.

"Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons, there was as much whisky here as now, and it would take all my command as custom-house inspectors, to break open all the parcels and packages containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where soldiers get liquor just as we would in St. Louis.

"The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick—as base a charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have good hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and regimental surgeons. The civilian doctors, would, if permitted, take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should be taken from my command for his sick. I think that, when we are endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses.

"I send you Dr. Derby's acknowledgment that he gave the leave of absence of which he was charged. I have placed him in arrest, in obedience to General Halleck's orders, but he remains in charge of the Overton Hospital, which is not full of patients.

"The State Hospital also is not full, and I cannot imagine what Dr. Derby wants with the Female Academy on Vance Street. I will see him again, and now, that he is the chief at Overton Hospital, I think he will not want the academy. Still, if he does, under your orders, I will cause it to be vacated by the children and Sisters of Mercy. They have just advertised for more scholars, and will be sadly disappointed. If, however, this building or any other be needed for a hospital, it must be taken; but really, in my heart, I do not see

what possible chance there is, under present circumstances, of filling with patients the two large hospitals now in use, besides the one asked for. I may, however, be mistaken in the particular building asked for by Dr. Derby, and will go myself to see.

"The fort is progressing well, Captain Jenney having arrived. Sixteen heavy guns are received, with a large amount of shot and shell, but the platforms are not yet ready; still, if occasion should arise for dispatch, I can put a larger force to work. Captain Prime, when here, advised that the work should proceed regularly under the proper engineer officers and laborers. I am, etc,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding.*

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, *September* 21, 1862.

"*Editor* 'BULLETIN.'

"SIR: Your comments on the recent orders of Generals Halleck and McClellan afford the occasion appropriate for me to make public the fact that there is a law of Congress, as old as our Government itself, but re-enacted on the 10th of April, 1806, and in force ever since. The law reads: 'All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in quarters and on the march; and whoever shall commit any waste or spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses and gardens, cornfields, inclosures or meadows, or shall maliciously destroy any property whatever belonging to the inhabitants of the United States, unless by order of the commander-in-chief of the armies of said United States, shall (besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the nature and degree of the offense, by the judgment of a general or regimental court-martial.'

"Such is the law of Congress; and the orders of the com-

mander-in-chief are, that officers or soldiers convicted of straggling and pillaging shall be punished with death. These orders have not come to me officially, but I have seen them in newspapers, and am satisfied that they express the determination of the commander-in-chief. Straggling and pillaging have ever been great military crimes; and every officer and soldier in my command knows what stress I have laid upon them, and that, so far as in my power lies, I will punish them to the full extent of the law and orders.

"The law is one thing, the execution of the law another. God himself has commanded: 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods,' etc. Will any one say these things are not done now as well as before these laws were announced at Sinai? I admit the law to be that 'no officer or soldier of the United States shall commit waste or destruction of cornfields, orchards, potato-patches, or any kind of pillage on the property of friend or foe near Memphis,' and that I stand prepared to execute the law as far as possible.

"No officer or soldier should enter the house or premises of any peaceable citizen, no matter what his politics, unless on business; and no such officer or soldier can force an entrance unless he have a written order from a commanding officer or provost-marshal, which written authority must be exhibited if demanded. When property such as forage, building or other materials are needed by the United States, a receipt will be given by the officer taking them, which receipt should be presented to the quartermaster, who will substitute therefor a regular voucher, to be paid according to the circumstances of the case. If the officer refuse to give such receipt, the citizen may fairly infer that the property is wrongfully taken, and he should, for his own protection, ascertain the name, rank, and regiment of the officer and report him in writing.

If any soldier commits waste or destruction, the person whose property is thus wasted must find out the name, company, and regiment of the actual transgressor. In order to punish there must be a trial, and there must be testimony. It is not sufficient that a general accusation be made, that soldiers are doing this or that. I cannot punish my whole command, or a whole battalion because one or two bad soldiers do wrong. The punishment must reach the perpetrators, and no one can identify them as well as the party who is interested. The State of Tennessee does not hold itself responsible for acts of larceny committed by her citizens, nor does the United States or any other nation. These are individual acts of wrong, and punishment can only be inflicted on the wrong-doer. I know the difficulty of identifying particular soldiers, but difficulties do not alter the importance of principles of justice. They should stimulate the parties to increase their efforts to find out the actual perpetrators of the crime.

"Colonels of regiments and commanders of corps are liable to sevère punishment for permitting their men to leave their camps to commit waste or destruction; but I know full well that many of the acts attributed to soldiers are committed by citizens and negroes, and are charged to soldiers because of a desire to find fault with them; but this only reacts upon the community and increases the mischief. While every officer would willingly follow up an accusation against any one or more of his men whose names or description were given immediately after the discovery of the act, he would naturally resent any general charge against his *good* men, for the criminal conduct of a few bad ones.

"I have examined into many of the cases of complaint made in this general way, and have felt mortified that our soldiers should do acts which are nothing more or less than stealing, but I was powerless without some clew whereby to

reach the rightful party. I know that the great mass of our soldiers would scorn to steal or commit crime, and I will not therefore entertain vague and general complaints, but stand prepared always to follow up any reasonable complaint when the charge is definite and the names of witnesses furnished.

"I know, moreover, in some instances when our soldiers are complained of, that they have been insulted by sneering remarks about 'Yankees,' 'Northern barbarians,' 'Lincoln's hirelings,' etc. People who use such language must seek redress through some one else, for I will not tolerate insults to our Country or Cause. When people forget their obligations to a Government that made them respected among the nations of the earth, and speak contemptuously of the flag which is the silent emblem of that country, I will not go out of my way to protect them or their property. I will punish the soldiers for trespass or waste if adjudged by a court-martial, because they disobey orders; but soldiers are men and citizens as well as soldiers, and should promptly resent any insult to their country, come from what quarter it may. I mention this phase because it is too common. Insult to a soldier does not justify pillage, but it takes from the officer the disposition he would otherwise feel, to follow up the inquiry and punish the wrong-doers.

"Again, armies in motion or stationary must commit some waste. Flankers must let down fences and cross fields; and, when an attack is contemplated or apprehended, a command will naturally clear the ground of houses, fences, and trees. This is waste, but is the natural consequence of war, chargeable on those who caused the war. So in fortifying a place, dwelling-houses, must be taken, materials used, even wasted, and great damage done, which in the end may prove useless. This, too, is an expense not chargeable to us, but to those

who made the war; and generally war is destruction and nothing else.

"We must bear this in mind, that however peaceful things look, we are really *at war;* and much that looks like waste or destruction is only the removal of objects that obstruct our fire, or would afford cover to an enemy.

"This class of waste must be distinguished from the wanton waste committed by army-stragglers, which is wrong, and can be punished by the death-penalty if proper testimony can be produced.

"Yours, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding.*"

These letters reveal characteristics which had much to do with the attachment felt by soldiers for a commander who would not allow red-tapism to close his eyes to actual facts, or cause him to inflict punishment on soldiers stung by the insults of men only restrained by cowardice from being open enemies.

The rest of the season was spent in making Memphis a strong position for a depot during the war. Fort Pickering was completed, and the soldiers prepared for further work by constant drills and practice. On the 15th of November General Sherman received a note from General Grant asking him to come to Columbus, Kentucky for consultation. Genral Grant proposed to move against General Pemberton who was then below Holly Springs behind the Tallahatchie River. Grant proposed to utilize all the available troops, leaving only a garrison at Memphis. General Sherman left Memphis with three small divisions and soon opened communication with General Grant when near Holly Springs. Pemberton's army had fallen back at our approach. On the 8th of December, General Sherman was again called into consultation with General Grant, this time at Oxford, Missis-

sippi. At this interview, plans were made for the capture of Vicksburg, and General Grant sent the following dispatch to General Halleck at Washington:

"OXFORD, *December* 8, 1862.

"*Major General* H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.*

"General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men; will land above Vicksburg (up the Yazoo, if practicable), and cut the Mississippi Central road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they cross Black River. I will co-operate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force now at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha; and, when an opportunity occurs, make a real attack. After cutting the two roads, General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired will necessarily be left to his judgment.

I will occupy this road to Coffeeville.

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

This dispatch was shown to General Sherman before being sent, and he also received the following instructions from General Grant regarding the operations to be made. This and the subsequent letter embody all the instructions regarding the first movement against Vicksburg.

"HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, OXFORD,
MISSISSIPPI, *December* 8, 1862.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, *Commanding Right Wing Army in the Field, present.*

"GENERAL: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division

of your present command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis' forces at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own way.

"As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and, with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate.

"The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely to yourself.

"The quartermaster in St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand men. Should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.

"On arriving in Memphis put yourself in communication with Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

"Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

"Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege-guns, and whatever cavalry force may be there.

"One regiment of infantry and at least a section of artillery will also be left at Friar's Point or Delta, to protect the stores of the cavalry post that will be left there.

"Yours truly,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, *December* 14, 1862.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN, *Commanding, etc., Memphis, Tenn.*

"I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you no difficulty about retaining the troops on this side the river, and Steele to command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, with the twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemy are as yet on the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, but so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. I feel particularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of the river; if not now, at least after you start. If Gorman will send them, instruct them where to go and how to communicate with me. My headquarters will probably be in Coffeeville one week hence. In the meantime I will order transportation, etc. . . . It would be well if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base for supplies before we get through. . . .

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

General Sherman proceeded to carry out the orders of his superior, and issued the following to the officers and men under his charge dated, Memphis, December 18, 1862:

"I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses

to the sick alone, will be allowed unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.

"II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and invoice it to Captain A. R. Eddy, chief quartermaster at Memphis.

"III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.

"IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quartermaster, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.

"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.

"VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the

United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies."

Sherman embarked on the 20th of December, 1862, having been delayed two days by the lack of steamboat transportation.

The three divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, and Morgan, reported an aggregate of thirty thousand and sixty-eight officers and men of all arms for duty. At Helena, Sherman's force was increased by the division of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, twelve thousand three hundred and ten strong, comprising the brigades of Brigadier-Generals C. E. Hovey, John M. Thayer, Wyman, and Frank P. Blair, Jr. The place of rendezvous was at Friar's Point, on the left bank of the Mississippi, below Helena. The fleet reached Milliken's Bend on the twenty-fourth. Christmas day, Brigadier-General Burbridge landed with his brigade of A. J. Smith's division, and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas railway at the crossing of the Tensas; and Sherman pushed on to a point opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, landed on the west bank, and sent Morgan L. Smith with his division to break up the same road at a point eight miles from Vicksburg. On the 26th, the transports, led and convoyed by the gunboat fleet, under Acting Rear Admiral D. D. Porter, ascended the old mouth of the Yazoo about twelve miles. Of the transport fleet, Morgan's division led the advance, followed in order by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith. By noon on the 27th, the entire command had disembarked on the south bank of the river. The Yazoo was very low, and its banks were about thirty feet above the water. On reaching the point of debarkation, De Courcey Stuart and Blair were sent in the direction of Vicksburg about three miles, and as soon as the whole army had disembarked it moved

out in four columns, Steele's above the mouth of Chickasaw bayou; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of Steele's division, below the same bayou; Morgan L. Smith's on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg, with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou about a mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it, and A. J. Smith's division on the main road.

All the heads of columns met the enemy's pickets, and drove them toward Vicksburg. During the night of the 27th, the ground was reconnoitered, and was found to be extremely difficult. In front was a bayou, passable only at two points, which were commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters lining the levee on its opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of beach, on which were constructed rifle-pits and batteries, and behind that a range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked with rifle-trenches.

Steele followed an old levee from the Yazoo to the foot of the hills north of Thompson's Lake, but found to reach the hard land he would have to cross a long corduroy causeway, with a battery enfilading it, others cross-firing it. He skirmished with the enemy on the morning of the 28th, but on close examination of the swamp and causeway and rifle-pits well-manned, he concluded it was impossible for him to reach the county road without great sacrifice of life.

On reporting that he could not cross from his position to the one occupied by the center, Sherman ordered him to retrace his steps and return in steamboats to the southwest side of Chickasaw bayou, and support Morgan's division. This he did during the night of the 28th, arriving in time to upport him, and take part in the assault of the 29th.

Morgan's division was on the best of ways from the Yazoo to firm land. He had attached to his trains the pontoons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the ford or cross-

ing, and by which the enemy's picket had retreated. The pontoon bridge was placed during the night across a bayou erroneously supposed to be the main bayou, and it was therefore useless; but the natural crossing remained, and Morgan was ordered to cross with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of the hill.

During the morning of the 28th a heavy fog enveloped the section. General Morgan advanced De Courcey's brigade and engaged the enemy; heavy firing of artillery and infantry was sustained, and his column moved on until he encountered the real bayou, which again checked his progress, and was not passed until the next day.

At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the bayou was a narrow sand strip with abattis thrown down by the enemy on our side, having the same deep boggy bayou with its levee parapet and system of cross-batteries and rifle-pits on the other.

"To pass it in the front by the flank would have been utter destruction, for the head of the column would have been swept away as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank. While reconnoitering it on the morning of the 28th, during the heavy fog, General Morgan L. Smith was shot in the hip by a chance rifle-bullet, and disabled, so that he had to be removed to the boats, and thus at a critical moment was lost one of the best and most daring leaders—a practical soldier and enthusiastic patriot. Brigadier-General Davis Stuart who succeeded to his place and to the execution of his orders, immediately studied the nature of the ground in his front, saw all its difficulties, and made the best possible disposition to pass over his division as soon as he should hear General Morgan engaged on his left.

"To his right General A. J. Smith had placed General Burbridge's brigade of his division, with orders to make rafts and

cross over a portion of his men, to dispose his artillery so as to fire at the enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect of a diversion.

"Landrum's brigade of A. J. Smith's division occupied a high position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed well forward into the tangled abattis within three-fourths of a mile of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the town of Vicksburg.

"The boats still lay at the place of debarkation, covered by the gunboats and four regiments of infantry, one of each division. Such was the disposition of Sherman's forces during the night of the 20th.

"The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts seven miles above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluff near Snyder's house, called Drumgould's Bluff; his left the fortified town of Vicksburg; and his line connecting these was near fourteen miles in extent and was a natural fortification, strengthened by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated and skillful officers.

"Sherman's design was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the center near Chickasaw Creek, at the head of a bayou of the same name, and once in position, to turn to the right, Vicksburg, or left, Drumgould's. According to information then obtained he supposed the organized force of the enemy to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reinforced at the rate of about four thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada, or Rosencrans those of Bragg in Tennessee.

"Nothing had yet been heard from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south; or of General Banks, who was supposed to be ascending the Mississippi, but who in reality had but very recently reached New Orleans, and was engaged

in gathering his officers there and at Baton Rouge, and in regulating the civil details of his department. Time being all-important, Sherman then determined to assault the hills in front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th—Morgan's division to carry the position to the summit of the hill, Steele's division to support him and hold the country road. General A. J. Smith was placed in command of his own first division and M. L. Smith's second division, with orders to cross on the sand-pit, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the further side, or carry at all events, the levee parapet and first line of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan. It was nearly noon when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him, and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was also near at hand. All the troops were massed as closely as possible, and the supports were well on hand.

"The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's works; but they here met so withering a fire from the rifle-pits, and cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the columns faltered, and finally fell back to the point of starting, leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

"General Morgan at first reported that the troops of his division were not at all discouraged, though the losses in Blair's and De Courcey's brigades were heavy, and that he would renew the assault in half an hour.

"Sherman then urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack, though it had to be made across a narrow sand-bar, and up a narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor of Morgan, or a real attack, according to its success.

During Morgan's progress, he crossed over the Sixth Missouri, covered by the Thirteenth Regulars deployed as skirmishers up to the bank of the bayou, protecting themselves as well as possible by fallen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharp-shooters that showed a mark above the levee. All the ground was completely swept beforehand by the artillery, under the immediate supervision of Major E. Taylor, chief of artillery. The sixth Missouri crossed rapidly by companies, and lay under the bank of the bayou with the enemy's sharp-shooters over their heads within a few feet, so near that these sharp-shooters held out their muskets and fired down vertically upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and make a road up it; but it was impossible, and after the repulse of Morgan's assault, Sherman ordered General A. J. Smith to retire this regiment under the cover of darkness, which was successfully done, though with heavy loss.

"Whilst this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across the bayou in his front, and Landrum pushed his advance through the close abattis and entanglement of fallen timber close up to Vicksburg. When the night of the 29th closed in we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a repulse. During the night it rained very hard, and our men were exposed to it in the miry, swampy ground, sheltered only by their blankets and rubber ponchos, but during the following day it cleared off, and the weather became warm.

"After a personal examination of the various positions, Sherman came to the conclusion that he could not break the enemy's center without being too much crippled to act with any vigor afterward. New combinations having therefore become necessary, he proposed to Admiral Porter that the navy should cover a landing, at some point close up to the Drumgould's Bluff batteries, while he would hold the present

ground, and send ten thousand choice troops to attack the enemy's right, and carry the batteries at that point, which, if successful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo River, and place Sherman in communication with General Grant. Admiral Porter lent his hearty concurrence to this plan, and it was agreed that the expeditionary force should be embarked immediately after dark on the night of the 31st of December, and under cover of all the gunboats, proceed before day slowly and silently up to the batteries; the troops there to land, storm the batteries, and hold them. Whilst this was going on, Sherman was to attack the enemy below, and hold him in check, preventing reinforcements going up to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move all his force thither.

"Steele's division and one brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division were designated and embarked; the gunboats were all in position, and up to midnight everything appeared favorable.

"The assault was to take place about 4 A. M. Sherman had all his officers at their posts, ready to act on the first sound of cannonading in the direction of Drumgould's Bluff; but about daylight he received a note from General Steele, stating that Admiral Porter had found the fog so dense on the river, that the boats could not move, and that the expedition must be deferred till another night. Before night of January, 1, 1863, he received a note from the admiral, stating that inasmuch as the moon would not set until twenty-five minutes past five, the landing must be a daylight affair, which in his judgment would be too hazardous to try.

"Thus disappeared the only remaining chance of securing a lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and Black rivers, from which to operate upon Vicksburg and the railway to the east, as well as to secure the navigation of the Yazoo River.

"One-third of the command had already embarked for this expedition, and the rest were bivouacked in low, swampy, timbered ground, which a single night's rain would have made a quagmire. Marks of overflow stained the trees from ten to twelve feet above their roots. A further attempt against the center was deemed by all the brigade and division commanders impracticable.

"It had now become evident to all the commanders that for some cause unknown to them, the co-operating column under General Grant had failed. A week had elapsed since the time when it should have reached the rear of Vicksburg, yet nothing was heard from it. Sherman accordingly decided to abandon the attack and return to Milliken's Bend, which had a large extent of clear land, houses for storage, good roads in the rear, plenty of corn and forage, and the same advantages as any other point for operating against the enemy inland, on the river below Vicksburg, or at any point above where he might attempt to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi River."

On the 2d of January the troops were embarked and late that day the last of the transports passed out of the Yazoo. Near the mouth of that river General Sherman surrendered the command of the expedition to Major-General McClernand and issued the following order to the army:

"HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
STR. FOREST QUEEN, MILLIKEN'S BEND, *January* 4, 1863.

"Pursuant to the terms of General Orders Number 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by General G. W. Morgan and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and

restricting my authority to my own corps, I desire to express to all commanders, to soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for their zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one purpose of our movement, the capture of Vicksburg; but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement, in which others were to assist. We were on time; unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others. We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify; and having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff now attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by letter to Major-General McClernand, commanding the Army of the Mississippi, on board the steamer 'Tigress,' at our rendezvous at Gaines' Landing and at Montgomery Point.

"By order of *Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN.

"J. H. HAMMOND, A. A.-G."

General Grant had been detained by the surrender of Holly Springs with its depot of supplies, and the enemy had thus

been enabled to concentrate his forces for the defense of Vicksburg. The appointment of McClernand was by President Lincoln himself, and without knowledge by the President of what was going on in the west. But the war correspondent again "made history," and utilized the untoward events to the injury of the commander who had met every requirement and whose men had acted like veterans. The usual cries of "bungling," "failure," etc., were raised, but that there was no foundation for these attacks is plainly proved by the official report of Major-General Grant written after the final capture of Vicksburg:

General Grant says: "General Sherman's arrangement as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, last December, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side from the attack afterward, I saw the impossibility of making it successful."

General Sherman cheerfully accepted the subordinate command, and again proved his loyalty to the cause and carelessness of personal honor. But when Admiral Porter came down for consultation as to the movements of the immediate future, the naval commander practically refused to have anything to do with McClernand till persuaded by Sherman of the necessity for the good of the service. And after an unsuccessful movement up the Arkansas, during which General McClernand—to use his own words—believed his "star was in the ascendant," that commander made a report totally ignoring all part taken by Admiral Porter and his fleet. One incident of that fruitless attempt is worthy of record as told by General Sherman:

"When daylight broke it revealed to us a new line of parapet straight across the peninsula, connecting Fort Hindman, on the Arkansas River bank, with the impassable swamp about a mile to its left or rear. This peninsula was divided

into two nearly equal parts by a road. My command had the ground to the right of the road, and Morgan's corps that to the left. McClernand had his quarters still on the Tigress, back at Notrib's farm, but moved forward that morning (January 11th) to a place in the woods to our rear, where he had a man up a tree, to observe and report the movements.

"There was a general understanding with Admiral Porter that he was to attack the fort with his three iron-clad gunboats directly by its water-front, while we assaulted by land in the rear. About 10 A. M. I got a message from General McClernand, telling me where he could be found, and asking me what we were waiting for. I answered that we were then in close contact with the enemy, viz., about five or six hundred yards off; that the next movement must be a direct asault; that this should be simultaneous along the whole line; and that I was waiting to hear from the gunboats; asking him to notify Admiral Porter that we were all ready.

"As the gunboats got closer up I saw their flags actually over the parapet of Fort Hindman, and the Rebel gunners scamper out of the embrasures and run down into the ditch behind. About the same time a man jumped up on the Rebel parapet just where the road entered, waving a large white flag, and numerous smaller white rags appeared above the parapet along the whole line. I immediately ordered 'Cease firing!' and sent the same word down the line to General Steele, who had made similar progress on the right, following the border of the swamp. I ordered my aid, Colonel Dayton, to jump on his horse and ride straight up to the large white flag, and when his horse was on the parapet I followed with the rest of my staff. All firing had ceased, except an occasional shot away to the right, and one of the captains (Smith) of the Thirteenth Regulars was wounded after the display of the white flag. On entering the line, I saw that

our muskets and guns had done good execution; for there was a horse-battery, and every horse lay dead in the traces. The fresh-made parapet had been knocked down in many places, and dead men lay around very thick. I inquired who commanded at that point, and a Colonel Garland stepped up and said that he commanded that brigade. I ordered him to form his brigade, stack arms, hang the belts on the muskets, and stand waiting for orders. Stuart's division had been halted outside the parapet. I then sent Major Hammond down the Rebel line to the right, with orders to stop Steele's division outside, and to have the other Rebel brigade stack its arms in like manner, and to await further orders. I inquired of Colonel Garland who commanded in chief, and he said that General Churchill did, and that he was inside the fort. I then rode into the fort, which was well built, with good parapets, drawbridge, and ditch, and was an inclosed work of four bastions. I found it full of soldiers and sailors, its parapets toward the river well battered in, and Porter's gunboats in the river, close against the fort, with their bows on shore. I soon found General Churchill in conversation with Admiral Porter and General A. J. Smith, and about this time my adjutant-general, Major J. H. Hammond, came and reported that General Deshler, who commanded the rebel brigade facing and opposed to Steele, had refused to stack arms and surrender, on the ground that he had received no orders from his commanding general; that nothing separated this brigade from Steele's men except the light parapet, and that there might be trouble there at any moment. I advised General Churchill to send orders at once, because a single shot might bring the whole of Steele's division on Deshler's brigade, and I would not be responsible for the consequences; soon afterward, we both concluded to go in person. General Churchill had the horses for himself and staff in the

ditch; they were brought in, and we rode together to where Garland was standing, and Churchill spoke to him in an angry tone: 'Why did you display the white flag!' Garland replied, 'I received orders to do so from one of our staff.' Churchill denied giving such an order, and angry words passed between them. I stopped them, saying that it made little difference then, as they were in our power. We continued to ride down the line to its extreme point, where we found Deshler in person, and his troops were still standing to the parapet with their muskets in hand. Steele's men were on the outside. I asked Deshler: 'What does this mean? You are a regular officer, and ought to know better.' He answered, snappishly, that 'he had received no orders to surrender;' when General Churchill said: 'You see, sir, that we are in their power, and you may surrender.' Deshler turned to his staff-officers and ordered them to repeat the command to 'stack arms,' etc., to the colonels of his brigade. I was on my horse and he was on foot. Wishing to soften the blow of defeat, I spoke to him kindly saying that I knew a family of Deshlers in Columbus, Ohio, and inquired if they were relations of his. He disclaimed any relation with people living north of the Ohio, in an offensive tone, and I think I gave him a piece of my mind that he did not relish. He was a West Point graduate, small but very handsome, and was afterward killed in battle. I never met him again."

CHAPTER IX.

VICKSBURG AND ITS RESULTS—WORK OF PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT SIEGE—HARD FIGHTING AND THE FINAL OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

The campaign of 1863 opened early, and the plans for an active campaign were determined by the consultation of two men now recognized as the greatest generals of the war.

Early in January General Grant visited the headquarters of General McClernand near the town of Napoleon, Arkansas. Although McClernand was in command of the Army of the Mississippi by virtue of the order of the War department, Grant outranked him because of his general command over the department of the Tennessee. By an order No. 210 of December 18, 1862, from the War Department, received at Arkansas Post, the Western armies had been grouped into five corps d'armee, viz: the Thirteenth, Major-General McClernand; the Fourteenth, Major-General George H. Thomas, in Middle Tennessee; the Fifteenth, Major-General W. T. Sherman; the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, then at or near Memphis; and the Seventeenth, Major-General McPherson, also at the back of Memphis. Grant had ordered the two corps commanded by Sherman and McClernand to return to Vicksburg and resume work on the canal, which had been commenced by General Thomas Williams. The work on canal building was pushed vigorously, though the troops were much troubled by the unusually high water. General Grant made reconnoissance in person and communicated his discoveries to Sherman, who on receipt gave prompt or-

ders to the troops and within an hour and a half returned to General Grant word that the regiment was ready.

"MILLIKEN'S BEND, *March* 16, 1863.

"*General* SHERMAN.

"DEAR SIR: I have just returned from a reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou, with the admiral (Porter), and five of his gunboats. With some labor in cutting tree-tops out of the way, it will be navigable for any class of steamers.

"I want to have your pioneer corps, or one regiment of good men for such work, detailed and at the landing as soon as possible.

"The party will want to take with them their rations, arms, and sufficient camp and garrison equipage for a few days. I will have a boat at any place you may designate, as early as the men can be there. The Eighth Missouri (being many of them boatmen) would be excellent men for this purpose.

"As soon as you give directions for these men to be in readiness, come up and see me, and I will explain fully. The tug that takes this is instructed to wait for you. A full supply of axes will be required.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

General Sherman also received the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March* 16, 1863. }

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.

"GENERAL: You will proceed as early as practicable up Steele's Bayou, and through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the gunboats now there by any route they

may take to get into the Yazoo River, for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting an army through that route to the east bank of that river, and at a point from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg.

"Make such details from your army corps as may be required to clear out the channel of the various bayous through which transports would have to run, and to hold such points as in your judgment should be occupied.

"I place at your disposal to-day the steamers Diligent and Silver Wave, the only two suitable for the present navigation of this route. Others will be supplied you as fast as required and they can be got.

"I have given directions (and you may repeat them) that the party going on board the steamer Diligent push on until they reach Black Bayou, only stopping sufficiently long at any point before reaching there to remove such obstructions as prevent their own progress. Captain Kossak, of the Engineers, will go with this party. The other boat-load will commence their work in Steele's Bayou, and make the navigation as free as possible all the way through.

"There is but little work to be done in Steele's Bayou, except for about five miles about midway of the bayou. In this portion many overhanging trees will have to be removed, and should be dragged out of the channel.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

The gunboats were prepared to remove obstructions and moved up the Yazoo and Steele's Bayou. Part of Stuart's division went up the Mississippi to Gwin's plantation and the next day General Sherman and several officers took a tug for the purpose of overtaking Admiral Porter. This was accomplished at a point about seventy miles up the river. Porter

thought he had passed through the worst, and urged General Sherman to return and clear out the Black Bayou. Having a tug at his disposal, General Sherman devoted much of his time to personal inspection of the work as it progressed and of a careful examination of the surrounding country. During the afternoon of the 19th we heard heavy firing, which General Sherman at once understood was something more than skirmishing or guerrillas, and that night he received a communication written on tissue paper and brought to him by a negro. Says the General:

"The admiral stated that he had met a force of infantry and artillery which gave him great trouble by killing the men who had to expose themselves outside the iron armor to shove off the bows of the boats, which had so little headway that they would not steer. He begged me to come to his rescue as quickly as possible. Giles A. Smith had only about eight hundred men with him, but I ordered him to start up Deer Creek at once, crossing to the east side by an old bridge at Hill's plantation, which we had repaired for the purpose; to work his way up to the gunboat-fleet, and to report to the admiral that I would come up with every man I could raise as soon as possible. I was almost alone at Hill's, but took a canoe, paddled down Black Bayou to the gunboat Price, and there, luckily, found the Silver Wave with a load of men just arrived from Gwin's plantation. Taking some of the parties who were at work along the bayou into an empty coal-barge, we tugged it up by a navy-tug, followed by the Silver Wave, crashing through the trees, carrying away pilot-house, smoke-stacks, and everything above-deck; but the captain (McMillan, of Pittsburgh) was a brave fellow, and realized the necessity. The night was absolutely black, and we could make two and a half of the four miles. We then disembarked, and marched through the canebrake, carrying

lighted candles in our hands, till we got into the open cotton-fields at Hill's plantation, where we lay down for a few hours' rest. These men were a part of Giles A. Smith's brigade, and part belonged to the brigade of T. Kirby Smith, the senior officer present being Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Fifty-fourth Ohio, an excellent young officer. We had no horses.

"On Sunday morning, March 21, as soon as daylight appeared, we started, following the same route which Giles A. Smith had taken the day before; the battalion of the Thirteenth United States Regulars, Major Chase, in the lead. We could hear Porter's guns, and knew that moments were precious. Being on foot myself, no man could complain, and we generally went at the double-quick, with occasional rests. The road lay along Deer Creek, passing several plantations; and occasionally, at the bends, it crossed the swamp, where the water came above the hips. The smaller drummer-boys had to carry their drums on their heads, and most of the men slung their cartridge-boxes around their necks. The soldiers generally were glad to have their general and field officers afoot, but we gave them a fair specimen of marching, accomplishing about twenty-one miles by noon. Of course, our speed was accelerated by the sounds of the navy-guns, which became more and more distinct, though we could see nothing. At a plantation near some Indian mounds we met a detachment of the Eighth Missouri, that had been up to the fleet, and had been sent down as a picket to prevent any obstructions below. This picket reported that Admiral Porter had found Deer Creek badly obstructed, had turned back; that there was a Rebel force beyond the fleet, with some six-pounders, and nothing between us and the fleet. So I sat down on the door-sill of a cabin to rest, but had not been seated ten minutes when, in the wood just ahead, not three hundred yards off, I heard quick and rapid firing of musketry. Jump-

ing up, I ran up the road, and found Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, who said the head of his column had struck a small force of Rebels with a working gang of negroes, provided with axes, who on the first fire had broken and run back into the swamp. I ordered Rice to deploy his brigade, his left on the road, and extending as far into the swamp as the ground would permit, and then to sweep forward until he uncovered the gunboats. The movement was rapid and well executed, and we soon came to some large cotton-fields and could see our gunboats in Deer Creek, occasionally firing a heavy eight-inch gun across the cotton-field into the swamp behind. About that time a Major Kirby, of the Eighth Missouri, galloped down the road on a horse he had picked up the night before, and met me. He explained the situation of affairs, and offered me his horse. I got on bareback, and rode up the levee, the sailors coming out of their iron-clads and cheering most vociferously as I rode by, and as our men swept forward across the cotton-field in full view. I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on the deck of one of his iron-clads, with a shield made of the section of a smoke-stack, and I doubt if he was ever more glad to meet a friend than he was to see me. He explained that he had almost reached the Rolling Fork, when the woods became full of sharp-shooters, who, taking advantage of trees, stumps, and the levee, would shoot down every man that poked his nose outside the protection of their armor; so that he could not handle his clumsy boats in the narrow channel. The Rebels had evidently dispatched a force from Haines' Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling Fork, had anticipated the movement of Admiral Porter's fleet, and had completely obstructed the channel of the upper part of Deer Creek by felling trees into it, so that further progress in that direction was simply impossible. It also happened that, at the instant of my arrival, a party of about four

hundred Rebels, armed and supplied with axes, had passed around the fleet and had got below it, intending in like manner to block up the channel by the felling of trees, so as to cut off retreat. This was the force we had struck so opportunely at the time before described. I inquired of Admiral Porter what he proposed to do, and he said he wanted to get out of that scrape as quickly as possible. He was actually working back when I met him, and, as we then had a sufficient force to cover his movement completely, he continued to back down Deer Creek. He informed me at one time things looked so critical that he had made up his mind to blow up the gunboats, and to escape with his men through the swamp to the Mississippi River. There being no longer any sharpshooters to bother the sailors, they made good progress; still, it took three full days for the fleet to back out of Deer Creek into Black Bayou, at Hill's plantation, whence Admiral Porter proceeded to his post at the mouth of the Yazoo, leaving Captain Owen in command of the fleet. I reported the facts to General Grant, who was sadly disappointed at the failure of the fleet to get through the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff, and ordered us all to resume our camps at Young's Point. We accordingly steamed down, and regained our camps on the 27th. As this expedition up Deer Creek was but one of many efforts to secure a footing from which to operate against Vicksburg, I add the report of Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, who was the first to reach the fleet:

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
YOUNG'S POINT, LOUISIANA, *March* 28, 1863.

"*Captain* L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General,

"CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the movements of the First Brigade in the expedition up Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, and Deer Creek.

"The Sixth Missouri and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois regiments embarked at the mouth of Muddy Bayou on the evening of Thursday, the 18th of March, and proceed up Steele's Bayou to the mouth of Black; thence up Black Bayou to Hill's plantation, at its junction with Deer Creek, where we arrived on Friday at four o'clock P. M., and joined the Eighth Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman commanding, which had arrived at that point two days before. General Sherman had also established his headquarters there, having preceded the Eighth Missouri in a tug, with no other escort than two or three of his staff, reconnoitering all the different bayous and branches, thereby greatly facilitating the movements of the troops, but at the same time exposing himself beyond precedent in a commanding general. At three o'clock of Saturday morning, the 20th instant, General Sherman having received a communication from Admiral Porter at the mouth of Rolling Fork, asking for a speedy co-operation of the land forces with his fleet, I was ordered by General Sherman to be ready, with all the available force at that point, to accompany him to his relief; but before starting it was arranged that I should proceed with the force at hand (eight hundred men), while he remained, again entirely unprotected, to hurry up the troops expected to arrive that night, consisting of the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers, completing my brigade, and the Second Brigade, Colonel T. Kirby Smith commanding.

"This, as the sequel showed, proved a very wise measure, and resulted in the safety of the whole fleet. At daybreak we were in motion, with a regular guide. We had proceeded but about six miles, when we found the enemy had been very busy felling trees to obstruct the creek.

"All the negroes along the route had been notified to be

ready at nightfall to continue the work. To prevent this as much as possible, I ordered all able-bodied negroes to be taken along, and warned some of the principal inhabitants that they would be held responsible for any more obstructions being placed across the creek. We reached the admiral about 4 o'clock P. M., with no opposition save my advance-guard (Company A, Sixth Missouri), being fired into from the opposite side of the creek, killing one man, and slightly wounding another; having no way of crossing, we had to content ourselves with driving them beyond musket-range. Proceeding with as little loss of time as possible, I found the fleet obstructed in front by fallen trees, in rear by a sunken coal-barge, and surrounded by a large force of Rebels with an abundant supply of artillery, but wisely keeping their main force out of range of the admiral's guns. Every tree and stump covered a sharp-shooter, ready to pick off any luckless marine who showed his head above-decks, and entirely preventing the working-parties from removing obstructions.

"In pursuance of orders from General Sherman, I reported to Admiral Porter for orders, who turned over to me all the land-forces in his fleet (about one hundred and fifty men), together with two howitzers, and I was instructed by him to retain a sufficient force to clear out the sharp-shooters, and to distribute the remainder along the creek for six or seven miles below, to prevent any more obstructions being placed in it during the night. This was speedily arranged, our skirmishers capturing three prisoners. Immediate steps were now taken to remove the coal-barge, which was accomplished about daylight on Sunday morning, when the fleet moved back toward Black Bayou. By 3 o'clock P. M. we had only made about six miles, owing to the large number of trees to be removed; at this point, where our progress was very slow, we discovered a long line of the enemy filing along the edge

of the woods, and taking position on the creek below us, about one mile ahead of our advance. Shortly after, they opened fire on the gunboats from batteries behind the cavalry and infantry. The boats not only replied to the batteries, which they soon silenced, but poured a destructive fire into their lines. Heavy skirmishing was also heard in our front, supposed to be by three companies from the Sixth and Eighth Missouri, whose position, taken the previous night to guard the creek, was beyond the point reached by the enemy, and consequently liable to be cut off or captured. Captain Owen, of the Louisville, the leading boat, made every effort to go through the obstructions and aid in rescuing the men. I ordered Major Kirby, with four companies of the Sixth Missouri, forward, with two companies deployed. He soon met General Sherman, with the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, driving the enemy before them, and opening communication along the creek with the gunboats. Instead of our three companies referred to as engaging the enemy, General Sherman had arrived at a very opportune moment with the two regiments mentioned above, and the Second Brigade. The enemy, not expecting an attack from that quarter, after some hot skirmishing, retreated. General Sherman immediately ordered the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois to pursue; but, after following their trace for about two miles, they were recalled.

"We continued our march for about two miles, when we bivouacked for the night. Early on Monday morning, March 22d, we continued our march, but owing to the slow progress of the gunboats did not reach Hill's plantation until Tuesday, the 23d instant, where we remained until the 25th; we then re-embarked, and arrived at Young's Point on Friday, the 27th instant.

"Below you will find a list of casualties.

"Very respectfully,

"GILES A. SMITH,

"*Colonel Eighth Missouri Commanding First brigade.*"

"P. S.—I forgot to state above that the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, being under the immediate command of General Sherman, he can mention them as their conduct deserves."

At this time it became evident that the Mississippi River could not be diverted from its course. Every camp was full of rumors of disagreements and the army correspondents again were active. There was but little on which to base the absurd stories. The officers and men constantly argued among themselves as to the feasibility of the different plans. But it was apparent that some officer high in command was seeking personal advantage. General Sherman understood what influences were at work, and sent his famous letter to General Rawlins, seeking to unmask the batteries of McClernand and make him show his hand if possible. This letter was called a protest against the very man to aid whom it was written. It was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, *April* 8, 1863.

Colonel J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to *General* GRANT.

"SIR: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I will not name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of campaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any result falling below the popular standard, claim that their advice was unheeded, and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom. My opinions are—

"1. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the other grand armies of the United States.

"2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas; supplies collected there while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White, and Madison on the St. Francis River.

"3. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchee Rivers, as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp-road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

"4. That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton; and, lastly, where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad crosses the same river (Big Black.) The capture of Vicksburg would result.

"5. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point; this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg—Haines' Bluff or Yazoo City.

"6. I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou, which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous, as a military channel, to supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Mississippi, or the Black River Bridge; and such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River.

"7. The chief reason for operating solely by water was the season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchee and Yalabusha Rivers. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year.

"I make these suggestions, with the request that General Grant will read them and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer that he should not answer this letter, but merely give it as much or as little weight as it deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as though conceived by myself. I do not believe General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring.

"I am, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

General Grant was not disturbed by the intimation contained in the warning letter from his friend, and allowed those to exercise their peculiar talents who thought to make the war a stepping-stone to greater heights than mere military affairs. He was too intent upon defeating an enemy in front, to care much for those in the rear. General Sherman had his own views regarding the manner of moving on Vicksburg, but never failed to do justice to his commander, and especially never used the lessons of experience as a basis for hostile criticism. Both these soldiers have often confessed that if they had had in the fall and winter of 1862 the knowledge they possessed a few months later they would have pursued a different course in attacking Vicksburg. That this other

plan coincided with the views previously expressed by General Sherman, never was used by him to sneer at the abilities of Grant.

This expedition proved a failure. But Vicksburg was to be taken, if not in one way then in another. General Grant's orders for the movement past Vicksburg via Richmond and Carthage were dated April 20, 1863, and assigned McClernand's 13th corps the right and McPherson's 17th the center, and Sherman's 15th the left. On the 26th of April General Grant sent word to General Sherman to wait till the roads were better or the canals were finished before making further advance. On the 28th, General Sherman received word from Grant that the attack on Grand Gulf was to be made on the following day, and suggested that a simultaneous feint be made on the enemy's batteries on the Yazoo, near Haines' Bluff, provided it could be made without the ill-effect on the army and the country of an apparent repulse. The object was to make a show, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent from Vicksburg to the assistance of the forces to be encountered at Grand Gulf. "The ruse," says General Grant, "succeeded admirable." Sherman gave the necessary orders, embarked Blair's second division on ten steamboats, and about 10 A. M. on the 29th of April, proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, Captain Breese, with the Choctaw and De Kalb, iron-clads, and the Tyler, and several smaller wooden boats of the fleet, already with steam up, prepared to co-operate in the proposed demonstration against Haines' Bluff.

The gunboats at once engaged the batteries, and for four hours a vigorous demonstration was kept up. Toward evening, Sherman ordered the division of troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, and seemingly prepare to assault; knowing that there was no road across the submerged field

that lay between the river and the bluff. As soon as the troops were fairly out on the levee, the gunboats resumed their fire and the enemy's batteries replied with spirit. The enemy could be seen moving guns, artillery, and infantry back and forth, and evidently expecting a real attack. Keeping up appearances until night, the troops were re-embarked. During the next day similar movements were made, accompanied by reconnoissances of all the country on both sides of the Yazoo.

While there, orders came from General Grant to hurry forward to Grand Gulf. Dispatching orders to the divisions of Steele and Tuttle at once to march for Grand Gulf, via Richmond, Sherman prolonged the demonstration till night and quietly dropped back to his camp at Young's Point.

"In the meantime, as many of the Thirteenth Army Corps as could be got on board the transports and barges were embarked, and were moved down to the front of Grand Gulf, for the purpose of landing and storming the enemy's works as soon as the navy should have silenced the guns. Admiral Porter's fleet opened at 8 A. M. on the 29th of April, and gallantly kept up a vigorous fire at short range for more than five hours; by which time General Grant, who witnessed the engagement from a tug-boat, became convinced that the enemy's guns were too elevated to be silenced, and his fortifications too strong to be taken from the water-front. He at once ordered the troops back to Hard Times, there to disembark and march across the point to the plain immediately below Grand Gulf. During the night, under cover of the fire of the gunboats, all the transports and barges ran safely past the batteries. They were immediately followed by the fleet, and at daylight, on the 30th, the work of ferrying the troops over to Bruinsburg was commenced. The Thirteenth Corps was started on the road to Port Gibson as soon as it could draw

three days' rations, and the Seventeenth Corps followed as fast as it was landed on the east bank. The enemy was met in force near Port Gibson at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of May, was driven back on the following day, was pursued across the Bayou Pierre, and eight miles beyond the north fork of the same bayou, both which streams were bridged by McPherson's corps, and on the 3d of May, with slight skirmishing all day, was pushed to and across the Big Black River, at Hankinson's Ferry. Finding here that the enemy had evacuated Grand Gulf, and that we were already fifteen miles from that place on the direct road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, General Grant halted his army to wait for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps, and went back to Grand Gulf in person, to move the depot of supplies to that point.

"Sherman reached Young's Point on the night of May 1st. On the following morning, the second division, now commanded by General Blair, moved up to Milliken's Bend to garrison that place until relieved by troops ordered from Memphis for that purpose; and at the same time, General Sherman himself, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, took up the line of march to join General Grant. They reached Hard Times at noon on the 6th, crossed the Mississippi to Grand Gulf during the night and the following day, and on the 8th marched eighteen miles to Hankinson's Ferry, relieving Crocker's division and enabling it to join McPherson's corps. General Grant's orders for a general advance had been issued the day previous, and the movement had already begun. McPherson was to take the right-hand road by Rocky Springs and Utica to Raymond, and thence to Jackson; McClernand, the left-hand road, through Willow Springs, keeping as near the Black River as possible; Sherman to move on Edwards' Station, and both he and McClernand to strike

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION HILLS.

the railroad beween Edwards' Station and Bolton. At noon on the 10th, Sherman destroyed the floating bridge over the Big Black and marched to Big Sandy; on the 11th he reached Auburn, and on the morning of the 12th encountered and dispersed a small force of the enemy endeavoring to obstruct the crossing of Fourteen Mile Creek. Pausing for the pioneers, to make a new crossing in lieu of a bridge burned by the enemy's rear-guard, toward evening Sherman met General Grant on the other side of Fourteen Mile Creek, and was ordered to encamp there, Steele's division toward Edwards' Depot and Tuttle's toward Raymond. During the night, news was received that McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, had the same day met and defeated two brigades of the enemy at Raymond, and that the enemy had retreated upon Jackson, where reinforcements were constantly arriving, and where General Joseph E. Johnston was hourly expected to take personal command.

"Determining to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no enemy in his rear, if it could be avoided, General Grant at once changed his orders to McClernand and Sherman, and directed them to march upon Raymond. On the 13th McPherson moved to Clinton, Sherman to a parallel position at Mississippi Springs, and McClernand to a point near Raymond. Having communicated during the night, so as to reach their destination at the same hour, on the 14th, Sherman and McPherson marched fourteen miles, and at noon engaged the enemy near Jackson. At this time McClernand occupied Clinton, Mississippi Springs, and Raymond, each with one division, and had Blair's division of Sherman's corps near New Auburn, and had halted, according to orders, within supporting distance. The enemy marched out with the bulk of his forces on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from Jackson, while

a small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance from the city, on the Mississippi Springs road, and endeavored by unusual activity, aided by the nature of the ground, to create the appearance of great strength, so as to delay Sherman's advance until the contest with McPherson should be decided.

"During the day it rained in torrents, and the roads, which had been very dusty, became equally muddy, while the troops pushed on, and about 10 A. M. were within three miles of Jackson. Then were heard guns of McPherson to the left, and the cavalry advance reported an enemy in front, at a small bridge at the foot of the ridge along which the road led.

"The enemy opened briskly with a battery. Hastily reconnoitering the position, Sherman ordered Mower's and Matthie's, formerly Woods', brigades of Tuttle's division, to deploy forward to the right and left of the road, and Buckland's to close up. Waterhouse's and Spohre's batteries were placed on commanding ground and soon silenced the enemy's guns, when he retired about half a mile into the skirt of woods in front of the intrenchments at Jackson. Mower's brigade followed him up, and he soon took refuge behind the intrenchments.

"The stream, owing to its precipitous banks, could only be passed on the bridge, which the enemy did not attempt to destroy, and forming the troops in similar order beyond the bridge, only that Mower's brigade, from the course he took in following the enemy, occupied the ground to the left of the road, and Matthie's brigade to the right, the two batteries in the center, and Buckland's brigade in reserve.

"As the troops emerged from the woods in their front, and as far to their left as they could see, appeared a line of intrenchments, and the enemy kept up a brisk fire with artillery from the points that enfiladed the road. In order to ascer-

tain the nature of the flanks of this line of intrenchments, Sherman directed Captain Pitzman, acting engineer, to take the Ninety-fifth Ohio, and make a detour to the right, to see what was there. While he was gone Steele's division was closed up. About one P. M. Captain Pitzman returned reporting that he found the enemy's intrenchments abandoned at the point where he crossed the railroad, and had left the Ninety-fifth Ohio there in possession. Sherman at once ordered General Steele to lead his whole division into Jackson by that route, and as soon as the cheers of his men were heard, Tuttle's division was ordered in by the main road. The enemy's infantry had escaped to the north by the Canton road, but we captured about two hundred and fifty prisoners, with all the enemy's artillery (eighteen guns), and much ammunition and valuable public stores. Meanwhile, after a warm engagement, lasting more than two hours, McPherson had badly defeated the main body of the enemy, and driven it north. The pursuit was kept up until nearly dark.

"Disposing the troops on the outskirts of the town, in obedience to a summons from General Grant, Sherman met him and General McPherson near the State-house, and received orders to occupy the line of rifle-pits, and on the following day to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and all the property belonging to the enemy. Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th of May, Steele's division was set to work to destroy the railroad and property to the south and east, including Pearl River Bridge, and Tuttle's division to the north and west. The railroads were destroyed by burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of four miles east of Jackson, three south, three north, and ten west.

The next few days were spent in making the investment of Vicksburg complete, and on the afternoon of the 19th of May

General Grant had ordered a general assault to be made. At 2 o'clock that day the fight commenced, and almost the entire army was engaged. But the enemy was so strongly intrenched that our men were repulsed with great loss. One incident connected with this assault is worthy of record in the words of General Sherman, who in this case received proof of the correctness of his opinion when he wrote the warning letter to General Grant. He says:

"After our men had fairly been beaten back from off the parapet, and had got cover behind the spurs of ground close up to the Rebel works, General Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left his horse some distance to the rear. I pointed out to him the Rebel works, admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the result with McPherson and McClernand was about the same. While he was with me, an orderly or staff-officer came and handed him a piece of paper, which he read and handed to me. I think the writing was in pencil, on a loose piece of paper, and was in General McClernand's handwriting, to the effect that 'his troops had captured the rebel parapet in his front,' that 'the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg', and asking him (General Grant) to give renewed orders to McPherson and Sherman to press their attacks on their respective fronts, lest the enemy should concentrate on him (McClernand). General Grant said, 'I don't believe a word of it;' but I reasoned with him, that this note was official, and must be credited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with new troops. He said he would instantly ride down the line to McClernand's front, and if I did not receive orders to the contrary, by 3 o'clock P. M., I might try it again. Mower's fresh brigade was brought up under cover, and some changes were made in Giles Smith's brigade; and, punctually at 3 P. M., hearing heavy firing down along the line to my left, I

ordered the second assault. It was a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful and bloody. It also transpired that the same thing had occurred with General McPherson, who lost in this second assault some most valuable officers and men without adequate result; and that General McClernand, instead of having taken any single point of the Rebel main parapet, had only taken one or two small outlying lunettes open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the Rebels behind their main parapet, and most of them were actually thus captured. This affair caused great feeling with us, and severe criticisms on General McClernand, which led finally to his removal from the command of the Thirteenth Corps, to which General Ord succeeded. The immediate cause, however, of General McClernand's removal was the publication of a sort of congratulatory order addressed to his troops, first published in St. Louis, in which he claimed that he had actually succeeded in making a lodgment in Vicksburg, but had lost it, owing to the fact that McPherson and Sherman did not fulfill their parts of the general plan of attack. This was simply untrue. The two several assaults made May 22d, on the lines of Vicksburg, had failed, by reason of the great strength of the position and the determined fighting of its garrison. I have since seen the position at Sevastopol, and without hesitation I declare that at Vicksburg to have been the more difficult of the two."

It was now determined to make a regular siege, and the soldiers entered heartily into the work of approaching the enemy by trenches. This was no easy task to men unaccustomed to the heat of this section. On the evening of July 3d, the sappers were close to the enemy's works. The next day the enemy celebrated the national birthday by surrendering the city they had held at so much cost. General Grant in his report of the siege, dated July 6th, says:

"Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where Johnston has made a stand."

After toiling two months in the stifling trenches, without pausing to share the joy for the national triumph which crowned their work, Sherman's men marched fifty miles in the heat through a country almost destitute of water, to meet the enemy.

The advance of his troops appeared before the enemy's works in front of Jackson on the 9th of July, and on the 12th had invested that place, until both flanks rested upon Pearl River. Constant skirmishing was kept up in front, while a cavalry expedition was sent off to the east to destroy the railroads, until the night of the 16th of July. Sherman had all his artillery in position, and an ammunition train had arrived during the day. Learning this, and perceiving the impossibility of longer maintaining his position, Johnston marched out of Jackson, and destroyed the floating bridges over the Pearl River. Early on the 17th, the evacuation was discovered, and Sherman's troops entered the city. Johnston continued the retreat to Morton, thirty-five miles east of Jackson. Two divisions of our troops followed as far as Brandon, through which place they drove the enemy's cavalry on the 19th. General Sherman at once sent out

expeditions in all quarters to thoroughly destroy all the bridges, culverts, embankments, water-tanks, rails, ties, and rolling-stock of the railways centering in Jackson. Sherman returned to the line of the Big Black, to recuperate.

Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant says:

"The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and dispersion of Johnston's army entitle General Sherman to more credit than usually falls to the lot of one man to earn. His demonstration at Haines' Bluff, in April, to hold the enemy about Vicksburg, while the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi; his rapid marches to join the army afterward; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the first attack; his almost unequaled march from Jackson to Bridgeport, and passage of Black River; his securing Walnut Hills on the 18th of May, attest his great merit as a soldier."

There can be no question as to the valor of the army in this campaign. Despite discouragements and the unaccustomed climate, the rank and file had endured hardships without a murmur. As to the credit for the inception and completion of the plan of campaign, General Sherman left no possibility of doubt of his opinion.

The campaign of Vicksburg, in its conception and execuion, belonged exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain many of his letters and notes, all in his own handwriting, prescribing the routes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even the amount of food and tools to be carried along. Many persons gave his Adjutant-General, Rawlins, the credit for these things, but they were in error; for no commanding general of an army ever gave more of his personal attention to details, or wrote so many of his own orders, reports, and letters, as General Grant. His success at Vicks-

burg justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. The President conferred on him the rank of Major-General in the regular army, the highest grade then existing by law; and General McPherson and I shared in his success by receiving similar commissions as Brigadier-Generals in the regular army."

These were the words of a commander who had disproved the charge that he was crazy and who now claims for himself only the credit of having done his duty as a soldier. It would have been better for the country had other Generals evinced the same degree of unselfish devotion.

For some reason there was no further advance. The enemy's country had been cut in twain. The Mississippi river no longer stood as a dividing line between two sections of the country. It was open to the Federal army and the people of the North, but was practically closed to the South. As bearing upon subsequent events and, revealing the state of public feeling at the time, the following correspondence is suggestive:

[PRIVATE.]

"WASHINGTON, *August* 29, 1863.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: The question of reconstruction in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, will soon come up for decision of the Government, and not only the length of the war, but our ultimate and complete success will depend upon its decision. It is a difficult matter, but I believe it can be successfully solved, if the President will consult opinions of cool and discreet men, who are capable of looking at it in all its bearings and effects. I think he is disposed to receive the advice of our generals who have been in these states, and know much more of their condition than gassy



EXPLOSION IN THE CRATER AT VICKSBURG.

politicians in Congress. General Banks has written pretty fully on the subject. I wrote to General Grant, immediately after the fall of Vicksburg, for his views in regard to Mississippi, but he has not yet answered.

"I wish you would consult with Grant, McPherson, and others of cool good judgment, and write me your views fully, as I may wish to use them with the President. You had better write me unofficially, and then your letter will not be put on file, and cannot hereafter be used against you. You have been in Washington enough to know how every thing a man writes or says is picked up by his enemies and misconstrued. With kind wishes for your further succses,

"I am yours truly,

"H. W. HALLECK."

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, MISSISSIPPI, *September* 17, 1863.

"H. W. HALLECK *Commander-in-Chief*, Washington, D. C.

"DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of August 29th and with pleasure confide to you fully my thoughts on the important matters you suggest, with absolute confidence that you will use what is valuable, and reject the useless or superfluous. That part of the continent of North America known as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, is in my judgment the key to the whole interior. The valley of the Mississippi is America, and, although railroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet the water-channels still mark the lines of fertile land, and afford cheap carriage to the heavy products of it.

"The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage, are as directly concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as

are those who dwell on its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the nation has recovered its possession, this generation of men will make a fearful mistake if they again commit its charge to a people liable to misuse their position, and assert, as was recently done, that, because they dwelt on the banks of this mighty stream, they had a right to control its navigation.

"I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, to revive the State governments of Louisiana, etc., or to institute in this quarter any civil government in which the local people have much to say. They had a government so mild and paternal that they gradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselves controlled; they asserted an absolute right to seize public moneys, forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel and commerce. They chose war—they ignored and denied all the obligations of the solemn contract of government and appealed to force.

"We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is a two-edged sword, and it may be that many of the inhabitants cry for peace. I know them well, and the very impulses of their nature; and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South which borders on the great river, we must recognize the classes into which they have divided themsleves:

"1. The large planters, owning lands, slaves, and all kinds of personal property: These are, on the whole, the ruling class. They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached. In some districts they are bitter as gall, and have given up slaves, plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy; whereas, in others, they are conservative. None dare admit a friendship for us, though they say freely that they were at the outset opposed to war and disunion. I know we can manage this class, but only by action. Argu-

ment is exhausted, and words have lost their usual meaning. Nothing but the logic of events touches their understanding; but, of late, this has worked a wonderful change. If our country were like Europe, crowded with people, I would say it would be easier to please this class than to reconstruct it, subordinate to the policy of the nation; but, as this is not the case, it is better to allow the planters, with individual exceptions, gradually to recover their plantations, to hire any species of labor, and to adapt themselves to the new order of things. Still, their friendship and assistance to reconstruct order out of the present ruin cannot be depended on. They watch the operations of our armies, and hope still for a Southern Confederacy that will restore to them the slaves and privileges which they feel are otherwise lost forever. In my judgment, we have two more battles to win before we should even bother our minds with the idea of restoring civil order—viz., one near Meridian, in November, and one near Shreveport, in February and March next, when Red River is navigable by our gunboats. When these are done, then, and not until then, will the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, submit. Slavery is already gone, and, to cultivate the land, negro or other labor must be hired. This, of itself, is a vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjust their minds and habits to this new order of things. The civil government of the representative type would suit this class far less than a pure military rule, readily adapting itself to actual occurrences, and able to enforce its laws and orders promptly and emphatically.

"2. The smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers: This class will probably number three-quarters of the whole; have, in fact, no real interest in the establishment of a Southern Confederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the false theory that they were to be benefited some-

how—they knew not how. They are essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home if they could. These are the real *tiers etat* of the South, and are hardly worthy a thought; for they swerve to and fro according to events which they do not comprehend or attempt to shape. When the time for reconstruction comes, they will want the old political system of caucuses, legislatures, etc., to amuse themselves and make them believe they are real sovereigns; but in all things they will follow blindly the lead of the planters. The Southern politicians, who understand this class, use them as the French do their masses—seemingly consult their prejudices, while they make their orders and enforce them. We should do the same.

"3. The Union men of the South: I must confess I have little respect for this class. They allowed a clamorous set of demagogues to muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs. Afraid of shadows, they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them, without a murmur, to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and everything; and, when we reach them, they are full of complaints if our men take a few fence-rails for fire, or corn to feed our horses. They give us no assistance or information, and are loudest in their complaints at the smallest excesses of our soldiers. Their sons, horses, arms, and everything useful are in the army against us, and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peaceful citizens. I account them as nothing in this great game of war.

"4. The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyers about towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never did work and never will. War suits them, and the rascals are brave, fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in every sense. They care not a sou for niggers, land, or anything. They hate Yankees per se, and don't

bother their brains about the past, present, or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty of forage, and an open country, they are happy. This is a larger class than most men suppose, and they are the most dangerous set of men that this war has turned loose upon the world. They are splendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless. Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson are the types and leaders of this class. These men must all be killed or employed by us before we can hope for peace. They have no property or future, and therefore cannot be influenced by anything, except personal considerations. I have two brigades of these fellows in my front, commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas. Stephen D. Lee is in command of the whole. I have frequent interviews with their officers, a good understanding with them, and am inclined to think, when the resources of their country are exhausted, we must employ them. They are the best cavalry in the world, but it will tax Mr. Chase's genius for finances to supply them with horses. At present horses cost them nothing; for they take where they find, and don't bother their brains as to who is to pay for them; the same may be said of the cornfields, which have, as they believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for their special benefit. We propose to share with them the free use of these cornfields, planted by willing hands that will never gather the crops.

"Now that I have sketched the people who inhabit the district of country under consideration, I will proceed to discuss the future.

"A civil government now, for any part of it, would be simply ridiculous. The people would not regard it, and even the military commanders of the antagonistic parties would treat it lightly. Governors would be simply petitioners for

military assistance, to protect supposed friendly interests, and military commanders would refuse to disperse and weaken their armies for military reasons. Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting powers, and, instead of contributing to the end of the war, would actually defer it. Therefore, I contend that the interests of the United States, and of the real parties concerned, demand the continuance of the simple military rule, till after all the organized armies of the South are dispersed, conquered, and subjugated.

"The people of all this region are represented in the Army of Virginia, at Charleston, Mobile and Chattanooga. They have sons and relations in each of the rebel armies, and naturally are interested in their fate. Though we hold military possession of the key-points of their country, still they contend, and naturally, that should Lee succeed in Virginia, or Bragg at Chattanooga, a change will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt to reconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it, till all idea of the establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned. We should avail ourselves of the present lull to secure the strategical points that will give us an advantage in the future military movements, and we should treat the idea of civil government as one in which we as a nation have a minor or subordinate interest. The opportunity is good to impress on the population the truth that they are more interested in civil government than we are; and that, to enjoy the protection of laws, they must not be passive observers of events, but must aid and sustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; they must not only submit themselves, but should pay their share of taxes, and render personal services when called on.

"It seems to me, in contemplating the history of the past two years, that all the people of our country, North, South, East and West, have been undergoing a salutary political

schooling, learning lessons which might have been acquired from the experience of other people; but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that we would only learn by actual experience of our own. The people even of small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, had reasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions were superior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation. Half our territorial nation rebelled, on a doctrine of secession that they themeslves now scout; and a real numerical majority actually believed that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty that it could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the present war has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, the experience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.

"Another great and important natural truth is still in contest, and can only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote have been our great arbiter. Heretofore all men have cheerfully submitted to it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not necessarily physical majorities. The South, though numerically inferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority of numbers, and therefore by natural law they contend that they are not bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in my judgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decide it, and it is the only question now left for us as a people to decide. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majority has both the natural and constitutional right to govern them. If we cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to select their own government, and they have the argument. Our armies must prevail over theirs; our officers, marshals, and courts, must penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land, before we have the natural right to demand their submission.

"I would banish all minor questions, assert the broad doctrine that as a nation the United States has the right, and also the physical power, to penetrate to every part of our national domain, and that we will do it—that we will do it in our own time and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two, or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle, if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will not cease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us are enemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts. If the people of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if they stand by, mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have no right to immunity, protection, or share in the final results.

"I even believe and contend further that, in the North, every member of the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional law to 'maintain and defend the Government against all its enemies and opposers whomsoever.' If they fail to do it they are derelict, and can be punished, or deprived of all advantages arising from the labors of those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds his share of taxes, or his physical assistance in this, the crisis of our history, he should be deprived of all voice in the future elections of this country, and might be banished, or reduced to the condition of a mere denizen of the land.

"War is upon us, none can deny it. It is not the choice of the Government of the United States, but of a faction; the Government was forced to accept the issue, or to submit to a degradation fatal and disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war, it should be 'pure and simple' as applied to the belligerents. I would keep it so, till all traces of the war are effaced; till those who appealed to it are sick

and tired of it, and come to the emblem of our nation, and sue for peace. I would not coax them, or even meet them half-way, but make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.

"I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the South sneer at all overtures looking to their interests. They scorn the alliance with the Copperheads; they tell me to my face that they respect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fight manfully and well for a principle, but despise the Copperheads and sneaks at the North, who profess friendship for the South and opposition to the war, as mere covers for their knavery and poltroonery.

"God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any man living, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only one honorable issue from it. We must fight it out, army against army, and man against man; and I know, and you know, and civilians begin to realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organized armies than through any species of conventions that can be framed. The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place and ridiculous. The section of thirty-pounder Parrott rifles now drilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than the largest Democratic meeting the State of New York can possibly assemble at Albany; and a simple order of the War Department to draft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be more convincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon to Jeff. Davis and all his misled host.

"The only government needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, now exists in Grant's army. This needs, simply, enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow in due season. This army has its well-

defined code of laws and practice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of a city, the country, the rivers, the sea, indeed to all parts of this land. It better subserves the interest and policy of the General Government, and the people here prefer it to any weak or servile combination that would at once, from force of habit, revive and perpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of this country have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of the nation. They know it and feel it, and in after-years they will be the better citizens from the dear-bought experience of the present crisis. Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizens must obey as well as command. Obedience to law, absolute—yea, even abject—is the lesson that this war, under Providence, will teach the free and enlightened American citizen. As a nation, we shall be the better for it.

"I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of coursee governments founded on a different and it may be an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in the end England and France will join with us in jubilation at the triumph of constitutional government over faction. Even now the English manifest this. I do not profess to understand Napoleon's design in Mexico, and I do not see that this taking military possession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now as we want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question as to what nation she should fall a prey. That is now solved, and I don't see that we are damaged. We have the finest part of the North American continent, all we can people and take care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land, and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enough people, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defy interference from any and every quarter.

"I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue, as heretofore, to collect, in well-organized armies, the physical strength of the nation; applying it, as heretofore, in asserting the national authority; and in persevering, without relaxation, to the end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say; but, fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed—no other choice is left us except degradation. The South must be ruled by us, or she will rule us. We must conquer them, or ourselves be conquered. There is no middle course. They ask and will have nothing else, and talk of compromise is bosh; for we know they would even scorn the offer.

"I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till the superabundant population of the North could flow in and replace the losses sustained by war; but this could not be, and we are forced to take things as they are.

"All therefore I can now venture to advise is to raise the draft to its maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard as possible, and push the war, pure and simple. Great attention should be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them may be founded the future stability of the Government.

"The cost of the war is, of course, to be considered, but finances will adjust themselves to the actual state of affairs; and, even if we would, we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger the cost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end must be attained somehow, regardless of loss of life and treasure, and is merely a question of time.

"Excuse so long a letter. With great respect, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"That this letter was received with more faith than had been accorded to Sherman's former advice regarding the troops

needed for the carrying on of the war is evidenced from the fact that Abraham Lincoln solicited the privilege of having it published. But General Sherman, had no desire for a newspaper controversy, and possibly had determined to give no further reason for the history makers manufacturing rumors regarding his sanity. Read in the light of subsequent events it points to serious errors made by men who believed they were acting in line with the policy marked out by Lincoln.

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, *September* 17, 1863.

"*Brigadier-General* J. A. RAWLINS, *Acting-Assistant Adjutant-General*, Vicksburg.

"DEAR GENERAL: I inclose for your perusal, and for you to read to General Grant such parts as you deem interesting, letters received by me from Prof. Mahan and General Halleck, with my answers. After you have read my answer to General Halleck, I beg you to inclose it to its address, and return me the others.

"I think Prof. Mahan's very marked encomium upon the campaign of Vicksburg is so flattering to General Grant, that you may offer to let him keep the letter, if he values such a testimonial. I have never written a word to General Halleck since my report of last December, after the affair at Chickasaw, except a short letter a few days ago thanking him for the kind manner of his transmitting to me the appointment of Brigadier-General. I know that in Washington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset of the war I would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared and with an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose. I was then construed unsound, and now that I insist on war pure and simple, with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed vindictive. You remember what Polonius said to

his son Laertes: 'Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it, that the opposed may beware of thee.' What is true of the single man, is equally true of a nation. Our leaders seemed at first to thirst for the quarrel, even anxious to array against us all possible elements of opposition; and now, being in, they would hasten to quit long before the 'opposed' has received that lesson which he needs. I would make this war as severe as possible, and show no symptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy; indeed, I know, and you know, that the end would be reached quicker by such a course than by any seeming yielding on our part. I don't want our Government to be bothered by patching up local governments, or by trying to reconcile any class of men. The South has done her worst, and now is the time for us to pile on our blows thick and fast.

"Instead of postponing the draft till after the elections, we ought now to have our ranks full of drafted men; and, at best, if they come at all, they will reach us when we should be in motion.

"I think General Halleck would like to have the honest, candid opinions of all of us, viz., Grant, McPherson, and Sherman. I have given mine, and would prefer, of course, that it should coincide with the others. Still no matter what my opinion may be, I can easily adapt my conduct to the plan of others, and am only too happy when I find theirs better than mine. If no trouble, please show Halleck's letter to McPherson, and ask him to write also. I know his regiments are like mine (mere squads), and need filling up.

"Yours truly, W. T SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

CHAPTER X.

RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA.

SERVICES OF SHERMAN AND HIS COMMAND IN THE RELIEF OF ROSECRANS' ARMY WHEN PENNED AT CHATTANOOGA —SIMPLE ACCOUNT OF THE WORK, AND THANKS FROM CONGRESS.

A long season of rest followed the close of the campaign against Vicksburg and the fall of Port Hudson. Grant's army was practically disbanded. Many officers secured leaves of absence and many of the officers had their families brought to camp. Some of the army corps were stationed at points near Vicksburg. The 9th (Parke's) returned to Kentucky; Ord's was sent down to Natchez, and Sherman's was encamped on the Big Black some twenty miles from Vicksburg. It may well be understood that the soldiers enjoyed the rest in quiet camps after so long and wearing a campaign. They were allowed frequent opportunities of visiting Vicksburg and studying the place they had invested so long.

An incident occurred during this quiet that demonstrated the inclination of men calling themselves leaders to arrogate to themselves superior wisdom and feelings of humanity. It may as well be taken as an object lesson for those statesmen who affect a better understanding of matters of immediate importance to the country than other citizens of less wealth and prominence, even though the latter may have had that best of all experiences for a citizen—four years service in the war. In relating this incident General Sherman

unconsciously illustrates his superior sagacity and comprehension at all times during the war of what would be the natural result of a close of hostilities.

"While we occupied the west bank of the Big Black, the east bank was watched by a Rebel cavalry-division, commanded by General Armstrong. He had four brigades, commanded by Generals Whitfield, Stark, Cosby, and Wirt Adams. Quite frequently they communicated with us by flags of truce on trivial matters, and we reciprocated, merely to observe them. One day a flag of truce, borne by a Captain B— of Louisville, Kentucky, escorted by about twenty-five men, was reported at Messinger's Ferry, and I sent orders to let them come right into my tent. This brought them through the camps of the Fourth Division, and part of the Second; and as they drew up in front of my tent, I invited Captain B—(and another officer with him, a major from Mobile), to dismount, to enter my tent, and to make themselves at home. Their escort was sent to join mine, with orders to furnish them forage and everything they wanted. B— had brought a sealed letter for General Grant at Vicksburg, which was dispatched to him. In the evening we had a good supper, with wine and cigars, and, as we sat talking, B— spoke of his father and mother in Louisville, got leave to write them a long letter without its being read by anyone, and then we talked about the war. He said: 'What is the use of your persevering? It is simply impossible to subdue eight millions of people;' asserting that 'the feeling in the South had become so embittered that a reconciliation was impossible.' I answered that, 'sitting as we then were, we appeared very comfortable, and surely there was no trouble in our becoming friends.' 'Yes,' said he, 'that is very true of us, but we are gentlemen of education, and can easily adapt ourselves to any condition of things; but this would not

apply equally well to the common people, or to the common soldiers.' I took him out to the camp-fires behind the tent, and there were the men of his escort and mine mingled together, drinking their coffee, and happy as soldiers always seem. I asked B— what he thought of that, and he admitted that I had the best of the argument. Before I dismissed this flag of truce, his companion consulted me confidentially as to what disposition he ought to make of his family, then in Mobile, and I frankly gave him the best advice I could."

But the quiet of camp life was soon rudely broken, and we were reminded that soldiers could look forward to no long seasons of comfort. It had seemed as if the war was over as far as our work was concerned, and the general feeling was that the other armies had but to follow our example and then return home. But it was only because we had as slight a conception of the task as had the critics who only a few months before had sneered at General Sherman because he could not accept the optimistic views of the Secretary of State.

General Rosecrans had attempted to bag Bragg's army in Chattanooga. But Bragg had played his enemy a pretty trick, by withdrawing his army from the city and then driving Rosecrans into the trap and holding him there. It appeared as if the entire army under Rosecrans must either starve or be surrendered. Troops were ordered from every possible quarter for the relief of the beleaguered army. The families of the officers who had come South for a visit were rapidly hurried away, and active preparations made for operations that would include the entire force. General Sherman at this time experienced a loss that was keenly felt by those who had been favored with constant sight of the bright little face of "Sergeant" Willie. The little fellow had won all

hearts by his winning ways, and his fondness for playing soldier. At every part of the camp he was a welcome visitor, and many a father petted him as a relief from the terrible feeling of loneliness. Wlilie was taken sick on the way to Memphis, while his father was sending the family North. He died at the Gayoso House shortly after their arrival. General Sherman was sorely afflicted, but he was a soldier and at this time must go on with his work, leaving to the other members of the family the sad duty of carrying the form of little Willie to their home in Ohio. In the letter to his friend Captain Smith, General Sherman touchingly tells of his loss.

"GAYOSO HOUSE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, }
October 4, 1863—*Midnight.* }

"*Captain* C. C. SMITH, *commanding Battalion Thirteenth United States Regulars.*

"MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expression of the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers and soldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poor child. I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment of kindred, and I assure you of full reciprocity.

"Consistent with a sense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave my post, and sent for the family to come to me in that fatal climate, and in that sickly period of the year; and behold the result! The child that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with more confidence than I did in my own plan of life, now floats a mere corpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother, brother, and sisters, clustered about him. For myself, I ask no sympathy. On, on, I must go, to meet a soldier's fate, or live to see our country rise superior to all factions, till its flag is adored and respected by ourselves and by all the powers of the earth.

"But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth. I have seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, as he beheld the battalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers. Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers.

"God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead, but will not be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed him to that same mysterious end.

"Please convey to the battalion my heart-felt thanks, and assure each and all that if in after years they call on me or mine, and mention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when Willie was a sergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family that will open all it has; that we will share with them our last blanket, our last crust!

"Your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

Long afterward, in the spring of 1867, his body was disinterred and brought to St. Louis, where he is now buried in a beautiful spot, in Calvary Cemetery, by the side of another child, "Charles," who was born at Lancaster, in the summer of 1864, died early, and was buried at Notre Dame, Indiana. Over Willie's grave is erected a beautiful marble monument, designed and executed by the officers and soldiers of that battalion which claimed him as a sergeant and comrade.

The work now upon us was very pressing. It was whispered that a large part of Lee's army had been sent to aid Bragg in capturing Rosecrans. This policy was believed to be for the purpose of aiding the sympathizers of the Rebellion in the North who were constantly on the watch for a chance for an effective fire in the rear. Major-General S. A. Hurlbut was in command at Memphis and to him the General Commanding at Washington (Halleck,) sent dispatches urging

the utmost speed in forwarding troops to counteract the efforts of the enemy.

It was the task of Sherman's troops to repair the Memphis Charleston Railroad, so as to have supplies forwarded in that direction. As the work progressed we had frequent skirmishes with the enemy, though General Sherman took every precaution to prevent any general engagement until the army could be massed for the purpose. At Corinth on the 16th of October, 1863, General Sherman received the following dispatches:

"MEMPHIS, *October* 14, 1863—11 A. M.

"Arrived this morning. Will be off in a few hours. My orders are only to go to Cairo, and report from there by telegraph. McPherson will be in Canton to-day. He will remain there until Sunday or Monday next, and reconnoiter as far eastward as possible with cavalry in the meantime.

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

"WASHINGTON, *October*, 14, 1863—1 P. M.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, *Corinth.*

"Yours of the 10th is received. The important matter to be attended to is that of supplies. When Eastport can be reached by boats, the use of the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time it must be guarded as far as used. The Kentucky Railroad can barely supply General Rosecrans. All these matters must be left to your judgment as circumstances may arise. Should the enemy be so strong as to prevent your going to Athens, or connecting with General Rosecrans, you will nevertheless have assisted him greatly by drawing away a part of the enemy's forces.

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., *October* 16, 1863.

"*Major General* U. S. GRANT, *Louisville.*

"GENERAL: You will receive herewith the orders of the President of the United States, placing you in command of the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee. The organization of these departments will be changed as you may deem most practicable. You will immediately proceed to Chattanooga, and relieve General Rosecrans. You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Sherman by telegraph. A summary of the orders sent to these officers will be sent to you immediately. It is left optional with you to supersede General Rosecrans by General G. H. Thomas, or not. Any other changes will be made on your request by telegram.

"One of the first objects requiring your attention is the supply of your armies. Another is the security of the passes in the Georgia mountains, to shut out the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. You will consult with General Meigs and Colonel Scott in regard to transportation and supplies.

"Should circumstances permit, I will visit you personally in a few days for consultation.

"H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*"

By the last order General Grant was made commander of all the forces in the west, and the first step taken toward the initiation of that great undertaking with which General Sherman's name will ever be linked. The reasons leading up to the appointment may be drawn from the following letter from General Halleck:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., *October* 20, 1863.

"*Major-General* GRANT, *Louisville.*

"GENERAL: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give you a brief statement of the objects aimed at by

General Rosecrans' and General Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of the measures directed to be taken to attain these objects.

"It has been the constant desire of the Government from the beginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee from the hands of the Rebels, who fully appreciated the importance of continuing their hold upon that country.

"In addition to the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the upper valley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and other materials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of East Tennessee would cut off one of their most important railroad communciations, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta, etc.

"When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of 1862, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reached there before Buell, and, by threatening his communciations, forced him to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. Again, after the battle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg's defeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee. The same was urged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season or other causes prevented further operations after the battle of Stone River.

"Last spring, when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawn out of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged General Rosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out his projected plan of campaign, General Burnside being ready to co-operate, with a diminished but still efficient force. But he could not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to lie still till your campaign should be terminated. I represented to him, but without avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able to reinforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you.

"When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance,

he was allowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out the objects of the expedition. He was directed, however, to report his movements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect his left, so far as possible, with General Burnside's right. General Burnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right, as far as possible, with General Rosecrans' left, so that, if the enemy concentrated upon either army, the other could move to its assistance. When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville, and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, he was instructed to move down the river and co-operate with General Rosecrans.

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were not carried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that he believed that Bragg was in retreat, and that General Rosecrans needed no reinforcements. When the latter had gained possession of Chattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, but simply to hold the mountain-passes, so as to prevent the ingress of the Rebels into East Tennessee. That object accomplished, I considered the campaign as ended, at least for the present. Future operations would depend upon the ascertained strength and movements of the enemy. In other words, the main objects of the campaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, and by holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it from Rebel invasion.

"The moment I received reliable information of the departure of Longstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forward to General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of the Ohio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance. I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, Sherman, and yourself, to send forward all available troops in your department. If these forces had been sent to

General Rosecrans by Nashville, they could not have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move by Corinth and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has been proved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from the Army of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroad transportation, to reach General Rosecrans' army in the field.

"In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it is believed that General Rosecrans when he first moved against Bragg had double, if not treble, his force. General Burnside, also, had more than double the force of Buckner; and, even when Bragg and Buckner united, Rosecrans' army was very greatly superior in number. Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia, under Longstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority. It is now ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners paroled by you at Vicksburg, and General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally and improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks to swell the Rebel numbers at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, in violation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by the Rebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a useful lesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we are contending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, nor even his most solemn engagements. You may, therefore, expect to meet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners released by you and others on parole, not to serve again till duly exchanged.

"Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able to concentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than we anticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him. Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means of supplying them at this season of the year. A single-track railroad can supply an army of

sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usual number of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with a large mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great.

"I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville to Decatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that triangle will be of great assistance to you. I hope, also, that the recent rise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enable you to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport, or Florence.

"If you re-occupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should never have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and should receive your early attention.

"I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fully understanding the objects of the campaign, and the means of attaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War, in his interviews with you at Louisville, has gone over the same ground.

"Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existing circumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from the authorities at Washington. You have never, heretofore, complained that such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations, and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your present campaign.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

"W. H. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*"

On the 27th of October we were still mending bridges and preparing roads for transportation, when General Sherman received the following dispatch at the hands of a rough and dirty looking fellow, who was as good a soldier as he was a tough-looking citizen:

GENERAL SHERMAN'S ARMY DESTROYING THE RAILRAOD AND TELEGRAPH WIRES.

"Drop all work on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennessee, and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport, till you meet further orders from me.

"U. S. GRANT."

We were obliged to make forced marches, and hurried toward the east as rapidly as possible. An incident related by General Sherman shows what close connection there was between the guerrillas and their friends at home.

"On the road to Florence I was accompanied by my staff, some clerks and mounted orderlies. Major Ezra Taylor was chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk at headquarters. The latter seems to have dropped out of the column, and gone to a farm-house near the road. There was no organized force of the Rebel army north of the Tennessee River, but the country was full of guerrillas. A party of these pounced down on the farm, caught young Taylor and another of the clerks, and after reaching Florence, Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, and learned that when last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, and was tied to the tail-board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the north of the road we had traveled. The major appealed to me to do something for his rescue. I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, but knowing that there was always an understanding between these guerrillas and their friends who staid at home, I sent for three or four of the principal men of Florence, (among them a Mr. Foster, who had once been a Senator in Congress), explained to them the capture of young Taylor and his comrade, and demanded their immediate restoration. They, of course, remonstratd, denied all knowledge of the acts of these guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens of Alabama, residing at home. I insisted that these guerrillas were their own sons and neighbors; that they knew their

haunts, and could reach them if they wanted, and they could effect the restoration to us of these men; and I said, moreover, they must do it within twenty-four hours, or I would take them, strip them of their hats and coats, and tie them to the tail-boards of our wagons till they were produced. They sent off messengers at once, and young Taylor and his comrade were brought back the next day."

At Bridgeport, General Sherman received a request from General Grant to go at once to Chattanooga without waiting for the advance of the troops, as he was needed for a consultation. On the morning of the 14th of November he reached Chattanooga and the next day rode out to examine the surroundings. Much to the surprise of General Sherman, it was discovered that General Grant had been practically surrounded, and was actually besieged by the enemy, whose army was uncomfortably near. From Grant's headquarters could be seen the house where Bragg was staying. Matters looked discouraging for the armies of the west. The officers and men of General Thomas' army were worn out and discouraged. The horses could scarcely drag the guns. Forage was scarce. For these reasons Grant wished Sherman to take the field first and commence the attack, believing the other troops would fight better with such an example.

General Sherman took with him Generals Thomas, "Baldy" Smith, Brannan, and a few others and climbed a hill to get a good view of the country. After careful study they returned to their commands to make preparation for an attack. No better record of the battles around Chattanooga can be found than are contained in the official report of General Sherman:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENN., BRIDGEPORT, ALABAMA, *December* 19, 1863.

Brigadier-General JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Chief of Staff to General* GRANT, *Chattanooga.*

"GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to make an official record of events with which the troops under my command have been connected during the eventful campaign which has just closed.

"During the month of September last, the Fifteenth Army Corps, which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the Big Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, Mississippi. It consisted of four divisions. The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and Colonel J. A. Williamson, (of the Fourth Iowa.)

"The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, was composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, and J. A. J. Lightburn.

"The third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, was composed of three brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower and R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood, of the Twelfth Iowa.

"The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, was composed of three brigades, led by Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, Colonel Loomis, Twenty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. R. Cockerill, of the Seventieth Ohio.

"On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form a part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reinforce General Rosecrans. I

designated the First Division, and at 4 P. M. the same day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the next day.

"On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders. It was explained to me that, in consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed to conflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith's division of General McPherson's corps had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its stead, to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my third division, General Tuttle, to remain and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg; and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps. This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, Colonel J. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. I. Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.

"The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic, for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow, on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence-rails, and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats; but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats

came in on the 3d and 4th. On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all the dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows:

"To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; and in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present army.

"I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus' division was already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smith was still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad as fast as its limited stock would carry them. General J. D. Webster was superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work night and day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; but the capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I could move horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore I dispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, and finally moved the entire Fourth division by land.

"The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and he endeavored to thwart us form the start. A considerable force assembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of Salisbury Station; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt compelled to turn back and use a part of my troops, that had already reached Corinth, to resist the threatened attack.

"On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole

force, I started myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalion of the Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort. We reached Collierville Station about noon, just in time to take part in the defense made of that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of the Sixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmers with a force of about three thousand cavalry with eight pieces of artillery. He was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, and we resumed our journey the next day, reaching Corinth at night.

"I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the First division, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward to Bear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and an engineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flad, was engaged in its repairs.

"Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our front, near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by General Stephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades, with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about five thousand.

"In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and to Iuka on the 19th of October.

"Osterhaus' division was in the advance, constantly skirmishing with the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's, both divisions under the general command of Major-General Blair. General John E. Smith's division covered the working party engaged in rebuilding the railroad.

"Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I had written to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch the Tennessee and send up some gunboats the moment the stage of water admitted; and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster at St. Louis, to dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat.

"The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had

two fine gunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after my arrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over, with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of the ferry-boat.

"Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, I pushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered General Blair, with the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyond Tuscumbia. This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fight at Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

"In the meantime many important changes in command had occurred, which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the case.

"General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent to Chattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the three departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee; and the department of the Tennessee had been devolved on me, with instructions, however, to retain command of the army in the field. At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best disposition of matters relating to the department, giving General McPherson full powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West Tennessee, and assigned General Blair to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps; and summoned General Hurlbut from Memphis, and General Dodge from Corinth, and selected out of the Sixteenth Corps a force of about eight thousand men, which I directed General Dodge to organize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward.

"On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions, was at Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth division, to cross the Tennessee by means of the gunboats and scow as rapidly as possible at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which he did; and the same day

a messenger from General Grant floated down the Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent to me at Iuka. He bore a short message from the general to this effect: 'Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; push your command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders;' etc. Instantly the order was executed; the order of march was reversed, and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the only place where we could cross the Tennessee. At first we only had the gunboats and coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived on the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with all the vigor possible. In person I crossed, and passed to the head of the column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the rear divisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched to Rogersville and Elk River. This was found impassable. To ferry would have consumed too much time, and to build a bridge still more; so there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way of Gilbertsboro, Elkton, etc., to the stone bridge at Fayetteville, where we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd.

"At Fayetteville I received orders form General Grant to come to Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave General Dodge's company at Pulaski,, and along the railroad from Columbus to Decatur. I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second and First divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; the Fourth division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Third by University Place and Swedon's Cove.

"In person I proceeded by Swedon's Cove and Battle Creek, reaching Bridgeport on the night of November 13th. I immediately telegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positions of my several divisions, and was

summoned to Chattanooga. I took the first steamboat during the night of the 14th for Kelly's Ferry, and rode into Chattanooga on the 15th. I then learned the part assigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessary maps and information, and rode, during the 16th, in company with Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the positions occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which could be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga and the line of the Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga Creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify. Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had been prepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things had been prearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From the hills we looked down on the amphitheater of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the desired position. The plan contemplated that, in addition to crossing the Tennessee River and making a lodgment on the terminus of Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton, with a part of my command.

"All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acute by the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of General Burnside in East Tennessee.

"My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and thirty miles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distance would admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I immediately ordered my leading division, General Ewing's, to march via Shellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge, but to be prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga, and in person I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennessee

from Kelly's Ferry, and immediately on my arrival put in motion my divisions in the order in which they had arrived. The bridge of boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, our passage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfully cut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationed along the road. I reached General Hooker's headquarters during a rain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's orders for the general attack on the next day. It was simply impossible for me to fulfill my part in time; only one division, General John E. Smith's, was in position. General Ewing was still at Trenton, and the other two were toiling along the terrible road from Shellmound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be in better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill their part. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed the attack. On the 21st I got the second Division over Brown's-Ferry Bridge, and General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. All labored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; but my rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry, and could not join me. I offered to go into action with my three divisions, supported by General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of my best divisions, Osterhaus' to act with General Hooker against Lookout Mountain. That division has not joined me yet, but I know and feel that it has served the country well, and that it has reflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of the Tennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, or whosoever has had its services during the late memorable events, confident that all will do it merited honor.

"At last, on the 23rd of November, my three divisions lay behind the hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga.

I dispatched the brigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to man the boats designed for the pontoon bridge, with orders, at midnight, to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of the South Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move along the river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets.

"General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the mouth of the Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatch the boats across for fresh loads. These orders were skillfully executed, and every Rebel picket but one was captured. The balance of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried across; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of November 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the east bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable rifle-trench as a *tete du pont.* As soon as the day dawned, some of the boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon bridge was begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the whole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person. A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamauga Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regiments which had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a most important purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bear my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent, viz., thirteen hundred and fifty feet, laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. I attribute it to the genuis and intelligence of General William F. Smith. The steamer Dun-

bar arrived up in the course of the morning, and relieved Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across; but by noon the pontoon-bridge was done, and my three divisions were across, with men, horses, artillery, and everything.

"General Jeff. C. Davis' division was ready to take the bridge, and I ordered the columns to form in order to carry the Missionary Hills. The movement had been carefully explained to all division commanders, and at 1 P. M. we marched from the river in three columns *in echelon;* the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column of direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the center, General John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the center, at one brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, General Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, prepraed to deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet an enemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers, with supports. A light, drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gained the foot-hills; our skirmishers crept up the face of the hills, followed by their supports, and at 3.30 P. M. we had gained, with no loss the desired point. A brigade of each division was pushed rapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were in possession. He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill and gave back artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at General Lightburn, who had swept around and got a farther hill, which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studying all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill; but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep depression between us and the one

immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line, facing southeast.

"The enemy felt our left flank about 4 P. M., and a pretty smart engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off; but it cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and had to go to the rear, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Tupper, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, who managed it with skill during the rest of the operations. At the moment of my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come with three regiments from Chattanooga, along the east bank of the Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army in Chattanooga. He left the three regiments attached temporarily to General Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga. As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to keep one of his brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and one intermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being kept busy at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the night the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and our camp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga our position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received, at the hands of Major Rowley of General Grant's staff, orders to attack the enemy at 'dawn of day,' with notice that General Thomas would attack in force early in the day. Accordingly before day I was in the saddle, at-

tended by all my staff, rode to the extreme left of our position near Chickamauga Creek, thence up the hill, held by General Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing.

"Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim light of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in the direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank. Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the series, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The farther point of this hill was held by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he had a fine plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, through which several roads and the railroad-tunnel pass, could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place d'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist our contemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangering his communications with his depot at Chickamauga Station.

"As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: The brigades of Colonels Cockerill and Alexander, and General Lightburn were to hold our hill as the key-point. General Corse, with as much of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from our right center. General Lightburn was to dispatch a good regiment from his position to co-operate with General Corse; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and Colonel Loomis, in like manner, to move along the west base, supported by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.

"The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had com-

pleted his preparations and his bugle sounded the 'forward!' The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right center, with the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of our hill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within about eighty yards of the intrenched position, were General Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he called his reserves, and asked for reinforcements, which were sent; but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach to his position, giving him great advantage. As soon as General Corse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losing ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four of his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleon battery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's battery were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire as carefully as possible, to clear the hill to our front, without endangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about 10 A. M., when General Corse received a severe wound, was brought off the field, and the command of the brigade and of the assault at that key-point devolved on that fine young, gallant officer, Colonel Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who fullfiled his part manfully. He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2 P. M. General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most

severe on the hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered up Colonel Raum's and General Matthias' brigades across the field to the summit that was being fought for. They moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Walcutt; but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of the hill. The enemy, at the time being massed in great strength in the tunnel-gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right rear of this command. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, exposed as they were in the open field; they fell back in some disorder to the lower edge of the field, and reformed. These two brigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute a part of the real attack. The movement, seen from Chattanooga five miles off with spy-glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs has repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. It was not so. The real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank by the well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the hill.

Thus matters stood about 3 P. M. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheater of Chattanooga lay in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas early in the day.

"Column after column of the enemy was streaming toward me; gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us, from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us. An occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard



PANORAMIC VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA FROM LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, SHOWING SHERMAN'S ARMY IN CAMP.

Knoll, and some musketry-fire and artillery over about Lookout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side; but about 3 P. M. I noticed the white line of musketry-fire in front of Orchard Knoll extending farther and farther right, and left, and on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on the center. I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which had been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in a different direction.

"The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared to us behind a spur of the hill, and could no longer be seen; and it was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the enemy's center. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit was the next step.

"I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it was found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemy commingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered to march at once by the pontoon bridge across Chickamauga Creek, at its mouth, and push forward for the depot.

"General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day, with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh,) and had been posted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to repair an old, broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis at 4 A. M., and the Fifteenth Army Corps was ordered to follow at daylight. But General Howard found that to repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed, and we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new pontoon bridge at its mouth. By about 11 A. M. General Jeff. C. Davis' division reached the depot, just in time to

see it in flames. He found the enemy occupying two hills, partially intrenched, just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away. The depot presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits—corn-meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks and chesses, etc., destined doubtless for the famous invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burning and broken. Still, the enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage for our horses, and meal, beans, etc., for our men.

"Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled with broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head of the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered the rear-guard of the retreating enemy. The fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant came up to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and at Graysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found the corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us that General Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hear his guns near Ringgold.

"As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possibly accommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the general plan, viz., to break up all communication between Bragg and Longstreet.

"We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest that we should interpose a proper force between these two armies. I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and thence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council-Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroad which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most successfully and fully accomplished that

day. The division of General Jeff. C. Davis was moved close up to Ringgold, to assist General Hooker if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps was held at Graysville for anything that might turn up. About noon I had a message from General Hooker, saying he had had a pretty hard fight at the mountain-pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come forward to turn the position. He was not aware at the time that Howard, by moving through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already turned it. So I rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found the enemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already out of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the waters flow to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee.

"I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations as to breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line, as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed back to Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and leisurely back to Chattanooga.

"On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and effectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold and Graysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to Graysville, consented that, instead of returning direct to Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery wagons and impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the Hiawassee River.

"Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps by way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road. On the 30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste,

leaving the bridge but partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee.

"This was to have been the limit of our operations. Officers and men had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather was bitter cold. I had already reached the town of Charleston, when General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside was completely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d of December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; but he feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, and ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the relief of Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside. Seven days before, we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two days' rations, without a change of clothing—stripped for the fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to the private included.

"Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by the road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that they needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough—and it had to be done. General Howard that night repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and at daylight the army passed over the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposed rightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee, and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sent me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and complete, and that he must push for Kingston, near which we would make a junction. But by the time I reached

Athens I had better studied the geography, and sent him orders, which found him at Decatur, that Kingston was out of our way; that he should send his boat to Kingston, but with his command strike across to Philadelphia, and report to me there. I had but a small force of cavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt of General Grant's orders, scouting over about Benton and Columbus. I left my aid, Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate with this cavalry and hurry it forward. It overtook me in the night at Athens.

"On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 A. M. the cavalry passed to the head of the column, was ordered to push to Loudon, and, if possible, to save a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry dash—so that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry got up. The enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying the pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge was gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust to General Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that General Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the time remained.

"Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of December, I sent my aid (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry at Loudon, to explain to him how all-important it was that notice of our approach should reach General Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to select the best materials of his com-

mand, to start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life and horse-flesh. Major Audenried was ordered to go along. The distance to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roads villainous.

Before day they were off, and at daylight the Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the Little Tennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river as being very shallow; but it was found too deep for fording, and the water was freezing cold—width two hundred and forty yards, depth from two to five feet; horses could ford, but artillery and men could not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson, who accompanied me, undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am under many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sent Captain Jenny back from Graysville to survey our field of battle. We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and spades. General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and partly with square trestles (made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th, troops and animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the 5th the Fifteenth Corps (General Blair's), was over, and General Granger's and Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracing was imperfect for want of spikes, and the bridge broke, causing delay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Marysville road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on a parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing me a few words from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel Long had arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well with him there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were symptoms of his speedy departure.

"I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the

problem for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the work. As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a pretty good ford for his horses and wagons at Davis', seven miles below Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons left by General Vaughn at Loudon, on which to pass his men. He marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th, all the heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major Van Buren, of General Burnside's staff, who announced that Longstreet had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry was on his heels; and that the general desired to see me in person as soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops to halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which were ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Granger to report in person to General Burnside for orders. His was the force originally designed to reinforce General Burnside, and it was eminently proper that it should join in the stern chase after Longstreet.

"On the morning of December 6th, I rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later in the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a wonderful production, for the short time allowed, in their selection of ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they were nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named 'Sanders,' where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now all was peaceful and quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim all round about that hilly barrier.

"The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had

done, and what he proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General Granger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I had brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition to the line of the Hiawassee, lest Bragg, reinforced, might take advantage of our absence to resume the offensive. I asked him to reduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it as part of my report:

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
KNOXVILLE, *December* 7, 1863.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, *commanding, etc.*

"'GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not deem, for the present, any other portion of your command but the corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section; and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

"'I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major-General commanding.*'"

"Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out of Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in, I put in motion my own command to return. General Howard was ordered to move, via Davis' Ford and Sweetwater, to Athens, with a guard forward at Charles-

ton, to hold and repair the bridge which the enemy had retaken after our passage up. General Jeff. C. Davis moved to Columbus, on the Hiawassee, via Madisonville, and the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains, to cover a movement of cavalry across the mountains into Georgia, to overtake a wagon train which had dodged us on our way up, and had escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from General Howard that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General Ewing's division to Athens, and went in person to Tellico with General Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th all our troops were in position, and we held the rich country between the Little Tennessee and Hiawassee. The cavalry, under Colonel Long, passed the mountain at Tellico and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond Murphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his farther pursuit of the wagon train useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico. I then ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which point I had previously ordered the corps of General Howard.

"On the 14th of December all of my command in the field lay along the Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual state of affairs, I received orders to leave on the line of the Hiawassee, all the cavalry, and come to Chattanooga with the rest of my command. I left the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel Long, reinforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, (Lieutenant-Colonel Heath)—the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army Corps—at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches, by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I received in person from General Grant orders to transfer back to their appropriate commands the corps of General Howard and the division commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps to its new field of operations.

"It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since our departure from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the present moment. I have been unable to receive from subordinate commanders the usual full, detailed reports of events, and have therefore been compelled to make up this report from my own personal memory; but, as soon as possible, subordinate reports will be received and duly forwarded.

"In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the men of my command for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur. Without a moment's rest after a march of over four hundred miles, without sleep for three successive nights, we crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than a hundred and twenty miles north and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the whole country. It is hard to realize the importance of these events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity; but as I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better body of soldiers in America than it. I wish all to feel a just pride in its real honors.

"To General Howard and his command, to General Jeff. C. Davis and his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of commanders and fidelity of commands. The brigade of Colonel Bushbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, in connection with General

Ewing's division, and displayed a courage almost amounting to rashness. Following the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

"In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits of the soldier. General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more especial at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear-guard, near Graysville, at night-fall. I must award to this division the credit of the best order during our movement through East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to the right and left gave some reason for disordered ranks.

"Inasmuch as exception may be taken to my explanation of the temporary confusion, during the battle of Chattanooga, of the two brigades of General Matthias and Colonel Raum, I will here state that I saw the whole, and attach no blame to anyone. Accidents will happen in battle, as elsewhere; and at the point where they so manfully went to relieve the pressure on other parts of our assaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously to an enemy vastly superior in force, and favored by the shape of the ground. Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would have shown their mettle, which has been tried more than once before and stood the test of fire. They reformed their ranks, and were ready to support General Ewing's division in a very few minutes; and the circumstance would have hardly called for notice on my part, had not others reported what was seen from Chattanooga, a distance of nearly five miles, from where could only be seen the troops in the open field in which this affair occurred.

"Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: Colonels Putnam, Ninety-third Illinois, O'Meara, Nineti-

eth Illinois, and Torrence, Thirtieth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, of the Eleventh Corps, and Major Bushnell, Thirteenth Illinois.

"Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, Corse, and Matthias; Colonel Raum; Colonel Waugelin, Twelfth Missouri; Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois; Major P. I. Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois; and Major Nathan McAlla, Tenth Iowa.

"Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa.

"My report is already so long, that I must forbear mentioning acts of individual merit. These will be recorded in the reports of division commanders, which I will cheerfully indorse; but I must say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments, who have so long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so much usefulness and credit to the public service, viz.: Colonel J. R. Cockerill, Seventieth Ohio; Colonel J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth Illinois; Colonel C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel J. A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa; Colonel G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Illinois; Colonel J. I. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana.

"My personal staff, as usual, have served their country with fidelity, and credit to themselves, throughout these events, and have received my personal thanks.

"Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of the battle-field of Chattanooga fought over by the troops under my command, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenny, engineer on my staff. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*"

"It is fitting to place here the following tributes to General Sherman and his army:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION, OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, *November* 25, 1863.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN.

"GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas' troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command in taking first so much of the same range of hills, and then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas' part certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside. I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d. At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spoke hopefully of being able to hold out that length of time.

"My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they reach the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee with a column of twenty thousand men, taking no wagons, or but few with him. His men will carry four days' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations, will accompany the expediton.

"I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left. If not, of course, the first thing is to dispose of him. If he has gone, the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out a reconnoissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Yours truly,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

"P. S.—On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all our strength to-morrow, and try if we cannot cut off a good portion of his rear troops and trains. His men have manifested a strong disposition to desert for some time past, and we will now give them a chance. I will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advance force early, on the most easterly road taken by the enemy. U. S. G."

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., }
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, *November* 29, 1863. }

"*Major-General*, W. T. SHERMAN.

"News is received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was not vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve the garrsion out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from which you will select in conjunction with the force now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded with provisions, which you can issue, and return the boat. I will have another loaded, to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly as possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off the country all you can.

"It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from Cumberland Gap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have with him, but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to five thousand. I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do better acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled with instructions. I will only add, that the last advices from Burnside himself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only to about the 3d of December.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General commanding.*"

[GENERAL ORDER No. 68.]

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, *February* 21, 1864.

"PUBLIC RESOLUTION—No. 12.

"Joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General W. T. Sherman and others.

"Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress and of the people of the United States are due, and that the same are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman, commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and the officers and soldiers who served under him, for their gallant and arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of our arms in that glorious victory.

"Approved February 19, 1864.

"By order of the Secretary of War:

"E. D. TOWNSEND, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

This closed the campaigns of 1863, and on the 19th of December, General Sherman gave orders for the distribution of the four divisions of the 15th Corps, for the repairing of roads and making ready for the campaign of the following year. There had been so much gained through the operations of the western army that it was confidently hoped that another year would see the war ended. It was with this object in view that the two commanders at a meeting at Nashville on the 21st of December 1863, determined upon the Meridian campaign and Bank's expedition up the Red River to Shreveport. It was believed these movements

would force such a diversion in the enemy's actions as to prevent a too great consolidation of troops.

There was an incident that occurred during the campaign, illustrative of General Sherman's promptness and ready sympathy. Riding along not far from camp near Chattanooga very near dusk, we came upon a young man in civilian's clothes who had apparently just dismounted from his own horse and was standing gazing intently at a dead animal lying by the road side. It was but a mere lad, perhaps eighteen years old, but there was something in his attitude that attracted General Sherman's attention. The general beckoned to me and requested me to call the young stranger. As I rode up to him, the lad seemed totally unconscious of my presence until I touched him. He turned on me a pair of beautiful dark eyes that were filling with tears as he asked me if I knew the way to camp, telling me that he had lost his way. I told him that General Sherman wished to speak with him, and that he was waiting for him at the corner of two roads. Leaving his horse he approached the general, saluted and asked what was his wish.

Very kindly General Sherman asked who he was, and how he came to have lost his way. With his first sentence it was apparent to General Sherman that the lad was not only a Union man but that he had been raised in New England. He said he had been acting as clerk to his brother, a captain of the regular army, and that he had neither seen nor heard of his brother since the battle. He was riding along and saw the dead horse by the wayside and at once was struck with its resemblance to the animal his brother had ridden just before he left him. He looked up appealingly and said, "How can I find his camp?"

General Sherman turned his horse and rode to the spot where the dead animal lay, and looked at the body care-

fully for a few moments and then came riding back with a smile on his face. To the young man he said, "That is not your brother's horse. It is one of those belonging to my command. Come with us and we will take you to camp."

The lad accepted the explanation and rode along with me till we came to the point at which he was to turn off for his brother's headquarters. Shortly after he had bidden us good night, one of General Sherman's aids asked him what made him tell such a whopper about the dead horse, and asserted there was no way of knowing to what corps the animal had belonged.

"Well," said the general, "perhaps you are right, but the whopper of which you complain did no harm, and you saw by the lad's eyes how much good it did him."

The next day I met the lad again, walking with his brother, their arms linked lovingly together, and could not help feeling that if I ever had an opportunity and could think quickly enough I would tell a bigger whopper if I could call out such a pleasant smile as greeted me when I sought to renew the acquaintance. It was one of the little incidences constantly occurring to explain the love and esteem felt by every soldier of Sherman's army for their commander, and reminds me of a letter published after his death by Private Dalzell, containing reference to the constancy of General Sherman's attendance at all the reunions of the Grand Army:

"To the Editor of the Sun—Sir: Our next national encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic, which will be held at Detroit next August, will be the first from which Gen. Sherman has been absent since he joined the order in 1884, after his retirement from the office of General of the Army. His commanding face and figure will be sadly missed. We

shall meet, a few of us but not often, not for long, but whenever we gather under the folds of the old flag,

> "'We shall meet, but we shall miss him.
> There will be one vacant chair.'

"He was the only one of the eminent officers of the Military Academy at West Point who ever countenanced the Grand Army of the Republic or attended its meetings.

"Did you know that?

"The volunteer officers always patronized it, but the regulars stood off. They do not like its leveling of all ranks to one equal rank of comradeship. They prefer the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, the Loyal Legion and other highfalutin' aristocratic cliques which exclude privates entirely. Not so with Uncle Billy, greater than any other regular living, except possibly Grant—and this concession is made merely to popular opinion. It is not mine, for to me William Tecumseh Sherman has no rival in the military annals of all time. Yet great as he was, he put on the simple, cheap private's blouse, made himself our equal, and sat down with us in all our national councils.

"The war being over, he saw no difference in rank—because there is none now. Greater than any of the conceited upstarts and carpet knights who never made their mark anywhere but on the pay rolls, he was just large enough to see what their small souls could never take in, that 'the post of honor is a private station,' that 'the men who did the fighting, all of it, every bit of it, were the privates of the army.' Therefore it is that we honor Sherman. This is the secret of it all, much as the world has marveled at it. The long line of men in blue, the poorest and the bravest and best the sun shone on since first it threw its radiance round the universe, stood uncovered and weeping for thirty-six long hours, along a line of railroad a thousand miles long, and while the

rain poured down in torrents, almost in midwinter, and froze as it fell, there they stood, these gray-haired boys in blue, weeping all the day, all the long night through, while Sherman marched down to the sea of eternal rest.

"Such a sight was never seen before. It was all as simple as A B C. He made himself the equal of his brethren. Though greater than any king that ever shook the planet with his armies, he was as plain, modest, kind, and gentle as a little child. And so we loved Sherman simply and only because he loved us! This is the whole story.

"PRIVATE DALZELL."

Shortly after this there were changes in the army organization that gave the commanders better opportunity of active operations, untrammeled by instructions given from a distance. It was Grant's purpose to use the Army of the Tennessee to keep open the Mississippi. Of the expedition up the Red River under General Banks it is only necessary for this narrative to state that it met with the approval and assistance of General Sherman and was successful in withholding from other points a large force of Rebels who were more easily handled by the forces at this point.

On the 4th of March, while at Nashville, Major-General Grant received telegraphic orders to report in person at Washington. Congress had passed an act creating the rank of Lieutenant-General, and the president had nominated Grant to the position. The relations between Grant and Sherman are touchingly shown by the following correspondence:

[PRIVATE.]

"NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *March* 4, 1864.

"DEAR SHERMAN: The bill reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place.

"I now receive orders to report at Washington immediately, in person, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order, but I shall say very distinctly on my arrival there that I shall accept no appointment which will require me to make that city my headquarters. This, however, is not what I started out to write about.

"While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

"There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

"The word 'you' I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now. Your friend,

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

"NEAR MEMPHIS, *March* 10, 1864.

"*General* GRANT.

"DEAR GENERAL: I have your more than kind and charac-

teristic letter of the 4th, and will send a copy of it to General McPherson at once.

"You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue as heretofore to manifest it on all proper occasions.

"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as heretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings, who will award to you a large share for securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

"I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

"Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed since.

"I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype, Washington—as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be—but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Savior.

"This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts—no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made

us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place, you would help me out, if alive.

"My only point of doubts was in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but, I confess, your common sense seems to have supplied all these.

"Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead-sure—and I tell you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let these influences work.

"Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic. Your sincere friend, W. T. SHERMAN."

On the 12th of March General Halleck was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and Lieutenant-General Grant assigned to the command of the armies of the United States.

General Halleck remained as chief-of-staff. General Sherman was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi and Major-General McPherson to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. Before the departure of Grant to Washington, General Sherman went to Nashville and accompanied him as far as Cincinnati. At the Burnet House in that city the two generals planned the campaigns of Richmond and Atlanta by which the war was to be brought to a successful close.

CHAPTER XI.

NEARING THE END—THE MARCH TO ATLANTA—CUTTING THE CONFEDERACY AGAIN—ALL THE ARMIES MOVING FOR A COMMON PURPOSE AND TO MEET VICTORIOUS.

By the opening of the Mississippi river the Confederacy had lost a large and important portion of its territory. From Texas and Arkansas it had drawn largely needed supplies. These states were now comparatively lost to the national enemies. The effect was serious, but it was necessary to make still another move that their territory should be so limited as to prevent their further operations. The plan determined upon by Grant and Sherman was that the armies of the West should move toward the East and finally draw around the southern forces like an anaconda. General Grant was to command the operations in the East in person while to General Sherman was left the important duty of cutting his way through the enemy's country. For this duty his past experience eminently fitted him. He was quick in action and fertile in expedients, and the general outline was all that could be determined upon in advance, the minor details being left to the judgment of General Sherman as events should make necessary. A detailed statement of the army under the command of General Sherman on April 10, 1864, shows the following:

The Army of the Cumberland—

	MEN.
Present and absent	171,450
Present for duty	88,883

The Army of the Tennessee—

	MEN.
Present and absent	134,763
Present for duty	64,957

The Army of the Ohio—

	MEN.
Present and absent	46,052
Present for duty	26,242

As it was necessary to maintain strong garrisons in the respective departments and to guard their lines of supply, General Sherman sought to prepare out of these three armies a body for operations in Georgia of about the following numbers:

	MEN.
Army of the Cumberland	50,000
Army of the Tennessee	35,000
Army of the Ohio	15,000
Total	100,000

The month of April was consumed in making preparations.

The amount of baggage to be carried by officers and men was limited to actual necessities and when the date for action came the following troops were ready for battle:

Army of the Cumberland, *Major-General* THOMAS.

	MEN.
Infantry	54,568
Artillery	2,377
Cavalry	3,828
Aggregate	60,773

Number of field-guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee, *Major-General* McPherson.

	MEN.
Infantry	22,437
Artillery	1,404
Cavalry	624
Aggregate	24,465

Guns, 96.

Army of the Ohio, *Major-General* Schofield

	MEN.
Infantry	11,183
Artillery	679
Cavalry	1,697
Aggregate	13,559

Guns, 28.

Grand aggregate, 98,797 men and 254 guns.

These figures do not include cavalry divisions of General Stoneman at Lexington and General Garrard at Columbia, Tennessee. General Blair with two division constituting the Seventeenth Army corps were to follow as soon as possible, and overtook the main army about June 4th. The following correspondence between Generals Grant and Sherman show the plans as then determined upon:

[Private and Confidential.]

"Headquarters Armies of the United States,
Washington, D. C., *April* 4, 1864.

Major-General, W. T. Sherman, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"General: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common center. For your information I now write you my program, as at present determined upon.

"I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

"Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found.

"Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.

"Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

"You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

"I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

"As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

"From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

"I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *April* 10, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-General* GRANT, *Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.*

"DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are

now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war.

"Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty co-operation. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to Colonel Comstock of your staff somewhat of the method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and division commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

"First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am completing the army oragnization according to the orders from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

"It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and cattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

"At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select garrison at Knoxville and Loudon, with twelve thousand men will drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front—it may be, pushing a select body of about two thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia.

"Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him cautiously, persistently, and to the best ad-

vantage. He will have two divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.

"McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty thousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas. If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I belive he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.

"McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas' divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at Columbia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according as the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston falling behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well, he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks, or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of Mobile till such time as he can reach me.

"Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the right, but pass to the left and act against Altanta or its eastern communications, according to developed facts.

"This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I will ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks.

"If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River, he will in a measure solve the most diffi-

cult part of my problem, viz., 'provisions.' But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we can find.

"I will inspire my command, if successful, with the feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that very ground.

"As ever, your friend and servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES IN THE FIELD,
CULPEPPER COURT-HOUSE, VIRGINIA, *April* 19, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy remain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain has continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more should fall in the meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, will probably be the day for our general move.

"Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my letters.

"What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other, believing a single defeat without any

victory to sustain them better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first upon one and then on the other.

"With the majority of military commanders they might do this.

"But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this army to do it.

"The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge, officers and men feel well. Yours truly,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, *April* 24, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-General* GRANT, Commanding Armies of the United States, Culpepper, Virginia.

"GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume the offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you think proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to Decatur, to join General Dodge.

"McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at Decatur at the earliest possible moment.

From these two points he will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette, where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton; or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah. I see that there is some risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and, should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga via Wills' Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him. My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

"At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feels certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are the great question. I have materially increased the number of cars daily. When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty per day. Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three; to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply and a day's accumulation.

"McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty days' rations, and to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread. Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance of the whole matter.

"Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur,

GEARY'S SECOND BRIGADE CHARGING UP THE MOUNTAIN AT BATTLE OF RESACA

and I will be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten our communications from that direction.

"Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot commit to paper. I am, with great respect,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

The opening movements are thus described by Colonel Bowman:

"The two hostile armies were separated by an inaccessible spur of the Alleghanies, called Rocky Face Ridge, cloven by Buzzard's Roost Gap, through which runs the railway and Mill Creek. This narrow pass was strongly fortified, was flooded by the waters of the creek, artificially raised by means of a dam, and was swept by strong batteries on the projecting spurs and on a ridge at the southern extremity.

"To assualt the enemy in this almost unapproachable position, formed no part of Sherman's plan. He decided to turn the enemy's left. McPherson was ordered to move rapidly by Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake's Creek Gap, on the railway at Resaca, eighteen miles below Dalton, or a point nearer than that place, make a bold attack, and after breaking the railway well, to retire to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek Gap, ready to fall on the enemy's flank when he retreated, as it was thought he would do.

"On the 7th of May, with slight opposition, Thomas occupied Tunnel Hill, directly in front of Buzzard's Roost Gap. On the 9th, Schofield moved down close to Dalton, from his camps at Red Clay, and Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard's Roost and Rocky Face Ridge with such vigor, that Newton's division of Howard's fourth corps carried the ridge, but turning south, found the crest too narrow

and too well protected by rock epaulements to enable it to reach the gorge. Geary's division of Hooker's twentieth corps, made a bold push for the summit, but the narrow road was strongly held by the enemy, and could not be carried.

"Meanwhile McPherson had reached Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of Confederate cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it. The next day he approached within a mile of Resaca, but finding that place very strongly fortified, and no road leading across to it, without exposing his left flank to an attack from the north, he retired to Snake Creek Gap and there took up a strong position.

"Leaving Howard's Fourth Corps and a small force of cavalry, to occupy the enemy's attention in front, on the 10th, Sherman ordered General Thomas to send Hooker's twentieth corps over to McPherson, and to follow with Palmer's fourteenth corps, and Schofield was directed to march by the same route. On the 12th, the whole army, except Howard's corps, moved through Snake's Creek Gap on Resaca—McPherson, in advance, by the direct road, preceded by Kilpatrick's division of cavalry; Thomas to the left, and Schofield to the right.

"General Kilpatrick, with his division, led, and drove Wheeler's division of the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road to within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him, and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railway bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek.


THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
furnished by
Brevet. Brig. Gen. O. M. Poe.
Chief Engineer
SIEGE or ATLANTA
Engraved for "Sherman and his Campaigns"
Union Works.
Rebel Works
GEORGIA
Adairsville
Calhoun
Fairmount
Pine Log P.O
Cassville
Cass Sta
Canton
Carterville
Euharlee
Allatoona
Acworth
Big Shanty
Burnt Hickory
Van Wert
DALLAS
MARIETTA
LOST MT
New Keys
Etna
New Babylon
Powder Spr
Sweet Water
Browning C.H
DECATUR
ATLANTA
Sand T
East Point
Rough & Ready
Flat Rock
Red Oak
Tuckers Cabin
Fairburn
JONESBORO
Captured Sep. 1st
Renfrew
County Line
Palmetto
Fayetteville
Lovejoy
Chattahoochee R.
Little River
Kenesaw Mt
Lost Mt
Pine Log Cr
Sweetwater Cr
Utoy
Peachtree Cr

General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton on the night of the 12th and morning of the 13th, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Rocky Face Mountain and the southern extremity of Snake Creek Gap had effectually concealed the flank movement of the Union army, and nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This enabled him to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, by his own foresight. On the 14th of May, the whole Rebel army was met in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, the right on some high hills to the north of the town. Sherman at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry, in the direction of Calhoun; Sweeney's division of the Sixteenth Corps, to cross and threaten Calhoun, and Garrard's cavalry division to move from its position at Villanow toward Rome, cross the Oostanaula, and break the railway below Calhoun and above Kingston, if possible, while the main army pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp Creek near its mouth, and made a lodgment close up to the enemy's works, driving Polk's corps from the hills that commanded the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek Valley, threw Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down it close to Resaca.

"General Schofield came upon his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, capturing a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oosta-

naula, and the next morning Sherman entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but not the railway bridge, which had been burned.

"The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on the heels of Hardee, who was bringing up the Confederate rear, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Schofield by blind roads to the left. In Resaca another four-gun battery and a considerable quantity of stores were found.

"During the 16th the whole of Sherman's army crossed the Oostanaula and on the 17th moved south by as many different roads as practicable. General Thomas had sent Jefferson C. Davis' division along the west bank of the Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville, the rear of the Rebel army was again encountered, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division, in the advance, had a sharp encounter with his rear-guard, but the next morning he was gone, and the Union troops pushed on through Kingston, to a point four miles beyond, where they found the enemy again formed on ground comparatively open, and well adapted for a great battle. General Schofield approached Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and General McPherson's army had been drawn from Woodland to Kingston in order to be in close support. On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville, strongly intrenched, but as our troops converged on him again he retreated, in the night-time, across the Etowah River, burning the road and railway bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in possession of the valuable country about the Etowah River.

"That morning Johnston had ordered Polk's and Hood's corps to advance and attack the Fourteenth Corps, General Palmer's which had followed them from Adairsville, but

Hood, who led the advance, being deceived by a report that the union troops had turned his right, delayed until the opportunity was lost. On the night of the 19th, the Confederate army held a commanding situation on a ridge before Cassville, but acting upon the earnest representations of Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, that their positions were untenable, Johnston crossed the Etowah on the following morning.

"Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield at Cassville's depot, and toward the Etowah bridge, Sherman gave his army a few days' rest, and time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the meantime General Jefferson C. Davis, with his division of the Fourteenth Corps, had got possession of Rome, with its forts, eight or ten guns of heavy caliber, and its valuable mills, and foundries. Two good bridges were also secured across the Etowah River near Kingston. Satisfied that the enemy would hold him in check at the Allatoona Pass, Sherman resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having loaded the wagons with forage and subsistence for twenty days' absence from the railway, left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, on the 23d put the army in motion for Dallas.

"General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene Creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas by way of Van Wert. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road by Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on Thomas' left. The head of Thomas' column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry, under Jackson, about Burnt Hickory, and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he

had detected the move, and was preparing to take a stand near Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

"On the 25th May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, Hooker's corps having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found Jackson's division of the enemy's cavalry at the bridge to his left. Rapidly pushing across the creek, he saved the bridge, though on fire, and following eastward about two miles, encountered and drove the infantry some distance, until he met Hood's corps in line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. Williams' and Ward's (late Butterfield's) divisions of Hooker's corps, were on other roads, and it was nearly four o'clock P. M. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed, and, by Sherman's order, made a bold push to secure possession of New Hope Church, where three roads from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas meet. Here a hard battle with Stewart's division of Hood's corps was fought, lasting two hours, but the enemy being covered by hastily constructed earthworks, and a stormy dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive him from these roads. The next morning General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield directed toward the left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman's with General Schofield. General McCook looked to the rear. Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took several days to deploy close to the enemy, when Sherman resolved gradually to work toward our left, and as soon as all things should be ready to push for the railway

east of Allatoona. In making the development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe encounters occurred between parts of the army. On the 28th, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable the rest of the army to extend still more to the left, and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas. Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay for effect, Sherman renewed his orders to General McPherson, to move to the left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and directed Generals Thomas and Schofield to move a corresponding distance to their left. This was effected without resistance on the 1st of June, and by pushing the left well around, all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth were occupied, after which Sherman sent General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. This was accomplished, Allatoona Pass was turned, and Sherman's real object gained.

"Ordering the railway bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, Sherman continued working by the left, and by the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the railway about Ackworth, when the latter abandoned his intrenchments, and fell back to Lost Mountain. The Union army then moved to Ackworth and reached the railway on the 6th.

On the 7th the Confederate right was extended beyond the railway, and across the Ackworth and Marietta road. On examining the Allatoona Pass, Sherman found it admirably

adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defense and garrison. As soon as the railway bridge was finished across the Etowah, stores came forward to camp by rail. At Ackworth, General Blair came up on the 8th of June with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of forces nearly compensated for the losses in battle, and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston and Allatoona.

General Sherman lost no time in his subsequent movements, the army was enthused at the prospect of active operations, and began to realize the nature of the attempt being made to sunder the Confederacy by a line drawn eastward. General Sherman says:

"On the 10th of June the whole combined army moved forward six miles, to 'Big Shanty,' a station on the railroad, whence we had a good view of the enemy's position, which embraced three prominent hills, known as Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. On each of these hills the enemy had signal stations and fresh lines of parapets. Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen with the naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen his ground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but his line was at least ten miles in extent—too long, in my judgment, to be held successfully by his force, then estimated at sixty thousand. As his position, however, gave him a perfect view over our field, we had to proceed with due caution. McPherson had the left, following the railroad, which curved around the north base of Kenesaw; Thomas the center, obliqued to the right, deploying below Kenesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, was on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.

"On the 11th the Etowah bridge was done; the railroad was repaired up to our very skirmish-line, close to the base of Kenesaw, and a loaded train of cars came to Big Shanty. The locomotive, detached, was run forward to a water-tank within the range of the enemy's guns on Kenesaw, whence the enemy opened fire on the locomotive; but the engineer was not afraid, went on to the tank, got water, and returned safely to his train, answering the guns with the screams of his engine, heightened by the cheers and shouts of our men.

"The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow and dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvised by each division for its own supply-train from the depot in Big Shanty to the camps. Meantime each army was deploying carefully before the enemy, intrenching every camp, ready as against a sally. The enemy's cavalry was also busy in our rear, compelling us to detach cavalry all the way back as far as Resaca, and to strengthen all the infantry posts as far as Nashville. Besides, there was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest would collect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee River, and break up our railroad below Nashville. In anticipation of this very danger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to take command of all the cavalry in that quarter, to go out toward Pontotoc, engage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June I learned that General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10th of June, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis in considerable confusion. I expected that this would soon be followed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee. General A. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps which had been with General Banks up Red River, had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been ordered to General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversion about Mobile; but, on

hearing of General Sturgis' defeat, I ordered General Smith to go out from Memphis and renew the offensive, so as to keep Forrest off our roads. This he did finally, defeating Forrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July; and he so stirred up matters in North Mississippi that Forrest could not leave for Tennessee. This, for a time, left me only the task of covering the roads against such minor detachments of cavalry as Johnston could spare from his immediate army, and I proposed to keep these too busy in their own defense to spare detachments.

By the 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continuous line of ten miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregular position of the enemy, when I reconnoitered, with a view to make a break in their line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain. When abreast of Pine Mountain I noticed a Rebel battery on its crest, with a continuous line of fresh rifle-trench about half-way down the hill. Our skirmishers were at the time engaged in the woods about the base of this hill between the lines, and I estimated the distance to the battery on the crest at about eight hundred yards. Near it, in plain view, stood a group of the enemy, evidently observing us with glasses. General Howard, commanding the Fourth Corps, was near by, and I called his attention to this group, and ordered him to compel it to keep behind its cover. He replied that his orders from General Thomas were to spare artillery ammunition. This was right, according to the general policy, but I explained to him that we must keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use his artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive, and ordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys. I continued to ride down our line, and soon heard, in quick succession, the three volleys. The next division in order was Geary's, and I gave him similar orders. General Polk, in my opinion, was killed

by the second volley fired from the first battery referred to.

"In a conversation with General Johnston, after the war, he explained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta to Pine Mountain, held by Bates' division, and was accompanied by Generals Hardee and Polk. When on Pine Mountain, reconnoitering, quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the battery close by, clustered about him. He noticed the preparations of our battery to fire, and cautioned these men to scatter. They did so, and he likewise hurried behind the parapet, from which he had an equally good view of our position; but General Polk, who was dignified and corpulent, walked back slowly, not wishing to appear too hurried or cautious in the presence of the men, and was struck across the breast by an unexploded shell, which killed him instantly. This is my memory of the conversation, and it is confirmed by Johnston himself in his 'Narrative,' page 337, except that he calculated the distance of our battery at six hundred yards, and says that Polk was killed by the third shot; I know that our guns fired by volley, and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley. It has been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk, and that I knew it was directed against that general. The fact is, at that distance we could not even tell that the group were officers at all; I was on horseback, a couple of hundred yards off, before my orders to fire were executed, had no idea that our shot had taken effect, and continued my ride down along the line to Schofield's extreme flank, returning late in the evening to my headquarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an abandoned house. In a cotton field back of that house was our signal station, on the roof of an old gin-house. The signal officer reported that by studying the enemy's signals he had learned the 'key,' and that he could read their signals. He explained to me that he had translated a signal about noon, from Pine

Mountain to Marietta, 'Send an ambulance for General Polk's body;' and later in the day another, 'Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk?' From this we inferred that General Polk had been killed, but how or where we knew not; and this inference was confirmed later in the same day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured.

"On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending to attack at any weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain; but Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned, and Johnston had contracted his front somewhat, on a direct line, connecting Kenesaw with Lost Mountain. Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about two miles of most difficult country, and McPherson's left lapped well around the north end of Kenesaw. We captured a good many prisoners, among them a whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth Alabama, three hundred and twenty strong.

"On the 16th the general movement was continued, when Lost Mountain was abandoned by the enemy. Our right naturally swung round, so as to threaten the railroad below Marietta, but Johnston had still further contracted and strengthened his lines, covering Marietta and all the roads below.

"On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, making army movements impossible, but we devoted the time to strengthening our positions, more especially the left and center, with a view gradually to draw from the left to add to the right; and we had to hold our lines on the left extremely strong, to guard against a sally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty. Garrard's division of cavalry was kept busy on our left, McPherson had gradually extended to his right, enabling Thomas to do the same still farther; but the enemy's position was so very strong, and everywhere it was covered by intrenchments, that we found it as dangerous to

assault as a permanent fort. We in like manner covered our lines of battle by similar works, and even our skirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and best forms of defensive works, such as rails, or logs, piled in the form of a simple lunette, covered outside with earth thrown up at night.

"The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench, varied according to the nature of the ground, viz; the trees and bushes were cut away for a hundred yards or more in front, serving as an abatis or entanglement; the parapets varied from four to six feet high, the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered way inside, and this parapet was surmounted by a 'head-log,' composed of the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt, lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting in notches cut in other trunks which extended back, forming an inclined plane, in case the head-log should be knocked inward by a cannon-shot. The men of both armies became extremely skillful in the construction of these works, because each man realized their value and importance to himself, so that it required no orders for their construction. As soon as a regiment or brigade gained a position within easy distance for a sally, it would set to work with a will, and would construct such a parapet in a single night; but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor by authorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmen who escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fed out of the regular army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars a month, under an existing act of Congress. These pioneer detachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war, for they could work at night while our men slept; they in turn were not expected to fight, and could therefore sleep by day. Our enemies used their slaves for a similar

purpose, but usually kept them out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify and strengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in their general retrograde. During this campaign hundreds if not thousands of miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies, and as a rule whichever party attacked one of them got the worst of it.

"On the 19th of June the Rebel army again fell back on its flanks, to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressed forward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still more concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad. These successive contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him, but were doubtless justified by sound reasons. On the 20th Johnston's position was unusually strong. Kenesaw Mountain was his salient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by Noonday and Nose's Creeks. His left flank was his weak point, so long as he acted on the 'defensive,' whereas, had he designed to contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in reserve a force with which to strike 'offensively,' from his right, he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume that such was his object. We were also so far from Nashville and Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our railroad and depots, so that the left [McPherson's] was held very strong.

"About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike this very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga. I therefore reinforced the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Cassville, and ordered forward from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E. Smith, to hold Kingston securely.

"While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had his hands full with Lee, in Virginia. General Halleck was the chief of staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily. I find from my letter-book that on the 21st of June, I reported to him tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day: 'This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as far off as ever. The roads are impassable; the fields and woods become quagmires after a few wagons have crossed over. Yet we are at work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and the right is across Nose's Creek. The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanks retired, to cover that town and the railroad behind. I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life.'

"The weather has a wonderful effect on troops; in action and on the march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind and uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather. Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aiming always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flank or the other, for his line of communication and retreat. On the 22nd of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas in person to advance his extreme right corps [Hooker's] and instructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army, viz., the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in close support of Hooker's deployed line. During this day the sun came out with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to my bivouac about dark, when a signal-message was received, dated—

THE BATTLE OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

"'KULP HOUSE, 5.30 P. M.

"'*General* SHERMAN:

"'We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only apprehension being from our extreme right flank. Three entire corps are in front of us.

"'*Major-General* HOOKER.'"

"Hooker's corps [the Twentieth] belonged to Thomas' army; Thomas' headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine; and Hooker, being an old army officer, knew that he should have reported this fact to Thomas and not to me; I was, moreover, specially disturbed by the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his right flank, when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that. I first inquired of my adjutant, Dayton, if he were certain that General Schofield had received his orders, and he answered that the envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General Schofield himself. I knew, therefore, that General Schofield must be near by, in close support of Hooker's right flank. General Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General Hooker's disposition to 'switch off,' leaving wide gaps in his line, so as to be independent, and to make glory on his own account. I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of discipline and propriety. The Rebel army was only composed of three corps; I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines, found them everywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker could not have encountered 'three entire corps.' Both McPherson and Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army, [Thomas'], so as to come into closer contact with one or other of the wings, asserting that he was the senior by commission to both McPherson and Schofield, and that in the

event of battle he should assume command over them, by virtue of his older commission.

"They appealed to me to protect them. I had heard during that day some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the 'Kulp House,' which was about five miles southeast of where I was, but this was nothing unusual, for at the same moment there was firing along our lines full ten miles in extent. Early the next day, 23d, I rode down to the 'Kulp House,' which was on a road leading from Powder Springs to Marietta, about three miles distant from the latter. On the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of the day before; then I rode along Geary's and Ward's divisions, which occupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged in burying the dead. I found General Schofield's Corps on the Powder Springs road, its head of column abreast of Hooker's right, therefore constituting a 'strong right flank,' and I met Generals Schofield and Hooker together. As rain was falling at the moment, we passed into a little church standing by the road-side, and I there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal-message of the day before. He was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed between them, Schofield saying that his head of column [Hascall's division] had been, at the time of the battle, actually in advance of Hooker's line; that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his troops before it did Hooker's; that General Hooker knew of it at the time; and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of his advance division [Haskell's] were lying farther out than any of Hooker's. General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact. I then asked him why he had called on me for help, until he had used all of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's division, and had learned from him that he had

not been engaged the day before at all; and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have been made by one corps, [Hood's] in place of three, and that it had fallen on Geary's and Williams' divisions, which had repulsed the attack handsomely. As we rode away from that church General Hooker was by my side, and I told him that such a thing must not occur again; in other words, I reproved him more gently than the occasion demanded, and from that time he began to sulk. General Hooker had come from the East with great fame as a 'fighter,' and at Chattanooga he was glorified by his 'battle above the clouds,' which I fear turned his head. He seemed jealous of all the army commanders, because in years, former rank, and experience, he thought he was our superior.

"On the 23d of June, I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary, which I cannot again better state:

"We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground. Yesterday the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder Springs road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more than two hundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in close contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of artillery-fire. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he

will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, notwithstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear, supplies are ample.

"During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to attack 'fortified lines,' a thing carefully avoided up to that time. I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near the Rebel center, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half. The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas' center, and had the telegraph-wires laid to it. The points of attack were chosen, and the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as possible. About 9 A. M. of the day appointed, the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry were kept up. At all points the enemy met us with determined courage and in great force. McPherson's attacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but could not reach the summit. About a mile to the right, just below the Dallas road, Thomas' assaulting column reached the parapet, where Brigadier-General Harker was shot down mortally

wounded, and Brigadier-General Daniel McCook, my old law-partner, was desperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterwards died. By 11.30 the assault was in fact over, and had failed. We had not broken the Rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns held their ground within a few yards of the Rebel trenches, and there covered themselves with parapet. McPherson lost about five hundred men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly two thousand men. This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to that date, and it is well described by Johnston in his 'Narrative' (pages 342, 343,) where he admits his loss in killed and wounded as—

	MEN.
Hood's corps (not reported)	
Hardee's corps	286
Loring's (Polk's)	522
Total	808

"This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual, Johnston overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand, whereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killed and wounded.

"While the battle was in progress at the center, Schofield crossed Olley's Creek on the right, and gained a position threatening Johnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, I ordered Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right, to Sweetwater. Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army to the railroad at a point [Fulton] about ten miles below Marietta, or to the Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the one afterward so successfully practiced at Atlanta. All the orders were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons, intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and

leave that place as our depot to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's cavalry. General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I had resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General Halleck on July 1st: 'General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and to-morrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right, back of General Thomas. This will bring my right within three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five miles from the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnston to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and the Chattahoochee, when I will, by the left flank, reach the railroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from the railroad with ten days' supplies in wagons. Johnston may come out of his intrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I want, for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with the enemy south of Kenesaw. I think that Allatoona and the line of the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight for Atlanta.'

"McPherson drew out of his lines during the night of July 2d, leaving Garrard's cavalry dismounted, occupying his trenches, and moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptly abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I expected as much, for, by the earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glass mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, had at his bivouac close by our camp. I directed the glass on Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill cautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly

see their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned by the enemy. In a minute I roused my staff, and started them off with orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possible road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat, especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River."

General Johnston had prepared for this attempt, and had covered his movement by a strong *tete-de-pont* at the Chattahoochee, and had besides intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Church. This caused a change in his plans, and General Sherman, leaving a garrison at Marietta, and ordering General Logan to join his army at the mouth of the Nickajack, overtook by General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July General Thomas pushed a force of skirmishers down the main road, captured the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack creek. This had the desired effect, and Johnston fell back to the Chattahoochee, covering the crossings from Turner's Ferry to the railroad bridge, and sending Wheeler's and Jackson's cavalry to the left bank. On the fifth Sherman advanced to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Price's Ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of the Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve. Heavy skirmishing along the front during the day demonstrated the enemy's position, which could be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee River, passable at that stage of water by means of bridges, except very difficult fords.

Conceiving that this would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, Sherman ordered General Schofield to cross to Smyrna camp-ground, near the mouth of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun,

surprising the guard, laying a pontoon bridge and a trestled bridge, and effecting a lodgment on high ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time General Garrard, with his cavalry, moved on Roswell, and destroyed the cloth factories which had supplied the Rebels. General Garrard was ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and Sherman ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was followed by the rest of General McPherson's army. General Howard had built a bridge at Power's Ferry, crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus, during the ninth, we had secured three points of passage over the Chattahoochee, with good roads leading to Atlanta. Learning this, Johnston crossed the river on the night of the ninth, burning the bridges in his rear. Thus, on the 10th, Sherman held possession of the right bank of the Chattahoochee. One of the chief objects of his campaign was gained; and Atlanta lay before him, only eight miles distant. It was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left, with its magazines, arsenals, workshops, and railways. But the men had worked hard, and needed rest.

In anticipation of this, Sherman had collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about two thousand strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the direct route to Opelika to destroy the only finished railway connecting the channels of travel between Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, running from Montgomery to Opelika, and to cut off Johnston's army from

a source of supply and reinforcement. Major-General Lovell H. Rosseau, commanding the district of Tennessee, had received permission to command the expedition. As soon as Johnston was across the Chattahoochee, and Sherman had begun to maneuver on Atlanta, the notice was given. General Rosseau started on the 10th of July, fulfilled his orders to the letter, passed through Talladega, reached the railway on the 16th, twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it up at that place, as well as three miles of the branch toward Columbus, and two miles toward West Point. He then turned north, and, on the 22d, joined Sherman at Marietta, having lost about thirty men.

Some time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's station, strengthening the railway guards and garrisons, and in improving the roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted down the river to draw attention in that direction, and all being ready for a general advance, on the 17th, Sherman ordered it to commence. General Thomas was to cross at Power's and Price's ferry bridges, and march by Buckhead; Schofield, who was already across at the mouth of Soap's Creek, to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell directly against the Augusta road at some point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. On the 17th the army advanced from their camps, and formed a line along the old Peach-tree road.

The same day Jefferson Davis relieved General Johnston from the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, and designated Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood as his successor. The telegram from General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General of the Confederate army, communicating this order, assigned as a reason for it that Johnston had failed to arrest the advance of the Union Army to the vicinity of

Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that he could defeat it. From the moment that bending to the pressure of public opinion, Jefferson Davis had, against his will, restored General Johnston to command in the west, that wrong-headed man had refrained from giving to his subordinate any assistance, had spent the time for action in caviling at details, had withheld the troops needed to render offense or defense successful, and had left Johnston in entire ignorance as to the approval of his plans until their consummation afforded the chance for his disgrace. With an army less than half the size of Sherman's, a victory by Johnston on the banks of the Tennessee, would have proved indecisive; while defeat would have been his utter destruction. Falling back to the strong mountain positions at Resaca, Allatoona, Ackworth, and Kenesaw, and interposing between himself and the Union army three rivers, the Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, Johnston had forced Sherman to consume seventy-two days in passing over the hundred miles between Ringgold and Atlanta, and there, behind secure fortifications, with an army larger than at the start, was preparing to attack the Union army, largely reduced by losses, by detachments, and by expiration of enlistments, in a position south of all the barriers it had passed, where a defeat would be so far decisive for Sherman as to cost him the fruits gained and months of delay, but indecisive for the Confederates, who could retire behind their works, too strong for assault and too extended for investment. At this crisis, Johnston, prudent and exhaustive in his plans, and skillful in their execution, was displaced by a successor, capable of fighting, but incompetent to direct. The Confederate tactics changed at once and the battle which Johnston was about to deliver upon the decisive point with thorough preparation was delivered by Hood, upon the first point that presented itself, with impetuosity.

The Confederate army, numbering forty-one thousand infantry and artillery and ten thousand cavalry, was now strongly posted, four miles in front of Atlanta, on the hills which form the south bank of Peach-tree Creek, holding the line of that stream and the Chattahoochee for some distance below.

On the 18th, continuing on a general right wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railway, seven miles east of Decatur, and broke up a section of about four miles. General Schofield reached Decatur the same day.

On the 19th, McPherson turned along the railway into Decatur. Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta, and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek by numerous bridges in the face of the enemy's lines. All found the enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily.

On the 20th, all the armies had closed in, toward Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's Corps of General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving Newton's division of the same Corps on the Buckhead road. On the 20th, about 4 P. M., the enemy sallied from his works and fell in line against Sherman's right center, composed of Newton's division of Howard's Corps, of Hooker's Corps, toward the south, and Johnson's division of Palmer's Corps. The blow was sudden and unexpected, but General Newton had covered his front by a line of rail-piles, which enabled him to repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's Corps, although uncovered, and compelled to fight on open ground drove the enemy back to his intrenchments. The action in front of Johnson's division was light, as the position was well intrenched. Sherman's entire loss was about fifteen hundred killed, wounded, and missing—chiefly in Hooker's Corps.

On the 22d Sherman discovered that the Confederate army had, during the night, abandoned the line of Peach-tree Creek, and fallen back to a line of redoubts, forming the defenses of Atlanta, and covering the approaches to that town. These works had been long since prepared, and the enemy was engaged in connecting the redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle-trenches. Sherman's army crossed Peach-tree Creek and closed in upon Atlanta—McPherson on the left, Schofield next, and Thomas on the right.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow the Augusta railway, with the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General Blair, on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its right; but as the advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth Corps was thrown out of line by the Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a hill to the south and east of the railway, where the Seventeenth Corps had driven the enemy, and it gave him a commanding position within view of the heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength. The Sixteenth Corps, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position and make it a strong left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left.

About noon Hood attacked. At the first indications of a movement, on his flank, General McPherson parted from General Sherman, with whom he was engaged in discussing the state of affairs and rode off to direct matters on the field. In a few moments, the sounds of musketry to McPherson's left and rear indicated to General Sherman Hood's purpose of throwing a superior force against his left, while his front would be checked by fortifications of Atlanta, and orders

were at once dispatched to the center and right to press forward and give employment to the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold a large force in reserve, awaiting developments. About half-past twelve o'clock, Lieutenant-Colonel William T. Clark, Assistant-Adjutant General, rode up and communicated to General Sherman the appalling intelligence that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner, that he had ridden to General Dodge's column, which was then moving, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless and wounded in two places. There was no time to yield to the grief caused by this terrible calamity. Not an instant was to be lost. Sherman instantly dispatched a staff-officer to General Logan to tell him what had happened and that he must assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, and hold the ground already chosen, especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before. The whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and, by a circuit to the east, had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and swung round to the right until it struck General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was along the abandoned Rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outwards. A space of wooded ground of half a mile intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line through which the enemy poured. The last order known to have been given by General McPherson was to hurry Colonel Wangelin's brigade of the Fifteenth Corps across from the railway to occupy this gap. Opportunely, it came on the double-quick and checked the

enemy. While Hardee assailed our left flank, Lieutenant-General A. P. Stewart, who had been placed in command of Polk's corps, was intended to move out from his main works and fall upon McPherson in front, but both attacks were not made simultaneously. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were fortifying, captured the pioneer company, its tools, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, who was forced to fight first from one side of the rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the important position on the hill. General Dodge held in check the attack of Hardee's corps, and punished him severely. General Giles A. Smith had gradually given up the extremity of his line, and formed a new one, connected on the right with General Leggett. On this ground the men fought desperately for four hours, repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is ascribed by Sherman to Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four P. M. had given up the attempt. In the meantime, Garrard's cavalry having been sent off to Covington, Wheeler, with his Confederate cavalry, had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel Sprague covered them with great skill, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe. On our left the enemy had taken Murray's regular battery of six guns, with its horses, as it was moving along unsupported and apprehensive of danger in a wooded road in the unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line

of battle on the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes. Hardee also captured two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off. About four P. M. there was a lull, during which the enemy advanced on the railway and the main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a picket, moved forward, and broke through our lines. The force on this part of the line had been weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, and Lightburn's brigade fell back in some disorder to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, including a valuable twenty-pounder Parrot battery of four guns, and separating the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, which were on the right and left of the railway.

Being in person close by, and appreciating the importance of the connection at that point, Sherman ordered several batteries of Schofield's army to be moved to a position commanding the interval by a left-flank fire, and ordered a constant fire of shells on the enemy within sight, and in the woods beyond, to prevent his reinforcing. Orders were also sent to General Logan to cause the Fifteenth Corps to regain its lost ground at any cost, and to General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet from where he held it until he saved the batteries. Logan had anticipated these orders, and was already in motion. The whole was executed in grand style, our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet; but at last the enemy gave way, and the Fifteenth Corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us three thousand

seven hundred and twenty-two officers and men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

There had been no time for mourning over the death of McPherson, though he was one of the most popular commanders in the army, both with his fellow officers and with those in the ranks. He was a splendid specimen of manhood, and never knew what fear was. The Army of the Tennessee had lost a commander in whom it trusted, and when called upon to avenge his death they performed such deeds of heroism as helped save the day for their army, and proved their attachment to the dead chief. Though there was some ill-feeling caused by the action of the Government in filling the place of Major-General McPherson, and one officer thought his slight too great to bear, the official reports prove that Logan—though ranking some of the West Point graduates, and though he had earned any position of responsibility, accepted whatever place of duty was assigned to him, and filled it to the fullest measure. His leadership of the Fifteenth Corps after the death of McPherson was brilliant in the extreme, and won from the Army commander strong encomiums. He had taken command of McPherson's army at the death of its leader by virtue of his rank, and—as was stated by General Sherman—"he had done well." But the jealousy of the West Point graduates made it impossible to place him in full command, and Major-General O. O. Howard was chosen. This caused the immediate resignation of General Hooker, which was accepted promptly, and so far as Sherman was concerned, gladly. The nomination of Howard was promptly confirmed and the operations against Atlanta pushed with vigor. General Sherman's plan now was to move the Army of the Tennessee to the right boldly against the railroad to the south of Atlanta, and to send the cavalry around on both sides to seize the Macon road near Jonesboro.

The following official reports are important as showing the progress up to this time, and the successes which attended the movements of the army immediately after the death of McPherson. That Major-General Logan was actuated by motives of the highest patriotism was proved by the encomiums fairly extorted by him from his superiors, and by the immediate hold he had gained upon the soldiers mourning the death of a brave commander.

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, *July* 23, 1864.

"*General* HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

"Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper of the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with a radius of one and a half miles, and we closed in. While we were forming our lines, and selecting positions for our batteries, the enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on our extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps (General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy's cavalry got well to our rear, and into Decatur, and for some hours our left flank was completely enveloped. The fight that resulted was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides. The enemy took one of our batteries (Murray's of the Regular Army) that was marching in its place in column in the road, unconscious of danger. About 4 P. M. the enemy sallied against the division of General Morgan L. Smith, of the Fifteenth Corps, which occupied an abandoned line of rifle-trench near the railroad east of the city, and forced it back some four hundred yards, leaving in his hands for the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries were immediately after recovered by the same troops reinforced. I cannot

well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; I know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy loss on the enemy.

"General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11 A. M., and passing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon an ambuscade without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staff and orderlies, and was shot dead.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, GA., *July* 25, 1864 8–A. M.

"*Major-General* HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

"GENERAL: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results, coupled with some data or information, without occasionally making mistakes. McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to the command as it were in the midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left; but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practiced one of his favorite games of attacking our left when in motion, and before it had time to cover its weak flank. After riding over the ground and hearing the varying statements of the actors, I directed General Logan to make an official report of the actual, result and I herewith inclose it.

"Though the number of dead Rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to give full credit to the report that our loss, though only thirty-five hundred and twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equaled that number, viz., thirty-two hundred and twenty. Happening at that point of the line when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to bury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporary truce

on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at all others.

"I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breaking of the railroad toward Augusta. I am now grouping my command to attack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong line of circumvallation with flanks, so as to have as large an infantry column as possible, with all the cavalry to swing round to the south and east, to strike that road at or below East Point.

"I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENN., BEFORE ATLANTA, GEORGIA, *July* 24, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following general summary of the result of the attack of the enemy on this army on the 22d inst:

"Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred and twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery.

"We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce sent in by them, in front of the Third division, Seventeenth corps, one thousand of their killed.

"The number of their dead in front of the Fourth division of the same corps, including those on the ground not now occupied by our troops, General Blair reports, will swell the number of their dead on his front to two thousand.

"The number of their dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, up to this hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commanding officer reports that at least as many more are yet unburied, burying parties being still at work.

"The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps

is four hundred and twenty-two. We have over one thousand of their wounded in our hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried off during the night, after the engagement, by them.

"We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now. We also captured five thousand stands of arms.

"The attack was made on our lines seven times, and was seven times repulsed. Hood's and Hardee's Corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged us.

"We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank.

"We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits. A detailed and full report will be furnished as soon as completed.

RECAPITULATION.

Our total loss	3,521
Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried and delivered to them	3,220
Total prisoners sent North	1,017
Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands	1,000
Estimated loss of the enemy, at least	10,000

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN A. LOGAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., *July* 29, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-Colonel* WILLIAM T. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Tennessee, present.

"COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, during the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th; and, while advancing in line of battle to a more favorable position, we were met by the Rebel in-

fantry of Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a determined and desperate attack on us at 11.30 A. M. of the 28th, yesterday.

"My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown up in front of them.

"The onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced and lasted until about three o'clock in the evening. During that time six successive charges were made, which were six times gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.

"Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously, but each time with like result.

"The worst of the fighting occurred on General Harrow's and Morgan L. Smith's fronts, which formed the center and right of the corps.

"The troops could not have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination not to give ground; had they shown less, they would have been driven from their position.

"Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods, Harrow, and Morgan L. Smith, division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the assault.

"My thanks are due to Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reinforcements at a time when they were much needed.

"My losses were fifty killed, four hundred and forty-nine wounded, and seventy-three missing; aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

"The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. There were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets left on the ground. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of seventy-three wounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are being cared for by our surgeons.

"Five hundred and sixty-five Rebels have up to this time

been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied.

"A large number of their wounded were undoubtedly carried away in the night, as the enemy did not withdraw till near daylight. The enemy's loss could not have been less than six or seven thousand men.

"A more detailed report will hereafter be made.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN A. LOGAN."

"*Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.*"

General Howard, in transmitting this report added:

"I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troops engaged. I never saw better conduct in battle. General Logan, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one man."

Everything was in readiness, and the orders had all been given, when, on the morning of the 26th General Sherman received a request from General Stoneman asking permission after breaking the railway, to proceed with his command to Macon and Andersonville, and release our prisoners of war thirty thousand in number, suffering the extremities of starvation, and rotting by hundreds from the loathsome diseases that follow in its train. "There was something captivating in the idea," says Sherman, and deeming the execution within the bounds of probable success, he consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry and breaking the road, General Stoneman might make the attempt with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time fixed.

"General McCook, in the execution of his part of the move-

SHERMAN AT ATLANTA.

ment, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was provided, crossed his command and moved rapidly on Palmetto station, on the West Point railway, here he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion toward Campbelltown, which was successfully accomplished. McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of wagons belonging to the Rebel army in Atlanta, killed eight hundred mules, and captured two hundred and fifty prisoners. He then pushed for the Macon railway, reached it at Lovejoy's station at the time appointed, burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and, finding his progress east too strongly opposed, moved south, and west, and reached Newman on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, and which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures and cut his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men; among them Colonel Harrison, Eighth Indiana Cavalry, a valuable officer, who was taken prisoner while fighting his men as skirmishers on foot. McCook succeeded, however, in cutting his way out, reaching the Chattahoochee, crossed the river, and got to Marietta without further loss."

Sherman says in his official report:—

"'General McCook is entitled to much for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole, the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to

break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale that I knew the damage would soon be repaired.'

"Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur road, during the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's Creek, the extreme right beyond it, to prolong the line due south, facing east. On the same day, by appointment of the President, Major-General Oliver O. Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, relieving General Logan, who had exercised the command with great ability since the death of McPherson on the 22d, and who now returned to the immediate charge of his own Fifteenth Corps. Dodge got into line on the evening of the 27th, and Blair came into position on the right early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house, called Ezra Church, on the Bell's Ferry road. Here Logan's Fifteenth Corps joined on and formed the extreme right flank of the army before Atlanta, along a wooded and commanding ridge. About ten A. M., all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up their accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after awhile, assumed the form of a parapet. In order to be prepared to defeat the enemy if he should repeat his game of the 22d, Sherman had, the night before, ordered Jefferson C. Davis' division, of Palmer's Fourteenth Corps, which, by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee, had been left in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and thence toward White Hall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of Howard's new line. The object of this movement was that in case of an attack this division might in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an expected moment. Brigadier-General Morgan, who commanded the division during the temporary illness of General

Davis, marched early for Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on the maps did not exist at all; and from this cause, and the intricate nature of the wooded ground, great delay was experienced. About noon, Hardee and Lee sallied forth from Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and formed their masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground, and after some heavy artillery firing, advanced in parallel lines against the Fifteenth Corps, expecting to catch it in air. The advance was magnificent; but Sherman had prepared for this very contingency; our troops were expecting this attack, and met it with a galling and coolly delivered fire of musketry that swept the ranks of the enemy and drove him back in confusion. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the Rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail piles only to be hauled over as prisoners. About four P. M., the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. General Logan on this occasion was again conspicuous, his corps being chiefly engaged. Our entire loss was less than six hundred. Had Davis' division not been delayed by causes beyond control, what was simply a complete repulse of the enemy would have been a disastrous rout. Instructed by the terrible lessons of the 22d and 28th of July, Hood abandoned his rash offensive, and assumed a strict defensive attitude, merely meeting Sherman's successive extensions of his right flank by continuing his own line of works to the south.

"Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee did not reach to East Point, Sherman was forced to transfer Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards Palmer's Fourteenth Corps of Thomas' army. Schofield moved from the left on the 1st of August, and Palmer's corps followed at once taking a line below Utoy Creek, which Schofield prolonged to a point near East Point.

"About the 1st of August, General Hooker, deeming himself aggrieved by the promotion of General Howard, who had served under him in the Army of the Potomac, and had but recently come to the West as his subordinate, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was, at his own request, relieved from command of the Twentieth Corps and ordered to report to the Adjutant-General at Washington. Major-General Henry W. Slocum, then at Vicksburg, was sent for to assume the command, which until his arrival, devolved upon Brigadier-General A. S. Williams. Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis was promoted to the command of the Fourteenth Corps, in lieu of General Palmer, relieved at his own request; and Major-General D. S. Stanley succeeded to the command of the Fourth Corps, vacated by General Howard.

"From the 2d to the 5th, Sherman continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along the whole line. Reilley's brigade of Cox's division of Schofield's army, on the 5th tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about four hundred men, who were caught by the entanglements and abatis; but the next day this position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or Macon railway. The enemy's line at that time was nearly fifteen miles in length, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. He was enabled to hold this long and attenuated front by the use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of the ground that it was impossible for the Union commanders to discover the weak parts.

"To reach the Macon road, Sherman now saw he would

have to move the whole army; but before beginning, he ordered down from Chattanooga some four-and-a-half-inch rifled guns, which arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and creating confusion.

"On the 16th of August, Sherman issued orders prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point railway, near Fairburn, and thence to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with wagons carrying provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders, Wheeler, with his corps of ten thousand cavalry, was detached by General Hood to break up the Union communications. Passing round by the East and North, Wheeler made his appearance on the Chattanooga railway, near Adairsville, capturing nine hundred beef-cattle, and made a break in the road near Calhoun. Hood could not have more distinctly evinced his want of mental perspective than by detaching so large a force on the eve of a battle momentarily to be expected. At the best, Wheeler could only annoy Sherman; his absence might destroy Hood. Sherman was not slow to take advantage of a blunder so well-timed for his plans. Suspending the execution of his orders for the time being, he directed General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about five thousand cavalry, to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point railway, and effectually break it near Fairburn; then to proceed across to the Macon railway, and thoroughly destroy it; to avoid, as far as possible, the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. Sherman expected that this cavalry expedi-

tion would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of success it would leave him in a better position to take full advantage of the result.

"Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, broke the West Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross' cavalry, and got possession of the railway, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry, which had been dispatched below Jonesboro' in cars, was run back and disembarked, and, with Jackson's Rebel cavalry, made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east, made a circuit, and struck the railway about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines; when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, of which he brought in one gun and destroyed the others. Returning by a circuit north and east, Kilpatrick reached Decatur on the 22d. He estimated the damage done to the railway as sufficient to interrupt its use for ten days; but, upon learning all the details of the expedition, Sherman became satisfied that it had not accomplished the chief object in view, and accordingly at once renewed his original orders for the movement of the whole army.

"This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with the main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its intrenchments. The army commanders were immediately notified to send their surplus wagons, encumbrances, and sick back to the intrenched position at the bridge over the Chattahoochee, and that the movement would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on the extreme left,

and marched to a position below Proctor's Creek, while the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, moved back to the river. Both movements were effected without loss. On the night of the 26th, the Army of the Tennessee broke camp, and moved rapidly by a circuit toward Sandtown and across Camp Creek, a small stream about a mile below Proctor's Creek; the Army of the Cumberland moved below Utoy Creek, while the Army of the Ohio remained in position to mask the movement, which was attended with the loss of but a single man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell. On the 27th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to the West Point railway, above Fairburn; the Army of the Cumberland to Red Oak, and the Army of the Ohio closed in near Diggs' and Mims'. The three columns were thus massed on the line of the West Point railway from Diggs', two miles below East Point, to within an equal distance of Fairburn. The 28th was consumed in destroying the road. For twelve and a half miles the ties were burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted with the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, logs, rock, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and being satisfied with its execution, Sherman ordered the whole army to face eastward and move the next day by several roads: General Howard, on the right, towards Jonesboro', General Thomas in the center to Couch's on the Decatur and Fayetteville road and General Schofield on the left, by Morrow's Mills. The railway from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge which divides the waters of the Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro', makes a wide bend to the east. The position now selected by Sherman, parallel to the railway, facing eastwardly, was

therefore a very important one, and he was anxious to seize it as a necessary preliminary to his ulterior movements.

"The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th. General Thomas, who encountered little opposition or difficulty, save what resulted from the narrow roads, reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point, and came into position toward Rough and Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, and consequently a greater distance to move, encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal Creek. Here a short delay occurred, and some cannonading and skirmishing, but Howard soon drove the enemy, passed the Renfrew House, on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of the day, and wisely pushed his march toward Jonesboro', saved the bridge across Flint River, and halted only when the darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the next morning, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth Corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its left and right flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act offensively or defensively, as the case called for.

"As soon as Sherman, who made his headquarters with Thomas at Couch's, learned that General Howard had passed Renfrew's, he directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jefferson C. Davis' Fourteenth Corps, to move General Stanley's Fourth Corps, in connection with General Schofield, toward Rough and Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' Corps to feel for the railway. General Schofield was also

ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough and Ready. These movements were progressing during the 31st, when Stephen D. Lee's and Hardee's Corps of the enemy came out of the works at Jonesboro', and attacked General Howard in the position just described. After a contest of over two hours, the attack was repulsed, with great loss to the enemy, who withdrew, leaving his dead and many wounded on the ground.

In the meanwhile, Sherman was aiming to get his left and center between Stewart's Corps remaining at Atlanta, and the Corps of Hardee and Lee engaged in Howard's front. General Schofield had reached the railway, a mile below Rough and Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; General Stanley, of General Thomas' army, had also struck the road below General Schofield, and was destroying it, working south; and Baird's division of Davis' Corps had struck it still lower down, within four miles of Jonesboro'.

"The Confederate forces being thus divided, orders were at once given for all the army to turn on the fraction at Jonesboro'; General Howard to keep the enemy busy, while General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. The troops were also ordered as they moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the railway, as it was impossible to say how soon our hold of it might be relinquished, from the necessity of giving attention in other quarters. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to the north, and General Kilpatrick was sent south, to the west bank of the Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railway below Jonesboro'. On the 1st of September Davis' Corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was deployed, facing south, his right in connection with General Howard, and his left on the railway; while General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down the

Rough and Ready road, and along the railway, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, Blair's Corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro', to act on that flank in conjunction with General Kilpatrick's. About 5 P. M. General Davis assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners the greater part of Gowan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hasten their movements, but owing to the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads, they did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. About 2 o'clock that night, the sounds of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These sounds continued for about an hour, and again about 4 A. M. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer, which could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. At daybreak it was discovered that Hardee and Lee had abandoned their lines at Jonesboro', and Sherman ordered a general pursuit south; General Thomas following to the left of the railway, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield diverging two miles to the east. Near Lovejoy's Station the enemy was again overtaken in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected, behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the right, and a confluent of the Flint River to his left. Pushing close up and reconnnoitering the ground, Sherman found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville

road, and presently rumors began to arrive, through prisoners captured, that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1st, that Hood had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the unexplained sounds so plainly heard; that Stewart's Corps was then retreating toward McDonough, and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and Sherman being satisfied with the substantial success already gained, ordered the work of destroying the railway to cease, and the troops to be held in hand, ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

"On the same night, a courier arrived from General Slocum, reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and retreated on the McDonough road, and that he himself with the Twentieth Corps had entered and taken possession on the morning of the 2d of September.

"Atlanta being won, the object of the movement against the railway being therefore already concluded, and any pursuit of the enemy with a view to his capture being futile in such a country, Sherman gave orders, on the 4th, for the army to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th the army marched to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where it remained a day. On the 7th it moved to Rough and Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected. The Army of the Cumberland was then grouped round about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur, all in clean and healthy camps, at last enabled to enjoy a brief period of rest, so much needed for reorganization and recuperation.

"To return to the erratic movements of Wheeler, whom, in the presence of the campaigns of two large armies, we have

almost forgotten. He succeeded in breaking the railway about Calhoun, made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Leibold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off, then passed up into East Tennessee, and remained a short while at Athens; but on the first show of pursuit he moved beyond the Little Tennessee, and crossing the Holston, near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, passed over toward Sequatchee and McMinnville, and thence to Murfreesboro', Lebanon, and Franklin. From Franklin he was pursued toward Florence, and out of Tennessee, by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger. He did great injury to many citizens, and destroyed the railway nearly as fast as the construction parties were able to repair it; but, except by being absent from Hood's army at the critical moment, had no influence whatever upon the campaign.

"Thus ended, four months after its inception, one of the greatest campaigns of the war—a campaign which doubly secured the possession of the mountain regions of the center, and laid the Atlantic and Gulf slopes at the mercy of the Union commander. Divided in twain by the conquest of the Mississippi, the domain of the Rebellion was quartered by the capture of Atlanta. A vital spot had been reached; the granary of Georgia was lost; and there was suddenly presented to the Confederate authorities the alternative, to concentrate their two remaining armies or to perish.

"Two dangers had menaced the success of Sherman's campaign. The first was the question of supplies. This was in great part solved by the energetic and successful management of the superintendent of military railways, Colonel W. W. Wright. 'No matter when or where a break has been made,' says Sherman, 'the repair-train seemed on the spot, and the damage was generally repaired before I knew of the

break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time, almost out of the materials improvised on the spot.' But the solution was mainly due to the forethought exercised by Sherman himself in successively establishing secondary depots, strongly garrisoned, as at Chattanooga, Resaca, Rome, and Allatoona, and by great exertions accumulating at each, stores sufficient to render the army independent of the rear during any temporary interruption of the communications. The second danger ever present consisted in the rapid diminution of the army, not only by the heavy casualties incidental to offensive warfare, but also by the expiration of the terms of service of a large number of the regiments. This was prevented from becoming fatal by the bravery of the army in attacking; by the skill of its commander, in turning obstacles too great to be surmounted by direct approach; by the patriotism of the veterans, in re-enlisting; by the noble exertions of the governors of the Western States, in encouraging and expediting re-enlistments, and pushing the veterans to the front; and by the folly of Hood, in attacking the Union troops in strong positions, protected by earthworks, instead of attempting to take them at a disadvantage, as in crossing Peach-tree Creek. On the 12th of August, President Lincoln conferred upon General Sherman a commission as Major-General in the regular army, as a reward for his services in this campaign.

"Stoneman marched from Decatur on the day appointed, with the whole effective strength of his division, numbering about two thousand in all, organized in three brigades, commanded by Colonels Adams, Biddle, and Capron. The first

brigade consisted of the First and Second regiments of Kentucky cavalry; the Second, of the Fifth and Sixth Indiana; the third brigade, of the Fourteenth Illinois, Eighth Michigan, and a squadron of Ohio cavalry under Captain McLoughlin.

"Stoneman moved out along the line of the Georgia Central railway to Covington, and thence turned south and pushed by way of Monticello, Hillsboro', and Clinton, for Macon. A battalion of the Fourteenth Illinois cavalry of Capron's brigade succeeded in entering Gordon, destroying eleven locomotives and seven trains of cars laden with munitions of war. The bridge over the Oconee was also destroyed by General Stoneman's orders, by another detachment from his command.

"On arriving within fifteen miles of Macon on the evening of the 30th of July, General Stoneman ascertained from reliable sources that, in anticipation of such an attempt, the probability of which had been freely discussed in the Northern newspapers, the Confederate authorities had taken the precaution to remove all the Union prisoners previously confined in the military prisons at Macon and Millen, in the direction of Florence, South Carolina; and that this movement had only been completed on the preceding day. The prime object of the expedition being thus unfortunately frustrated, Stoneman reluctantly determined to return to the main body. But in the meanwhile the enemy had concentrated in heavy force, and was now moving upon his line of retreat.

"On the morning of Sunday, the 31st of July, finding what seemed to be a heavy force of the enemy in his front, Stoneman deployed a strong line of skirmishers, which soon developed the fact that taking advantage of the unfavorable nature of the country for the operations of cavalry, Allen's brigade

of Confederate infantry had passed around his flank and taken up a strong position directly across the line of his homeward march, while Armstrong's brigade of the enemy's cavalry, in connection with Allen's infantry, was dangerously menacing his left flank. With the Oconee in his rear and a formidable enemy in his front Stoneman had evidently no resource but to destroy that enemy or be himself destroyed.

"Dismounting the troopers of one brigade, he caused them repeatedly to charge the enemy on foot, but they were as often repulsed with heavy loss. Rallying the broken columns by his personal exertions and with the assistance of the gallant Major Keogh and other officers of his staff, Stoneman placed himself at the head of his men, and again charged, but without more favorable result. At the critical moment, Armstrong's brigade assailed his left flank. The Union cavalry gave way before the combined opposition, and were with difficulty reformed. By this time the enemy had completely surrounded them.

"Perceiving this, and deeming all further resistance useless, Stoneman gave permission to such of his officers and men as wished to try the apparently desperate chance of cutting their way through the opposing lines, to make the attempt, and then, causing hostilities to cease on his part, sent in a flag of truce, and unconditionally surrendered the remainder of his force.

"Among those who cut their way though the enemy's lines, and thus escaped and rejoined the main army, was the bulk of Colonel Adam's brigade and a number of Colonel Capron's men. The entire number captured was less than fifteen hundred.

"The failure to unite with McCook, which was the prime cause of this disaster, undoubtedly occurred in consequence of false, but apparently reliable information concerning the

roads and crossing of the Ocmulgee River, whereby General Stoneman was led to believe he could prolong his easterly march to Covington without sacrificing the combination. Yet in all concerted operations, the co-operative movements are of the first importance; all others, no matter how great their intrinsic value, must be deemed secondary. Great success alone can excuse, while not even success can justify, any departure from the primary features of the plan."

On the morning when the movement commenced, July 28th, I was witness to a little incident in which the peculiar character of General Sherman when under fire was displayed in a strong light. We were approaching the position held by the Fifteenth Corps, and General Sherman was riding along with his staff slightly in advance of the guards, when a cannon-ball passed over his head and fell not far behind him, killing the horse of an orderly. As the horse fell the General could not at first determine whether or not the soldier was injured. He promptly rode to the spot, and as he approached, the soldier had extricated himself and was rising. Seeing that no harm had befallen the man, General Sherman turned and quietly scanned the front with his glass, telling the others to stand by the road-side. The next ball came directly in line with the other, and General Sherman ordered us to turn to the right and climb a hill, as the Rebels had got the range of that road and were enfilading it. There was not a moment when he appeared more concerned than he would have been seated at his fireside.

The closing days of the struggle before Atlanta are vividly told by General Sherman, and included in his correspondence with the Rebel General Hood, who assumed to criticise the actions of our army before Atlanta. It will be seen that the Federal General was as ready with his pen as with his sword:

"The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our po-

sition before Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water and provisions. The troops had become habituated to the slow and steady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a continuous clatter of musketry. The main lines were held farther back, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded and stacked for instant use. The field-batteries were in select positions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots from them gave life and animation to the scene. The men loitered about the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructing ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug, comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home. General Schofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the center, and Howard on the right. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps (Baird's and Jeff. C. Davis') were detached to the right rear, and held in reserve.

"I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against the railroad about Jonesboro', and had heard from General Garrard that Stoneman had gone on to Macon; during that day, August 1st, Colonel Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came into Marietta from General McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had been overwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan. Of course, I was disturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but made all possible preparations to strengthen our guards along the railroad to the rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which had defeated McCook would at once be on the railroad about Marietta. At the same time Garrard was ordered to occupy the trenches on our left, while Schofield's whole army moved to the extreme right, and extended the line toward East Point. Thomas was also ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set free the other division (Johnson's) of

the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's) which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held in reserve ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure a footing on the Macon Railroad at or below East Point.

"These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August, when General McCook came in and reported the actual results of his cavalry expedition. He had crossed the Chattahoochee River below Campbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly across to the Macon Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason to expect General Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work, tore up two miles of track, burned two trains of cars, and cut away five miles of telegraph wire. He also found the wagon-train belonging to the Rebel army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons, killed eight hundred mules, and captured seventy-two officers and three hundred and fifty men. Finding his progress eastward, toward McDonough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan, where he found himself completely surrounded by infantry and cavalry. He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out, losing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and then returned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry. This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by Colonel Brownlow. Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was down about Macon, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee. On the 4th of August, Colonel Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of nine hundred men belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual, all the rest lost, and this was partially confirmed by a report which came to me all the way round by General Grant's headquarters before Richmond. A few days afterward Colonel Capron also got in, with another small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the report that General Stoneman had covered

the escape of these two small brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundred men, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson. Thus another of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out of the fragments we hastily reorganized three small divisions under Brigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick.

"Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad first before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed the Ocmulgee River high up near Covington, and had gone down that river on the east bank. He reached Clinton, and sent out detachments which struck the railroad leading from Macon to Savannah at Griswold Station, where they found and destroyed seventeen locomotives and over a hundred cars; then went on and burned the bridge across the Oconee, and reunited the division before Macon. Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but could not cross over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found his retreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force. There he became bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of his command. He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small force of seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, with their brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta. The former reached us entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at some place farther north, and came in by detachments. Stoneman surrendered, and remained a prisoner until he was exchanged some time after, late in September, at Rough and Ready.

"I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army. Therefore the most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, on the right, was committed the charge of this special object. He had his own Corps—the

Twenty-third—composed of eleven thousand and seventy-five infantry, and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery, with McCook's broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and fifty-four men and horses. For this purpose I also placed the Fourteenth Corps—Palmer's—under his orders. This corps numbered at the time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantry and eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmer claimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission as major-general, and denied the latter's right to exercise command over him. General Palmer was a man of ability, but was not enterprising. His three divisions were compact and strong, well commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act on the offensive. His Corps—the Fourteenth—had sustained, up to that time, fewer hard knocks than any other Corps in the whole army, and I was anxious to give it a chance. I always expected to have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which was then the vital objective of the campaign. Its possession by us would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give us the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood's army was the real object to be desired. Yet Atlanta was known as the 'Gate-City of the South,' was full of foundries, arsenals, and machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy.

"On the 4th of August, I ordered General Schofield to make a bold attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered General Palmer to report to him for duty. He at once denied General Schofield's right to command him; but, after examining the dates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments, I wrote to General Palmer.

"'*August 4th*—10.45 P. M.

"'From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day, my decision is, that he ranks you as a Major-General, being of the same date of present commission, by reason of his previous superior rank as Brigadier General. The movements of to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of co-operation. I did hope that there would be no necessity for making this decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur in actual battle. The Sandtown road, and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of two thousand men.'

"I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to whose army Palmer's Corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:

"'I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can properly do so. I recommend that his application be granted.'

"And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the 4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory—not imputing to him, however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that 'the events did not keep pace with my desires.' General Schofield had reported to me that night:

"'I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps.

I have ordered General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops (Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been lost by two days' delay. The force may likely be too small.'

"I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmer's divisions—Davis' and Baird's—to follow *en echelon* in support of Schofield, and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person. He came on the 6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation being accepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas. He then rode to General Thomas' camp, where he made a written resignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, and was granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home in Illinois, there to await further orders. General Thomas recommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the senior division commander of the Corps, should be ordered back to Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted Major-General, and assigned to command the Corps. These changes had to be referred to the President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved and executed; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the slowness or inactivity of that splendid Corps. It had been originally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded by him in person, and had imbibed somewhat his personal character, viz., steadiness, good order, and deliberation—nothing hasty or rash, but always safe, 'slow, and sure.'

"On August 7th I telegraphed to General Halleck:

"'Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and of General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away all the time, and there is no peace,

inside or outside of Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted yesterday by General Reilley's brigade, turned it and gained the ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of all our dead and wounded. He continued to press on that flank, and brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He drove the enemy behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who are of his best troops—for the militia hug the breastworks close. I do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured. I have sent back to Chattanooga for two thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in town. I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is as good a place to fight it out on, as farther inland. One thing is certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a used-up community when we are done with it.'

"In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilley's brigade had struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, got entangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lost about five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as above reported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and we could see from it that the Rebels were extending their lines, parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to our line of investment. On the 10th of August the Parrott thirty-pounders were received and placed in position; for a couple of days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries converging on Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced our infantry lines, thereby shortening and strengthening the investment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unless some accident or positive neglect on the part of our antago-

nist should reveal an opening. However, it was manifest that no such opening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strong defenses. He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, and had damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he would attempt the same game against our rear. Therefore I made extraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, which were so essential, both for defense and offense. Kilpatrick was given that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposed flank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook's division was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and the railroad. On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to General Grant, then in Washington, I used this language:

"'Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his communications, I may have to leave a Corps at the railroad-bridge, well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works, which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches. I have lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expiration of service; and this is the only reason why I want reinforcements. We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we have lost by his acts.'

"On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut in entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had been commissioned a Major-General in the regular army, which was unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of Atlanta. These did not change the fact that we were held in check by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forced on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every house in the

town should be battered down by our artillery. It was evident that we must decoy him out to fight us on something like equal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege and attack his communications. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, I gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the railroad bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains, hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad depot, while the rest of the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroad below East Point.

"Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, and had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca, captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strong enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander, Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place. General John E. Smith, who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men, and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton, when Wheeler retreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th another detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoona and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood had sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads. For some days our communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destruction of the telegraph lines, as well as railroad. I at once ordered strong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left by Garrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick. The former moved with so much caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the contrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attracted to him at once. He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point road, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our right flank. I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit and confidence, that I concluded to

suspend the general movement of the main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalry to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro', in the hopes that it would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby not only secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catch Hood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase the chances of success, I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a reserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, the utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantry and artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th, and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit of Atlanta. He reported that he had destroyed three miles of the railroad about Jonesboro', which he reckoned would take ten days to repair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry (Ross'); that he had captured a battery and destroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he also brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners. On the 23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south, when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my original plan. Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad and telegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired, and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to his own army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz., up about the Hiawassee. On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee bridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by the single Corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found that the Rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resist us, could be easily

utilized against themselves; and on returning to my camp, at 7.15 P. M. that same evening I telegraphed to General Halleck as follows:

"'Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the south, to-morrow night, and for some time you will hear little of us. I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee bridge, by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps will hold the railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army, provisioned for twenty days.'

"Meantime General Dodge, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, had been wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two divisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night. The Twentieth Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the Fourth Corps(Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with the Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied the vacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change at all. The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard) drew out of their trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland (Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed to suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely; but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. An artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded another, and the next morning some of his infantry came out of Atlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward related that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta 'that

the Yankees were gone;' the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the celebration of their grand victory.

"On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield) both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extending from East Point to Red-Oak Station, and Fairburn, where we spent the next day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly. The track was heaved up in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail by rail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence-rails on which the rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph poles, wrapped around and left to cool. Such rails could not be used again; and, to be still more certain, we filled up many deep cuts with trees, brush, and earth, and commingled with them loaded shells, so arranged that they would explode on an attempt to haul out the bushes. The explosion of one such shell would have demoralized a gang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even the attempt to clear the road.

"Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a bold front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally out to attack him in position. His first movement was on the 30th, to Mount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough and Ready. Thomas was on his right, within easy support, moving by cross-roads from Red Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending from Couch's to Renfrew's; and Howard was aiming for Jonesboro'.

"I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwise very pleasant. We stopped for a short noon-rest near a little church (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood back about a hundred yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks. The infantry column had halted in the road, stacked their arms, and the men were scattered about—some lying in the shade of the trees, and

others were bringing corn-stalks from a large corn-field across the road to feed our horses, while still others had arms full of the roasting-ears, then in their prime. Hundreds of fires were soon started with the fence-rails, and the men were busy roasting the ears. Thomas and I were walking up and down the road which led to the church, discussing the chances of the movement, which he thought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fire at which a soldier was roasting his corn. The fire was built artistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks, standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, and turning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely. He was down on his knees, intent on his business, paying little heed to the stately and serious deliberations of his leaders. Thomas' mind was running on the fact that we had cut loose from our base of supplies, and that seventy thousand men were then dependent for their food on the chance supplies of the country (already impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy,) and on the contents of our wagons. Between Thomas and his men there existed a most kindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the most familiar way. Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of this man roasting his corn, he said, 'What are you doing?' The man looked up smilingly: 'Why, general, I am laying in a supply of provisions.' 'That is right, my man, but don't waste your provisions.' As we resumed our walk, the man remarked, in a sort of musing way, but loud enough for me to hear: 'There he goes, there goes the old man, economizing as usual.' 'Economizing' with corn, which cost only the labor of gathering and roasting!

"As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals, away off to our right front, but an ominous silence continued toward our left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear the sound of battle. That night we reached

Renfrew's, and had reports from left to right (from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills, to General Howard, within a couple of miles of Jonesboro'). The next morning (August 31st) all moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points between there and Jonesboro'. Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro,' and his men began at once to dig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro', tearing up the railroad-track as they advanced. About 3 P. M. the enemy sallied from Jonesboro' against the Fifteenth Corps, but was easily repulsed, and driven back within his lines. All hands were kept busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north front of Jonesboro', connecting on his right with Howard and his left reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield. General Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 P. M., swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the Rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with two field-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked Davis' movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below Jonesboro', and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro' on the east, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps. I sent first Captain Audenried (aid-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastly General Thomas himself, and that is the only time during the campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a gallop. Night was approaching, and

the country on the farther side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley had come up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's Corps, and that Corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and Hardee did escape.

"Meantime General Slocum had reached his Corps—the Twentieth—stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S. Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we had reached the railroad. That night I was so restless and impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like that of musketry. I walked to the house of a farmer close by my bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came from the direction of Atlanta—twenty miles to the north of us—and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He said he had, and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 A. M., arose other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real battle.

"The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forward along the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up against his lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station. While bringing forward troops and feeling the new position of our adversary, rumors came from the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and that General Slocum was in the city. Later in the day I received a note in Slo-

cum's own handwriting, stating that he had heard during the night the very sounds that I have referred to; that he had moved rapidly up from the bridge about daylight, and had entered Atlanta unopposed. His letter was dated inside the city, so there was no doubt of the fact. General Thomas' bivouac was but a short distance from mine, and, before giving notice to the army in general orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him the note. In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed by Thomas himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectly certain that it was genuine. The news seemed to him too good to be true. He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, as the news spread to the army, the shouts that arose from our men, the wild hallooing and glorious laughter, were to us a full recompense for the labor and toils and hardships through which we had passed in the previous three months.

"A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back and forth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to our telegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge. Of course, the glad tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North, where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons, and brothers, away down in 'Dixie Land;' and congratulations came pouring back full of good-will and patriotism. The victory was most opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he had previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that General Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg, and my army seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier, when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that 'Atlanta was ours, and fairly won.' On this text many a fine speech was made, but none more eloquent than that by Edward Everett, in Boston. A Presidential election then agitated the North. Mr. Lincoln

represented the national cause, and General McClellan had accepted the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was that the war was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to go free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be slavery. Success to our arms at that instant was therefore a political necessity; and it was all-important that something startling in our interest should occur before the election in November. The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement, and made the election of Mr. Lincoln certain. Among the many letters of congratulation received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant seem most important:

"'EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *September* 3, 1864.

"'The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations, that have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation. ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

"'President of the United States.'"

"'CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 4, 1864—9 P. M.

"'Major-General SHERMAN:

"'I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery

bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great rejoicing. U. S. GRANT,

"'Lieutenant-General.'"

"These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders, and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of those competent to bestow it.

"The army still remained where the news of success had first found us, viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due reflection, I resolved not to attempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowly and deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period of rest, and to think well over the next step required in the progress of events. Orders for this movement were made on the 5th September, and three days were given for each army to reach the place assigned it, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland in and about Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur.

"Personally I rode back to Jonesboro' on the 6th, and there inspected the Rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardee in his retreat. The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, and on the 8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by the Twentieth Corps—General Slocum. In the Court-House Square was encamped a brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second and Thirty-third Regiments, which had two of the finest bands of the army, and their music was to us all a source of infinite pleasure during our sojourn in that city. I took up my headquarters in the house of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one corner of the Court-House Square, and at once set about a measure already ordered, of which I had thought much and long, viz., to remove the entire civil population, and to deny to all civilians from the rear the expected profits of civil

trade. Hundreds of sutlers and traders were waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach Atlanta with their wares and goods, with which to drive a profitable trade with the inhabitants. I gave positive orders that none of these traders, except three—one for each separate army—should be permitted to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, I peremptorily required that all the citizens and families resident in Atlanta should go away, giving to each the option to go south or north, as their interests or feelings dictated. I was resolved to make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civil population to influence military measures. I had seen Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, and each at once was garrisoned by a full division of troops, if not more; so that success was actually crippling our armies in the field by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile population.

"I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, to General Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:

"'If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.'

"I knew, of course, that such a measure would be strongly criticised, but made up my mind to do it with the absolute certainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom. I knew that the people of the South would read in this measure two important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other, if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor 'to die in the last ditch,' that the opportunity would soon come.

"Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in

by a flag of truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners, saying that he was authorized to make such an exchange by the Richmond authorities, out of the vast number of our men then held captive at Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hoped to rescue at the time of his raid. Some of these prisoners had already escaped and got in, had described the pitiable condition of the remainder, and, although I felt a sympathy for their hardships and sufferings as deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all the prisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had been sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then beyond my control. There were still about two thousand, mostly captured at Jonesboro', who had been sent back by cars, but had not passed Chattanooga. These I ordered back, and offered General Hood to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army as would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to their own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give him could at once be put to duty in his immediate army. Quite an angry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at the time in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of which I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as illustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with certain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, never hitherto published.

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *September* 12, 1864.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"'GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of

my staff, with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of the James, across the peninsula formed by the Appomatox and the James, and south of the Appomatox to the Weldon road. This line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men; but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg road; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not exactly see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have been taken. With these forces, my idea would have been to divide them, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should be abandoned by the enemy, you could take and open up a

new base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views, and to have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It would probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans here indicated will be executed. If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.

"'In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any living man, myself included.

"'Truly yours,

"'U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*'"

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, *September* 20, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
City Point, Virginia.

"'GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge at the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September 12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all engaged.

"I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed, and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed worthy of promotion.

"I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care, and to express their preference,

based upon claims of actual capacity and services rendered.

"These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not exist equal in number to that of the officers who really deserve promotion.

"As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being steadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms.

"We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

"Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but, until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can more thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama River and Columbus, Georgia.

"The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off all foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed. From my knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate more difficulty in getting the heavy ships

across the bar than in reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings of the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, or else it would not be attempted. If successful, I suppose that Fort Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the Savannah River. Then the reduction of that city is the next question. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people find subsistence, my army won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay an army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; but if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is an abundance of corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the enemy would doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River. Either horn of the dilemma will be worth a battle. I would prefer his holding Augusta, as the probabilities are; for then, with the Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere matter of time. This campaign can be made in the winter.

"But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by mere threatening to do so

I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not over-loyal to the South. I will therefore give it as my opinion that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and its river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession.

"I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby, west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions. They cannot hope to enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that General Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose. If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your center, and let General Canby have command over the Mississippi River and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.

"I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him everything that may occur to me of interest to you.

"'In the meantime, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks.

"'Yours as ever, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*'"

"'HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, *September* 16, 1864.

"'*General* W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

"'MY DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just received. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I have not written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta, the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that I have been suffering from my annual attack of 'coryza,' or hay-cold. It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see to write. As you suppose, I have watched your movements most attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that your campaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its results are less striking and less complete than those of General Grant at Vicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter, a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and more continuous strain upon yourself and upon your army.

"'You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro recruiting agents. Your letter was a capital one, and did much good. The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way. They were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well afford to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employes at home.

"'I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, and I fear it will not amount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn, again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the Rebellion would be crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be no draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc., has done much harm, in a military point of view. I have seen enough of politics here

to last me for life. You are right in avoiding them. McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose the respect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation with such traitors and Copperheads as B—, V—, W—, S— & Co. He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he had not the manliness to oppose it. A Major-General in the United States Army, and yet not one word to utter against Rebels or the Rebellion! I had much respect for McClellan before he became a politician, but very little after reading his letter accepting the nomination.

"'Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of Atlanta. I understand that, when here, he said that you would fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc. He is most unmeasured in his abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen of what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes. They are dictated by himself and written by W. B. and such worthies. The funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to do with his being relieved on either occasion. Moreover, I have never said anything to the President or Secretary of War to injure him in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well. His animosity arises from another source. He is aware that I know some things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, am jealous of him, etc. I know of no other reason for his hostility to me. He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don't think it will do him much good, or me much harm. I know very little of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorable man. Thomas is also a noble old war-horse. It is true, as you say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.

"'I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta,

and do not know what instructions he has sent you. I fear that Canby has not the means to do much by way of Mobile. The military effects of Banks' disaster are now showing themselves by the threatened operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus keeping in check our armies west of the Mississippi.

"'With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future success, yours truly,

"'H. W. Halleck.'"

"'Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Atlanta, Georgia, *September* 20, 1864.

"'*Major-General* Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

"'General: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the inhabitants of Atlanta.

"'In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to question my motives. I could not tamely submit to such impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such parts of the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could have had no other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people; but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meet him there too.

"'It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of the inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has been attended with no force, and that no women or children have suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors and friends.

"'My real reasons for this step were:

"'We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and occupation.

"'We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs. This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by families as residences.

"'Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly captured. As captors, we have a right to it.

"'The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

"'The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting complaints and special grievances that are not military.

"'These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General Hood and his people or not. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

"'W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.

"'*General* HOOD, commanding Confederate Army.

"'GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it to go south, and the rest north. For the latter I can provide food and transportation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the former I can provide transportation by cars

as far as Rough and Ready, and also wagons; but, that their removal may be made with as little discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the families from Rough and Ready to the cars at Lovejoy's. If you consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who prefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movable effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding, etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other. If they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so; otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may be employed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families or non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you will assist in conveying them south. If this proposition meets your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or persons sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner be harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any cars, wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point, shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to, say, two days after a certain time appointed.

"'I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in explanation, and shall await your reply. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"'W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF, September 9, 1864.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in Georgia.

"'GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You say therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove," etc. I do not consider that I have any alternative in this matter. I therefore accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and shall render all assistance in my power to expedite the transportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer to control their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundred men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order at that place, and that the removal begin on Monday next.

"'And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

"'In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'J. B. HOOD, *General.*'"

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.

"'*General* J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Co federate Army.

"'GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer

to go in that direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly.

"'You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a "brave people."

"'I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history.

"'In the name of common sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war—dark and cruel war—who dared and badgered us to

battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the—to you—hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into Rebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana; turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received! Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'W. T. SHERMAN,
"'Major-General commanding.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
September 12, 1864.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Misssispipi.

"'GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women, children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had

you seen proper to let the matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close this correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests of the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have dropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to notice, at least as far as to signify my dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence.

"'I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify the languge of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in the dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty" Your original order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced the edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interests of the United States." This alone you offered to us and the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God and man. You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded aspersions upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered and extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who desired to flee from your fraternal embraces. You are equally unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro', by General Hardee, or of Atlanta, by myself. General Hardee defended his position in front of Jonesboro', at the expense of injury to the houses; an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta at the same risk and cost.

If there was any fault in either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta, of your purposes to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his home and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of either of us. I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far above and miles beyond my line of defense. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for several weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

"'The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to me. I am only a general of one of the armies of the Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or the political questions which led to or resulted from it. These grave and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge

my country with "daring and badgering you to battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first gun was fired on either side. You say we insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired upon it, and those who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes and Indians. The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out insolent intruders and took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves, and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, my government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separated herself from your Government by nearly an unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the navy, we built and bought a

few vessels, hoisted the flag of our country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around the whole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, on the contrary, the moderation of our government toward traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies and well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my government, by acts of Congress, has consficated "all debts due Northern men for goods sold and delivered." The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property of our enemies in retaliation for their acts—declaring us traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power extended, either in their country or our own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true.

"'You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men, women, and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the claim that it is an act of "kindness to these families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping edict, covering all the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the defenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you "will make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner." And, because I characterize what you call a kindness as being real cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and chil-

dren from what you call kindness, is a "sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

"'You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purpose of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever attained by that race, in any country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to sacrifice everything for the peace and honor of the South, and refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between myself, my country, and my God.

"'You say, "Let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is—for myself, and I believe for all the true men, aye, and women and children, in my country—we will fight you to the death! Better die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your Government and your negro allies!

"'Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th of September, I close this correspondence with you; and, notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke His almighty aid in defense of justice and right.

"'Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'J. B. HOOD, *General.*'"

"'ATLANTA, GA., *September* 11, 1864.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN,

"'SIR: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but respectfully to peti-

tion you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta.

"'At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.

"'Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?" Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or friends to go to." Another says: "I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much." We reply to them: "General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General Hood will take it thence on." And they will reply to that: "But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from there on."

"'We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a large portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses enough to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings.

"'This being so, how is it possible for the people still here mostly women and children, to find any shelter? And how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter

or subsistence, in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them much, if they were willing to do so?

"'This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering cannot be described by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.

"'We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred—surely never in the United States—and what has this helpless people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

"'We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.

"'In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.

"'Respectfully submitted:

"'James M. Calhoun, Mayor.
"'E. E. Rawson, Councilman.
"'S. C. Wells, Councilman.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.

"'JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON, and S. C. WELLS, representing City Council of Atlanta.

"'GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeat the Rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws and Constitution that all must respect and obey. To defeat those armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot im-

part to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

"'You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority, wherever it once had power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I believe that such is the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into Rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and its desolation.

"'You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

"'We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your

houses, or your lands, or anything you have, but we do want and will have—a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it.

"'You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better. I repeat, then, that, by the original compact of Government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of Rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers, and ammunition, and molded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early success.

"'But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter.

"'Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle over your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste, W. T. SHERMAN,

"'Major-General commanding.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.

"'*General* J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate Army.

"'GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been carefully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by two soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit that you began the controversy by characterizing an offiical act of mine in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former answer, and to the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no "negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier left Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now. There are a few guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton.

"'I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of tne shelling of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, foundries, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice. See the books.

"'This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not begin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN,

"'Major-General commanding.'"

"'HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

"'GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also the official report of your campaign, are just received. I have not had time as yet to examine your report. The course which you have pursued in removing Rebel families from Atlanta, and in the exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department. Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own army to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy—and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which we have heretofore conquered and occupied—will justify you in gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your march farther into the enemy's country. Let the disloyal families of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and natural protectors, in the Rebel ranks; we have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly are not required to treat the so-called non-combatant Rebels better than they themselves treat each other. Even here in Virginia, within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people long enough. Let them go with their husbands and

fathers in the Rebel ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory within reach which I did not want for my own use. This the Rebels have done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia and other Rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our armies. In many sections of the country they have not left a mill to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use them to supply our armies. We must do the same.

"'I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for the last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly applied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in burning private houses or uselessly destroying private property. That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying whatever may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.

"'Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"'H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff.'"

Atlanta was in the hands of Sherman. It had been taken as the result of a grand campaign, during which the commander had revealed to his men more of his character as a soldier than they had known before. In moving an army into the enemy's country it had been necessary for officers and men to limit their impedimenta to the smallest possible burden. In this General Sherman had followed the instructions he had given and there were many division and corps commanders who had far more luxurious headquarters than the general at the head of the army.

Even the great advance thus made was not without its terrible losses. The death of McPherson had occurred at a time when it was scarcely possible to even speak of it. After the fall of Atlanta it was the constant habit of officers and

men to sit around their camp-fires and recount former experiences with the dead comrade. If all citizens could understand what satisfaction there was in these camp talks they would understand better why we perpetuate the custom now, when years have passed and the stories must of necessity be worn threadbare. But it must be remembered that the experience of an army like ours is practically limitless, and also that some of the stories bear repeating. I remember two told by an Iowa general which I have heard repeated around many a camp-fire, always with the prefacing remark, "I can only give you the incidents; nobody can tell the story like General Trumbull."

While McPherson was in command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Trumbull had a command of a division. Among them was a jovial fellow who was the life of the camp with his songs, stories and ever ready wit. He was from the Faderland, bearing the name as I remember it, of Fritz Reiser. At the battle of the Hatchie, Fritz got in the way of a cannon-ball and was obliged to have his leg amputated. He was carried to the hospital and bore the operation without a murmur, though keeping up a constant gibe at the fellows who fired the gun. One day, while Fritz was in the hospital, General McPherson came along and asked to be shown through the wards. The general was understood to be a pretty strong democrat, though he was doing his best to demonstrate that the war for the suppression of the Rebellion had not been a failure. As the general came along the wards, guided by General Trumbull, he would ask the name of the patients, and had a pleasant word for all. Fritz had recovered so far as to be as full of his jokes as usual, and when General McPherson came to his cot and asked in what battle he had been wounded, he looked up with a quaint smile and said:

"O, General, I met the democratic party the other day and they shot my leg off."

The general joined in the laugh, remarking to his guide that it was on him. Just as the officers were leaving the ward, Fritz called out:

"Say, General, where is that democratic party now? Give 'em my love—and my leg, too, if they want it to run away with."

Another of the stories connected with that campaign covered a time when the soldiers had been forced to stay in camp with little to excite them. They suffered from camp fever somewhat, but more from that dreaded homesickness, which Trumbull used to say killed more soldiers than bullets. The general commanding the post was a careful officer, and one day issued an order that the troops should be encouraged in manly diversions to take their minds off from the prevailing sickness. Early one morning after the receipt of the order, General Trumbull rode over to the headquarters of the major who was then in command of Trumbull's old regiment, and asked an orderly to call him out. The major came, and after the usual salute the following conversation ensued:

"Major, have you received new orders to-day?"

"Yes, General, I have the orders commanding officers to encourage manly diversions among the troops."

"Well, sir, you will report at my tent with the adjutant of your regiment at half past seven to-night, and we will encourage a little game of draw."

The major tells another part of the story which the general has entirely forgotten. The major says that one time that night he raised the general ten dollars when he suspected he had been bluffing.

"Oh," said the general, "that's gambling. We don't do

that; that's barred. Just a little raise of a quarter or so is sufficiently 'manly' to cover the orders."

Of course the major was forced to comply, but very soon was astonished to be raised out of his boots by the general, whose pleasant face was wreathed with a sort of ace-full smile.

"But," said the major, "I thought you didn't want us to bet so high, General."

"Well," quietly remarked the general, "I didn't then, but I feel a little more manly now."

CHAPTER XII.

FROM ATLANTA TO THE SEA—PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS.

General Sherman was a soldier of too great experience and sagacity to suppose that he was to remain long in idleness in the midst of the enemy's country and occupying one of his most important cities. He had not fully determined whether he would hold Atlanta as a military post or move to another position. Nor had it developed whether it would be better to co-operate with the army south or north of his present position. Jeff Davis' insane jealousy of Johnston made it impossible to follow out the plans which had been made by that general, and the Confederate authorities were forced to utilize the rashness of Hood to maintain their assumed position regarding military operations. But the folly of Davis was of value to Sherman as he revealed his full designs in order to fire the hearts of his supporters.

By the middle of September, General Sherman had his forces well prepared for active operations. Hood had been also making preparations, and a battle was imminent. It was Sherman's desire to do all possible toward breaking the force of the unity of feeling in Georgia. He had learned from the people that the vice president of the Confederacy was at heart a Union man, and knew he must have many friends in Georgia. Crops were ready for gathering, and the people were naturally anxious to have their friends at home to do work absolutely necessary. General Sherman's manner of treating the Georgians is well worth careful attention.

"One day two citizens, Messrs. Hill and Foster, came into our lines at Decatur, and were sent to my headquarters. They represented themselves as former members of Congress, and particular friends of my brother, John Sherman; that Mr. Hill had a son killed in the Rebel army as it fell back before us somewhere near Cassville, and they wanted to obtain the body, having learned from a comrade where it was buried. I gave them permission to go by rail to the rear, with a note to the commanding officer, General John E. Smith, at Cartersville, requiring him to furnish them an escort and an ambulance for the purpose. I invited them to take dinner with our mess, and we naturally ran into a general conversation about politics, and the devastation and ruin caused by the war. They had seen a part of the country over which the army had passed, and could easily apply its measure of desolation to the remainder of the State, if necessity should compel us to go ahead.

"Mr. Hill resided at Madison, on the main road to Augusta, and seemed to realize fully the danger; said that further resistance on the part of the South was madness, that he hoped Governor Brown, of Georgia, would so proclaim it, and withdraw his people from the Rebellion, in pursuance of what was known as the policy of 'separate State action.' I told him if he saw Governor Brown, to describe to him fully what he had seen, and to say that if he remained inert, I would be compelled to go ahead devastating the State in its whole length and breadth; that there was no adequate force to stop us, etc.; but if he would issue his proclamation withdrawing his State troops from the armies of the Confederacy, I would spare the State, and in our passage across it confine the troops to the main roads, and would, moreover, pay for all the corn and food we needed. I also told Mr. Hill that he might, in my name, invite Governor Brown to visit Atlanta;

that I would give him a safeguard, and that if he wanted to make a speech, I would guarantee him as full and respectable an audience as any he had ever spoken to. I believe that Mr. Hill, after reaching his home at Madison, went to Milledgeville, the capital of the State, and delivered the message to Governor Brown. I had also sent similar messages by Judge Wright, of Rome, Georgia, and by Mr. King, of Marietta. On the 15th of September I telegraphed to General Halleck as follows:

"'My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few more of the subordinate reports. I am awaiting a courier from General Grant. All well; the troops are in good, healthy camps, and supplies are coming forward finely. Governor Brown has disbanded his militia, to gather the corn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, and have sent them a hearty invitation. I will exchange two thousand prisoners with Hood, but no more.'

"Governor Brown's action at that time is fully explained by the following letter, since made public, which was then only known to us in part by hearsay:

"'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
MILLEDGEVILLE, GA., *September* 10, 1864.

"'*General* J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee.

"'GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for the defense of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has terminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, and as many of these left their homes without preparation, expecting to be gone but a few weeks, who have remained in service over three months, most of the time in the trenches, justice requires that they be permitted, while the enemy is preparing for the winter campaign, to

return to their homes, and look for a time after important interests, and prepare themselves for such service as may be required when another campaign commences against other important points in the State. I therefore hereby withdraw said organization from your command.

"'JOSEPH C. BROWN.'"

"This militia had composed a division under command of Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, and were thus dispersed to their homes, to gather the corn and sorghum, then ripe and ready for the harvesters.

"On the 17th I received by telegraph from President Lincoln this dispatch:

"'WASHINGTON, D. C., September 17, 1864—10 A.M.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN:

"'I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioning corn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you.

"'A. LINCOLN,

"'President of the United States.'"

"I replied at once:

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 17, 1864.

"'*President* LINCOLN, Washintgon, D. C.

"'I will keep the department fully advised of all developments connected with the subject in which you feel interested.

"'Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and Mr. King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself. I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged in Rebellion, begun in error and perpetuated in pride, but that Georgia can now save herself from the devastations of war preparing for her, only

by withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army, and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in which event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep our men to the high-roads and commons, and pay for the corn and meat we need and take.

"'I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but it would be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without surrendering principle or a foot of ground, arouse the latent enmity of Georgia against Davis.

"'The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is a Union man at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him or let him have a share in his government.

"'W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*'"

"I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at that time, seriously entertained the proposition; but he hardly felt ready to act, and simply gave a furlough to the militia, and called a special session of th Legislature, to meet at Milledgeville, to take into consideration the critical condition of affairs in the State.

"On the 20th of September Colonel Horace Porter arrived from General Grant, at City Point, bringing me the letter of September 12th, asking my general views as to what should next be done. He staid several days at Atlanta, and on his return carried back to Washington my full reports of the past campaign, and my letter of September 20th to General Grant in answer to his of the 12th.

"About this time we detected signs of activity on the part of the enemy. On the 21st Hood shifted his army across from the Macon road, at Lovejoy's, to the West Point road, at Palmetto Station, and his cavalry appeared on the west side of Chattahoochee, toward Powder Springs; thus, as it were, stepping aside, and opening wide the door for us to en-

ter Central Georgia. I inferred, however, that his real purpose was to assume the offensive against our railroads, and on the 24th a heavy force of cavalry from Mississippi, under General Forrest, made its appearance at Athens, Alabama, and captured its garrison.

"General Newton's division (of the Fourth Corps) and Corse's (of the Seventeenth) were sent back by rail, the former to Chattanooga, and the latter to Rome. On the 25th I telegraphed to General Halleck:

"'Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leaving open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busy on all our roads. A force, number estimated as high as eight thousand, are reported to have captured Athens, Alabama; and a regiment of three hundred and fifty men sent to its relief. I have sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will send another division to Rome. If I were sure that Savannah would soon be in our possession, I should be tempted to march for Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have. Jeff. Davis is at Macon. W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*'"

"On the next day I telegraphed further that Jeff. Davis was with Hood at Palmetto Station. One of our spies was there at the time, who came in the next night, and reported to me the substance of his speech to the soldiers. It was a repetition of those he had made at Columbia, South Carolina, and Macon, Georgia, on his way out, which I had seen in the newspapers. Davis seemed to be perfectly upset by the fall of Atlanta, and to have lost all sense and reason. He denounced General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown as little better than traitors; attributed to them personally the many misfortunes which had befallen their cause, and informed the

soldiers that now the tables were to be turned; that General Forrest was already on our roads in Middle Tennessee; and that Hood's army would soon be there. He asserted that the Yankee army would have to retreat or starve, and that the retreat would prove more disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow. He promised his Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soon tread their 'native soil,' etc., etc. He made no concealment of these vainglorious boasts, and thus gave us the full key to his future designs. To be forewarned was to be forearmed, and I think we took full advantage of the occasion.

"On the 26th I received this dispatch:

"'CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *September* 26, 1864—10 A. M.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN, Atlanta.

"'It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a first step, and do anything else you may feel your force sufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goes to the Alabama line, will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?

"'U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*'

"Answer:

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, *September* 26, 1864.

"'GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent one division (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome.

"'Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will not be able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to the rear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend the roads.

"'Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits

that are in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.

"'Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this, and draws his supplies by that road. Jefferson Davis is there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road.

"'Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's cavalry.

"'W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*'

"General Grant first thought I was in error in supposing that Jeff. Davis was at Macon and Palmetto, but on the 27th I received a printed copy of his speech made at Macon on the 22d, which was so significant that I ordered it to be telegraphed entire as far as Louisville, to be sent thence by mail to Washington, and on the same day received this dispatch:

"'WASHINGTON, D. C., *September* 27, 1864—9 A. M.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN, Atlanta.

"'You say Jeff. Davis is on a visit to General Hood. I judge that Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit.

"'A. LINCOLN, *President of the United States.*'

"To which I replied:

"'HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, *September* 28, 1864.

"'*President* LINCOLN, Washington, D. C.

"'I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, on the 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday. It was bitter against General Jos. Johntson and Governor Brown. The militia are on furlough. Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to get a Legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless in concert with other

Governors. Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here, and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are here now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back to Madison and Milledgeville.

"'Great efforts are being made to reinforce Hood's army, and to break up my railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force at Nashville. It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to send back any considerable part of my army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if the occasion calls for it.

"'W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*'"

General Sherman was anxious to render some relief to the Union prisoners confined at Andersonville. Reports had been brought to camp of the terrible condition there, and it was hard to keep the men from serious revenge, so bitterly did they resent the treatment of their comrades by the Confederacy. General Sherman corresponded with General Hood, and received ready acceptance of his offer to furnish supplies for the prisoners. They were asked for from the Sanitary Commission at St. Louis, but did not reach the men till after they had been transferred to Jacksonville.

Towards the last of September General Grant became convinced that an attack was to be made all along our lines for the purpose of driving Sherman out of Georgia. He telegraphed his expectations to Sherman, and was urged to furnish as many troops as possible in order that what had been gained might be held and further advance made. Early in October the intentions of the enemy were plain, and General Sherman prepared to receive them when their attack was made with such force as would make their defeat certain.

The army had undergone changes since the capture of Atlanta. General Schofield had gone to the rear, leaving

General J. D. Cox in command of the Army of the Ohio, (Twenty-third Corps). General Thomas had been sent to Chattanooga, with Newton's division of the Fourth Corps and Morgan's of the Fourteenth Corps, leaving General D. S. Stanley, remaining and available for this movement, and after General Dodge was wounded, his corps (the Sixteenth) had been broken up, and its two divisions were added to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, constituting the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General O. O. Howard. Generals Logan and Blair had gone home to assist in the political canvass, leaving their corps, viz., the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, under the command of Major-Generals Osterhaus and T. E. G. Ransom. These five corps were very much reduced in strength, by detachments and by discharges, so that for the purpose of fighting Hood there was only about sixty thousand infantry and artillery, with two small divisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and Garrard's). General Elliot was the chief of cavalry to the Army of the Cumberland, and was the senior officer of that arm of service present for duty.

We had railroad guards at all places of importance between Marietta, Ringgold, and Chattanooga. All the important bridges were protected by block-houses, and capable of defense against cavalry or infantry; and at nearly all the regular railroad-stations we had smaller detachments intrenched. There was little fear of the enemy's cavalry damaging our roads seriously, for they rarely made a break which could not be repaired in a few days; but it was necessary to keep General Hood's infantry off the main route of communication. Forrest had with him in Middle Tennessee eight thousand cavalry, and Hood's army was stated at from thirty-five to forty thousand men, infantry and artillery, including Wheeler's cavalry, then about three thousand strong.

We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th of October, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, and the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw. The telegraph-wires had been cut above Marietta, and it was inferred that Allatoona was their objective point; and on the 4th of October from Vining's Station to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the enemy, a message was signaled for General Corse, at Rome, to hurry back to the assistance of the garrison at Allatoona.

From the heights of Kenesaw, General Sherman gazed anxiously toward Allatoona. He knew General Corse, and believed if he were there the place would be defended. Late in the evening of October 5th the signal officer at Kenesaw reported that he had just had a signal that Corse was there, and General Sherman dispatched General Cox, with the Twenty-third Corps to his assistance, and the outcome was watched with great anxiety. On the 6th the following dispatch was received from General Corse.

"I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all hell yet; my losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro' to Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.

"JOHN M. CORSE, *Brigadier-General.*"

General Corse's report of this fight at Allatoona is full and graphic. It is dated Rome, October 27, 1864; and says that he received his orders by signal to go to the assistance of Allatoona on the 4th, when he telegraphed to Kingston for cars, and a train of thirty was started for him, but ten of them got off the track and caused delay. By 7 P. M. he had at Rome twenty cars, which he loaded with Colonel Rowett's brigade, and part of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry; started at 8 P. M., reached Allatoona at 1 A. M. of the 5th, and sent the

train back for more men; but the road was in bad order, and no more men came in time. He found Colonel Tourtellotte's garrison composed of eight hundred and ninety men; his reinforcement was one thousand and fifty-four: total for the defense, nineteen hundred and forty-four. The outposts were already engaged, and at daylight he drew back the men to the ridge on which the redoubts were built.

The enemy was composed of French's division of three brigades, reported from four to five thousand strong. This force surrounded the place by 8 A. M., when General French sent in by flag of truce this note:

"AROUND ALLATOONA, *October*, 5, 1864.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, United States Forces, Allatoona:

"I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you to surrender your forces at once, and unconditionally.

"'Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners of war.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

"S. G. FRENCH,

"*Major-General commanding forces Confederate States.*"

General Corse answered at once:

"HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION FIFTEENTH CORPS,
ALLATOONA, GA., 8-30 A. M., *October* 5, 1864.

"*Major-General* S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States, etc.

"Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that

we are prepared for the 'needless effusion of blood' whenever it is agreeable to you.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN M. CORSE,

"*Brigadier-General commanding forces United States.*"

The attack began immediately from front, flank, and rear. There were two small redoubts, with parapets and ditches, one on each side of the railroad-cut. These redoubts had been located by Colonel Poe, United States Engineer, the previous June. Each redoubt overlooked the storehouses by the railroad, and could aid the other by catching in flank the attacking force of either. Our troops endeavored to hold some ground outside the redoubts, but were soon driven inside, when the enemy made assaults, but were always driven back. About 11 A. M., Colonel Redfield, of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, was killed, and Colonel Rowett was wounded, but never ceased to fight and encourage his men. Colonel Tourtellotte was shot through the hips, but continued to command. General Corse was shot across the face, the ball cutting his ear, which stunned him, but he continued to encourage his men and to give orders. The enemy (about 1:30 P. M.) made a last effort to carry one of the redoubts, but was cut to pieces by the artillery and infantry fire from the other, when he began to draw off, leaving his dead and wounded on the ground.

"Before finally withdrawing, General French converged a heavy fire of his cannon on the block-house at Allatoona Creek, about two miles from the depot, set it on fire, and captured its garrison, consisting of four officers and eighty-five men. By 4 P. M. he was in full retreat south, on the Dallas road, and got by before the head of General Cox's column had reached it; still several ambulances and strag-

glers were picked up by this command on that road. General Corse reported two hundred and thirty-one Rebel dead, four hundred and eleven prisoners, three regimental colors, and eight hundred muskets captured."

General Sherman esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and important that it was made the subject of a general order, viz., No. 86, of October 7, 1864:

"The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in the handsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the most important principle in war, that fortified posts should be defended to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked. The thanks of this army are due and are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtellotte, Colonel Rowett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallant defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate the importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger when present, boldly, and manfully, and well.

"Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby instructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades at the front.

"By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

"L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-camp.*"

General Sherman confused the enemy by the rapidity of his movements, and his own troops were proportionately enthusiastic. We could see daily progress toward the completion of our task. In the midst of war the thought of peace was gloriously exciting. Seated around camp-fires, with an almost certainty of a bitter fight on the morrow, soldiers would talk of conquering, of peace, and of the happiness of their return home as if bullets were made of love letters, and can-

non-balls of pudding. The situation on the 9th of October is stated in the following dispatches, the first to General Thomas at Nashville, the second to Grant at City Point, Virginia.

"I came up here to relieve our road. The Twentieth Corps remains at Atlanta. Hood reached the road and broke it up between Big Shanty and Acworth. He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. We have plenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce. I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea-coast. We cannot defend this long line of road."

"To General Grant:

"It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma & Talladega road, at Blue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people, will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result. I can make this march and make Georgia howl! We have on hand over eight thousand head of cattle and three million rations of bread, but no corn. We can find plenty of forage in the interior of the State."

General Forrest with his Rebel cavalry was making much trouble and materially aiding General Hood in keeping up the fight on the main army. Both these Confederates were

doing all the damage possible by burning railroads, bridges and even supplies when they were unable to prevent the latter from falling into our hands. Hood made an attack on Colonel Clark B. Weaver at Resaca and sent to the garrison the following communication, calling for an unconditional surrender:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, *October* 12, 1864.

"*To the Officer commanding the United States Forces at Resaca, Georgia.*

"SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paralled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.

"Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. B. HOOD, *General.*"

To this Colonel Weaver, in command replied:

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,
FIFTEENTH CORPS, RESACA, GA., *October* 12, 1864.

"*To General* J. B. HOOD:

"Your communication of this date just received. In reply, I have to state that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, to the effect that, if the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken. In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it.

"I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, CLARK R. WEAVER, *Commanding Officer.*"

General Hood did not "come and take it," but made that battle entirely on paper, saving himself much trouble.

Toward the last of October General Sherman received a

dispatch from General Halleck intimating that the authorities at Washington were willing to allow him to undertake the march to the sea. That other generals were afraid of the undertaking is seen by the following correspondence between Sherman and Thomas:

"Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions. Re-establish the road, and I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move to Blue Mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the country."

General Thomas' reply was:

"NASHVILLE, *October* 17, 1864—10.30 A. M.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN:

"Your dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 P. M. of the 16th, just received. Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions, Wagner's and Morgan's, was to move up Lookout Valley this A. M., to intercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport. I will order him to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct the road as soon as possible. Will also reorganize the guards for posts and block-houses. Mower and Wilson have arrived, and are on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant cannot co-operate with you as at first arranged.

"GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Major-General.*"

So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General Thomas heartily favored the proposed plan of campaign. On the same day, Sherman wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga:

"Hood is not at Dear Head Cove. We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette. Hood is moving south via Summerville,

Alpine, and Gadsden. If he enters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think he has given up all such idea. I want the road repaired to Atlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; my army recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war. It is folly for us to be moving our armies on the reports of scouts and citizens. We must maintain the offensive. Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right—the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas of these my views. We must follow Hood till he is beyond the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive."

After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled to go on to Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by Decatur and abandon altogether his attempt to make Sherman let go his hold of Atlanta by attacking our communications. It was clear he had no intention to meet us in open battle, and the lightness and celerity of his army proved we could not possibly catch him on a stern-chase. We therefore quietly followed him down the Chattanooga Valley to the neighborhood of Gadsden.

General Slocum, in Atlanta, had likewise sent out, under strong escort, large trains of wagons to the east and brought back corn, bacon, and all kinds of provisions, so that Hood's efforts to cut off our supplies only reacted on his own people. So long as the railroads were in good order, our supplies came full and regular from the North; but when the enemy broke our railroads we were justified in stripping the inhabitants of all they had.

On the 19th of October Sherman telegraphed to General Halleck, at Washington:

"Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south. Our advance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-

office. I shall pursue him as far as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venture toward Tennessee except around by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps back to General Thomas, and leave him, with that corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the Tennessee River; and with the rest I will push into the heart of Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads of the State. The break in our railroad at Big Shanty is almost repaired, and that about Dalton should be done in ten days. We find abundance of forage in the country."

On the same day he telegraphed to General L. C. Easton, chief-quartermaster, who had been absent on a visit to Missouri, but had got back to Chattanooga:

"Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and make all orders in my name that will expedite its completion. I want it finished, to bring back from Atlanta to Chattanooga the sick and wounded men and surplus stores. On the 1st of November I want nothing in front of Chattanooga except what we can use as food and clothing, and haul in our wagons. There is plenty of corn in the country, and we only want forage for the posts. I allow ten days for all this to be done by which time I expect to be at or near Atlanta."

He also telegraphed General Amos Beckwith, chief-commissary in Atlanta:

"Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary for war. Send all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirty days' food and but little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta, and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the sea-shore. Make all dispositions accordingly. I will go down the Coosa until I am sure that Hood has gone to Blue Mountain."

On the 21st of October we reached Gaylesville, bivouacked in an open field back of the village, and remained there till the 28th.

General Grant, in designating General Wilson to command the cavalry, predicted that he would, by his personal activity, increase the effect of that arm "fifty per cent.," and he advised that he should be sent south, to accomplish all proposed to be done with the main army, but Sherman had not so much faith in cavalry, and preferred to adhere to his original intention of going with a competent force.

About this time General Beauregard had reached Hood's army at Gadsden. Without assuming direct command of that army, he had authority from the Confederate Government to direct its movements, and to call to his assistance the whole strength of the South. His orders, on assuming command, were full of alarm and desperation, dated—

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
October 17, 1864.

"In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military Division of the West, I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and sections, for their generous support. In assigning me to this responsible position, the President of the Confederate States has extended to me the assurance of his earnest support. The Executives of your States meet me with similar expressions of their devotion to our cause. The noble army in the field, composed of brave men and gallant officers, are strangers to me, but I know they will do all that patriots can achieve.

"The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta. He can and must be driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia and surrounding States to speak the word, and the work is done. We have abundant provisions. There

are men enough in the country, liable to and able for service, to accomplish the result.

"My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days that are past, and, with the blessing of a kind and overruling Providence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil. The security of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriotism, summon us to the field. We can not, dare not, will not fail to respond. Full of hope and confidence, I come to join you in your struggles, sharing your privations, and, with your brave and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country! * * * *

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, *General.*"

General Beauregard made his fight also on paper, and saved his precious life that he might engage in other operations more profitable than fighting General Sherman. But Generals Hood and Forrest were doing all the good possible to their cause by roaming through the country and terrifying the people of the North by giving the reliable correspondents opportunity of supplying much reading matter of an exciting character to their papers. During October it was apparent that the people of the North had become alarmed, and it was predicted that General Sherman would be gobbled by that terrible thing, "the Rebel cavalry." November 1st General Sherman telegraphed the situation to Grant and received the following reply:

"CITY POINT, *November* 1, 1864—6 P. M.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN:

"Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone

so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is far away he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing in the other. If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary. "U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"ROME, GEORGIA, *November* 2, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

"Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I may turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee River. General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama. No single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff Davis' cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by maneuvering. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his. W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

By this date, under the energetic action of Colonel W. W. Wright, the railroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was repaired so far as to admit of the passage of cars, and Sherman transferred his headquarters to Kingston as more central; and from that place, on the same day, again telegraphed to General Grant:

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, *November* 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my movements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement through Georgia.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

That same day he received the following in answer to the Rome dispatch:

"CITY POINT, VA., *November* 2, 1864—11.30 A. M.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN: Your dispatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, ought to be looked upon now as the 'object.' With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.

"I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are

to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.

"U. S. GRANT *Lieutenant-General.*"

This was the first time that General Grant assented to the "march to the sea," and, although many of his warm friends and admirers insist that he was the author and projector of that march, General Grant never thought so or said so. The truth is fully given in an original letter of President Lincoln, which Sherman received at Savannah, Georgia, every word of which is in his own familiar handwriting. It is dated—

"WASHINGTON, *December* 26, 1864.

"When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering 'nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce; and, taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide. A. LINCOLN."

Says Sherman himself:

"Of course, this judgment, made after the event, was extremely flattering, and was all I ever expected, a recognition of the truth and of its importance. I have often been asked, by well-meaning friends, when the thought of that march first

entered my mind. I knew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlanta could not turn back. It must go ahead, but when, how, and where, depended on many considerations. As soon as Hood had shifted across from Lovejoy's to Palmetto, I saw the move in my 'mind's eye;' and, after Jeff. Davis' speech at Palmetto, of September 26th, I was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as to the time and manner. When General Hood first struck our railroad above Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forced to watch his movements further, till he had 'carromed' off to the west of Decatur. Then I was perfectly convinced, and had no longer a shadow of doubt. The only possible question was as to Thomas' strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field. I did not suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attack fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur, and Nashville; but he did so, and in so doing he played into our hands perfectly.

"On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and telegraphed to General Grant, reviewing the whole situation, gave him my full plan of action, stated that I was ready to march as soon as the election was over, and appointed November 10th as the day for starting. On the 8th I received this dispatch:

"'CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *November 7, 1864—10.30* P. M.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN:

"'Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no present reason for changing your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do I will inform you. I think everything here is favorable now. Great good fortune attends you! I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for.

"'U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*'

"Meantime trains of cars were whirling by, carrying to the rear an immense amount of stores which had accumulated at Atlanta, and at the other stations along the railroad; and General Steedman had come down to Kingston, to take charge of the final evacuation and withdrawal of the several garrisons below Chattanooga.

"On the 10th of November the movement may be said to have fairly begun. All the troops designed for the campaign were ordered to march for Atlanta, and General Corse, before evacuating his post at Rome, was ordered to burn all the mills, factories, etc., etc., that could be useful to the enemy, should he undertake to pursue us, or resume military possession of the country. This was done on the night of the 10th, and next day Corse reached Kingston. On the 11th General Thomas and I interchanged full dispatches. He had heard of the arrival of General A. J. Smith's two divisions at Paducah, which would surely reach Nashville much sooner than General Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he was perfectly satisfied with his share of the army.

"On the 12th, with a full staff, I started from Kingston for Atlanta; and about noon of that day we reached Cartersville, and sat on the edge of a porch to rest, when the telegraph operator, Mr. Van Valkenburg, or Eddy, got the wire down from the poles to his lap, in which he held a small pocket instrument. Calling 'Chattanooga,' he received this message from General Thomas, dated—

"'NASHVILLE, *November* 12, 1864—8:30 A. M.

"'*Major-General* SHERMAN:

"'Your dispatch of twelve o'clock last night is received. I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and, if he attempts to follow you, I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly or-

SHERMAN'S ARMY LEAVING ATLANTA.

ganize my troops, and believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly.

"'The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. I have no additional news to report from the direction of Florence.

"'I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will have at least a clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully equal your expectations.

"'GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Major General.*'

"I answered simply: 'Dispatch received—all right.' About that instant of time, some of our men burnt a bridge, which severed the telegraph-wire, and all communication with the rear ceased thenceforth.

"As we rode on toward Atlanta that night, I remember the railroad trains going to the rear with a furious speed; the engineers and the few men about the trains waving us an affectionate adieu. It surely was a strange event—two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspired with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the Rebel army and the Rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for better or worse, it would end the war."

CHAPTER XIII.

ON THE MARCH.

On the 12th of November our army started on a march, having cut entirely all communication with the rear, and relying upon our own resources and what we could find in the enemy's country. Two days later the entire army was in motion, with the intent of cutting its way through to the sea.

The army was divided into two wings, right and left, commanded as to its two wings by Major Generals O. O. Howard, and H. W. Slocum.

"The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Major-General P. J. Osterhaus commanding, and the Seventeenth Corps, Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding.

"The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-General Jefferson C. Davis commanding, and the Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding.

"The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Corse.

"The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by Major-General J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals M. D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith.

"The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A. Baird.

"The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals N. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and W. T. Ward.

"The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my own orders. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and was composed of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, of Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins, of Illinois."

Having sifted out the sick and non-combatants, the force was about 55,329 of infantry; 5,063 of cavalry; 1,812 of artillery, in all 62,204, officers and men. The General Orders issued just before starting show how carefully and skillfully the whole thing had been planned and what reason General Grant had for his constant assertion that Sherman would strike salt water somewhere.

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 119.]

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, *November* 8, 1884.

"The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform the officers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one. All the chances of war have been considered and provided for, as far as human sagacity can. All he asks of you is to maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which have characterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strike a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producing what we all so much desire, his complete overthrow. Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers or foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not

be loaded with anything but provisions and ammunition.

"All surplus servants, non-combatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.

"By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

"L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-Camp.*"

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 120.]

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, *November* 9, 1864.

"1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into two wings viz.:

"The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.

"2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

"3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition train and provision train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels.

"The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

"4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled.

"5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, acording to the measure of such hostility.

"6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses, to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to

serve as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion of their maintenance.

"7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

"8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, repair roads and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practice the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

"9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and organized; and the commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at all times.

"By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

"L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-Camp.*"

Cutting our bridges behind us, it was necessary to deceive the enemy as to our objective points. For this reason the right wing with the cavalry followed the railroad southeast toward Jonesboro', and General Slocum, with the Twentieth Corps led off toward the east by Decatur, thus following diverging roads, and apparently threatening both Macon and

Augusta. The true point was Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, and the entire army was to be there in one week.

The army was in prime marching order and the boys swung along singing patriotic airs, and apparently bent on a picnic. There permeated the army a firm belief that we were really marching home, and whenever General Sherman passed along the lines they would salute him with some jolly expression indicative of the universal feeling. The army passed through Covington on the 16th and it was both amusing and touching in the extreme to see the negroes crowd around General Sherman and shout their gladness. General Sherman relates the following incident occurring at Covington:

"I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, to avoid the crowd that followed the marching column that some one brought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson, who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached me after we had passed the main part of the town. I asked to be excused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at the crossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the east of the town. Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to a plantation house close by, where were assembled many negroes, among them an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw. I asked him if he undertsood about the war and its progress. He said he did; that he had been looking for the 'angel of the Lord' ever since he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting for the Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that our success was to be his freedom. I asked him if all the negro slaves comprehended this fact, and he said they surely did. I then explained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where they were, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eat up the food needed for our fighting-men; that our success was their as-

sured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, hearty men as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old and young, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down and cripple us in our great task. I think Major Henry Hitchcock was with me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, and I believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which was carried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, and that it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred of swelling our numbers so that famine would have attended our progress. It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed me with a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum molasses under his arm, and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating, and, catching my eye, he remarked *sotto voce* and carelessly to a comrade, 'Forage liberally on the country,' quoting from my general orders. On this occasion, as on many others that fell under my personal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foraging must be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and that all provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular commissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept their ranks."

Foraging was reduced to a system by the army. The forage parties were strung out so as to serve as flankers, and each officer of divisions and regiments adopted various ingenious devices for the collection of the supplies needed. They were taken from whatever point the men could secure them, and were packed in all sorts of vehicles, and in all strange manner on the backs of horses, mules, and even cows. These gangs were called "Sherman's bummers," and it may well be believed they were the terror of the residents.

On the morning of the 23d we reached Milledgeville, and found that the army had kept its appointment. General Sherman told the boys they had observed the time-table ex-

cellently, and they replied that they had lost no meals in consequence. At this point we found the first Southern newspapers we had seen since we left Atlanta, and they revealed the state of feeling among the people at the outrageous proceedings of Sherman's army in marching directly through their country. Judging from the tone of the editorials and communications published in these papers, it was evidently the intention of some sober-minded and prudent Southrons to absolutely annihilate the army, and use the trappings for harness to their mules for another century. The following are a few of the appeals. It will be seen that some of the Southern members of Congress were as valiant as many in the North have been since they could fight Southern brigadiers in the safety of Washington.

"CORINTH, MISSISSIPPI, *November 18, 1864.*

"*To the People of Georgia:*

"Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally around your patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy all the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in an overruling Providence, and success will crown your efforts. I hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

"RICHMOND, *November 18, 1864.*

"*To the People of Georgia:*

"You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the enemy. Put everything at the disposal of our generals; remove all provisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructions in his path.

"Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade

and ax can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy by retarding his march.

"Georgians, be firm! Act promptly, and fear not!

"B. H. Hill, *Senator.*"

"I most cordially approve the above.

"James A. Seddon, *Secretary of War.*"

"Richmond, *November, 19 1864.*

"*To the People of Georgia:*

"We have had a special conference with President Davis and the Secretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have done and are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency that presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night and by day. Let him have no rest.

"Julian Hartridge, Mark Blauford,
"J. H. Reynolds, General N. Lester.
"John T. Shoemaker, Joseph M. Smith,
"*Members of Congress.*"

How much these appeals disturbed our army may be understood by the frolics they enjoyed at the capital of Georgia. One night the boys got together at the State House and organized a full legislature and voted to repeal the act by which Georgia was taken out of the Union. When the declaration of the vote was taken I could not help feeling that it was far more in accordance with the real sentiment of the people of Georgia than was that other vote forced on them by the fire-eaters, who had nothing to lose and all to gain by their course.

From Milledgeville we were to proceed to Savannah, the army being divided as before, and one portion having the pleasant task of going by way of Millen to release our prisoners held there by the enemy. We encountered the Rebel General Wheeler with his cavalry, but they were not in sufficient force to make any serious trouble. General Hardee had also been sent to his native State to fire the hearts of the people against us, but either his tinder was defective, or the hearts rather damp, for his mission was not a success. On the 26th we reached Sandersville, and here a brigade of Rebel cavalry revealed their intention of burning all the supplies in our line, so that we should have no food to sustain our army. General Sherman promptly gave orders to burn the houses, and when he entered the town he told the people that if the plan of burning as indicated that day were carried out he would not leave a house standing in the State. This was the means of changing the plans of the Rebels, who saw that we had the power to execute the threat. Those who have believed that no wrong was committed except by Sherman's army may read the following incident, which to my personal recollection did make the General "mad" as he found it out.

"On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of the main road, marching through the fields. Close by, in the corner of a fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome young officer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo planted in the road. He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, and told me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade staff of the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horse had exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all the flesh from one of his legs. I saw the terrible wound, and made full inquiry into the facts. There had been no resistance at that point, nothing to give warning of danger, and the Rebels had

planted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction matches to explode them by being trodden on. This was not war, but murder, and it made me very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of Rebel prisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picks and spades, and made them march in close order along the road, so as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up. They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help laughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it was supposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but they found no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister."

By the 10th of December the army had completely invested Savannah. General Sherman discovered that the defenses of the city were commanded by General Hardee, and determined to try to open communication with our fleet, supposed to be in Ossabaw Sound with supplies of clothing for us. General Sherman's story of the closing scenes of this part of our tramp will recall pleasant memories to those who watched the operations of the army from near the rice mill where we first really saw that we had reached the sea, in a manner effective.

"Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by General Howard, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee, ten miles to the rice plantation of a Mr. Cheeves, where General Howard had established a signal-station to overlook the lower river, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron, which, the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightly sent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeechee as near to Fort McAllister as it was safe.

"On reaching the rice-mill at Cheeves', I found a guard and a couple of twenty-pound Parrot guns, of De Gres' battery, which fired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly

seen over the salt marsh, about three miles distant. Fort McAllister had the Rebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back across the marsh to where we were, but otherwise everything about the place looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath.

"The signal officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole of the rice-mill. Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw, we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom I could communicate with the signal officer above, and at the same time look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee River at Fort McAllister. About 2 P. M. we observed signs of commotion in the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and some musket skirmishing in the woods close by.

"This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had been anxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal officer discovered about three miles above the fort a signal flag, with which he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, who was preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I was there. On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fort to be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance of General Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soon attempt the assault. The sun was rapidly declining, and I was dreadfully impatient. At that very moment some one discovered a faint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along the horizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little by little grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of a steamer coming up the river. 'It must be one of our squadron!' Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and our attention was divided between this approaching steamer and the expected assault. When the sun was about an hour high, another signal message came

from General Hazen that he was all ready, and I replied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from below. Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of this vessel, signaling with a flag, 'Who are you?' The answer went back promptly, 'General Sherman.' Then followed the question, 'Is fort McAllister taken?' 'Not yet, but it will be in a minute!' Almost at that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the dark fringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as on parade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steady pace. Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belching forth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaulting lines. One color went down, but it was up in a moment. On the lines advanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was a pause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and the parapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in the air, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that we did. Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantly sent by the signal officer to our navy friends on the approaching gun-boat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister from their view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must have heard the cannonading.

"During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves' mill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on the parapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro at Cobb's plantation, 'This nigger will have no sleep this night!'

"I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, which happened to be a beautiful moonlight one. At the wharf belonging to Cheeves' mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our men in fishing or in gathering oysters. I was there in a minute, called for a volunteer crew, when sev-

eral young officers, Nichols and Merritt among the number, said they were good oarsmen, and volunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister. General Howard asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of the boat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will. The tide was setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though the distance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was so crooked that the actual distance was fully six miles. On the way down we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk some years before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister.

"Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach. I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was. He answered that the general was at the house of the overseer of the plantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it. We accordingly landed, tied our boat to a drift-log, and followed our guide through bushes to a frame house, standing in a grove of live-oaks, near a row of negro quarters. General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of getting supper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, for we were really very hungry. Of course, I congratulated Hazen most heartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution very highly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail the exact results. The fort was an inclosed work, and its land front was in the nature of a bastion and curtinas, with good parapet, ditch, *fraise*, and *chevaux-de-frise*, made out of the large branches of live-oaks. Luckily, the Rebels had left the larger and unwieldly trunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for the skirmish line, which crept behind these logs, and from them kept the artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately.

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one

from below, one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along the capital. All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis and line of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailants than the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark. Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two. Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and the garrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty of them killed or wounded), were in his power. The commanding officer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, and General Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did.

"Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was in the river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a point of timber, and I was determined to board her that night, at whatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going on in the outer world. Accordingly, after supper, we all walked down to the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been, entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, and the sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outside the fort was full of torpedoes. Indeed, while we were there, a torpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was hunting for a dead comrade. Inside the fort lay the dead as they had fallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their living comrades sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight. In the river close by the fort was a good yawl tied to a stake, but the tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to the bank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, manned the boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, I entered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings of all about torpedoes.

"The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find

the gunboat within a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully three miles, and not seeing the gun-boat, I began to think she had turned and gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends of the river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light, and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor. Pulling alongside, we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth and enthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among them Captain Williamson, United States Navy. She proved to be the Dandelion, a tender of the regular gun-boat Flag, posted at the mouth of the Ogeechee. All sorts of questions were made and answered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached the squadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and they had been expecting us for some days. They explained that Admiral Dahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was then engaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was on his flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; that General J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South, with his headquarters at Hilton Head, and that several ships loaded with stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in Port Royal Sound. From these officers I also learned that General Grant was still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters and things generally remained pretty much the same as when we had left Atlanta. All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia, cut off from all communication with our friends; and the Rebel papers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, and fleeing for safety to the coast. I then asked for pen and paper, and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren, General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general terms the actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of Fort McAllister, and of my desire that means

should be taken to establish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeechee to the rear of the army. As a sample, I give one of these notes, addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication, to relieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:

"ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, *December* 13, 1864—11.50 P. M.

"*To Hon.* E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

"To-day at 5 P. M., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison and stores. This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down to this gun-boat to communicate with the fleet. Before opening communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading into Savannah, and invested the city. The left of the army is on the Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on the Ogeechee, at King's Bridge. The army is in splendid order, and equal to anything. The weather has been fine, and supplies were abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all molested by guerrillas.

"We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister, could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can go ahead.

"We have already captured two boats on the Savannah River, and prevented their gun-boats from coming down.

"I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, and the garrison at fifteen thousand. General Hardee commands.

"We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a large supply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our teams are in far better condition than when we started.

"My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses. We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of rails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee's and Hood's armies.

"The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communication with our fleet and our consequent independence as to supplies, dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve the army.

"I regard Savannah as already gained.

"Yours truly,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

After he had completed his plans for the siege of Savannah General Sherman received letters from General Grant urging him to move his army toward Richmond. This was a serious disappointment to General Sherman, and to his army. It had been believed possible to take Savannah, and the army was ripe for the work. The correspondence shows the feeling of Sherman and his officers.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *December* 3, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding armies near Savannah, Georgia.

"GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by Colonel Markland, special agent of the post-office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast.

"Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from congratulating you and those under your com-

mand, until bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

"Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

"In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

"Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled, if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papers better than I can give it.

"After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me.

"Yours truly,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *December* 6, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army.

"You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will probably take them three months without interruption to re-establish a through line from east to west. In that time I think the job here will be effectually completed.

"My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

"Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to force him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow. The result will probably be

known in New York before Colonel Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock will give you full information of all operations now in progress.

"Very respectfully your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by sea was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the course of events that I was very much concerned. I supposed, as a matter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, ready to convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orders contemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind, I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, and sent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoiter the ground, and to prepare it so as to make it a fortified camp large enough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that would thus be left behind.

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS.,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, *December* 16, 1864.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
City Point, Virginia.

"GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands of Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 3d, and last night at the hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previously made you a hasty scrawl from the tug-boat Dandelion, in Ogeechee River, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast, destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investing closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the fleet.

"Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements which were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to our possession. But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty or sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah, if time will allow.

"At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely, with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware of its importance; but, since passing down the river with General Foster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably adapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an army operating against Savannah. Sea-going vessels can easily come to King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half miles due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all our camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favored with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy details are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes, so that I have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, by liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival except bread. Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight to twenty days' supply per corps, and some of the troops only had one day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they did not want, for sweet potatoes were very abundant, as well as corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We started with about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over ten thousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep, hogs, and the

cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses, we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have no doubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteen thousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our columns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, and each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom was for each brigade to send out daily a foraging party of about fifty men, on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of about forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number of horses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my order, because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too many idlers mounted. General Easton is now engaged in collecting statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at was fully attained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them. All these animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations, or by the quartermaster's department, after they are systematically accounted for. While General Easton is collecting transportation for my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island all our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort McAllister, covered by the Ogeechee River, and intrenchments to be erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is now reconnoitering the ground, but in the meantime will act as I have begun, as

though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely, the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks and feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I will place some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from General Foster, in position, near enough to reach the center of the city, and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard the city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across the narrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.

"If I had time, Savannah with all its dependent fortifications, would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues of supply.

"The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to the city, in both of which he has been foiled—General Slocum (whose left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first boat, and in the second instance driving back two gun-boats and capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a crew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Island and the upper end of Hutchinson Island, and has a brigade on the South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of his corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of plan made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in *statu quo* till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you require at James River, which I will accompany and command in person. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry, say five thousand three hundred, and, it may be, a division of the Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the Ogeechee, where, in co-

operation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of Port Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer that other less valuable troops should be sent to reinforce Foster from some other quarter. My four corps, full of experience and full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand fighting men, will be a reinforcement that Lee cannot disregard. Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, it may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, by sea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the middle of January.

"I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in Tennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas assured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him of the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee.

"Why he did not turn him at Franklin, after checking and discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of Waynesburg. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action; but he is judicious and brave, and the troops feel great confidence in him. I still hope he will outmaneuver and destroy Hood.

"As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has good artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to

ten thousand militia. In all our marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use anything but a skirmish line, though at several points he had erected fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats. In Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah River about three miles above the city, around by a branch of the Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt marshes and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common corduroy roads.

"There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women and children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed them beyond a few days I cannot imagine. I know that his requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills which could alone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can draw nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the southeast, and that by a disused wagon road. I could easily get possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main army. Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the weather is splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personal dislike to turning northward. I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah, but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it will require to obtain transportation by sea.

"I am, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Major-General United States Army.*"

Having concluded preparations, General Sherman dispatched (by flag of truce) into Savannah by the hands of Colonel Ewing, a demand for the surrender of the place. The following letter gives the result:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., }
IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, *December* 17, 1864. }

"*General* WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces in Savannah.

"GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew, that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the reduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army—burning to avenge the National wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war. I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, to be used by you for what it is worth.

"I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, SAVANNAH, GA., *December* 17, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces near Savannah, Georgia.

"GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from you of this date, in which you demand 'the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts,' on the ground that you 'have received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the city,' and for the further reason that you 'have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied.' You add that, should you be 'forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will make little effort to restrain your army,' etc., etc. The position of your forces, a half mile beyond the outer line for the land defense of Savannah, is, at the nearest point, at least four miles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line are both intact.

"Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is incorrect. I am in free and constant communication with my department.

"Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts is refused.

"With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of your letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with) I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from them in future.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"W. J. HARDEE, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GA., *December* 18, 1864—8 P. M.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

"GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and to-day received his answer —refusing; copies of both letters are herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my lines are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But I myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards beyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no pickets outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R. Cuyler, president of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a prisoner in our hands) that the mile-posts are measured from the Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river. By to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not. From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat that we can see nothing from any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feels confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two points in front of General Davis' (Fourteenth) Corps. All of General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of an enemy.

Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a sufficient number of boats, I shall make a co-operative demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like very much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for the James River as soon as General Easton, who is now gone to Port Royal for that purpose, reports to me that he has an approximate number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated forces. I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for already the movement of our transports and the gun-boats has required more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs; there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and there are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to have the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We find only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. All these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc., en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remark that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with his department. This language he thought would deceive me; but I am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the Union Plank road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah. We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it from the three-mile post back to the bridge

(about twelve miles). In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to assault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it, the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the batteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faint belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay operations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.

"I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Major-General United States Army.*"

On receipt of Hardee's letter General Sherman sought other means of bringing the enemy to terms. He desired to avoid the sacrifice involved in an assault, and pushed his troops around the city, so that if an assault were made he might capture the whole of Hardee's army. On the night of the 21st, General Hardee evacuated the post he had asserted his ability to hold, and the next day our troops entered the city of Savannah, General Sherman sending to President Lincoln the following, announcing the happy ending of the expedition:

THE ADVANCE GUARD BEFORE SAVANNAH.

"I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."

It is well here to note certain facts bearing closely upon the argument that the Rebels treated their prisoners as well as was possible. Our army had marched over three hundred miles through the enemy's country, and near the prison pen at Andersonville, and had subsisted on the surplus products gathered by the soldiers as their only means of subsistence, their base of supplies having been cut off at Atlanta. There was not a man with the army on the march who did not learn enough of the facts regarding the resoucres of the South to understand that something else than poverty forced the starving of the poor fellows at Andersonville.

Shortly after Christmas General Sherman received the following from Mr. Lincoln. Even at this day its reading brings a thrill of pleasure as it recalls the effect of such news as was contained in Sherman's brief note to the people of the North, who had for so long watched and waited for news of the last army:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *Dec.* 26, 1864.

"MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN:

"Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift—the capture of Savannah.

"When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic Coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General

Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success.

"Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing forces of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.

"But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.

"Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.

"Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN."

There was a natural desire on the part of General Sherman to take his army through the state of South Carolina. This feeling pervaded the ranks quite as much as the officers' mess. There were many who understood what had been the part of that state in all the proceedings leading up to the commencement of hostilities. One fact I related around the camp fire one night that I will repeat as showing how well the army remembered incidents which in their mind were but portions of the war, so quickly does the mind in memory dissipate all central objects and facts, and focus all on a common point.

On the morning after the assault by Preston Brooks on Charles Sumner in the Senate of the United States I was riding with my mother who was giving John B. Gough and Henry Ward Beecher a drive through the beautiful city of Portland, Maine. Gough had lectured in Portland the night before, and was a guest at our home. When speaking of the dastardly attack, Mr. Gough said:

"I am not a man of passion, nor do I believe in war except

as a dire necessity, but I would like to see South Carolina depopulated, and a plough run crosswise each way over the whole State. It has been an infernal hot-bed of strife and deviltry ever since the organization of the Government."

The soldiers as a rule had the same feeling, even those who had before the war been democrats. It was natural, therefore, that they should desire to march by land through the State of South Carolina. The feeling was universal that the war was practically over, and that the march home would be even more of a picnic than the past few months. On the 8th of January, 1865, a general order was issued by direction of General Sherman, conveying to the army the thanks received both from the President and Congress. It indicated the close of the famous march to the Sea, and the completion of a task with which Sherman's name will ever be associated.

In his memoirs General Sherman publishes much interesting correspondence, showing what were the relations between himself and some of the officials at Washington. It was his pleasure to have made a close friend of Lincoln, as it had been his misfortune to incur the hostility of most of the more jealous and suspicious politicians who had forced themselves on the great War President. But General Sherman had the good habit of preserving his correspondence, and it is through this source that the people of this country are indebted for much historical information which might have been suppressed or ignored by the enterprising journalists whose information was in inverse proportion to their freedom to observe the operations of the army.

CHAPTER XIV.

MARCHING HOMEWARD.

The army which had been lost and found was now to realize its long hope. It was to begin a march northward, home being clearly in the perspective. It will be remembered that General Sherman had received on the 6th of December an order from General Grant to embark his command for Virginia, by sea. This was contrary to the wishes of General Sherman, but it was not till the 2d of January 1865, that he received by the hand of General J. G. Barnard of the United States engineers the following communication:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *December* 27, 1864.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Misssisippi.

"GENERAL: Before writing you definite instruction for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can, we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do it.

"In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your movement toward Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

"I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or adandon them entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast. Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability.

"Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now.

"It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could take shipping. It would be decidedly

preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance.

"From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication with you there, by steamboat and gun-boat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.

"Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens or Treasury agents, without orders of the War Department.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

To this the following reply was sent:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., }
IN THE FIELD NEAR SAVANNAH, GA., *January* 2, 1864. }

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, City Point.

"GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, your note of 26th, and letter of 27th December.

"I herewith inclose to you a copy of a *projet* which I have this morning in strict confidence, discussed with my immediate commander.

"I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain. I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton, quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forward them to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary steps may be taken to enable me to carry out this plan on time.

"I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to

add. Everything here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in our wagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my *projet* (January 15th). But, until those supplies are in hand, I can do nothing; after they are I shall be ready to move with great rapidity.

"I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear. It has turned out as, you will remember, I expected.

"I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from the Secretary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here, and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York.

"I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal, by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster (without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make a lodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo.

"General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this by a staff officer, who can return on one of the vessels of the supply fleet. I suppose that, now that General Butler has got through with them, you can spare them to us.

"My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent you in a day or two, as soon as some further subordinate reports come in.

"I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"[ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL.]

"PROJET FOR JANUARY.

"1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of Broad River and Beaufort, re-establish Port Royal Ferry, and mass the wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

"Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps about Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secure Sister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville. In the meantime, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved to a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got ready for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, by the 15th of January.

"2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance of forage and provisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th January, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at or near Coosawhatchie about the same date. General Foster's troops to occupy Savannah, and gun-boats to protect the rivers as soon as Howard gets Pocotaligo.

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

Prior to leaving Savannah General Sherman was brought into contact with Edwin M. Stanton, then Secretary of War, and the inevitable negro question was brought up. General Sherman had been forewarned as to the state of affairs at the National capital. As Mr. Stanton and his friends have given their side of the question to the public it is an important matter that the people should also have the simple story of the man who had won such wonderful victories, and yet who cared not for war, and showed his disinclination to make his services to his country the stepping stones to political preferment. Secretary Stanton arrived at Savannah on the 11th of January, in company with Simon Draper of New York, and as General Sherman quietly states, "a retinue of

civilians who had come down from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah." The first step was recorded in the following order, and the General's story follows: Let it be read by those who saw him on the march and in the field; who knew him as the fighter with care for his men, and as the conquerer, anxious to save bloodshed:

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 10.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, *January* 12, 1865.

1. Brevet Brigadier General Easton, chief-quartermaster, will turn over to Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury Department, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war, taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it to the quartermaster-general. He will also afford Mr. Draper all the facilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc., to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition.

2. General Easton will also turn over to Mr. Draper the custom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah as he may need in the execution of his office.

By order of General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-Camp.*

"Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, with orders to General Easton to ship it by the return vessels to New York, for the adjudication of the nearest prize court, accompanied with invoices and all evidence of title to ownership. Marks, numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales, so that the court might know the history of each bale. But Mr. Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, and ordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friend or foe, could trace

his identical cotton. I thought it strange at the time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims, real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identical cotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and that reclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than the actual quantity captured, viz., thirty-one thousand bales.

"Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curious about matters and things in general. I walked with him through the city, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments that occupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased at the ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts. Four of the 'dog-tents,' or tentes d'abri, buttoned together, served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or rough boards brought from demolished houses or fences. I remember his marked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his door out of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frame serving for his door.

"He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves, and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating their simple character and faith in our arms and progress. He inquired particularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was a democrat, and hostile to the negro. I assured him that General Davis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had any hostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers, and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed a large force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who had rendered admirable service. He then showed me a newspaper account of General Davis taking up his pontoon bridge across Ebenezer Creek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on the other side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry. I had heard such a rumor, and advised

Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced, to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and General Davis, explained the matter to his entire satisfaction. The truth was, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves, old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place of safety. It so happened that General Davis' route into Savannah followed what was known as the 'River Road,' and he had to make constant use of his pontoon train—the head of his column reaching some deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly over another. He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day and night. On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up from Ebenezer Creek while some of the camp followers remained asleep on the farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry. Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over, and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but this was a mere supposition. At all events, the same thing might have resulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humane commanders who filled the army. General Jeff. C. Davis was strictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons and columns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all felt sympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr. Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics. The negro question was beginning to loom up among the political eventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would the slaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes. I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, as such, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaves would be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters, equal to all others, politically and socially. Mr. Stanton seemed desirous of coming into contact with the

negroes to confer with them, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him. I accordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of the negroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to my rooms to meet the Secretary of War. Twenty responded, and were received in my room upstairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr. Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation in the form of questions and answers. Each of the twenty gave his name and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier as their spokesman:

"'*Question.*—State what your understanding is in regard to the acts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching the colored people in the Rebel States?'

"'*Answer.*—So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation to the Rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms and submit to the laws of the United States before the 1st of January, 1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slaves in the Southern States should be free. henceforth and forever. That is what I understood.'

"'*Q.*—State what you understand by slavery, and the freedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?'

"'*A.*—Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work of another man, and not by his consent. The freedom, as I understand it, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yoke of bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our own labor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government in maintaining our freedom.'

* * * * * * * *

"'*Q.*—State in what manner you would rather live—whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?'

"'*A.*—I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a prejudice against us in the South that will take years to get

over; but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren.'

"(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed with Frazier, but he thought they ought to live together along with the whites).

* * * * * * * *

"'*Q.*—If the Rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, what would be its effect?'

"'*A.*—I think they would fight as long as they were before the 'bayonet,' and just as soon as they could get away they would desert, in my opinion.'

* * * * * * * *

"'*Q.*—Do you understand the mode of enlistment of colored persons in the Rebel States by State agents, under the act of Congress; if yes, what is your understanding?'

"'*A.*—My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted by State agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to the State and do not swell the army, because every black man enlisted by a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that larger bounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are given by the United States. The great object should be to push through this Rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be something wanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthen the army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted.'

"'*Q.*—State what, in your opinion, is the best way to enlist colored men as soldiers?'

"'*A.*—I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be put a stop to. The ministers would talk to them, and the young men would enlist. It is my opinion that it would be far better for the State agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for the United States under the direction of General Sherman.'

"Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's

intimating that he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, and then he put the twelfth and last question:

"'*Q.*—State what is the feeling of the colored people toward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentiments and actions as friendly to their rights and interests, or otherwise?'

"'*A.*—We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as a man, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplish this work, and we unanimously feel inexpressible gratitude to him, looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithful performance of his duty. Some of us called upon him immediately upon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretary with more courtesy than he did us. His conduct and deportment toward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman. We have confidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could not be in better hands. This is our opinion now, from the short acquaintance and intercourse we have had.'

"It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary should have catechized negroes concerning the character of a general who had commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured cities, conducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundred miles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousands of freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loaded down my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I was construed by others as hostile to the black race. I had received from General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that there were certain influential parties near the President, who were torturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negro policy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though a civilian, knew better, and

appreciated my motives and character. Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by me as confidential, I now insert it here at length:

"'HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASH., D. C., *December* 30, 1864.

"'*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah.

"'MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, in this private and friendly way, to a matter which may possibly hereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may now anticipate.

"'While almost every one is praising your great march through Georgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain class having now great influence with the President, and very probably anticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedly disposed to make a point against you. I mean in regard to "inevitable Sambo." They say that you have manifested an almost criminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing to carry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, but repulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with you to Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia of that number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many more could have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this, you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you by cutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre of large numbers by Wheeler's cavalry.

"'To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as the idle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes from following you because you had not the means of supporting them, and feared they might seriously embarrass your march. But there are others, and among them

some in high authority, who think or pretend to think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a point against you.

"'I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of men by doing anything which you do not deem right and proper, and for the interests of the Government and the country; but simply to call your attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhat differently than from your stand-point. I will explain as briefly as possible:

"'Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in the South, and the probability that a part, at least, of the able-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of the Rebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by which these slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the route you have passed over should be made the route of escape, and Savannah the great place of refuge. These, I know, are the views of some of the leading men in the Administration, and they now express dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in your great raid.

"'Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be no further fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you to reopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interfering with your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves find at least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields about Savannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

"'I merely throw out these suggestions. I know that such a course would be approved by the Government, and I believe that a manifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves within our lines will do much to silence your opponents. You will appreciate my motives in writing this private letter. Yours truly,

H. W. Halleck.'"

It was fortunate for the pleasure of the trip made by the Secretary of War, that General Sherman did not allow the true state of affairs to become known to the army. Soldiers who had followed General Sherman across the enemy's country would not have enjoyed the thought that their commander was being subject to the criticism of slaves for the benefit of hostile influences at Washington. How little bitterness was caused to the brave General is seen by his calm statement of the facts, and further by his willingness to place in the hands of a man who had shown such an animus a full statement of the views held by him. As stated by General Sherman, Secretary Stanton saw the following, and made some verbal alterations.

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 15.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, *January* 16, 1865.

1. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United States.

2. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted to reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United States military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the laws of war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negro is free, and

must be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected to conscription, or forced military service, save by the written orders of the highest military authority of the department, under such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe. Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics will be free to select their own work and residence, but the young and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiers in the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as citizens of the United States.

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments, under the orders of the United States military authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed, according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and other articles necessary for their livelihood.

3. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall desire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purpose an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above designated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations will himself, or by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable agricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves, and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which land the military authorities will afford them protection until

such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall regulate their title. The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposal of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points heretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunity to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their land and labor.

4. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the United States, he may locate his family in any one of the settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all other rights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person. In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on board the gun-boats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages derived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as above defined, or unless absent on Government service, will be entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement by virtue of these orders.

5. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general officer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, to regulate their police and general management, and who will furnish personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving as near as possible the description of boundaries, and who may adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles as altogether possessory. The same general officer will also be charged with the enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting their interests while so absent from their settlements, and will be

governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War Department for such purpose.

6. Brigadier-General R. Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on the performance of his duties. No change is intended or desired in the settlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to property heretofore acquired be affected thereby.

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

On January 18th General Slocum was ordered to turn over the city of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, and Sherman made preparations to move. The first general order was issued January 19th. It provided that the right wing of the army should be held at Pocotaligo, then held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the left wing with the cavalry near Robertsville, South Carolina. It was given out that we were to move on Charleston or Augusta, in order to make the Confederates maintain their garrisons at those places.

On the 21st General Sherman, with his headquarters and staff, embarked for Beaufort, South Carolina, and reached that point on the 23d. The next day General Sherman went from Beaufort in person to inspect Pocotaligo. The winter rains had made it impossible to move the army, but toward the last of January it became colder, and by the 1st of February it became possible to carry out the plans made by General Sherman for cutting another "swath." That the time was well spent may be seen by the uniform success attending every movement. It has been noted that in his early life General Sherman studied law for the purpose of making his services more available to his country. His correspondence prior to the final march through the Carolinas tells of his busy life at the time:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *January* 21, 1865.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. As I arrived here at 1 P. M. and must leave at 6 P. M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance [six thousand] will reach the sea-board by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. * * * * *

"Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and if so, by which of several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, toward Montgomery and Selma. Thomas' forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcement Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

"Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of eight thousand effective. At Newbern about half the number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor because, on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

"If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be sent to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', in co-operation with your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

"There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.

"All other troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about Richmond.

"To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from Newbern or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

"This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. Yours truly,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS.,
IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, S. C. *January*, 29, 1865.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

"DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with your letter of January 21st, which I have read with interest.

"The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of security on the sea-board. I hope General Terry will follow it up by the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, from Admiral Porter's dispatch to me. I rejoice that Terry was not a West-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had the same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.

"Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reinforced by some more iron-clads, wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I withhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of all Sullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the capture of James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at this time. Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for the railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior. Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto, and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the common road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When I get to Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', via Fayetteville. By this circuit I cut all roads and devastate the land; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, will follow my movement, taking anything the enemy lets go, or so occupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces against me. I feel

sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston; and being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to Morehead City and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems that Lee must come out. If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should be pushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and maybe Goldsboro', or, rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro'. It is not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distant region, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forced to draw supplies from the north, it will be eating up the same stores on which Lee depends for his command.

"I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta. Canby and Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep employed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish the same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanooga forward to the Etowah, viz., Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby threatening Georgia. I know that the Georgia troops are disaffected. At Savannah I met delegates from several counties of the southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to the Confederate cause. I nursed the feeling as far as possible, and instructed Grover to keep it up.

"My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the Savannah River to the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville to-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all ready to start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway.

"We find the enemy on the east side of the Salkiehatchie, and cavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach and seem to be merely watching us. If we start on Tuesday, in one week we shall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road from the Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles. I will be sure that every rail is twisted. Should

we encounter too much opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect that branch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangle formed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee), breaking up that great center of the Carolina roads. Up to that point I feel full confidence, but from there may have to maneuver some, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies.

"You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridian trip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that February is usually a fine month. Before the March storms come we should be within striking distance of the coast. The months of April and May will be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and the Roanoke. You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well in hand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay so dearly that you will have less to do. I know that this trip is necessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and in the right position for it. My army is large enough for the purpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmost activity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentration against me may not be universal.

"I expect that Jeff Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me, for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia, and the heart of South Carolina.

"If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the direction of Athens.

"I think the 'poor white trash' of the South are falling out of their ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; but there is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight to the last. The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, and the disintegration elsewhere are

all good omens for us; we must not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts. I would ere this have been off, but we had terrific rains, which caught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in the rice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which had been carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout mere lakes of slimy mud. The weather is now good, and I have the army on terra firma. Supplies, too, came for a long time by daily driblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hope to start on Tuesday.

"I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on the reinforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield come, you had better relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs an operation on his leg. Let Schofield take command, with his headquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secure Goldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort and Wilmington). If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up.

"I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied as before, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirty days. I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs, cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Columbia districts. Even here we have found some forage. Of course, the enemy will carry off and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where the people burn their forage, and they will get tired of it.

"I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee, or be on his heels if he comes south. I observe that the enemy has some respect for my name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when they heard that the attacking force belonged to my army. I will try and keep up that feeling, which is a real power. With respect, your friend,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*"

"P. S.—I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind to follow coastwise. W. T. S."

[DISPATCH NO. 6.

FLAG STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
SAVANNAH RIVER, *January* 4, 1865.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army of General Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st of December.

The Rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escaped by crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward the railroad.

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its tranquillity is undisturbed. The Union soldiers who are stationed within its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York or Boston. One effect of the march of General Sherman through Georgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity has been imposed upon by the lying assertions of the Rebel government, affirming the inability of the United States Government to withstand the armies of Rebeldom. They have seen the old flag of the United States carried by its victorious legions through their State, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city without a blow.

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupied in making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for the march that he meditates. My attention has been directed to such measures of co-operation as the number and quality of my force permit.

On the 2d, I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated in my dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence of information from the senior officer there that the Rebels contemplated issuing from the harbor, and his re-

quest for my presence. Having placed a force there of seven monitors, sufficient to meet such an emergency, and not perceiving any sign of the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep in communication with General Sherman and be ready to render any assistance that might be desired. General Sherman has fully informed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, they shall not lack assistance by water.

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was begun and the only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sent to Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation. This took place about 3 P. M., and was witnessed by General Sherman and General Barnard (United States Engineers), and myself. The Pontiac was ordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed the first move by the Harvest Moon.

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed in the large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as they gathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels. The notes of a solitary bugle alone came from their midst.

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the Rebel works (Causten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course—the best approach of the kind to Savannah.

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department the powerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches. General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace but will contract the line very much.

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny. With his concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the men belonging to it have returned to their vessels. The excellent service performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes, and exemplified the efficiency of the organization—infantry and light artillery handled as skirmishers.

The howitzers were always landed as quickly as the men, and were brought into action before the light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore.

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vessels prevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization. With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I could frequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, when the attention of the Rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman.

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets of which were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since, when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back. Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as to sweep the ground in the direction of the causeway.

The transfer of the right wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufort will so imperil the Rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cut off or dispersed, if not moved in season.

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any want that may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will be ready to act from Broad River.

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exact direction must be decided more or less by circumstances which it may not be possible to foresee.

My co-operation will be confined to assistance in attacking Charleston or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in case the army pushes on without attacking Charleston; and time alone will show which of these will eventuate.

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground in spring, would permit little advantage to be derived from the presence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May. So that General Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose such objects as he prefers, and take

as much time as their attainment may demand. The Department will learn the objects in view of General Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him to General Halleck, which he read to me a few days since.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. A. DAHLGREN,

Rear Admiral, Commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, S. C., *January* 29, 1865.

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South.

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant, stating that Schofield's Corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-one thousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sent to Beaufort, North Carolina. That is well; I want that force to secure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro' and then to build the railroad out to that point. If Goldsboro' be too strong to carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston, should be held and and fortified strong. The movement should be masked by the troops already at Newbern. Please notify General Palmer that these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them. Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirably adapted for the work. If it is possible, I want him to secure Goldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington. As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meet some one of your staff, to explain in full the details of the situation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chief command of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If he finds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need not follow, but

turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secure Goldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before I have passed the Santee. Send him all detachments of men that have come to join my army. They can be so organized and officered as to be efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have been detached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee, you can better use these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc.

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, to take his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on the road out. I do not know that he can use them on any road here. I did instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina, to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry; but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do. If you move the pontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, and mark it with sign-boards—obstructing the old road, so that, should I send back any detachments, they would not be misled.

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened until I am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation of affairs about Charleston. If you can break the railroad between this and Charleston, then this force could be reduced.

I am, with respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GA., *January* 19, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by which his division entered the city of Savannah,

being the first troops to occupy that city. I now send it to you.

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro settlements.

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am satisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff Davis' dominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth that slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to slower operations of time. We have given the initiative, and can afford to await the working of the experiment.

As to trade-matters, I also think it is our interest to keep the Southern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to which they have hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously, and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in large quantities. But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on that score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power against us. We should assume a tone of perfect contempt for cotton and everything else, in comparison with the great object of the war—*the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and power.* If the Rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play into our hands by taking away the only product of value they have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions. By such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class of small farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton to exchange for food and clothing for their families. I

SHERMAN'S SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS, CROSSING THE SOUTH EDISTO RIVER ON PONTONS, FEBRUARY 9, 1865.

hope the Government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in large quantities, and especially that the President will not indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in such a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitate their execution.

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated and abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only say that as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their powers and duties. I rather think the Quartermaster's department of the army could better fulfill all their duties, and accomplish all that is aimed it by law. Yet on this subject I will leave Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, *January* 2, 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of December 26th, relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Easton, chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

I had already been approached by the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, belonged to the United States, and nobody should re-

cover a bale of it with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should help pay its expenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility was committed against the United States some time in December, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department, United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales' marks, etc., the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered General Easton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me with reference to cotton claimed by English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the General Government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line of investment of Sa-

vannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and for which he expected me to give some certificate entitling him to indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property—severe, but just—founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no child's play.

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, in answer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair, his personal friend, as follows:

"*Major-General* F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps.

"GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is received, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries.

"1. No one can practice law as an attorney in the United States without acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am not in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a court to administer law which denied the supremacy of the government itself.

"2. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant—or, rather, to trade, is a privilege which no one should seek of the Government without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

"3. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary use be necessary for the military authorities of the city. The title to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated by the courts of the United States.

"4. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order

No. 143, it is a public acknowledgment that he 'adheres to the enemies of the United States,' and all his property becomes forfeited to the United States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his family, and servants, and will be transported within the enemy's lines, but not by way of Port Royal.

"These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception will be made.

"I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, and covers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders are executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties claiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidence of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless some other positive end is to be gained.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

On the 1st of February the army for the campaign from Savannah northward was composed of two wings, commanded by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum, and was practically the same that had marched from Atlanta to Savannah. The same general orders were in force, and this campaign may be classed as a part of the former.

The right wing was grouped at or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagons of food, ammunition, and forage, only waiting for the left wing, which was detained by the flood in the Savannah River. It was composed as follows:

FIFTEENTH CORPS, MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. LOGAN.

First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods; Second Division, Major-General W. B. Hazen; Third Division, Brigadier-General John E. Smith; Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse. Artillery brigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ross, First Michigan Artillery.

SEVENTEENTH CORPS, MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.

First Division, Major-General Joseph A. Mower; Second Division, Brigadier-General M. F. Force; Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith. Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A. C. Waterhouse, First Illinois Artillery.

The left wing, with Corse's division and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above Savannah, engaged in crossing the river. It was composed as follows:

FOURTEENTH CORPS, MAJOR-GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS.

First Division, Brigadier-General W. P. Carlin; Second Division, Brigadier-General John D. Morgan; Third Division, Brigadier-General A. Baird. Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major Charles Houghtaling, First Illinois Artillery.

TWENTIETH CORPS, BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. S. WILLIAMS.

First Division, Brigadier-General N. I. Jackson; Second Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Geary; Third Division, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward. Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major J. A. Reynolds, First New York Artillery.

CAVALRY DIVISION, BRIGADIER-GENERAL JUDSON KILPATRICK.

First Brigade, Colonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry; Second Brigade, Colonel S. D. Atkins, Ninety-

second Illinois Volunteers; Third Brigade, Colonel George E. Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry. One battery of four guns.

The real strength of the army was at the time sixty thousand and seventy-nine men, and sixty-eight guns. The trains were made up of nearly twenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to each wagon, and six hundred ambulances, with two horses each. The contents of the wagons embraced an ample supply of ammunition for a great battle; provisions for twenty days, but depending largely for fresh meat on beeves driven on the hoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, to be gathered along the line of march.

The Confederate forces still occupied Charleston and Augusta, but their garrisons could make no effective resistance in the field to our veterans flushed with victory, and marching "homeward." General Sherman felt absolute confidence in his troops, and was amused by the bravado of General Wade Hampton, who avowed his purpose of driving out the invader who had desecrated the sacred soil of South Carolina. The boys as they marched along found very little in the soil that seemed sacred, and less in the action of the Rebel commanders to enttile them to respect. We were bound for Goldsboro', and General Sherman had provided for such co-operations with the navy as to secure for the army safe points along the coast in case of serious reverses. On the 5th of February we were at Beaufort Bridge, and good progress was reported to General Sherman from other divisions. There was expected severe resistance when the army should strike the railroad at Bamberg, by which the enemy held communication with the two cities, Augusta and Charleston. But when the army approached it was found that "Sherman's bummers" had taken the road and awaited the approach of the generals to give them possession. It was not considered surprising to the army—those "bummers" would take most

anything in reach, and never stopped at such a little thing as a railroad. It did not take long for the South Carolina railroad to become a mass of twisted rails under the hands of the veterans, who seemed as much at home destroying as building roads.

After a delay of four days we were pushing on toward Columbia, a portion of the cavalry making a demonstration toward Aiken, as if we were really going toward Augusta. On the 16th the Fifteenth Corps reached a point opposite Columbia across Broad River. In his retreat toward the city, Butler's cavalry had burned the bridge. There has been some criticism regarding the capture and burning of Columbia, but it may be answered by the following brief statement from General Sherman:

"Captain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrott guns unlimbered, firing into the town. I asked him what he was firing for; he said he could see some Rebel cavalry occasionally at the intersections of the streets, and he had an idea that there was a large force of infantry concealed on the opposite bank, lying low, in case we should attempt to cross over directly into the town. I instructed him not to fire any more into the town, but consented to his bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroes who were appropriating the bags of corn and meal which we wanted; also to fire three shots at the unoccupied State House. I stood by and saw these fired, and then all firing ceased. Although this matter of firing into Columbia has been the subject of much abuse and investigation, I have yet to hear of any single person having been killed in Columbia by our cannon. On the other hand, the night before, when Woods' division was in camp in the open fields at Little Congaree, it was shelled all night by a Rebel battery from the other side of the river. This provoked me much at the time, for it was wanton mis-

chief, as Generals Beauregard and Hampton must have been convinced that they could not prevent our entrance into Columbia. I have always contended that I would have been justified in retaliating for this unnecessary act of war, but did not, though I always characterized it as it deserved."

On the 17th our army marched into Columbia, Wade Hampton and General Butler having concluded to postpone their dire punishment on us for having soiled the sacred dirt, or dirtied the sacred soil of the State which had produced Preston Brooks. Of the burning of Columbia, which has since been the basis of international dispute, General Sherman makes a clear record, which during the investigation, was completely sustained by many soldiers and officers:

"Having walked over much of the suburbs of Columbia in the afternoon, being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan's house to rest. Soon after dark I became conscious that a bright light was shining on the walls, and, calling some one of my staff (Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause, he said there seemed to be a house on fire down about the market-house. The same high wind still prevailed, and, fearing the consequences, I bade him go in person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty. He soon returned and reported that the block of buildings directly opposite the burning cotton of that morning was on fire, and that it was spreading; but he had found General Woods on the ground, with plenty of men, trying to put the fire out, or at least to prevent its extension. The fire continued to increase, and the whole heavens became lurid. I dispatched messenger after messenger to Generals Howard, Logan, and Woods, and received from them repeated assurances that all was being done that could be done, but that the high wind was spreading the flames beyond all control. These general officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen's division had been brought into the

city to assist Woods' division, already there. About eleven o'clock at night I went down-town myself, Colonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Simons' house, from which I could see the flames rising high in the air, and could hear the roaring of the fire. I advised the ladies to move to my headquarters, had our own headquarter wagons hitched up, and their effects carried there, as a place of greater safety. The whole air was full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc., some of which were carried four or five blocks, and started new fires. The men seemed generally under good control, and certainly labored hard to girdle the fire, to prevent its spreading; but, so long as the high wind prevailed, it was simply beyond human possibility. Fortunately, about 3 or 4 A. M., the wind moderated, and gradually the fire was got under control; but it had burned out the very heart of the city, embracing several churches, the old State House, and the school or asylum of that very Sister of Charity who had appealed to me for my personal protection. Nickerson's Hotel, in which several of my staff were quartered, was burned down, but the houses occupied by myself, Generals Howard and Logan, were not burned at all. Many of the people thought that this fire was deliberately planned and executed. This is not true. It was accidental, and in my judgment began with the cotton which General Hampton's men had set fire to, on leaving the city (whether by his orders or not is not material), which fire was partially subdued early in the day by our men; but when night came the high wind fanned it again into full blaze, carried it against the frame houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond our control."

From Columbia to Fayetteville our march was scarcely more impeded than if war had ceased. The Confederates were seeking the proper place for the infliction of their terri-

ble revenge, and we were quite ready to afford them the opportunity. At Fayetteville we found a very honest, God-fearing population, and as our arrival was on Sunday, they were engaged in their houses of worship, praying faithfully for the success of the Rebel arms. From this point General Sherman dispatched the following reports:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., *Sunday, Mch. 12*, '65.

"*Hon.* E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army has reached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M.

"I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he will doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell you what I know will give you pleasure—that I have done all that I proposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington are incidents, while the utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, and Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement. These points were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the Confederacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold on to Richmond, and we will destroy his country, and then of what use is Richmond? He must come out and fight us on open ground, and for that we must ever be ready. Let him stick behind his parapets, and he will perish.

"I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the right road, though a long one. My army is as united and cheerful as ever, and as full of confidence in itself and its leaders. It is utterly impossible for me to enumerate what we

have done, but I inclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial. At Columbia and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridges which the Confederacy had in this part of the country. This arsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged. I cannot leave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it up with gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls. I take it for granted the United States will never again trust North Carolina with an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.

"Hoping that fortune may still attend my army, I remain, your servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, FAYETTEVILLE, N. C., *March 12*, 1865.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Army, City Point, Virginia.

"DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Hardee, as usual, retreating across Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but our pontoons will be up to-day, and with as little delay as possible I will be after him toward Goldsboro'.

"A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from here, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied with all else, having in a measure lived off the country.

"The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though we have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to almost any other body of men I ever heard of.

"Our march was substantially what I designed—straight on Columbia, feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We de-

stroyed, in passing, the railroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburg to the Congaree; again, from Columbia down to Kingsville on the Wateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thence we turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville. At Columbia we destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among which were forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery and material of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-five guns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we find about twenty guns and a magnificent United States arsenal.

"We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore destroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use; and the United States should never again confide such valuable property to a people who have betrayed a trust.

"I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us. Some I will send down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land, under small escort, as soon as we cross Cape Fear River.

"I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of this march will be appreciated. It had to be made not only to destroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents in the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in a position to aid you materially in the spring campaign.

"Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield about Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded.

"Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward

Greensboro' or Charlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most important.

"The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to the enemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of the red-clay hills, which are impassable to wheels in wet weather.

"I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days. "Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., }
IN THE FIELD, FAYETTEVILLE, N. C. *March* 12, 1865. }

"*Major-General* TERRY, commanding United States forces, Wilmington, North Carolina.

"GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which left Wilmington at 2 P. M. yesterday, which arrived here without trouble. The scout who brought me your cipher message started back last night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact of your opening the river.

"General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy's steamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure two others known to be above, and we will load them with refugees (white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded our movements, and consumed our food.

"We have swept the country well from Savannah to here, and the men and animals are in fine condition. Had it not been for the foul weather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but at Columbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, and destroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property of inestimable value to our enemy. At all points he has fled from us, 'standing not on the order of his going.'

"The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will now call on Lee to feed them.

"I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour you can spare; finish the loads with oats or corn. Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any risk. We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro'. We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he shall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the same from Wilmington. If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro' by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth a million of dollars. I can whip Jos. Johnston, provided he does not catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form.

"I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless mouths; as many to go down to Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to go in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington.

"I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you. I am, truly your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

At this point also General Sherman found a copy of the *New York Tribune* fully a month later date than he had seen, and in it found news of our movements which had been read by the Confederate authorities, thus neutralizing Sherman's efforts to deceive the enemy as to our intentions.

General Hardee had been annoying the army in its progress toward Goldsboro', and one night Brigadier-General Rhett, the commander of his rear guard, was captured and brought to headquarters. The young officer felt extremely mortified at being captured without a fight, but he might have saved himself all feeling on this subject, as the next day we captured his entire brigade in almost a similar manner. At

Averysboro' Hardee had taken a position in which he evidently determined to make a stand, but General Sherman sent Generals Slocum and Fitzpatrick to attend the matter, and the battle of Averysboro' resulted in a victory for our troops.

On the eighteenth we were within twenty-seven miles of Goldsboro', and during the day could hear sounds of cannonading in the direction of General Slocum's army, and later found that the General had run up against the whole of Johnston's army. But General Sherman received the news with composure. As he stated to one of his staff, "There is no force in the field that can seriously disturb this army; it is too near home to be conquered." Sherman sent back orders to have Slocum fight defensively till reinforcements could be brought up. He did not want to risk a general engagement, because he had been on so long a march that our provisions were well-nigh exhausted. Referring to this point in his marches, Sherman pays a just tribute to a subordinate—General Mower—who had in his impetuosity broken through Johnston's army, and almost destroyed it, when he was ordered back by General Sherman in accordance with his intention of making no general battle. General Sherman says:

"I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed Mower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would have brought on a general battle, and it could not have resulted otherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superior numbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred to make junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engaging Johnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown. The next day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, the roads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro.' The heaviest fighting at Bentonsville was on the first day, viz., the 19th,

when Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns, knocking back Carlin's division; but as soon as General Slocum had brought up the rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward the Twentieth on its left, he received and repulsed all attacks, and held his ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the right wing. His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundred and forty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and two hundred and twenty-six missing. He reported having buried of the Rebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, and captured three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners.

"The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-five men killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men wounded, and seventy missing. General Howard reported that he had buried one hundred of the Rebel dead, and had captured twelve hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.

* * * * * * * * *

"I was close up with the Fifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st, considered the fighting as mere skirmishing, and know that my orders were to avoid a general battle, till we could be sure of Goldsboro', and of opening up a new base of supply. With the knowledge now possessed of his small force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865. But I was content then to let him go, and on the 22d of March rode to Cox's Bridge, where I met General Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Corps; and the next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found General Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfect junction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated. During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro'; General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison's Depot to the South, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at Mount Olive Sta-

tion, near him, and there we all rested, while I directed my special attention to replenishing the army for the next and last stage of the campaign. Colonel W. W. Wright had been so indefatigable that the Newbern Railroad was done, and a locomotive arrived in Goldsboro' on the 25th of March.

"Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army in a civilized country. The distance from Savannah to Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five large navigable rivers, viz., the Edisto, Broad, Catawba, Pedee, and Cape Fear, at either of which a comparatively small force, well handled, should have made the passage most difficult, if not impossible.

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"On reaching Goldsboro' I learned from General Schofield all the details of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of the fight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg. I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaiting me, with the General's letter of February 7th, covering instructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter of March 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville.

"These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the events of the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself, to fill out the picture."

COPIES OF LETTERS AND DISPATCHES.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *February* 7, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to be of any service, I have mailed to you copies of

instructions to Schofield and Thomas. I have informed Schofield by telegraph of the departure of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front. These troops marched down the Weldon road, and as they apparently went without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have not returned. I was absent from here when they left. Just returned yesterday morning from Cape Fear River. I went there to determine whether Schofield's Corps had better go to operate against Wilmington and Goldsboro'. The instructions with this will inform you of the conclusion arrived at.

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against Wilmington fully determined before we started back; hence the absence of more detailed instructions to him. He will land one division at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of the river, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with his pontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if he can. With the aid of the gun-boats, there is no doubt but this move will drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of the city, either back to their line, or away altogether. There will be a large force on the north bank of Cape Fear river, ready to follow up and invest the garrison, if they should go inside.

The railroads of North Carolina are four feet, eight and one-half inches gauge. I have sent large parties of railroad men there to build them up, and have ordered stock to run them. We have abundance of it idle from non-use of the Virginia roads. I have taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you wherever you may turn up. I did this before when you left Atlanta, and regret that they did not reach you promptly when you reached salt water.

* * * * * * * * *

Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell are now at my headquarters, very desirous of going to

Washington to see Mr. Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feeling within the Rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate us to greater activity.

I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would decline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one would be more pleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed in my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our personal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to support you that you have ever done to support me, and would do all in my power to make our cause win. Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *January* 31, 1865.

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.

GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. At the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the depletion of your command by my orders. It will be impossible at present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of infantry indicated.

General Slocum is advised before this of the changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General Stoneman, might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by Sherman's forces. He might also be able to return to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing some of our prisoners of war in Rebel hands.

Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while executing the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movements will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this.

Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. This probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without taking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, the reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky cavalry which Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern Virginia.

It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.

You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copy of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you as to these preparations.

As this expedition goes to destroy, and not to fight battles, but to avoid them when practicable, particularly against anything like equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go as light as possible. Stoneman's experience in raiding will teach him in this matter better than he can be directed.

Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and keep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *January* 31, 1865.

Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding Army of the Ohio.

GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes, North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Of course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. This obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed you would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred to should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio." Your headquarters will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you feel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to Cape Fear River.

Your movements are intended as co-operative with Sherman's movement through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be obtained is to secure Wilmington.

Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the line of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern,

you can best use for throwing supplies from the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage, for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy.

I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required by your command.

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February. This limits your time very materially.

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men has already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechan-

ics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *March* 16, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just received. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing. I knew, or thought I did, that with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere. To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of the greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us. But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for the country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see it in that light.

Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have been attempting to get something done in the West, both to co-operate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness there—to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so that he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I have said, he had not moved at last advices. Canby was sending a cavalry force of about seven thousand from Vicksburg toward Selma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February as possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date. He has not yet started, or had not at last ad-

vices. I ordered him to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He would either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material, which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers were full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of movements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it was Stoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in North Carolina were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman might get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would be sufficient for him to take. In the meantime I had directed Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and as soon as the snow in the mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as possible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the 12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he (Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon as possible.

Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as heard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since about the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited from publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our own resources, therefore, for information. You will see from the papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears this will tell you all.

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of none going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but I think no division or brigade. The determination seems to be to hold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient to leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them) and move out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads are entirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myself with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts to evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over—think I will—and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are the last avenues left to the enemy.

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I have stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except those from Illinois.

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to fortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. He has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville and has been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the Virginia line. I told him to get ready for a campaign toward Lynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there or elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for anyone else to take his troops and come east, or go toward Rome, whichever may be necessary. I do not believe either will.

When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back upon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against anything the enemy can do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannot go there with force enough to touch you. His army is now demoralized, and deserting very fast, both

to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if we did not follow.

Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now on their way to join you. If more reinforcements are necessary, I will send them. My notion is that you should get Raleigh as soon as possible, and hold the railroad from there back. This may take more force than you now have.

From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to the enemy without keeping up communications with the rear.

Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces from Wilmington and Newbern, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIDGE, NEUSE RIVER,
NORTH CAROLINA, *March* 22, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday, the 14th instant, that I was already to start for Goldsboro', to which point I had also ordered General Schofield from Newbern, and General Terry from Wilmington. I knew that General Jos. Johnston was supreme in command against me, and that he would have time to concentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of this march. Accordingly, General Slocum was ordered to send his main supply train, under escort of two divisions, straight for Bentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions, disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march toward Raleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'. General Howard, in like manner, sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well to the right, and, with the four divisions of the Fifteenth Corps,

took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposed left flank. We started on the 15th, but again the rains set in, and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible.

On Tuesday, the 15th, General Slocum found Hardee's army, from Charleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position across the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers, where the road branches off to Goldsboro'. There a pretty severe fight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomely the advanced line, held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by a Colonel Butler. Its commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumter notoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before been captured by Kilpatrick's scouts from his very skirmish line. The next morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through and beyond Averysboro'. General Slocum buried one hundred and eight dead Rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns. Some eighty wounded Rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing their wounds, we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officer and four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled for the purpose.

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'. I was with the left wing until I supposed all danger had passed; but when General Slocum's head of column was within four miles of Bentonsville, after skirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there was infantry in his front. He deployed a couple of brigades, which, on advancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied, when he formed a line of the two leading divisions (Morgan's and Carlin's) of Jeff. C. Davis' Corps. The enemy attacked these with violence, but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the

Twentieth Corps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrick massed his cavalry on the left.

General Jos. Johnston had the night before marched his whole army (Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had drawn from every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crush one of our corps, and then defeat us in detail. He attacked General Slocum in position from 3 P. M. on the nineteenth till dark; but was everywhere repulsed, and lost heavily. At the time I was with the Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the right; but, on hearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps toward Cox's bridge, in the night brought Blair's Corps over, and on the 20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear. We struck him about noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify. Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, the right division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken in two within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at the bridge across Mill Creek. Last night he retreated, leaving us in possession of the field, dead, and wounded. We have over two thousand prisoners from this affair and the one at Averysboro', and I am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handled yesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have now been out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of our foragers, our men "dirty, ragged, and saucy," and we must rest and fix up a little. Our entire loss thus far (killed, wounded, and prisoners) will be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part of which are, as usual, slight wounds. The enemy has lost more than double as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand.

I limited the pursuit this morning to Mill Creek, and will forthwith march the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, reclothe, and get some rations.

Our combinations were such that General Schofield entered Goldsboro' from Newbern; General Terry got Cox's Bridge, with pontoons laid, and a brigade across Neuse River intrenched; and we whipped Jos. Johnston—all on the same day.

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville, and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place (Cox's Bridge) to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride into Goldsboro'.

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall post General Terry about Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partly to protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage as the country affords, until the railroads are repaired leading into Goldsboro'.

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected; but I will soon have them both going. I shall proceed at once to organize three armies of twenty-five thousand men each, and will try and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we may determine, by or before April 10th.

I inclose you a copy of my orders of to-day. I would like to be more specific, but have not the data. We have lost no general officers nor any organization. General Slocum took three guns at Averysboro', and lost three others at the first dash on him at Bentonsville. We have all our wagons and trains in good order.

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', N. C,, *March* 23, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the United States, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found Lieutenant Dunn awaiting me with your letter of March

16th, and dispatch of the 17th. I wrote you fully from Cox's Bridge yesterday, and since reaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctually to Newbern, whence it will be dispatched to you.

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good service between Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ball moving. I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy and discourage him much.

General Slocum's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are now coming in. I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between the Weldon road and the Little River. General Howard to-day is marching south of the Neuse, and to-morrow will come in and occupy ground north of Goldsboro', extending from the Weldon Railroad to that leading to Kinston.

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troops belonging to the regular corps, to be broken up, and the men to join their proper regiments and organizations; and have ordered General Schofield to guard the railroads back to Newbern and Wilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-five thousand men, with which to take the field. His army will be the center, as on the Atlanta campaign. I do not think I want any more troops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the present regiments, and I can make up an army of eighty-thousand men by April 10th. I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Station, on the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest.

We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the proper staff officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions. As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but the moment we stop, trouble begins.

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done.

I do not like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries; but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made ere this, and the road properly stocked. I can only hear of one locomotive (besides the four old ones) on the Newbern road, and two damaged locomotives (found by General Terry) on the Wilmington road. I left Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements in anticipation of my arrival, and have heard from neither, though I suppose them both to be at Morehead City.

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, and if we can maintain them will in a short time be in a position to march against Raleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you may determine.

If I get the troops all well placed, and the supplies working well, I may run up to see you for a day or two before diving again into the bowels of the country.

I will make, in a very short time, accurate reports of our operations for the past two months. Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', N. C., *March* 24, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I might report further. All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which I have posted at Mount Olivet Station, south of the Neuse) and General Terry's command (which to-morrow will move from Cox's Ferry to Faison's Depot, also on the Wilmington road). I send you a copy of my orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to Morehead City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in boats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and cloth-

ing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from there twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City and Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. I feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got Johnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity and caution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its operations to our stragglers and foraging parties. My marching columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walk right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we can checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defense of Richmond, or to abandon the *cause*. I feel certain, if he leaves Richmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy. I will study my maps a little more before giving my positive views. I want all possible information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and with what draught.

We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn and forage than I had expected. The families remain, but I will gradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington. We will need every house in the town. Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of many things of which I need not write.

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', N. C., *April* 5, 1865.

Major-General GEORGE H. THOMAS, commanding Department of the Cumberland.

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my command—it is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you in the way of orders or men; nor do I think

you need either. General Cruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will at once be broken up, and the men sent to their proper regiments, as that of Meagher was on my arival here.

You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocum should have command of the two corps that properly belong to you, viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he was but a corps commander, and could not legally make orders of discharge, transfer, etc., which was imperatively necessary. I therefore asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command "an army in the field," called the army of Georgia, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. The order is not yet made by the President, though I have recognized it, because both General Grant and the President have sanctioned it, and promised to have the order made.

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided into three parts of two corps each—much as our old Atlanta Army was.

I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains in Richmond) to pass the Roanoke, and open communication with the Chowan and Norfolk. This will bring me in direct communication with General Grant.

This is an admirable point—country open, and the two railroads in good order back to Wilmington and Beaufort. We have already brought up stores enough to fill our wagons, and only await some few articles, and the arrival of some men who are marching up from the coast, to be off.

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which of course are all right. You can make reports direct to Washington or to General Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the general state of affairs, that I may know what is happening. I must give my undivided attention to matters

here. You will hear from a thousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march. Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

[LETTER FROM ADMIRAL DAHLGREN.]

SOUTH-ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA, CHARLESTON, *April* 20, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies of the
of the Tennessee, Georgia, and Mississippi.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of your handwriting, which has just reached me from Goldsboro'; it was very suggestive of a past to me, when these regions were the scene of your operations.

As you progressed through South Carolina, there was no manifestation of weakness or of an intention to abandon Charleston, until within a few hours of the fact. On the 11th of February I was at Stono, and a spirited demonstration was made by General Schimmelpfennig and the vessels. He drove the Rebels from their rifle-pits in front of the lines, extending from Fort Pringle, and pushed them vigorously. The next day I was at Bull's Bay, with a dozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron. General Potter had twelve or fifteen hundred men, the object being to carry out your views. We made as much fuss as possible, and with better success than I anticipated, for it seems that the Rebs conceived Stono to be a feint, and the real object at Bull's Bay, supposing from the number of steamers and boats, that we had several thousand men. Now came an aid from General Gillmore, at Port Royal, with your cipher dispatch from Midway; so I steamed down to Port Royal to see him.

Next day was spent in vain efforts to decipher—finally it was accomplished. You thought that the state of the roads *might* force you to turn upon Charleston; so I went there on

the 15th, but there was no sign yet of flinching. Then I went to Bull's Bay next day (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owing to the difficulties of shoal water. One of the gun-boats had contrived to get up to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailors were working hard. On the evening of the 16th I steamed down to Stono to see how matters were going there. Passing Charleston, I noticed two large fires, well inside—probably preparing to leave. On the 17th, in Stono, rumors were flying about loose of evacuation. In course of the morning, General Schimmelpfennig telegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symptoms of leaving; that he would again make a push at Stono, and asked for monitors. General Schimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, and we met in the Folly branch, near Secessionville. He was sure that the Rebs would be off that night, so he was to assault them in front, while a monitor and gun-boats stung their flanks both sides. I also sent an aid to order my battery of five eleven-inch guns, at Cumming's Point, to fire steadily all night on Sullivan's Island, and two monitors to close up to the island for the same object. Next morning (18th) the rascals were found to be off, and we broke in from all directions, by land and water. The main bodies had left at eight or nine in the evening, leaving detachments to keep up a fire from the batteries. I steamed round quickly, and soon got into the city, threading the streets with a large group of naval captains who had joined me. All was silent as the grave. No one to be seen but a few firemen.

No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the track you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural to desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any one spot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston.

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete in execution; and now it is yours to secure the last army which Rebeldom possesses. I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, and hope that the result may be all that you wish.

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shocked every mind. Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratum of American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of a madman. Who have prompted him?

I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him is ever nearest to my heart. Generous, brave, and noble, as I ever knew him to be, that he should close his young life so early, even under the accepted conditions of a soldier's life, as a son of the Union, would have been grief sufficient for me to bear; but that his precious remains should have been so treated by the brutes into whose hands they fell, adds even to the bitterness of death. I am now awaiting the hour when I can pay my last duties to his memory.

With my best and sincere wishes, my dear general, for your success and happiness, I am, most truly, your friend,

J. A. DAHLGREN.

CHAPTER XV.

PEACE—CLOSING SCENES OF THE GREAT REBELLION—SHERMAN'S RECORD AND THE MANIPULATIONS OF POLITICIANS.

There was practically little to be done, except to make terms of surrender for the armies of the Confederacy, whose commanders realized the futility of further resistance. After the taking of Goldsboro', it required but a few days to place the army in position for further effort, but General Sherman was desirous of having a personal interview with General Grant. He had received the following letter, and determined to go to City Point as soon as the road was finished.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *March* 22, 1865.

"*Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

"GENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the fact, yet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro' on the 19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may be regarded as the successful termination of the third campaign since leaving the Tennessee River, less than one year ago.

"Since Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemy are left dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for all their supplies. These I hope to cut next week. Sheridan is at 'White House,' shoeing up and resting his cavalry. I expect him to finish by Friday night and to start the following morning, via Long Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred, and the extreme left of the army around

Petersburg. He will make no halt with the armies operating here, but will be joined by a division of cavalry, five thousand five hundred strong, from the army of the Potomac, and will proceed directly to the Southside and Danville roads. His instructions will be to strike the Southside road as near Petersburg as he can, and destroy it so that it cannot be repaired for three or four days, and push on to the Danville road, as near to the Appomattox as he can get. Then I want him to destroy the road toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push on to the Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually. From that point I shall probably leave it to his discretion either to return to this army, crossing the Danville road south of Burkesville, or go and join you, passing between Danville and Greensboro'. When this movement commences, I shall move out by my left, with all the force I can, holding present intrenched lines. I shall start with no distinct view, further than holding Lee's forces from following Sheridan. But I shall be along myself, and will take advantage of anything that turns up. If Lee detaches, I will attack; or if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor to repulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage.

"It is most difficult to understand what the Rebels intend to do; so far but few troops have been detached from Lee's army. Much machinery has been removed, and material has been sent to Lynchburg, showing a disposition to go there. Points, too, have been fortified on the Danville road.

"Lee's army is much demoralized, and great numbers are deserting. Probably, from returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can be picked up, his numbers may be kept up. I estimate his force now at about sixty-five thousand men.

"Wilson started on Monday with twelve thousand cavalry, from Eastport. Stoneman started on the same day, from

East Tennessee, toward Lynchburg. Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior of Alabama.

"I ordered Gillmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to hold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send to Wilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also directed to forward to Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you. I understand this will give you about five thousand men, besides those brought east by Meagher.

"I have been telegraphing General Meigs to hasten up locomotives and cars for you. General McCallum, he informs me, is attending to it. I fear they are not going forward as fast as I would like.

"Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

The railroad was completed March 24th, and General Sherman proceeded at once to City Point, where he met General Grant and President Lincoln, who had come down on a boat to consult with General Grant about the terms to be made to the armies about to surrender or be bagged. General Sherman was cordially received, and Lincoln was delighted at reports of his progress, and especially at his desire to prevent any further shedding of blood. In the interview the President impressed General Sherman as a man in whom there was no thought of bitterness caused by the war, but rather that kindliness which led to every effort to save further loss of life.

Soon after the interview, General Sherman proceeded down the James River, and at Old Point Comfort took on board the son of the Secretary of War, and at once set sail for his army in North Carolina. He had arranged with General

Grant for a reorganization of his army. By the 5th of April matters had progressed so far as to make an advance possible, and confidential orders were issued to the corps commanders.

But the next day we heard news that put the army to a frenzy of delight. It was no less than the evacuation of Richmond by the army under Lee, and the flight of Jeff. Davis. The news was received in the form of a cipher dispatch as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WILSON'S STATION, *April* 5, 1865.

"*Major-General* SHERMAN, Goldsboro', North Carolina:

"All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left with him—horse, foot, and dragoons—at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I will push on to Burkesville, and, if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*"

General Sherman issued the following to the troops under his command:

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 54.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, SMITHFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA,
April 12, 1865.

The general commanding announces to the army that he

has official notice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him his entire army, on the 9th inst., at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four long years of war.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

It would be difficult to portray the scenes following the receipt of this information. Let those who were far from the fields of battle, who had seen no piles of victims awaiting burial; who had not left friends dying without a word as they rushed to avenge their death: let these recall their own feelings when the tidings were brought to them, and they may partially understand what was in the minds of the men of the army. From all sides were heard men singing the songs of the war, and eagerly anticipating the day when home roofs should be seen and loved ones held to hearts strained most to breaking.

General Sherman proceeded to Raleigh, to prepare for the next duty.

On the morning of the 14th General Kilpatrick reported from Durham's Station that a flag of truce had come in from the enemy, with a package from General Johnston. It was as follows:

"The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieu-

tenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate existing war."

General Sherman replied as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April* 14, 1865.

"*General* J. E. JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army.

"GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the university, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of failure to agree.

"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

Two days later Johnston replied, making an appointment

for a meeting with General Sherman at a point midway between the two armies. General Sherman ordered a locomotive, and was about to start when a telegraph operator came to him with the information that a cipher dispatch was then being received which he ought to see before departure. He waited, and the dispatch proved to be from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and the attempt on the life of Mr. Seward and his son. General Sherman feared the effect of this news on his men, and ordered the operator to keep it a secret till his return. General Sherman's account of the interview and subsequent negotiations discloses some of the causes for the strong attachment felt both by him and General Grant for General Johnston.

"We soon reached the house of a Mr. Bennett, dismounted, and left our horses with orderlies in the road. Our officers, on foot, passed into the yard, and General Johnston and I entered the small frame-house. We asked the farmer if we could have the use of his house for a few minutes, and he and his wife withdrew into a smaller log-house, which stood close by.

"As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched him closely. The perspiration came out in large drops on his forehead, and he did not attempt to conceal his distress. He denounced the act as a disgrace to the age, and hoped I did not charge it to the Confederate Government. I told him I could not believe that he or General Lee, or the officers of the Confederate army, could possibly be privy to acts of assassination; but I would not say as much for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders, and men of that stripe. We talked about the effect of this act on the country at large and on the armies, and he realized that it made my situation extremely delicate. I explained to him that I had not yet revealed the

news to my own personal staff or to the army, and that I dreaded the effect when made known in Raleigh. Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly endeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman or man in Raleigh might say something or do something that would madden our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would befall the place.

"I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not oppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could do the same with honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedly admitted this, and added that any further fighting would be '*murder*,' but he thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, we might arrange terms that would embrace all the Confederate armies. I asked him if he could control other armies than his own; he said not then, but intimated that he could procure authority from Mr. Davis. I then told him that I had recently had an interview with General Grant and President Lincoln, and that I was possessed of their views; that with them and the people North there seemed to be no vindictive feeling against the Confederate armies, but there was against Davis and his political adherents; and that the terms that General Grant had given to General Lee's army were certainly most generous and liberal. All this he admitted, but always recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing his own army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia. General Johnston's account of our interview in his 'Narrative' (page 402, *et seq.*) is quite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming the capitulation of Loeben, to which he refers. Our conversation was very general and extremely cordial, satisfying me that it could have but one result, and that which we all desired, viz., to end the war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return to Raleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's

assassination could be divulged, on General Johnston's saying that he thought that during the night he could procure authority to act in the name of all the Confederate armies in existence, we agreed to meet again the next day at noon at the same place, and parted, he for Hillsboro' and I for Raleigh.

"We rode back to Durham's Station in the order we had come, and then I showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death. I cautioned the officers to watch the soldiers closely, to prevent any violent retaliation by them, leaving that to the Government at Washington; and on our way back to Raleigh in the cars I showed the same dispatch to General Logan and to several of the officers of the Fifteenth Corps that were posted at Morrisville and Jones' Station, all of whom were deeply impressed by it; but all gave their opinion that this sad news should not change our general course of action.

"As soon as I reached Raleigh I published the following orders to the army, announcing the assassination of the President, and I doubt if, in the whole land, there were more sincere mourners over his sad fate than there were in and about Raleigh. I watched the effect closely, and was gratified that there was no single act of retaliation though I saw and felt that one single word by me would have laid the city in ashes, and turned its whole population houseless upon the country, if not worse:"

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDER, NO. 56.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April* 17, 1865.

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on the evening of the 14th instant, at the theater in Washington City, his Excellency, the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was assassinated by one who

uttered the State motto of Virginia. At the same time the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while suffering from a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his own house, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposed fatally. It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that other high officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it seems that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare, begins to resort to the assassin's tools.

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for he knows that the great mass of the Confederate army would scorn to sanction such acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequence of Rebellion against rightful authority.

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now be prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and guerrillas; but woe unto the people who seek to expend their wild passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

The following are the papers signed on the surrender of Johnston's army, and General Sherman's comments on them:

TERMS of a Military Convention, entered into this 25th day of April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station, North Carolina, between *General* JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, commanding the Confederate Army, and *Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, commanding the United States Army in North Carolina:

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States army.

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly released from this obligation.

4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, *General*,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.

Approved: U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

"I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request, General Grant wrote on these terms his approval, and then I thought the matter was surely at an end. He took the original copy, on the 27th, returned to Newbern, and thence went back to Washington.

"I immediately made all the orders necessary to carry into effect the terms of this convention, devolving on General Schofield the details of granting the paroles and making the muster-rolls of prisoners, inventories of property, etc., of General Johnston's army at and about Greensboro', North Carolina, and on General Wilson the same duties in Georgia; but thus far I had been compelled to communicate with the latter through Rebel sources, and General Wilson was necessarily confused by the conflict of orders and information. I

deemed it of the utmost importance to establish for him a more reliable base of information and supply, and accordingly resolved to go in person to Savannah for that purpose. But before starting I received a *New York Times*, of April 24, containing the following extraordinary communications:"

[FIRST BULLETIN.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *April* 22, 1865.

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called a basis of peace, had been entered into on the 18th inst. by General Sherman with the Rebel General Johnston. Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at the conference.

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions given by the late President, in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the third of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had requested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a letter to Davis and to the Rebel Congress. General Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen, and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which

SURRENDER OF GENERAL JOHNSON.

he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant:

"WASHINGTON, *March* 3, 1865—12 P. M.

"*Lieutenant-General* GRANT:

"The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.

"Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. "EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*"

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from Salisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis to escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations.

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It is stated here by respectable parties that the amount of specie taken south by Jeff Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with General Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations look to this end."

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for North Carolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army. EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

"Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons for rejecting them.

"The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrage on me, for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in advance, as was his duty, the purpose of the administration to limit our negotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary, at Savannah, he had authorized me to control all matters, *civil* and military.

"By this bulletin he implied that I had previously been furnished with a copy of his dispatch of March 3d, to General Grant, which was not so; and he gave warrant to the impression, which was sown broadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davis to escape. Under the influence of this, I wrote General Grant the following letter of April 28th, which has been published in the Proceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

"I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal and official insult, which I afterward publicly resented.

"'GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the *New York Times* of the 24th, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, Hon. E. M. Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public very erroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, with comments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three years hence, after the Government has experimented a little more in the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the vast country known as the "South."

"'In the meantime, however, I did think that my rank (if not past services) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of War would keep secret what was communicated

for the use of none but the cabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of giving publicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawing therefrom inferences wide of the truth. I never saw or had furnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the 3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey to me its substance, or anything like it. On the contrary, I had seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, made in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any other official hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated to allay the fears of the people of the South, after the destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them without any government whatever.

"'We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simply impossible for our military power to reach all the masses of their unhappy country.

"'I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army into bands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable only of infinite mischief. But you saw, on your arrival here, that I had my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct military operations in this quarter," I inferred that you were satisfied with the military situation; at all events the instant I learned, what was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I acted in such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston's whole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to General Lee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.

"'Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman were likely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe," is in deep error. General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury," but had gone back to "Statesville." Davis was between us, and therefore Stoneman was beyond

him. By turning toward me he was approaching Davis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mounted force greatly needed for Davis' capture, and for other purposes. Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and as my official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in that regard.

"'As the editor of the *Times* has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn from this singular document the conclusion that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention.

"'I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputation, in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans and purposes, not to my liking. It is not fair to withold from me the plans and policy of the Government (if any there be), and expect me to guess at them; for facts and events appear quite different from different standpoints. For four years I have been in camp dealing with soldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other conclusion. They will learn with pain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in common-sense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night, winter and summer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand men in magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the day appointed, have brought discredit on our Government! I do not wish to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted, before publishing to the world a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudi-

cation, and then accompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to be let loose upon me. It is true that non-combatants, men who sleep in comfort and security, while we watch on the distant lines, are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough to draw our pay. I envy not the task of "reconstruction," and am delighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it.

"'As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived at a different conclusion from that of the Secretary of War. I will therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and, when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civil authorities the execution of the task of which they seem so jealous. But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to go back to Nashville and follow my path, for they will see some things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

"'With sincere respect,

"'W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

"'P. S.—As Mr. Stanton's most singular paper has been published, I demand that this also be made public, though I am in no manner responsible to the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors.

"'W. T. S., *Major-General.*'"

MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865.

SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

That the Confederate army might return to their homes, the following supplemental terms were made:

1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their

industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation, if necessary.

2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the general commanding the department may direct.

3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers and men, to be retained by them.

4. The commanding general of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water, from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention.

J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major-General*,
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.
J. E. JOHNSTON, *General*,
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.

On the 5th of May General Sherman received the following from General Schofield. As it leads up to the attack on General Sherman by Mr. Stanton, it is fair that our commander's side of that affair should be always at hand. This was the second attack on General Sherman; the first sought to destroy him at the commencement of the war—this to nullify his great work:

"RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, *May* 5, 1885.

"*To Major-General* W. T. SHERMAN, Morehead City.

"When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines (for trade and intercourse) had been ex-

tended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once.

"I hope the Government will make known its policy as to the organs of State government without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done. The people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite settlement. 'What is to be done with the freedmen?' is the question of all, and it is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negroes from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too soon, for he probably will undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from you fully, when you have time to write. I will send your message to General Wilson at once.

"J. M. SCHOFIELD, *Major-General.*"

Says General Sherman:

"I was utterly without instructions from any source on the points of General Schofield's inquiry, and under the existing state of facts could not even advise him, for by this time I was in possession of the second bulletin of Mr. Stanton, published in all the Northern papers, with comments that assumed that I was a common traitor and a public enemy; and high officials had even instructed my own subordinates to disobey my lawful orders. General Halleck, who had so long been in Washington as the chief of staff, had been sent on the 21st of April to Richmond, to command the armies of the Potomac and James, in place of General Grant, who had transferred his headquarters to the National capital,

and he (General Halleck) was therefore in supreme command in Virginia, while my command over North Carolina had never been revoked or modified."

[SECOND BULLETIN.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *April* 27—9:30 A. M.
To Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the military Division of the James. Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that Sherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by the President, and they were ordered to disregard it, and push the enemy in every direction.

E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, *April* 26—9:30 P. M.
"*Hon.* E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

"Generals Meade, Sheridan and Wright are acting under orders to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his command only, and no other.

"They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any one except from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat.

"Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new arrangement has been made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was to be suspended until further orders.

"I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman's, but to push forward as rapidly as possible.

"The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis' specie is moving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible.

"I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to intercept the Rebel chiefs and their plunder.

"The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteen million dollars.

"H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General commanding.*"

General Sherman continues:

"Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in Washington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on this whole matter, and will abide the judgment of the country on the patriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connection. General Halleck's measures to capture General Johnston's army, actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro', on the 26th of April, simply excited my contempt for a judgment such as he was supposed to possess. The assertion that Jeff. Davis' specie-train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was reported to be moving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast as possible, found plenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand men had been at Goldsboro' from March 22d to the date of his dispatch, April 26th; and such a train would have been composed of from fifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie, even if it all were in gold. I suppose the exact amount of treasure which Davis had with him is now known to a cent; some of it was paid to his escort, when it disbanded at and near Washington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a small parcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars, which is now retained in the United States Treasury vault at Washington, and shown the curious.

"The thirteen millions of treasure, with which Jeff. Davis was to corrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to the contents of a hand-valise!

"To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of these published bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express the state of my feelings. I was outraged beyond measure, and was resolved to resent the insult, cost what it might. I went to the Wayanda and showed them to Mr. Chase, with whom I had a long and frank conversation, during which he explained to me the confusion caused in Washington by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the sudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson, who was then supposed to be bitter and vindictive in his feelings toward the South, and the wild pressure of every class of politicians to enforce on the new President their pet schemes. He showed me a letter of his own, which was in print, dated Baltimore, April 11th, and another of April 12th, addressed to the President, urging him to recognize the freedmen as equal in all respects to the whites. He was the first man, of any authority or station, who ever informed me that the Government of the United States would insist on extending to the former slaves of the South the elective franchise, and he gave as a reason the fact that the slaves, grateful for their freedom, for which they were indebted to the armies and Government of the North, would by their votes, offset the disaffected and Rebel element of the white population of the South."

General Sherman now proceeded toward Washington in company with Secretary Chase, and at the first opportunity informed Mr. Stanton that he did not wish to meet him on any account; that he resented the insult offered him, and that he certainly would not accept hospitality at his hands. His story of the review of the troops at Washington is one that has been read at many camp-fires. That it was written

by Sherman the man, rather than the soldier, is proved in every line, as well as by his last order to his army, with which fittingly this portion of my work must end:

"By invitation I was on the reviewing stand, and witnessed the review of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), commanded by General Meade in person. The day was beautiful, and the pageant was superb. Washington was full of strangers, who filled the streets in holiday dress, and every house was decorated with flags. The army marched by divisions in close column around the Capitol, down Pennsylvania Avenue, past the President and cabinet, who occupied a large stand prepared for the occasion, directly in front of the White House.

"I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Sherman, who arrived that day, accompanied by her father, the Hon. Thomas Ewing, and my son Tom, then, eight years old.

"During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps crossed Long Bridge, bivouacked in the streets about the Capitol, and the Fourteenth Corps closed up to the bridge. The morning of the 24th was extremely beautiful, and the ground was in splendid order for our review. The streets were filled with people to see the pageant, armed with bouquets of flowers for thier favorite regiments or heroes, and everything was propitious. Punctually at 9 A. M. the signal-gun was fired, when in person, attended by General Howard and all my staff, I rode slowly down Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children densely lining the sidewalks, and almost obstructing the way. We were followed close by General Logan and the head of the Fifteenth Corps. When I reached the Treasury building, and looked back, the sight was simply magnificent. The column was compact, and the glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving with the

regularity of a pendulum. We passed the Treasury building, in front of which and of the White House was an immense throng of people, for whom extensive stands had been prepared on both sides of the avenue. As I neared the brick house opposite the lower corner of Lafayette Square, some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward, who, still feeble and bandaged for his wounds, had been removed there that he might behold the troops. I moved in that direction and took off my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window. He recognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on steadily past the President, saluting with our swords. All on his stand arose and acknowledged the salute. Then, turning into the gate of the Presidential grounds, we left our horses with orderlies, and went upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sherman, with her father and son. Passing them, I shook hands with the President, General Grant, and each member of the cabinet. As I approached Mr. Stanton he offered me his hand, but I declined it publicly, and the fact was universally noticed. I then took my post on the left of the President, and for six hours and a half stood, while the army passed in the order of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Fourteenth Corps. It was in my judgment, the most magnificent army in existence—sixty-five thousand men, in splendid physique, who had just completed a march of nearly two thousand miles in a hostile country, in good drill, and who realized that they were being closely scrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymen and by foreigners. Division after division passed, each commander of an army corps or division coming on the stand during the passage of his command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, and spectators. The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the careful dress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the companies, all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered

and bullet-ridden flags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice. Many good people up to that time had looked upon our Western army as a sort of mob; but the world then saw and recognized the fact that it was an army in the proper sense, well organized, well commanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it had swept through the South like a tornado. For six hours and a half that strong tread of the Army of the West resounded along Pennsylvania Avenue. Not a soul of that vast crowd of spectators left his place; and when the rear of the column had passed by, thousands of the spectators still lingered to express their sense of confidence in the strength of a Government which could claim such an army.

"Some little scenes enlivened the day, and called for the laughter and cheers of the crowd. Each division was followed by six ambulances, as a representative of its baggage train. Some of the division commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry, hams, etc., and some of them had the families of freed slaves along, with the women leading their children. Each division was preceded by its corps of black pioneers, armed with picks and spades. These marched abreast in double ranks, keeping perfect dress and step, and added much to the interest of the occasion. On the whole, the grand review was a splendid success, and was a fitting conclusion of the campaign and the war.

"I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders taking leave of the army, which ended my connection with the war, though I afterward visited and took a more formal leave of the officers and men on July 4, 1865, at Louisville, Kentucky:"

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 76.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D. C., *May* 30, 1865.

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and Georgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your homes, and others will be retained in military service till further orders.

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty.

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate histories, yet bound by one common cause—the union of our country, and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-Face Mountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind.

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christmas found us at Savannah.

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of the wilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro'. Even then we paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for peace instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checked us; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offered submission, your General thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender.

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all that men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and we have a right to join in the universal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our Government stands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and navy of the United States.

To such as remain in the service your General need only remind you that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are equally important in the future. To such as go home he will only say that our favored country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man

may find a home and occupation suited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatience sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good citizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our country, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its old armor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of our inheritance.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

SCENE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GENERALS SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON, APRIL 18, 1865.
JAMES BENNETT'S HOUSE WHERE INTERVIEW WAS HELD.—GENERAL KILPATRICK AND GENERAL HAMPTON DISCUSSING THE CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XVI.

SERVICES IN PEACE—DEATH.

Not the greatest services to his country were rendered by General Sherman during the war. Conflict had ceased, and those who had been fighting four years returned to peaceful pursuits. In every State of the Union there were soldiers in factories, on the farm and in commercial pursuits. But they claimed their commanders as part of their present as of their past lives. This was especially so with those who had served under General Sherman. For them there was never any of that feeling of estrangement as in some cases was felt against those officers who entered political life after the war closed.

As soldiers we watched the performance of Sherman's duties while acting on the frontier and guarding the Pacific railroads. As soldiers we rejoiced at his advance to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and then, when Grant was made President, to the rank of General. As his friends we cordially grasped his hand when he laid down the latter position that General Sheridan might be tendered the honor. But the great delight of all who had ever served under General Sherman was when meeting him at the reunions of the Grand Army. Upon these occasions his presence had more to do with bringing back old memories than all other incidents combined. In every position in life General Sherman had proved his honesty and sincerity of purpose. When the war was over and the political intrigues at Washington disgusted him, he applied for permission to remove the headquarters of the army to St. Louis, that he might be out of an atmosphere in

which he could find no pleasure. When, in 1884, it was sought to draw him into political life, by making him the nominee of a party for the presidency, he refused to have anything to do with the matter, though it was evident he could have had the nomination had he so desired. The following statement was first published in the *North American Review:*

"In the year of our Lord, 1884, there was to be a sharp contest for the nomination, in Chicago, for a Presidential candidate of the republican party. The press and people generally believed that Blaine wanted it, and everybody turned to him as the man best qualified to execute the policy to accomplish the result aimed at. Still, abnegating himself, he wrote to me from Washington this letter:

["'*Confidential, strictly and absolutely so.*]

"'WASHINGTON, D. C., *May* 25, 1884.

"'MY DEAR GENERAL: This letter requires no answer. After reading it, file it away in your most secret drawer, or give it to the flames.

"'At the approaching convention at Chicago it is more than possible, it is indeed not improbable, that you may be nominated for the presidency. If so, you must stand your hand, accept the responsibility, and assume the duties of the place to which you will surely be chosen if a candidate.

"'You must not look upon it as the work of the politicians. If it comes to you, it will come as the ground swell of popular demand, and you can no more refuse than you could have refused to obey an order when you were a lieutenant in the army. If it comes to you at all, it will come as a call of patriotism. It would in such an event injure your great fame as much to decline it as it would for you to seek it. Your historic record, full as it is, would be rendered still more glorious by such

an administration as you would be able to give the country. Do not say a word in advance of the convention, no matter who may ask you. You are with your friends, who will jealously guard your honor and renown.

"'Your friend, JAMES G. BLAINE.'

"To which I replied:

"'912 GARRISON AVENUE, ST. LOUIS, MO., *May* 28, 1884.

"'*Hon.* JAMES G. BLAINE, Washington, D. C.

"'MY DEAR FRIEND: I have received your letter of the 25th; shall construe it as absolutely confidential, not intimating even to any member of my family that I have heard from you, and though you may not expect an answer, I hope you will not construe one as unwarranted.

"'I have had a great many letters from all points of the compass to a similar effect, one or two of which I have answered frankly; but the great mass are unanswered.

"'I ought not to submit myself to the cheap ridicule of declining what is not offered, but it is only fair to the many really able men who rightfully aspire to the high honor of being President of the United States to let them know that I am not and must not be construed as a rival. In every man's life occurs an epoch when he must choose his own career, and when he may not throw off the responsibility, or tamely place his destiny in the hands of friends. Mine occurred, in Louisiana when, in 1861, alone in the midst of a people blinded by supposed wrongs, I resolved to stand by the Union as long as a fragment of it survived on which to cling. Since then, through faction, tempest, war, and peace, my career has been all my family and friends could ask. We are now in a good house of our own choice, with reasonable provisions for old age, surrounded by kind and admiring friends, in a community

where Catholicism is held in respect and veneration, and where my children will naturally grow up in contact with an industrious and frugal people. You have known and appreciated Mrs. Sherman from childhood, have also known each and all the members of my family, and can understand without an explanation from me how their thoughts and feelings should and ought to influence my action. But I will not even throw off on them the responsibility.

"'I will not in any event entertain or accept a nomination as a candidate for President by the Chicago republican convention, or any other convention, for reasons personal to myself. I claim that the civil war, in which I simply did a man's fair share of work, so perfectly accomplished peace that military men have an absolute right to rest and to demand that the men who have been schooled in the arts and practice of peace shall now do their work equally well. Any Senator can step from his chair at the Capitol into the White House and fulfill the office of President with more skill and success than a Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan, who were soldiers by education and nature, who fulfilled well their office when the country was in danger, but were not schooled in the practice by which civil communities are and should be governed. I claim that our experience since 1865 demonstrates the truth of this, my proposition. Therefore I say that patriotism does not demand of me what I construe as a sacrifice of judgment, of inclination, and of self-interest.

"'I have my personal affairs in a state of absolute safety and comfort. I owe no man a cent, have no expensive habits, envy no man his wealth or power, no complications or indirect liabilities, and would account myself a fool, a madman, an ass, to embark anew, at sixty-five years of age, in a career that may become at any moment tempest-tossed by perfidy, the defalcation, the dishonesty or neglect of any

single one of a hundred thousand subordinates utterly unknown to the President of the United States, not to say the eternal worriment by a vast host of impecunious friends and old military subordinates. Even as it is, I am tortured by the charitable appeals of poor, distressed pensioners, but as President these would be multiplied beyond human endurance.

"'I remember well the experience of Generals Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hayes, and Garfield, all elected because of their military services, and am warned, not encouraged, by their sad experiences.

"'The civilians of the United States should and must buffet with this thankless office, and leave us old soldiers to enjoy the peace we fought for, and think we earned.

"'With profound respect, your friend,

"'W. T. SHERMAN.'

"These letters prove absolutely that Mr. Blaine, though qualified, waived to me personally a nomination which the world still believes he then coveted for himself.

"For copies of these letters I believe I have been importuned a thousand times, but as a soldier I claim the privilege of unmasking my batteries when I please.

"In looking over my letter-book of that period, I find one recorded and dated two weeks before the Blaine letter, which is to me more satisfactory than any other, and, therefore, I embrace it in this article, which I want to be complete and final on this subject-matter, viz.:

"'912 GARRISON AVENUE, ST. LOUIS, MO., *May* 16, 1884.

"'*Hon.* C. M. BUTT, Viroqua, Wis.

"'MY DEAR SIR: I infer from your letter of May 14th, just received, that you are one of those soldiers who served under me in the Rebellion, and that you entertain for me that most acceptable feeling of love and confidence which I value

more than gold and riches. I also infer that you are a delegate to the republican convention, to meet at Chicago early in June, to select out of the great number of eminent and experienced men a candidate for President.

"'I am embarrassed by the receipt of many private letters intimating that my name may be presented, and that as an American officer and citizen I have no right to decline. It is simply exposing myself to ridicul to answer declining what is not offered, and probably never will be; and as a rule, such letters are ignored; but you are a delegate, and in my opinion have a higher title in being a member of that army which made our Government permanent and most honored among the nations of the earth, therefore entitled to an answer.

"'At this moment of time no danger or necessity exists which can make such a personal sacrifice necessary on my part. My brother, Senator Sherman, is fully advised of my views, so is my neighbor, ex-Senator Henderson, who will be at Chicago as a delegate from Missouri, and both should relieve me of any embarrassment, for I will not allow the use of my name as a candidate. I have a thousand reasons, any one of which to me is good and sufficient, and I claim the full benefit of the freedom for which we fought, of choosing for myself my own course of action in life. I do not want my old comrades to think me eccentric or unreasonable, but to concede to me the simple privilege of living out my own time in peace and comfort.

"'This letter is meant for yourself alone, and not for the public. "'With great respect, yours, etc.,

"'W. T. SHERMAN.'

"In giving to the *North American Review* at this late date these letters, which thus far have remained hidden in my pri-

vate files, I commit no breach of confidence, and to put at rest a matter of constant inquiry referred to in my letter of May 28th, 1884, I here record that my immediate family are strongly Catholic. I am not and cannot be. This is all the public has a right to know; nor do I wish to be construed as departing from a resolve made forty years ago never to embark in politics. The brightest and best youth of our land have been drawn into that maelstrom, and their wrecked fortunes strew the beach of the ocean of Time. My memory even in its short time brings up names of victims by the hundreds, if not thousands.

"'Still, American citizens should take an interest in public events, because with them resides the ultimate power, the "Sovereignty." We have thrown overboard the old doctrine of the divine right of kings, and substituted "The will of the people," and the civilized world looks toward America for a solution of the greatest problem of human existence and happiness—good government; this is only possible by watching jealously and closely the drift of public events.

"'Thus far as a nation we have met every phase, colonial and national, military and civil, and in my judgment the people of the United States have in the past fifty years accomplished larger physical results than those of Asia in a thousand years, or of Europe in five hundred years. I am equally convinced that our people in every section are more intelligent, more temperate, and enjoy more of the comforts of life than did our immediate ancestors. So that we are well warranted in allowing the drift of public events to continue as now, as little disturbed by artificial obstructions as possible. 'Tis true that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," and citizens should and must watch the conduct of their chosen agents. Acts are substantial, words and professions are only idle wind; none but men who have done well should be chosen to

office. The worst men always promise most—and of all things the nation should not be represented abroad by men who labored to destroy the Government. Again, the incident recently reported as having occurred at Richmond, Va., of displaying the Rebel flag in a procession to which Union men were invited, among them the venerable Andrew G. Curtin, of Pennsylvania, one of the famous war Governors, who to my personal knowledge has gone to the extreme limit of possibility to create a perfect reconciliation, was calculated to arouse feelings which it were wiser to allow to die out. We now have a common country, a common destiny, and but a single national flag.

"I was glad to receive from high authority the assurance that the affair had been greatly exaggerated. Still it is well to emphasize the fact that the Rebel flag went down forever at Appomattox, and can not be resurrected without protest, if not actual bloodshed. W. T. SHERMAN.'"

In later years he repeatedly recalled what impressions had been made on his mind by the bickerings among the politicians, when it would have seemed that all personal ambition must have been stilled in the effort to recover from the terrible strain of the war, and to secure to the country its full benefit. It was the one characteristic of the General, which should be held for a lesson, now that he has passed away. When we meet around the camp-fires we shall miss him, but there will come to all the memory of General Sherman's reason for wishing that these reunions of the old soldiers should be maintained as long as there remains a single survivor of the war.

It has become too common to say that the reunions of the Grand Army have little good purpose or result. This is in line with that spirit which finds no excuse for preserving relics of the war, or of otherwise cherishing memories of days

which cost so much of suffering, as well to the boys in the field as to the dear ones at home. It must be confessed that some cause has been given for this feeling. When the insignia of the Grand Army is made to do political work; when the very organization is sought for selfish ends; when it is asked to indorse action plainly in opposition to its principles, there is some excuse for the feeling of bitterness, but there remains another fact. The Grand Army was organized for a noble purpose. It has already wrought of good sufficient to have earned the support of honorable citizens. And no member was ever better fitted to plead for its maintenance than General Sherman.

At the encampment at Milwaukee, General Sherman was present, and this matter of growing hostility was a subject of frequent conversation. The General's idea was that it was as much the duty of members of the Grand Army to maintain their organization as it was to obey commands during the war. There were many who gained a new appreciation of the organization from the earnest words of their old commander. They will be more earnest in following the advice, now that they are words of a dead comrade.

During the last few years of his life General Sherman seems to have been more a citizen of the whole country than of any locality. For a short time a resident of St. Louis, then at the National capital, he finally settled in New York. He was the familiar object at social and public gatherings, rising to the position of one of the best after-dinner speakers the country has produced. No great gathering in the metropolis was deemed complete without the presence of General Sherman. All classes united to do him honor. But not even the bitterest political campaign found him mingling in the turmoil other than as a private citizen casting a simple ballot.

One of the General's delights was the theater, and among

the members of the profession he numbered hosts of friends.

It was at the theater that he made almost his last appearance in public. On the night of February 4th, 1891, there was given a special performance of "Poor Jonathan" at the Casino. Invitations had been sent to the military officers in the city and vicinity, and the General occupied one of the proscenium-boxes. He seemed to be in the best of spirits, and was the life of the little gathering in the box.

"He returned to his home immediately after the performance, and, although the weather was clear and cold, in some way the General caught a severe cold. Its first effects were noticed on the following morning. His condition, however, did not prevent his attendance at the wedding of Miss Shepard on that afternoon. He coughed a little and complained of the cold while in the church. On Friday morning his condition had become more uncomfortable, but excited no alarm. His throat, however, had become affected in the meantime, and he was obliged to give up a dinner with Lawrence Barrett that evening at the Union League Club. On Saturday morning, when he began to show signs of facial erysipelas, accompanied by fever, he felt some anxiety, and sent for Dr. Alexander, who had been his family physician for a number of years. On Sunday the disease began to get a firm hold upon the old warrior. His face and neck became much swollen and inflamed, and conversation became difficult and painful. His condition was such that Dr. Alexander sent for Dr. Janeway, for the purpose of holding a consultation. The General was then confined to his bed, and it was found that the ordinary treatment applied in cases of erysipelas would not answer the purpose, in part owing to the General's advanced age.

"The disease had developed to such an extent on Monday that it was decided to summon the members of the family.

Telegrams were sent at once to Senator John Sherman, his brother; his daughters, Mrs. Thackara and Mrs. Fitch. The other children, with the exception of the Rev. T. E. Sherman, were at home. To him, however, a cable dispatch was sent. He is a student in the Jesuit Seminary on the Island of Jersey. Senator Sherman arrived at his brother's home on Monday night, and his daughters on the following day. The arrival of Senator Sherman, with the publication of the dispatch which called him, was the first intimation that the people of this city had of General Sherman's illness.

"Dr. Alexander remained at the sick man's bedside on Tuesday night, and when Dr. Janeway came to relieve him on Wednesday morning, he found the General resting on his back in a state of semi-stupor. His condition at that time was recognized as critical. He was in great pain when he moved, and gave evidence of growing weaker, despite the fact that whisky and milk, which were used as nourishment throughout the illness, were administered to him as often as possible. Intimate friends of the family were then informed of his precarious condition.

"The General rallied somewhat at noon, and his family began to hope that the illness was only temporary. But their hopes were delusive. In the afternoon the attending physicians, Drs. Alexander, Janeway and Green, began to send out hourly bulletins as an official answer to the hundreds of inquiries that poured in upon them. At 2:15 they made their first announcement, which read as follows: 'General Sherman was worse this morning, and his condition is critical. During the day his condition has improved considerably.'

"'From that time on until the end, there was a constant wavering between despair and hope, a succession of rallies and depressions. At times the General's strong constitution

and wonderful vitality would give proofs of their former power and engender the belief in the breasts of the watchers that he would recover. But these proofs were not lasting. Friends who came from the sick-room on Wednesday and on the following days were quickly surrounded by people anxious to hear the latest news of the patient's condition. He was still able to speak on Wednesday, and addressed a number of friends who approached his bedside, among them General Thomas Ewing. He did not attempt to converse with him, however, as his tongue had become swollen, and the lungs had filled.

"He improved again slightly during the evening so that two of the physicians and Senator Sherman left the house. The Senator, however, was summoned again at 2 o'clock on Thursday, when the veteran again grew worse. Thursday passed in much the same way as Wednesday, although it was found advisable to have the last rites of the Catholic Church administered just before noon. In the afternoon the sick man surprised his watchers by getting out of bed and walking a few steps to an easy-chair, where he sat for a few minutes. He showed the same marvelous will-power again in the evening. In his rallies he was able to clear his lungs a little. Whisky and milk were given to him as often as he could take nourishment. Late at night it was said that if the General could maintain his state at that time, there would be hopes of his ultimate recovery.

"Friday was another day of hope and disappointment. Several times it was reported that the General was dying, but he managed to rally, despite his weakened condition. He grew weak again at midnight, and at an early hour yesterday morning it was known that his death was only a question of a few hours. At 4 o'clock his family was all summoned to the room, and never left it, except for five minutes,

until the end. The alarming attack which seized the patient soon after 6 o'clock precipitated death. The doctors hurriedly held another consultation, did what they could to relieve the General, and then decided that hope must be abandoned.

"The chloroform plasters which had been placed on General Sherman's chest failed to help him. The police-officers then cleared the sidewalk and streets of all passengers, and people began to wait for the end. At 8:35 o'clock Dr. Janeway left the house, to which he did not again return. His face and his few words told plainly that he had no hope. At 11 o'clock Mr. Barrett came to the telegraph station and sadly made public the last bulletin before the announcement of the General's death. The man was almost overcome with grief. The bulletin simply said that the doctors had given up hope.

"Mr. Barrett returned to the house, and an hour and a half afterward his chief breathed his last.

"With one long sigh General William Tecumseh Sherman died. Death came at 1:50 P. M., Saturday, February 13th, 1891. Its coming was gentle, quiet, painless. Not a muscle moved. Life seemed to steal reluctantly away, it went so softly, leaving no sign of a struggle.

"For two hours the great soldier of the Nation had been unconscious. His eyes were closed, and he lay on his back suffering nothing. His family knelt around him, their loving glances fastened upon the still face. Heavy tapestries dimmed the light that came through an open window, and the wood fire shed a red glow over the room. At 1:20 o'clock it was seen that the hand of death was laid upon the stricken warrior. The tips of his fingers grew cold. He gasped. His head, lying on a soft pillow, was tenderly lowered. He gasped again, and again the pillow was pressed down to give

him relief. Finally it was removed, and the head rested upon the sheet, level with the shoulders. The fingers grew colder. The hand stiffened. The cold crept up the arm till it, too, was chilled. Then it crept on to the body, deadening every sense. It reached the heart and then—the end.

"It was the death for a conqueror to die. The face settled into a calm repose. Under each eye there was a slight swelling, and the right cheek was larger than the left. Both eyes were closed. The right arm was straight beside the body, the left was crossed upon the breast. It seems as if in going before the Great Commander of all the armies the hero of the civil war were giving the sergeant's salute:

"'All present and accounted for; Grant—Sheridan—Sherman!'

"Death came from suffocation. The lungs filled with mucus, the tongue swelled till it stopped the passage of the throat, the jaws became rigid. Frequent relapses had sapped the soldier's strength. His ammunition was all gone. He was helpless. He could not fight. For the first and last time he surrendered unconditionally.

"Kneeling beside the bed as the great heart ceased its beating were the General's son, P. T. Sherman, his four daughters, the Misses Rachel and Lizzie Sherman, Mrs. Fitch and Mrs. Thackara; his brother, Senator John Sherman; his sons-in-law, Lieutenants Fitch and Thackara; his brother-in-law, General Thomas Ewing; his physician, Dr. Alexander, U. S. A., and his nurse, Miss Elizabeth Price, of the New York Hospital.

"These had been summoned at 5:30 A. M., when it was believed that death was near, and had remained constantly beside the bed till all was over. In the morning the General made no effort to speak. His lips were sealed. When spoken to he responded only with a glance of the eye that

betokened a clear perception of all that was going on. Consciousness never deserted him till noon. For two days he had not suffered. Dr. Green, who had been called in on Wednesday, was with the General at 5:30 o'clock, having been sent for hastily, but he soon returned to his home to snatch an hour of much-needed rest. When he was awakened at 2 o'clock it was to be informed that the end had come. Dr. Janeway, the consulting physician, left the house at 9 o'clock, having given up all hope, and did not return till evening. Dr. Alexander, the ranking surgeon of the army in this city, never left the sick-room after 5 o'clock.

"No priest was called in. There were no religious rites of any kind in the death-chamber. The sacrament of extreme unction having been administered on Thursday, the services of a clergyman were not again required."

When the news flashed along the wires that General Sherman was dead, there was returned from all quarters messages of condolence and affection. It would be a work of pleasure to collect in a memorial volume all the kindly words said of the loved commander when he had passed away, by friends who had learned to love him. In such a record every soldier of Sherman's army would see reflected what had made him the idol of his troops. But that is beyond the scope of this work.

While the body did not lie in state, there were thousands who took the last look at the face of the dead hero. Speaking of the scenes the *New York Times* report says:

"The gloom that prevails about the neighborhood of General Sherman's late residence is a most eloquent tribute of the love those people bore him who saw him every day. Most of these, his neighbors, knew him only by sight. Others merely had passed the time of day with him. A few were fortunate in knowing him well. Yet all seemed to take his

death as a personal grief. There is hardly a house along Seventy-first street, from Central Park to the Hudson River, that does not display from over its door, or from a window, the Stars and Stripes draped in black. The same is true of Ninth Avenue about Seventy-first street. Sherman's death seems to have thrown a pall over the entire locality. Even the children have become imbued with the funereal atmosphere, and instead of romping and playing, they walk sedately up and down before the house of mourning.

"General Sherman's body was finally prepared for burial yesterday morning. The undertaker was busy until 9 o'clock. His work completed, the old soldier's body, dressed in the full uniform of his rank, was placed in its casket of metal and oak, lined with cream satin, and covered with black broadcloth. It is precisely similar to the one in which Mrs. Sherman was buried. The casket was brought down to the drawing-room on the first floor, and there placed on a black catafalque to remain until the family service is conducted by Father Taylor of the Church of the Blessed Sacrament. Then it will be handed over to the military authorities.

"At 10 o'clock the house was thrown open, and until 4 o'clock the body was lying in state. Between the same hours to-day the public will be admitted, unless the crowd becomes too great. That there was no overcrowd yesterday is undoubtedly due to the fact that it had been everywhere announced that the public would not be admitted; that in fact none but the family and intimate friends would look upon Sherman's face again. So many of his old comrades in arms, however, expressed disappointment at this that the family decided to allow as many as came and could be accommodated to enter.

"This decision was spread abroad as if by magic, with the result that there was a steady stream of men, women and

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children passing in and out of the house throughout the day. There was not the slightest confusion or crowding, however. Several of the biggest policemen in the Broadway squad were detailed to duty outside the house, and soldiers from Governor Island were stationed inside to keep the people moving in the right direction.

"The visitors pass into the front door, enter the parlor to the right, pass into the drawing-room, around the bier, and out into the hall again through the dining-room. In the front parlor they notice hanging on the wall, with a mirror between them, two large oil paintings, one of the great commander, by Healy of Rome, and another of his wife. A flag is draped over the General's portrait. Two other flags are draped beneath it. One is the flag that waved over the General's headquarters through all his campaigns. The other is a beautiful silk emblem made for him years ago by ladies.

"Passing into the drawing-room the visitors find it dimly lighted by the flickering light of six candles in a great bronze candelabrum standing in a corner. At its base rests a superb pillow of double English violets. On a card attached to this tribute is written: 'With loving regards, Mrs. Admiral Porter.' That the widow of America's last admiral should have, on the very day when she was following his body to its grave, paused for a moment in her grief to send this token of sympathy to the bereaved family of America's last General, was a thought of sweet consolation to the latter.

"But this was not the only floral tribute. The atmosphere of the room is fairly heavy with the perfume that comes from a bank of flowers that almost conceals a great mahogany sideboard on the east side of the room. There is a splendid bunch of palms 'from the grandchildren of Zachary Taylor,' a wreath of ivy and white lilacs from Mme. Macchetta d'Allegri and Blanche Roosevelt, of Paris; a pillow of roses and calla

lilies from the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, and numerous other pieces. General Sherman's escutcheon hangs on the wall.

"Just at the foot of the bier, on a pedestal of black marble, around which is a wreath of ivy, is a marble bust of the General. It is so placed that the eyes, which are cast downward —the face bearing that semi-serious expression so familiar to those who knew the General—seem to be gazing upon the dead face of its original. The bit of marble was one of the General's household treasures, upon which his kindly eyes often looked with pride. It is not to be wondered at that strange thoughts passed through the minds of the mourners yesterday, as there, in the dim light that surrounded his bier, they saw the Sherman of marble seemingly gazing down with placid features upon the Sherman of clay, as inanimate and far less enduring than itself.

"Approaching the casket the visitors saw folded upon it an American flag, upon which rested the General's hat, his spurs, and the gold-hilted sword and scabbard presented to him at the close of the war by the State of New York. Just where the sword and scabbard are crossed glistens a silver plate, upon which is engraved:

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN,
General, U. S. A.
Born February 8, 1820.
Died Feb. 14, 1891.

"Looking down through the glass cover of the casket, the visiting friend sees the General Sherman he knew in life, and not a body disfigured by sickness, as report has had it. The right hand rests on the sash of the Legion of Honor, which the General wears with his full military uniform. The face is calm and natural. Those who knew the General in

life will recall the severe lines that marked his forehead. These lines are as strongly marked in death as they were in life, and the result is that the face wears an expression that is extremely natural. During his sickness the General's neck and the lower portion of his face were badly discolored by applications of iodine. This has all been concealed. In fact, the only thing in the General's appearance that is strange to those who knew him (excepting, of course, that appearance of death which stamps all upon whom the dreaded messenger calls), is a beard that is considerably longer than the stubby growth the General wore."

It will be allowed to trespass once more upon the work of the memorialist to record the glowing words with which Carl Schurz seconded the motion for the adoption of resolutions of the New York Chamber of Commerce. The resolutions, which were introduced by J. Edward Simmons, were as follows:

"*Whereas*, The members of the Chamber of Commerce but a short time since were called to assemble in the presence of a severe national bereavement to pay their tribute of respect to the character and noble labors of a distinguished civilian and statesman, having under his care the fiduciary interests of the Republic; and

"*Whereas*, To-day, by the dispensation of an all-wise Providence, we meet to pay our tribute of affectionate regard to the memory of a great soldier, whose splendid services in the long struggle for the preservation of the Union were as brilliant as they were successful, and whose achievements illustrated the greatness of a soldier who in conquest knew no hate, and in whose magnanimity there was no revenge; therefore,

"*Resolved*, that the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York hereby places on record its unanimous sentiment

of profound sorrow because of the irreparable loss the nation has sustained in the death of our distinguished soldier citizen, General William Tecumseh Sherman.

"*Resolved*, That by the death of General Sherman the world has lost one of its greatest military heroes. Pure in heart, of spotless integrity, cool and undismayed in danger, he not only won honor and renown from the soldiers of his command, but he invariably inspired them with friendship, affection, and confidence. He was the soldier of justice, right, and truth, and he has passed from our midst as a brilliant star pales and vanishes from the morning sky.

"*Resolved*, That the results achieved by the late war were largely due to the consummate skill, adroit strategy, and matchless generalship of William Tecumseh Sherman, and that the people of this Republic are indebted to him for his eminent services in securing to them the inestimable blessings of a united and prosperous country.

"*Resolved*, That as a public-spirited citizen he proved himself to be a capable man of affairs, with a deep interest in many of our local institutions. As an honorary member he has presided over the deliberations of this Chamber, and his genial presence was seldom missed at our annual banquets. Socially he was the peer of those with whom companionship had a charm, and illustrated in his intercourse all the qualities of a nobleman in the amenities of life. His home was a haven of repose, and love and gentleness were the angels that ministered at his fireside.

"*Resolved*, That the Chamber of Commerce hereby tenders to the family of General Sherman the expression of sincere sympathy in the hour of their bereavement."

In seconding these resolutions, Carl Schurz said:

"The adoption by the Chamber of Commerce of these resolutions, which I have the honor to second, is no mere per-

functory proceeding. We have been called here by a genuine impulse of the heart. To us General Sherman was not a great man like other great men, honored and revered at a distance. We had the proud and happy privilege of calling him one of us. Only a few months ago, at the annual meeting of this Chamber, we saw the familiar face of our honorary member on this platform by the side of our President. Only a few weeks ago he sat at our banquet table, as he had often before, in the happiest mood of conviviality, and contributed to the enjoyment of the night with his always unassuming and always charming speech.

"And as he moved among us without the slightest pomp of self-conscious historic dignity, only with the warm and simple geniality of his nature, it would cost us sometimes an effort of the memory to recollect that he was the famous captain who had marshaled mighty armies victoriously on many a battle-field, and whose name stood, and will forever stand, in the very foremost rank of the saviors of this Republic, and of the great soldiers of the world's history. Indeed, no American could have forgotten this for a moment; but the affection of those who were so happy as to come near to him would sometimes struggle to outrun their veneration and gratitude.

"Death has at last conquered the hero of so many campaigns; our cities and towns and villages are decked with flags at half-mast; the muffled drum and the funeral boom of cannon will resound over the land as his dead body passes to the final resting-place, and the American people stand mournfully gazing into the void left by the sudden disappearance of the last of the greatest men brought forth by our war of regeneration—and this last also finally become, save Abraham Lincoln alone, the most widely beloved.

"He is gone; but as we of the present generation remem-

ber it, history will tell all coming centuries the romantic story of the great 'March to the Sea'—how, in the dark days of 1864, Sherman, having worked his bloody way to Atlanta, then cast off all his lines of supply and communication, and, like a bold diver into the dark unknown, seemed to vanish, with all his hosts, from the eyes of the world, until his triumphant reappearance on the shores of the ocean proclaimed to the anxiously expecting millions, that now the final victory was no longer doubtful, and that the Republic would surely be saved.

"Nor will history fail to record that this great General was, as a victorious soldier, a model of republican citizenship. When he had done his illustrious deeds he rose step by step to the highest rank in the army, and then, grown old, he retired. The Republic made provision for him in modest republican style. He was satisfied. He asked for no higher reward. Although the splendor of his achievements and the personal affection for him, which every one of his soldiers carried home, made him the most popular American of his day, and although the most glittering prizes were not seldom held up before his eyes, he remained untroubled by ulterior ambition. No thought that the Republic owed him more ever darkened his mind. No man could have spoken to him of the 'ingratitude of republics' without meeting from him a stern rebuke. And so, content with a consciousness of a great duty, nobly done, he was happy in the love of his fellow-citizens.

"Indeed, he may truly be said to have been in his old age, not only the most beloved, but the happiest of Americans. Many years he lived in the midst of posterity. His task was finished, and this he wisely understood. His deeds had been passed upon by the judgment of history, and irrevocably registered among the glories of his country and his age. His

generous heart envied no one, and wished every one well; and ill-will had long ceased to pursue him. Beyond cavil his fame was secure, and he enjoyed it as that which he had honestly earned, with a genuine and ever-fresh delight, openly avowed by the charming frankness of his nature.

"He dearly loved to be esteemed and cherished by his fellow-men, and what he valued most, his waning years brought him in ever-increasing abundance. Thus he was in truth a most happy man, and his days went down like an evening sun in a cloudless autumn sky. And when now the American people, with that tenderness of affection which they have long borne him, lay him in his grave, the happy ending of his great ife may, in their hearts, soothe the pang of bereavement they feel at the loss of the old hero who was so dear to them, and of whom they were and always will be so proud. His memory will ever be bright to us all, his truest monument will be the greatness of this Republic he served so well, and his fame will never cease to be prized by a grateful country as one of its most precious possessions."

It had been the expressed wish of General Sherman that his funeral should be as unostentatious as possible. He desired no more the pomp and circumstance of death than of life. But it was impossible to limit or restrict the desire of the people to pay their last respects to the dead. The same cause which led to the opening of the private house that friends numbered by thousands might have opportunity of looking once more upon the face of their hero, caused a lengthened procession to follow the remains on the day of the funeral. The *New York World* of Friday, February 20th, gives a graphic account of the scenes at the funeral:

"One of General Shermans last wishes was that there should be as little pomp and ceremony as possible when he was carried to his grave. He would be laid away in a man-

ner as modest, simple, and quiet as his own life had always been. But he was, perhaps, the best-beloved citizen in New York's confines. And that is why it was that yesterday afternoon a line of soldiers, stretched from the street where he had last lived and died down to Washington Square, had gathered to do him honor. And because he was so beloved—the grim, kind old brave, with his big, honest heart—that is why every inch of vantage ground from Seventy-first street to Desbrosses street was filled up all along the line, till the thoroughfares were choked by the populace, who wished to lift their hats in saying to him: 'Vale; let him go forth.'

"Simple as could be was the ceremonial, but marvelously impressive for all that. The day was as sunny as the great heart had been, which is now stilled. The air was clear and sweet and crisp. That was the background of the picture. But underneath this brightness there was the sound of muffled drums, the gleam of arms reversed, the tolling of bells from steeples, and the sound of mournful guns; hushed voices and tears glistening in the eyes of men. And ever through it all there echoed the deep, slow notes of the Dead March, 'the last song, when the dead man is praised on his journey.'

"The hero's last march was almost the itinerary that in life he used to traverse with so much pleasure. Down Fifth avenue they bore him, where he had paced so often. Down by the great hotel, with its facade of marble, where he walked the length of its long corridor so many afternoons with head bent and hands folded behind his back; down by the neighborhood where the theaters are, in which his face has been an old familiar one for the past ten years; down by Houston street and Broadway, where the cars always stopped respecfully to let the General off to visit the old Army and Navy Headquarters before they moved to Whitehall street.

FUNERAL SCENE IN NEW YORK.

"Cold were the hands and quiet the lips that used to have a pleasant word and a hearty greeting for all who saluted the hero as he walked abroad. He of Shiloh, he of Atlanta, he of the March to the Sea was dead. And like a requiem, the deep, slow music seemed to chant about his bier as Saul sang unto David:

> Bear, bear him along!
> With his few faults shut up like dead flowerets.
> Are balm seeds not here
> To console us? The land has none left such as he on the bier.
> Oh, would we might keep thee, our brother!

"It is no straining expression to say that New York yesterday was a house of mourning. Business throughout the city was practically suspended. All the Federal, State and civil institutions were closed. Flags were flying at half-mast from the battery up to the north as far as the eye could reach, and not only along the route of the procession, but in quiet, out-of-the-way parts of the town, there were flags hung out from windows in every street. The city, like she of Rama, was weeping for her great soldier because he was not.

"Not only the rich and poor alike in New York gathered to salute the body of the General as he went away for the last time, but there were thousands of people who had come from all parts of the State and from New Jersey to honor him as he lay dead. Even as far as the East is from the West men whose names are household words had traveled across the country to bid the hero God-speed on his journey. The South joined hands with the North, and carriages full of veteran Confederates rode in the procession. The Lloyd-Garrison Post, No. 207, sent 100 veterans to represent the respect which the colored race felt for the General who had fought so bitterly in their cause. North and South, East

and West, from the four corners of the country, they came to be in at the 'lights out.'

"At high noon the city was all astir. As early as 10 o'clock the streets were dotted everywhere with soldiers in their uniforms. The cars one and all had on board from two to a half-dozen police officers on their way to take their station at the posts assigned. In every car on the "L" road you ran across a member of the militia, a veteran, weather-beaten and gray as moss, a young aspirant of the Seventh or Sixty-ninth, or again a drummer-boy, all bound for the neighborhood of Seventy-first street. And on all men's lips, both young and old, there was but the one name—'Sherman.'

"Not since the other—he of the few words and the grim determination—died has there been a demonstration so impressive, so solemn, so suggestive as the funeral procession yesterday. At the funeral of General Grant there was more to appeal to the eye; there was more to see. But yesterday there was only a plain, simple coffin, draped from head to foot in the Nation's colors, borne on a caisson, and a long line of soldiery, with arms reversed, following the simple bier. But the cortege and its surroundings were so in keeping with the personality and character of Sherman that there could be no onlooker who was not affected. It was simple, quiet, contained. So was the General. It was impressive, grand, majestic. So was Sherman.

"From Seventy-first street, where the body of the General was placed upon the caisson which has carried so many good braves before him, the streets along the route of the procession were lined with people. The largest crowd at first was naturally about Seventy-first street and Eighth Avenue, where the cortege formed. But gradually as the hour came due for the line to pass a given point the sidewalks about that point grew blacker and blacker with the people who were gathering.

Those who waited to see the line from its beginning to its end waited two hours and twenty minutes.

"The crowd was everywhere respectful, patient, orderly As Grover Cleveland rode by with Chauncey Depew there was an occasional attempt at salutation, but whoever the delinquent enthusiast might be he was quickly suppressed by his neighbors. The police regulations were efficiently carried out and there was no disturbance along the whole route. The one thing to be deprecated was the presence of appropriate drapings on so few house fronts. The best that can be said is that they were almost all meager to the last degree. Perhaps this paltry expression came about from the statement that every detail of the funeral in this city would be of the simplest character. That is the most charitable interpretation to put on what seemed, in many high places, a lack of proper respect for the great hero of a hundred battles, who yesterday was to make his last march to the sea—the sea whereof the waves break on the shores where the eternals are."

The funeral train, starting from the Jersey City depot of the Pennsylvania road, sped swiftly across the country to St. Louis, where General Sherman's body was to be laid beside those of his wife and child. Wherever it stopped crowds had gathered, and at most of the stations along the route the people stood silently and reverently as there passed a train decked in the emblems of a sorrow felt by a whole people.

Having passed through a line of mourners from the sea to the Mississippi, the cortege reached St. Louis at 8:45 on the morning of Saturday, March 21st. It was estimated that 25,000 troops were in line in the procession which escorted the remains to the last resting place chosen by General Sherman. At the grave, religious services were conducted by Father Thomas E. Sherman and the usual military honors were paid.

Regarding the action of the family in having the last offices of their church administered to General Sherman after he had lost consciousness, there have been unwarranted comments. Surely if ever a time comes when the nation's hero becomes alone the father, it is when his well-beloved children stand beside his death-bed and realize that the time has come for the last parting. A simple statement of the facts was made by his brother, Senator John Sherman, as follows:

"GENTLEMEN: A paragraph in your paper this morning gives an erroneous view of an incident in General Sherman's sick-chamber which wounds the sensitive feelings of his children, now in deep distress, which, under the circumstances, I deem it proper to correct. Your reporter intimates that advantage was taken of my temporary absence to introduce a Catholic priest into General Sherman's chamber to administer the rite of extreme unction to the sick man in the nature of a claim that he was a Catholic. It is well known that his family have been reared by their mother, a devoted Catholic, in her faith and now cling to it. It is equally well known that General Sherman and myself, as well as all my mother's children, are by inheritance, education, and connection Christians, but not Catholics, and this has been openly avowed on all proper occasions by General Sherman; but he is too good a Christian and too humane a man to deny to his children the consolation of their religion. He was insensible at the time and apparently at the verge of death, but if he had been well and in the full exercise of his faculties he would not have denied to them the consolation of the prayers and religious observances for their father of any class or denomination of Christian priests or preachers. Certainly, if I had been present, I would at the request of the family have assented to and reverently shared in an appeal to the Almighty for the life here and hereafter of my brother, whether in a prayer or extreme

unction, and whether uttered by a priest or preacher, or any other good man who believed what he spoke and had an honest faith in his creed. I hear that your reporter uttered a threat to obtain information which I cannot believe you would for a moment tolerate. We all need charity for our frailties, but I can feel none for any one who would wound those already in distress.

Very truly yours, "JOHN SHERMAN."

To this a single word may be added, involving no theological controversy or dogma, but granting to all the right claimed by every heart that has felt the sorrow of parting with loved ones.

It may be admitted with the scoffer that to the great world the service over the body of a consciousless, dying man was a mockery. Yet it was not such to the loved ones gathering there with breaking hearts and yet sustained by a faith in their religion and church. To them there was something of comfort and hope in the presence of the priest. It was to them a hope based upon a faith that is surely as much entitled to sympathy as the wanton agnosticism which would trespass on such sorrow for purposes of controversy. And not even the grossest materialist will claim that possible harm could result from this act dictated by affection. There was no danger of proselyting there. The father lay dying, and a nation listened for the sad news of the passing away of a hero who had won imperishable renown by services which mark the brightest pages of a nation's history, because they were imbued with no needless sacrifice of human life. From every quarter of the Union there came messages proving that loving hearts were longing for an opportunity to "do something" to make the last hours of the dying man more peaceful. Was it possible that this yearning should possess only the souls of comparative strangers? Was it not natural

that each should look to that which to them would bring the greatest comfort in such an hour? And is it not true that to every soldier heart will come a new thought of love for those who, standing by the bedside of their dying commander, administered to him for us all whatever of consolation there was in their hope and their prayers? To those sons and daughters I would extend the most cordial expressions of love and sympathy. They acted for a larger circle than they can realize with mortal thought. Let them cherish their hope. Let them rejoice in that they have embraced within its fold the loving and beloved father. And let them tell the complaining world:

"More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of. Wherefore let thy voice
Rise like a fountain for me night and day:
For what are men better than sheep or goats,
That nourish a blind life within the brain,
If, knowing God, they lift not hands of prayer
Both for themselves and those who call them friend!
For so the whole round world is every way
Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."